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Conclusions and Recommendations
Though formed a year ago, the Serbian government is still at the begin-
ning – it has not yet adopted a systemic program or strategy. The struc-
tures in power are in permanent election campaign having an eye on their 
ratings on the one hand and demonization of the former government on 
the other. The biggest party of the ruling coalition, SNS, spares not even 
its coalition partners from criticism. SNS populist rhetoric is mainly after 
promoting Vice-Premier Aleksandar Vučić. The predominant populism is 
best exemplified by the arrest of suspects in “the struggle against corrup-
tion” and the “socially-oriented” budget for the year 2013 that subsidizes 
health insurance of a larger circle of citizens. All this gives rise to specula-
tions about early elections, which are not to be ruled out. Aleksandar Vučić 
manifests a growing ambition to hold all the reins of power. He already 
controls all security services. Hence, citizens are under the impression that 
he is the most powerful man in Serbia.
The steps the government has taken so far do not indicate its inten-
tion to reform the security sector; on the contrary, they indicate an ambi-
tion to strengthen partisan control over it. They neither indicate a plan for 
setting up permanent anti-corruption institutions and mechanisms. Pri-
marily through the media controlled by parts or entire security services 
corruption is used for political showdowns and elimination of business 
competition. The security sector that has not undergone reform, operating 
under half-finished and legally discordant system of the democratic con-
trol and with cadres compromised on corruption will be unable to meet 
ambitious duties that have been allegedly imposed on it.
Despite a changed rhetoric and the agreement signed with Prishtina 
what marks domestic policy, except for populism, is a strong resistance to 
Serbia’s Europeanization and modernization. Populism is nothing but one 
of manifestations of Serb nationalism that persists as the only ideology 
now in the hands of Aleksandar Vučić. One cannot deny that some gov-
ernmental steps – such as negotiations with Prishtina agreement – were 
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positive. But only the implementation of the agreement will show whether 
or not the government signed it in good will. Speaking of the promises 
given in the election campaign, most of them have not been met – and 
stand no chance for being met.
The public in Serbia responded to the U-turn in the decades-long 
Kosovo policy as to something that could not have been avoided. People 
have been aware for long that Kosovo was a lost cause. Kosovo has been 
used only as a tool for the achievement of the goals in Bosnia. Persistence 
on the “Kosovo policy” threatened to “drown” Serbia. Germany’s resolute-
ness to put an end to the misuse of Kosovo and clearly define precondi-
tions for Serbia’s membership of EU turned out to be most efficient.
Belgrade’s and Prishtina’s agreement was in the focus of attention of 
domestic and international public alike. Kosovo has always been the topic 
the pro-European and anti-European Serbia clashed on. The platform that 
preceded the agreement opened the door to dilemmas about Serbia’s fu-
ture course. Generally speaking, the attitude towards Kosovo oscillates be-
tween two extremes: the irrational belief that getting a part of Kosovo is 
still a possibility on the one hand, and grim social and economic reali-
ties on the other. Resistance to Europeanization is to be expected in this 
context.
As an exponent of the conservative bloc, President Tomislav Nikolić 
retained his ambivalent attitude towards Kosovo and Serbia’s course to-
wards EU. All his Kosovo related statements have been contradictory. They 
stand for his attempt to win over the public, especially the conservative 
circles he represents but also reveal his poor understanding of interna-
tional circumstances. Nevertheless, his natural allies (SPC, parts of SANU, 
right-wing organizations such as Dveri, Naši et al, right-wing papers such 
as NSPM, Pecat, Geopolitika, etc. and broadcasters like Copernicus or Ra-
dio Focus, DSS and other parties of the bloc) had expected him to behave 
quite differently once in power. Now, disappointed in Nikolić they criticize 
him profusely.
The conservative bloc takes that Serb Progressive Party has let it down 
as it failed to make a clear break with the “treacherous” policy of Demo-
cratic Party and its leader, Boris Tadić. According to it, the West “precisely 
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cast SNS as the lead only a party with patriotic aura could possibly play.” 
So far the advocacy for the establishment of a “strong patriotic bloc” as “a 
genuine opposition and a new force at the Serbian political scene” sounds 
more like a cry for the moon than a serious threat. The attempt by anti-Eu-
ropean forces assembling DSS, SRS and their allies from right-wing groups 
and organizations to stage massive protests failed: so far these forces to 
not pose a serious threat to the ruling coalition.
Kosovo North leader’s opposition to the agreement is chilling out. 
This only testifies that their area for maneuver has always depended on 
Belgrade. Their grudge, deprived of Belgrade’s support, can only to some 
extent stand in the way of the agreement’s implementation.
The democratic opposition and civil society organizations do not re-
spond promptly and adequately to the state of affairs in the society: they 
are either tired out and disappointed, and take uncoordinated actions or 
irresponsible, corrupt and prioritize personal or group interests over the 
country’s modernization. All this contributed to an atmosphere of apathy. 
The present-day situation in Serbia calls for prompt responses from the 
opposition, civil society organizations and free media.
The process of accession to EU is crucial for Serbia regardless of all the 
criticism of EU for its ongoing crisis. That is the only way for Serbia to es-
tablish the rule of law and stabilize its institutions, as testified by all ear-
lier cases of the countries acceding EU.
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO EUROPEAN UNION
• Approach to Serbia – but also to all West Balkan coun-
tries – has to be more creative; the “stick and carrot” 
policy produces limited effects in the societies such as 
Serbian;
• The criteria and preconditions for Serbia’s accession are 
not attainable in foreseeable future; Serbia’s capacities 
are inadequate; its regressive, anti-European trends 
need to be curtailed through new policies, sectorial 
integration and developmental strategy;
• Serbia needs to be better integrated into economic 
areas dominated by eu; this is a huge market, the 
biggest in the world, which will survive despite all the 
challenges facing it today;
• Serbia’s civil society needs eu’s assistance to be able 
to monitor the implementation of the agreement with 
Prishtina and foster the country’s Europeanization;
• Overcoming of ethnic divides would open up vistas for 
pluralization of both Serbia’s and Kosovo’s societies 
and, therefore, needs to be insisted on;
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• The implementation of the agreement will be disputed 
from many sides; this calls for continued monitoring 
by European Commission on the one hand and civil 
societies in Kosovo and Serbia on the other.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 
SERBIAN GOVERNMENT
• A date for accession negotiations will be imbued with 
political energy only if all pro-European forces join 
hands for the common goal and initiate the society’s 
transformation with enthusiasm and faith in a Euro-
pean Serbia.
• Moral renewal of the society needs to be fostered at 
least in the domains under the government’s jurisdic-
tion (education);
• Security services have to be radically transformed and 
be placed in the service of the country’s democratic 
transformation;
• Renewal of regional trust and regional relations – con-
siderably undermined over the first year of the govern-
ment’s rule – call for earnest engagement;
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• Regional cooperation needs to be upgraded inasmuch 
as possible; Croatia could greatly help Serbia in the 
process of negotiations for eu accession;
• Foreign policy needs to be agreed on by all factors and 
adjusted to the country’s course towards Europe;
• Xenophobia and prejudice against minorities, espe-
cially Roma, call for an inter-cultural dialogue aimed 
at preventing ethnically, religiously and linguistically 
motivated conflicts;
• A dialogue on true decentralization has to be opened 
and include the status of the autonomous province of 
Vojvodina; more competences, obligations and rights 
the central government transfers to local/regional 
level contributes to the exercise of citizens’ human, 
social and cultural rights;
• Sandžak and South Serbia have to be approached with 
special care, notably when it comes to economy and 
minority infrastructures; fueling of the fear of Islamic 
fundamentalism has to be stopped;
• Civil sector and all relevant factors have to be involved 
in the upcoming accession negotiations to help the 
government achieve its desired goals;
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 12 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 13
13Conclusions and Recommendations
• A comprehensive program for the reform of the judici-
ary and a systemic strategy against corruption have to 
be developed and implemented;
• Social and political climate of pluralism has to be 
created and, in this context, measures against the in-
fluence of extreme right-wing organizations taken;
• The struggle against xenophobia and discrimination 
of minorities need to be on the governmental priority 
agenda; position of minority groups, especially lgbt 
population, cannot improve without a radical change 
of the mainstream value system; what Serbia needs 
is a value system establishing diversity as a potential 
rather than a threat;
• Human rights activists and the media have to be pro-
tected in earnest against assaults by extremist groups;
• Coping with the legacy of the wars of 1990s calls for 
veracity; this implies the respect for iCty contribution 
to revealing the truth about the crimes committed;
• An action plan for the implementation of the National 
Strategy against Violence against Women and Domes-
tic Violence has to be adopted as soon as possible;
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• The CoE Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence has 
to be ratified;
• Relevant authorities need to increase accommodation 
capacities of shelters and social care centers, especially 
for the most vulnerable groups of population in make-
shift settlements (such as Roma);
RECOMMENDATION TO THE CIVIL SECTOR
• Capacities for the advocacy of European values have to 
be strengthened;
• Individual, opposition parties, non-governmental 
organizations and free media need to join hands in 
the above-mentioned advocacy and in combating the 
mainstream populism;
• The entire democratic opposition bloc needs to launch 
a series of joint actions, including an initiative for the 
adoption of a new constitution.
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Human Rights: In the 
Shadow of Xenophobia
The Serbian society is far from being tolerant to diversity. Despite existing 
anti-discrimination legislation and institutions, certain social groups have 
trouble to exercise their rights. Besides, Serbia is a closed society. The rad-
ical nationalism of 1990s has scarred the social tissue and values – value 
judgments by the majority are changed at snail’s pace. The lack of politi-
cal will for reforms of the educational system and the media unwilling to 
contribute to a change of the predominant discourse produce generations 
often prone to extreme right-wing ideologies and are, as a rule, xenopho-
bic and intolerant. By reverting to tolerance – a benchmark of the modern 
civilization – Serbia would make a major step towards integration into EU. 
As underlined in a number of EU, CoE and OSCE reports, a country’s atti-
tude towards minorities is among key criteria in the process of accession 
to EU.
The new regime speaks more of changes to be made than acts to im-
plement the adopted standards and legislation. Besides, the regime is 
itself at the stage “self-taming” with regards to these standards and atti-
tudes. A change in attitudes, however, calls for a moral minimum each and 
every public servant would be duty bound to respect.
After years and years of incriminated institutions and disastrous pol-
icies, and against the backdrop of slow-paced transition and social trans-
formation, one can hardly expect to see a civilized society in the short run. 
In addition, Serbia lacks an “alternative” elite, a torchbearer of “civilized 
behavior.” The incumbent regime was a part of Milošević’s machinery and 
his warring policy. Its legitimacy and credibility are, therefore, extremely 
fragile.
The international community’s inadequate stance on Serbia’s respon-
sibility for the wars of 1990s after October 5, 2000, now resulted in the the-
sis that only nationalists were capable of pacifying extremists. Relativized 
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responsibility for wars, relativization of morals and the cynical theses 
about “Serbia that has not waged a war” prevented a climate propitious 
to a dialogue on facing the past. These are the premises that imbue inter-
pretation of the 1990s, as well as the attitude towards the international 
community, notably ICTY that is labeled anti-Serb. Historical revision of 
the entire 20th century additionally confuses citizens, especially younger 
generations. And it is such attitude towards the past that generates intol-
erance and discrimination against “others” and negatively affects the ex-
ercise of human rights.
The situation of human rights reflects the state of affairs in govern-
mental institutions and in the judiciary. The failed judiciary reform, along 
with corruption and unprofessionalism permeating the branch, add fuel 
to the fire of citizens’ grudge when it comes to the right to fair trial with-
out unnecessary delay. The fact that Serbia is among most sued countries 
in Strasbourg (9,500 cases) testifies of the situation of its judiciary. Hence, 
citizens distrust not only the judiciary but other institutions as well.
The Change of the Regime
The May 2012 elections tectonically changed Serbia’s political scenery. 
The victory of the Progressists and their coalition partners restored the 
political bloc of 1990s marked by nationalism, populism, deinstitutionali-
zation, revanchism and political radicalism. The Progressists and the gov-
ernment they formed know not how to address pressing economic and 
social problems. The new government resorted to the struggle against cor-
ruption, which gained it public trust over the initial months. As it turned 
out, however, the government lacked both strength and will to transfer 
the anti-corruption campaign to authorized institutions, including public 
prosecution offices.
Tailoring of the outcome of local elections to the central government 
threatens with anarchy. Serbia has not yet reached a consensus on its po-
litical system. Serbia’s political, institutional and administrative architec-
ture remains among most controversial issues twelve years after the ouster 
of the Milošević regime. The Constitutional Court’s decision on Vojvodina 
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statute, claiming many of its provisions contrary to the 2006 Constitution, 
coincided with the beginning of the new government’s rule. After ousters 
in Novi Sad and some other towns in Vojvodina, what we have now are de-
mands for abolishment of the province’s autonomy.
Professional public servants were massively dismissed, including the 
Governor of the Central Bank. They were replaced by “old cadres,” nota-
bly in the security sector. Reappointment of judges and prosecutors who 
had not been reelected (about 500) contributed to the climate of revan-
chism and practically annulled the anyway faulty judiciary reform. De-
posals throughout the governmental hierarchy almost equal a “cultural 
revolution” with longstanding consequences.
Except for the government’s strong position against membership of 
NATO and for military neutrality, little is known about the future course of 
army reforms – once successful thanks to assistance from NATO. Though 
outside the ruling coalition, Democratic Party of Serbia /DSS/ was a ma-
jor factor in drafting the new government’s policy: with regards to Kosovo 
and territorial arrangements at home. In almost no time the new regime 
demonstrated its affinity for Russia.
The country’s economic situation deteriorated in the past year. Po-
litical energy was almost entirely directed towards negotiations with 
Prishtina, a precondition for obtaining the date for accession negotiation. 
There was no telling at first whether the new regime was ready to go at 
the negotiations with hammer and tongs – and sign an agreement with 
Prishtina. The government’s initial steps were mere marketing, while its 
criticism mostly targeted Democratic Party /DS/ with a view to marginalize 
it politically. And in this the government was rather successful. With the 
opponent DS hesitating to make a major breakthrough in politics, SNS had 
played on this “populist matrix” that won it the elections.
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A Turn towards EU: Under the Pressure from Realities
The agreement with Prishtina signed in Brussels is a major step for 
Serbia. However, only its implementation will show how serious about Eu-
ropean integration Serbia’s regime and elites are. Hardly any progress was 
made at home: the carefully built cult of Vice-Premier Aleksandar Vučić 
– who behaves as if everything depends on him – turned all institutions 
senseless. All in all, what marked the entire 2012 was a non-stop election 
campaign of Serb Progressive Party /SNS/: the party was working on its rat-
ings in the event early elections were called.
Domestic scene was hardly in turmoil over the Brussels agreement. 
Actually, citizens of Serbia have been aware for long that Kosovo was a 
lost cause and that they should prioritize everyday life over the issue. In 
this context the public largely supported the make-believe struggle against 
corruption.
In its coalition-forming agreement the new parliamentary majority 
composed of Serb Progressive Party /SNS/, Socialist Party of Serbia /SPS/ and 
United Regions of Serbia /URS/ committed itself to the country’s accession 
to EU as a strategic priority. This convinced EU and US officials that the new 
regime would pursue the course the former government, led by DS, had 
paved notwithstanding all vacillations and hesitations.
The dramatic economic situation threatening with collapse pushed 
the new government towards negotiations with Prishtina. Although ob-
structed all the time, the agreement was finally reached. The conservative 
bloc that believed that the Progressists would turn over a new leaf and put 
an end to Serbia’s course towards EU, strongly criticized such sudden turn 
of events. The bloc staged several protests against the agreement – but 
these protests just proved that the Kosovo issue could not mobilize peo-
ple any longer.
EU Commission’s Serbia Progress Report in October 2012 was “nega-
tively neutral” – the date for the beginning of accession negotiations was 
postponed for some time or other in 2013. EU made no bones about con-
ditions Serbia had to fulfill to obtain the date for accession negotiations. 
For EU (as clearly stated by its most influential member-state, Germany) 
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and US normalization of relations with Prishtina will crucially test the new 
authorities’ intention to pursue Euro-integration. But it is the attitude to-
wards Kosovo where statements by incumbent officials most manifestly 
contradict one another and thus contribute to general confusion.
Leaders of the ruling coalition, including President Tomislav Niko-
lić, Premier Ivica Dačić and Vice-Premier for European Integration Suzana 
Grubješić expressed their dissatisfaction with the postponed “date.” As it 
seems, they would still not recognize that all candidate-countries have to 
fulfill the same preconditions. “In the process of European integration 
Serbia will come up with preconditions of its own,” said President Nikolić. 
“Serbia will not rush towards EU in a devil-may-care manner,” commented 
Suzana Grubješić. For his part Ivica Dačić said Serbia was pressed for time 
but “will not run after the date for the start of accession negotiations at 
any cost.”
Russian Factor
Russia’s bigger influence on Serbia’s foreign policy after the change of 
the regime has been clouded to a certain extent. Though Tomislav Niko-
lić and Ivica Dačić try to pass on themselves as pro-European politicians, 
their orientation towards the East is undisputable. “Serbia is the only 
country I love more than Russia,” Nikolić told the Russian Channel I on 
the eve of his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on 
September 11, 2012.1
Nikolić, a Russophile, hoped that Moscow would help “Serbia to get 
to its feet.” According to media reports, the two presidents agreed in So-
chi on a budgetary loan to Serbia, saying nothing about provisions of the 
agreement.2 Speaking of financial arrangements between the two coun-
tries, Russia had promised an 800-million-dollar loan to Serbia for mod-
ernization of its railroad. It was only after three years of being “on ice” that 
the arrangement is gradually implemented now (the issue was discussed 
1  Tanjug, 10. septembar 2012.
2  Tanjug, 11. septembar 2012.
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in October 2010 during the then President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to 
Belgrade).
During Dačić’s visit to Moscow, Serbia was admitted as a perma-
nent observer of the parliamentary assembly of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization /ODKB/, the treaty assembling most of ex-Soviet re-
publics – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tadzhikistan. The media in Russia called Serbia’s involvement Russia’s 
geopolitical success – as the treaty was for the first time enlarged beyond 
ex-Soviet territory.
Serb Orthodox Church
Serb Orthodox Church /SPC/ strongly advocated against the agreement 
with Prishtina. “We shall not accept Europe’s invitation if it is conditioned 
with Kosovo. If they expect us to give it up, we shall send our apologies 
and go on with our life, the hard and painful life we’ve lived for 500 years,” 
said Patriarch Irinej.3
SPC did not miss the opportunity to raise its voice on the eve of the 
crucial decision. Two days before Brussels’ deadline it publicized Patriarch 
Irinej’s appeal (on behalf of the Holy Synod and believers). The Patriarch 
directly appealed to three highest state officials – the President, the Pre-
mier and the Vice-Premier – to keep their “promises made in the election 
campaign and in the post-election period to never and on no account sur-
render, betray or sell Kosovo and Mehotija, the historical ‘Old Serbia.’”4 
SPC did not change its position once the agreement was signed.
Kosovo Overshadows Domestic Scene
While cooperative at the international scene, the present regime was 
repressive at home: it continued Slobodan Milošević’s policies for Vo-
jvodina, territorial arrangements, minorities and pluralism. While the in-
ternational community lent it a helping hand for its cooperative attitude 
3  Helsinki Bulletin No. 91
4  Danas, April 8, 2013.
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towards the issue of Kosovo – the assistance investing it with legitimacy 
of sorts among citizens – the regime pursued the policy of centralization. 
Non-stop campaigning against Democratic Party, the regime is after its de-
struction on the one hand, and a one-party system on the other. In brief, 
it is after a long-term rule of SNS.
While all the attention was focused on negotiations with Kosovo, do-
mestic affairs stagnated: the reform of the judiciary came to a standstill, 
the reform of the army and security sector as a whole was deadlocked and 
the undermined autonomy of Vojvodina threatened with abolishment. 
Consequently, the situation of human rights deteriorated, especially in 
the domain of minority rights and the rights of vulnerable groups.
The situation of the media worsened as well. It was obvious that the 
new regime wanted to control the media, which were to be its tools in 
the process of demonization and destruction of the opposition. As fear 
reigned again, criticism of the regime almost disappeared.
Except for adopting the budget for the year 2013, the government 
did nothing to change the course of economic collapse. “Economic pol-
icy banks on subventions only. And this can hardly encourage investment 
in the country in which both individual and public expenditure show a 
steady fall,” says Vladimir Gligorov of the Vienna-seated Institute for In-
ternational Economic Studies.5
According to IMF estimates, Serbia’s budget deficit will amount to 8 
percent of GDP and national debt to 65 percent of GDP unless the country 
fails to consolidate its fiscal policy. Public servants were dismissed mas-
sively throughout the administration: directors of state-run enterprises, 
ambassadors, members of executive and management boards, directors of 
medical centers, social care centers, museums, galleries, theaters, cultural 
centers, public libraries, members of school boards, etc., and even manag-
ers of the Safe House in Niš.
All this indicates that the regime wants to entrench a one-party sys-
tem and further undermine the rule of law. Overnight deposals have in-
troduced party membership as an absolute standard for public service. 
SNS has based most of its election campaign on promises, including the 
5  http://www.sindikalizam.org/index.php?fullnews=1545.
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promise of departisation of the public sphere. As it turned out, all politi-
cal parties, including SNS, gave up benefits and privileges with heavy heart 
and only partially. This is best exemplified by the fact that the legislation 
on state-run enterprises or public procurement failed to provide against 
all possibilities of systemic corruption. The struggle against corruption 
boiled down to arresting people every now and then: culmination of the 
campaign was the arrest of Miroslav Mišković, owner of Delta Holding 
Company, indicted only after six-month custody. No systemic step against 
corruption was taken: a new strategy against corruption was not adopted, 
the same as a law on the protection of whistle-blowers, independent in-
stitutions and agencies were not invested with more authority. In brief, a 
reform to enable systemic coping with corruption did not take place: sys-
temic laws were not adopted and the public sector was not reformed by 
the principles of good management.
Findings of the survey “Citizens’ participation in democratic processes 
in Serbia” conducted by the Center for Research, Transparency and Ac-
countability /CRTA/ and Ispos Strategic Marketing did not come as a sur-
prise. They indicated an extremely low level of citizens’ participation and 
trust in institutions. It goes without saying that changes cannot be ex-
pected without citizens’ participation.
The origins of Serbia’s problems of today are in the faulty and slow-
paced transition. What mark this transition are hybrid solutions that can 
be neither labeled capitalist nor socialist. Hence, its hallmarks are im-
poverished society, low standard of living, high unemployment rate and 
low salaries, nepotism, dependence on unfavorable loans, educational in-
stitution in deplorable state of neglect and citizens seeing no prospects 
of a better life. All this fuels general frustration and aggressive behavior 
among people, especially the young. Violence prevails in all spheres of so-
cial and political life, and domestic violence spirals.
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Attitude towards the Region
Shortly after the elections, representatives of the new regime man-
aged to impair the anyway fragile regional relations with many intemper-
ate statements. These statements were indicative of its prevalent mindset 
when it comes to the region. Interpretation of the recent past remains the 
main stumbling bloc in the way of regional normalization, especially with 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo.
The attitude towards Bosnia, which is still perceived as booty, is the 
most problematic. The joint session of Serbia’s and Republika Srpska’s /
RS/ governments clearly manifested the character of mutual relations 
and goals. President Nikolić said that Serbia had accepted the Dayton Ac-
cords but Bosnia-Herzegovina was, as he put it, a dysfunctional state that 
“slowly disappears before our eyes.” For Serb politicians, Croatia is a main 
rival to permanently compete with. The issue of refugees is Belgrade’s 
“main weapon” against Croatia. As evidenced by recent electoral outcome 
in Montenegro, Serbia has neither changed its attitude towards this coun-
try. Montenegrins have voted for independence once again. As it seems, 
Belgrade will continue to undermine Montenegro’s independence.
Speaking of Macedonia, it was during his visit to Skopje that Nikolić 
suggested that the two states should mediate the dispute between Serb 
and Macedonian orthodox churches. He also seized the opportunity to 
warn Macedonians against Albanians, saying “Once they /Albanians/ re-
alize their rights in the territory of Serbia, they will claim the same rights 
in other countries. How would you explain that they are entitled to a state 
of their own in Kosovo but not in Macedonia, how would you explain that 
they are entitled to a state of their own in Kosovo but not to an autono-
mous region in Greece or in Montenegro?”6
6  Ibid.
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Political and Social Mindset
Serbia’s political scene is permeated by nationalism and issues that 
have distanced citizens from politics. The media scene lives on scandals 
and sensationalism that discredit political elites and the sense of polit-
ical engagement. The society as a whole is apathetic. Citizens do not get 
self-organized. The overall character of a society reflects all collective and 
social processes in it: and this is what earmarks the entire territory of the 
Balkans.
Nationalism is most manifest in the manner in which the recent 
past is interpreted, new identity of Serbia created, Vojvodina treated and 
neighboring countries and minorities perceived. Findings of a number 
of surveys indicate high levels of xenophobia, religious intolerance and 
homophobia among citizens; negative trends in the trials of the accused 
for war crimes before domestic courts; huge deficiencies in the security 
sector; and, many shortcomings of the alleged anti-corruption campaign.
The society in disorder and the pressure of having the ends meet af-
fect each and every individual this way or another. The society is incapa-
ble of coping with the challenges and contemporary trends at the level of 
individuals. Hence, various personality disorders and pathological behav-
iors that threaten the lives of other people. The state has not developed a 
multisectorial and integrative approach to these problems.
Findings of the survey “Interaction of Value System and Cultural Pref-
erences among Secondary School Graduates” conducted by the Institute 
for the Study of Cultural Development, were devastating. They showed, in 
the context of “hatred for other nations,” that young people are most in-
tolerant to Albanians and Croats, as well as to Roma. One in four or five 
graduates opposes any contact whatsoever with other nations, while 50 
percent of them are specifically against contacts with Albanians, Croats 
and Roma.7
7  http://www.autonomija.info/igor-besermenji-mrznja-i-
stereotipi-drzavni-problem-broj-jedan.html.
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Identity Crisis
What Serbia’s new identity is and the values it rests on are among key 
problems facing the country in the aftermath of wars, defeats and social 
devastation and demoralization. Against the backdrop of confusion per-
meating all the spheres of social life, the process of identity building is 
marked by inconsequence, inauthenticity and, above all, fabrications.
A national identity is not a static but a dynamic and changeable 
notion. It is permanently built and rebuilt through debates and social 
responses to national and international developments. Each country per-
ceives itself and the outside world in its own way and thus influences 
global politics. Nationwide debates on the country’s position and goals at 
global level characterize political discourses of all countries with foreign 
policy ambitions, including those that are not democratic.
A state plays a major role in this symbolic sphere. It can impose in-
terpretation of the reality on the society through administrative (educa-
tional standards) and legal measures (citizenship acts), bestowing special 
status to certain symbols (national holidays, emblems, national awards) 
and representation at the international arena. Hence, statements by gov-
ernmental officials are significant directives to other participants in polit-
ical discourse. The policy of symbols has a special place in public sphere 
and its mutually competing interpretations of social realities.
The process of Serbia’s identity-building demonstrates not only con-
fusion and fabrication of the past but also narrow-mindedness about 
“others.” Serbia celebrates its national holiday on February 15 – the date 
associating the 19th century constitution that was in effect for two weeks 
only. Serbia has renounced anti-fascism – the legacy on which today’s Eu-
rope rests – begun rehabilitating followers of retrograde ideologies. While 
the process of rehabilitation of Draža Mihailović is nearing its end, reha-
bilitation of Nedić and Ljotić is announced. Mihailović was not only a Nazi 
collaborator – he was also a racist: his program called “Homogeneous Ser-
bia” gave rise to atrocities against Bosniaks, Croats and even Serbs oppos-
ing his ideas.
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Only a handful of civil society organizations question the fact that Pres-
ident of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić still holds the title of a “Tchetnik Duke.” 
Serbia’s leadership seized the opportunity of King Peter II’s, Queens Mary 
and Alexandra’s and Prince Andrei’s re-entombments in the family crypt 
in Oplenac to appeal for the nation’s unity and reconciliation, reconcilia-
tion between partisans and Tchetniks in the first place. Their appeal mir-
rors the policy of equalizing the “anti-fascist” roles of the two movements 
and prioritizing the Tchetnik movement in the process. President Nikolić 
stated on this occasion, “Differences and quarrels are frequent over here, 
even among siblings, and sometimes over nothing. The epilogue of such a 
dispute emerging in the World War II was tragic and affects us till this very 
day. The hatred between two Serb movements, Tchetniks and Partisans, 
which were after the same or similar goals, resulted in a grudge among 
brothers and enormous loss in human lives.”8
What mark the social climate are ideological differences about the en-
tire history of the 20th century. This notably refers to reinterpretations 
and revisions of the history of the World War II that picture the Tchet-
nik movement as a right-wing anti-fascist one. Consequently, history text-
books have been revised and state symbols changes: revisions that are 
crucial in the process of identity-building.
Serbia has renounced the legacies of the “first” and the “second” Yu-
goslavia as fatal to the Serb nation. It spared only the above-mentioned 
figures, followers of the Greater Serbia ideology that predominated the 
1990s. Identification with the ideology of Draža Mihailović stands in the 
way of democratic transformation as, like all similar ideologies, it is based 
on racism. All this puts across negative messages to Serbia’s minorities and 
its neighbors in the region and fuels tensions and anxiety.
Activism of extremist groupings, backed by the state and some lead-
ing parties, is in full swing. Statements Serbia’s representatives give in the 
so-called non-aligned world that mostly play on ex-Yugoslavia and Tito’s 
repute also mirror the general confusion.
8  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=05&dd=26&nav_
category=11&nav_id=717249.
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The prevalent interpretation of the 1990s wars boils down to the the-
sis that the West destroyed ex-Yugoslavia with its support to secessionist 
republics. ICTY has been denied from the very beginning as anti-Serb. Ac-
quittals of Ante Gotovina and Ramush Haradinaj were welcomed as argu-
ments against ICTY decisions. Notwithstanding the fact that Serbia adopted 
a parliamentary resolution on Srebrenica, a campaign against the resolu-
tion and Serbia’s responsibility for the wars, especially the war in Bosnia, 
is in full swing.
Shortly after the presidential inauguration Tomislav Nikolić declared 
that there had been no genocide in Srebrenica. This is what the incumbent 
authorities are saying too. Interpretations of the 1990s wars and the con-
sequences of these wars are major stumbling blocs for regional relations.
A fixed date for the beginning of accession negotiations with EU will 
mean little to Serbia unless the government and the entire society harness 
their energy for unavoidable changes. Only this could launch reforms, 
breathe life into economy, build market economy, establish competition, 
modernize the educational system and social policy, and mitigate pressing 
problems in the healthcare and pension system.
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Extreme Right-Wing: A Value 
System Imposed on the Society
Extremists groups intensified their activism, especially in Vojvodina, once 
the “new” coalition was in power (May 2012). The elections have brought 
about radical changes at the Serbian right-wing. So it happened that, got 
registered as a citizens’ association, the “Dveri” non-governmental organ-
izations scored pretty well in the elections. With its election campaign tar-
geting “tycoons” and unfair privatizations, while promoting itself as an 
organization with “clean hands,” Dveri won 4.35 percent of the vote (a bit 
below the election threshold). Dveri is known as a clerical and pro-Rus-
sian organization.9 After the party split in two (SNS is now in power) Serb 
Radical Party remained the most radical but failed to pass the electoral 
threshold. The biggest portion of its electorate has sided with SNS. The 
best organized of all, Serb People’s Movement “Naši” also scored pretty 
well considering its electoral debut. Having joined the ruling coalition the 
movement now participates in local self-government in Aranđelovac. An-
other radical organization beside Dveri and Serb People’s movement 1389 
is “Delije” – the “fan club” of the Red Star football team. This informal po-
litical organization belonging to the extreme right-wing is mostly used as 
a screen behind which young people are mobilized for extremist policies. 
“Delije” was most active when it came to Kosovo, chanting “Oh, Kosovo, 
the soul of Serbia, Turkey will never forget you. Neither will the rest who 
dare step on your soil.” The organization claims to be “the voice of people,” 
loyal to Serbhood and a fervent advocate of Eastern Orthodoxy.
9  „Dveri” is strongly present at the University, assembling, as it puts it, intellectuals 
of integrity. Its followers call themselves family people, patriots without “a 
homeland in reserve” and people caring for all and sundry. Europe is for those 
prone to stealing, homosexuals disrupt our families and they were the first to tell 
the truth about the regime of Boris Tadić but the opposition as well, they say.
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By the number of victims of extremism in the period 1999–201010 Ser-
bia ranked second in South Europe and sixth in Europe as a whole. Fully 
supported by the then president, Vojislav Kostunica, and Serb Orthodox 
Church the extreme right-wing bloomed after October 5. It was present in 
the media and in public sphere in general without any critical distance 
from the ideology it advocated or bothering to reexamine its value judg-
ments. This extreme right-wing was skillfully presented as the right to 
free expression counterpoising another extreme – the civil sector advo-
cating human rights, pictured as the extreme left-wing. This so-called ex-
treme left-wing has been practically all the time smeared by the media 
and right-wing groupings refraining not from physical assaults.
These extreme right-wing organizations live on xenophobia and pop-
ulism characterizing the societies such as Serbian. Remarkably conserv-
ative and populist, the Progressists are their natural allies, respected for 
their nationalism and radicalism – true, somewhat whitewashed nowa-
days.11 Their traditionalism, conspiracy theories (typical for right-wing 
parties), anti-modernism and anti-Westernization are turning politically 
acceptable.
The media contribute to this acceptability as they mostly refrain from 
opposing these stands. On the contrary, they promote them abundantly 
without value judgments of their own. Tabloidization of the media fuels 
the overall atmosphere: the media feel free to communicate hate speech, 
anti-Semitism, and fabricate affairs. They are not called to account for 
their discourse and lies. Hence, the media have become the most powerful 
tools for the promotion of right-wing organizations.
Flanked by conservative circles of Serb Orthodox Church /SPC/ and 
“football fans” in the past three years, right-wing organizations used 
threats to prevent pride parades. Their threats paid back in 2009 and 2001: 
10  http://www.athenainstitute.eu/en/select_country_profiles
11  Populist democracy of SNS is evident in plebiscitary decisions it makes, 
personalized power (A. Vučić), primacy of politics (legalism and the rule of 
law equal the rule of people), etc. This was probably best exemplified by its 
fight against corruption (the arrest of „tycoon” Miroslav Mišković without solid 
evidence and his protracted detention citizens allegedly applaud to).
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 32 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 33
33Extreme Right-Wing: A Value System Imposed on the Society
the government banned prides. They used the one and only Pride Parade 
in 2010 as a pretext to demolish downtown Belgrade, including assaults 
against LGBT persons, Roma and foreigners.12
The most agile among these organizations, Serb People’s Movement 
“Naši” was established in January 2006 in the then State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro. In almost no time the organization had access to the me-
dia. It fervently advocated against Serbia’s membership of EU and NATO, and 
for close ties with the Russian Federation. In August 2010 it signed a memo-
randum on cooperation with Serb People’s Movement 1389 but began acting 
independently only a year later. “Naši” is after turning its ideology into Ser-
bia’s mainstream policy. This is why it participates in elections at all levels.13
With SNS in power “Naši” notably shifted their activism against Vo-
jvodina’s autonomy and, in this context, were active on almost daily ba-
sis. Its activists set Vojvodina’s flag on fire in front of the offices housing 
League of Vojvodina Social Democrats /LSV/ in Novi Sad. Then they hung 
parched remnants of the flag on the front door as a “New Year greeting 
card” to LSV.14 The action, released “Naši,” was in support of their activ-
ist, Stefan Petrović, “condemned, in a political trial, to 15 years in prison 
for putting on fire the so-called flag of Vojvodina.” In 2012 activists of the 
Movement were several times repeating the same action in Novi Sad, Zren-
janin and Backa Palanka. “Naši” announced a continued campaign against 
“autonomists in North Serbia.” “A claim for a ban on LSV on the account of 
its unconstitutional activity has been submitted for consideration of the 
Constitutional Court,” released the movement.15
Neither the state nor the Prosecution does anything against the move-
ment’s actions and extremism. The movement was notably active in its ad-
vocacy against Serbia’s membership of NATO. On March 24, 2012, marking 
the anniversary of NATO intervention the movement staged a rally at the 
12  See Helsinki Bulletin No. 72, Pride Parade: Culture of Violence
13  http://Našisrbija.org/index.php/o-nama/.
14  In early hours of January 12, 2012, unknown perpetrators smashed the glass at the 
entrance to LSV offices. LSV released that its premises in Pančevo, Novi Sad, Vršac, 
Čoka and other towns have been assaulted 23 times in the past three years.
15  Ibid.
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Liberty Square in Novi Sad to “pay homage to victims of the aggression.” 
Alarm signal announcing NATO planes in 1999 opened the rally held under 
the slogan “NATO aggressors, get lost from Serbia.” Addressing the rally, the 
movement’s president, Ivan Ivanović, said, “The end of the bombardment 
was not the end of the war. The war against Serb nation and state has been 
on till this very day. NATO aggressors are not satisfied with the fact that 
they have occupied Kosovo but want to conquest the entire Serbia through 
their underlings paid by Western agencies. Nenad Čanak is their aider and 
abettor in Vojvodina.”16
“Naši” also staged a campaign against Turkish TV series, most popu-
lar in Serbia and the region. The campaign under the slogan “Obilić is a 
hero, Suleiman is nothing but a sissy” was their response to the ongoing 
series “Suleiman the Magnificent.” They printed posters and leaflets with 
the campaign’s slogan.17
“Naši” pressed criminal charges against the EXIT music festival for 
“unconstitutional and shameful promotion of the false state of Kosovo.” 
The charges were meant, they said, to prevent the promotion of the “pro-
Shiptar” project “Kosovo 20” at the festival’s share conference scheduled 
for April 26, 2012. The project, claimed the movement, promotes the “nar-
co-state of Kosovo as a state independent from Serbia, which directly 
breaches the constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia.”18
“Naši” also sued the on-line magazine e-novine for spreading reli-
gious hatred. Namely, on July 26, editor Petar Luković and director Jelić 
bylined the story under the headline “A Boob Attack at the Patriarch” along 
with a video showing an activist of the feminist group Femen assaulting 
Russian Patriarch Cyril. The last line of the story run “Fuck you, Cyril.”19
In the town of Aranđelovac, “Naši” activists have staged a campaign 
called “Urban guerilla” for months. The town was covered with graffiti and 
16  http://Našisrbija.org/?p=7631.
17  http://Našisrbija.org/?p=7685.
18  http://Našisrbija.org/?p=7901.
19  http://Našisrbija.org/?p=8723
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patriotic slogans targeting young population in the first place. Many sec-
ondary school students joined in and were spreading their ideology.20
Within the campaign titled “No to NATO murderers in the skies over 
Serbia” activists from the organization, along with their companions from 
“Kanon” and “Korak Srbije” organizations and bystanders booed US and 
NATO delegations at the military show in Batajnica. They shouted “Fuck, 
fuck, NATO pact.” Army officers had to remove US and NATO insignia from 
the exhibition given that some citizens were spiting on them. A poster say-
ing “NATO, fuck off” was placed alongside US planes.
“Naši” sent a letter of support to the Congress of the International 
Euro-Asian Movement to point out that “Naši” had been the first organi-
zation “to promote the first Serb political program for Serbia’s Euro-Asian 
integration, even before Putin publicly declared the Euro-Asian strategy of 
the Russian Federation.” The letter also emphasized that Russia important 
to Serbia more than ever before and that the idea of the Euro-Asian alli-
ance was the “light at the end of the tunnel of death.” For Serbs, quotes the 
letter, the idea and process of Euro-Asian unification is a natural course of 
action that gets them back to their roots, to their own being and future. 
For Serbs, as parts of the Eastern Orthodox and Slovene organism, “that is 
the only course that could be called the course towards victory.”21
In tandem with the group called “Ultra Tchetniks” “Naši” was promot-
ing “life and deeds” of Ratko Mladić in several towns in Serbia. The action, 
released the organization, was launched to mark March 12 and the birth-
day anniversary of Ratko Mladić. Graffiti with Mladić’s portrait and accom-
panying slogan first appeared in Novi Sad and Belgrade. The purpose of the 
action was “to demonstrate the Serb nation’s loyalty to hero Mladić and to 
let the quisling regime of Boris Tadić know that by arresting and extraditing 
him /Mladić/ it did not manage to choke Serbs’ unfailing love for freedom.”22
In Belgrade, several right-wing organizations went on protest 
march labeled “No to borders, Kosovo is Serbia” protesting against the 
20  http://Našisrbija.org/?p=8740.
21  http://Našisrbija.org/?p=8888.
22  http://dalje.com/hr-svijet/srpski-narodni-pokret-Naši-pokrenuo-
akciju-promocije-lika-ratka-mladica/423480,
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implementation of integrated border management in Kosovo. Starting 
from the Congregational Church /Saborna crkva/ protest marchers directed 
themselves towards the seats of the President, the government and the 
Constitutional Court – the march ended at the St. Sava Temple where pro-
testers lit candles in memory of Serb victims in Kosovo. The march was 
organized by Dveri, Srpski Obraz, Zavetnici /Pledgers/, Naši, 1389, Coun-
cil of the Diaspora Assembly, Movement for Serbia, Free Serbia, Serb Peo-
ple’s Defense, Zekim, the government of Srpska Krajina in exile, National 
Movement and New Standard. Addressing protest marchers President of 
“Naši” Ivan Ivanović said, “Without Kosovo and Metohija Serb youth have 
no future…They are telling us that there is no border with Kosovo. Do you 
hear this crying shame? Do you hear this political sluts and bunglers tell-
ing us that they are not tearing our country apart?”23 He also reminded of 
father Atanasije’s oath to rebels in 1804 – “The one who betrays, may his 
health betray him.” “We, Serbs in 2013, assembled by the monument to 
KaraĐorđe are saying, ‘The one who says that Kosovo and Metohija are in-
dependent, may he lose not only his tongue but also his head.”24
“Naši” publicized a list of non-governmental organizations that al-
legedly breach the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and its criminal 
laws, and are financed by foreign foundations and embassies. Under the 
Constitution and other legislation, claimed “Naši,” these are the organiza-
tion to be banned under summary procedure since their activity blatantly 
undermines interests of citizens of Serbia and the Republic of Serbia and 
its laws. The NGOs on the list are after destroying the legal system of a sov-
ereign state and for this purpose propagate partition of the Republic of 
Serbia: they call for recognition of the independence of the false state of 
Kosovo, and “use hate speech and discriminate Serbs in their motherland 
in many ways,” explain “Naši.”25
The list of “traitorous” organizations includes B92, Peščanik, NUNS, 
Danas, Vreme, Republika, Humanitarian Law Center, Women in Black, 
23  http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/276474/Nikad-granica—Kosovo-je-Srbija
24  http://www.smedia.rs/vesti/vest/107973/Kosovo-SNP-Naši-Nezavisno-Kosovo-
Miting-SNP-Naši-Za-nezavisno-Kosovo-ode-glava-VIDEO.html.
25  http://www.novimagazin.rs/vesti/ds-trazi-zabranu-rada-snp-Naši
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Center for Cultural Decontamination, YUCOM, Helsinki Committee for Hu-
man Rights, Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Sandžak Committee for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, EXIT Foundation, Autono-
mous Women’s Center, Women’s Fund “Reconstruction,” Belgrade Center 
for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Civic Initiatives, Queria Center, 
Gay-Strait Alliance and “Dokukino.” The purpose of the campaign, quotes 
the accompanying release, is to raise public awareness about the urgent 
need for “ban and arrest of the listed NGOs that openly commit the crime 
against the Constitution through a serious of grave crimes.”26
Further on, “Naši” announced publication of “The White Book of Black 
Organizations” prepared by its team of lawyers. This will be Serbia’s WikiLe-
aks leaving no one indifferent, says Ivan Ivanović. The list of the media and 
NGOs it published, says this organization, “strikes the very center of CIA pro-
ject developed in Serbia for more than 20 years, the purpose of which is to 
constantly destabilize Serbia as a key factor in the Balkans with the helping 
hand from mercenary media, organizations and political parties.”27
In response to the list published by “Naši,” Independent Journalists’ 
Association of Serbia /NUNS/ addressed President Tomislav Nikolić and Pre-
mier Ivica Dačić to warn them of the lists of unwelcome organizations and 
individuals composed by extreme rightist organizations and of continu-
ation of such a dangerous trend. NUNS has never received a reply to its 
letter. In its letter, NUNS says it is “deeply concerned with fueling of the 
climate of lynch and intolerance for people with different views” and ap-
peals to democratic public to vigorously confront the hate speech and the 
brutal campaign against individuals and organizations. “The Parliament’s 
clear-cut stance about such harmful phenomena would be by far more 
effective than bans on organizations and other administrative measures. 
Otherwise, the Serbian society could drown in the waters of 1990s when 
people with alternative views were exposed to public lynch and journalists 
even gunned down,” says NUNS release.28
26  http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/snp-Naši-spalili-zastavu-
vojvodine-plakati-sa-spiskom-neprijatelja_363902.html.
27  http://srbin.info/2012/12/snp-Naši-bela-knjiga-crnih-organiz/.
28  http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/280023/NUNS-Zasto-se-
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Liberal-Democratic Party /LDP/ called upon the government to ur-
gently respond to “Naši” threats to the media, the civil sector and people 
campaigning against social violence. “Once against Serbia has become a 
country in which differently minded people are stigmatized, political op-
ponents proclaimed traitors and criminals, in which everybody could prey 
on them as their pictures are posted, as those of the most wanted crimi-
nals, at every corner,” says the party release, adding that the ruling coali-
tion was the most responsible for the present “atmosphere of lynch:” by 
putting the lid on these topics, it silently supports violence.29
Ombudsman Saša Janković also expressed his concern over “Naši” 
posters accusing NGOs and NUNS of working for foreign intelligence ser-
vices, released his offices. “Given that these are accusations of grave crimes, 
the accusers should be summoned by relevant authorities to document 
their claims. Either are Serbia’s NGO activists and journalists spies to be 
put on trial or someone slanders them and acts against law and order and 
should be adequately punished for it,” quotes the release.30
“Naši” proposes adoption of a law providing that all NGOs financed 
from abroad shall be labeled “foreign agents.” The Movement – the contro-
versial proposals of which and its lists of “anti-Serb” NGOs and media have 
raised wide polemics – advocates a law on foreign agents, by US and Russian 
models, which “shall earmark every organization engaged in politics and 
financed from abroad as ‘a foreign agent’.”31 In support of their claim the 
Movement will submit evidence against “blacklisted” NGOs and media. Ac-
cording to “Naši,” all the organizations on their black list are financed from 
a common source – US government and the “infamous NED foundation that 
operates as an implementing organization for CIA special operations and is 
paid from USAID budget subsidized by the Department of State.”32
ne-reaguje-na-spisak-desnicara December 25, 2012.
29  Ibid.
30  Ibid.
31  http://www.rtv.rs/sr_ci/drustvo/Naši:-za-nvo-finansirane-iz-
inostranstva-oznaka-strani-agent-_357118.html, Ibid.
32  Ibid.
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USAID and NED, it claims, are prohibited in Latin America for “estab-
lishing structures that interfere in domestic affairs and undermine consti-
tutional orders,” while Russia treats them as foreign agents under its law 
on foreign agents. “The best paid on the list” of NED beneficiaries are B92, 
Peščanik, ANEM, NUNS, Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina, 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network /BIRN/, Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights, European Movement in Serbia, YUCOM, Youth Initiative for 
Human Rights and e-novine, says the Movement’s release, adding that CIA 
openly financed broadcasters Free Europe and Voice of America till 1999.33
Several NGOs called upon relevant authorities to have their say about 
the publishing of the black list and condemn “this act of public stigma-
tization and lynch of human rights organizations and media.” In a joint 
declaration released on the eve of the International Human Rights Day, 
December 10, 15 NGOs appealed against “unconstitutional activities by the 
organizations that spread hatred and intolerance, either those registered 
as citizens’ associations or informal groups.”34
These NGOs also called the state to fulfill its international obligations 
in the domain of human rights and human rights standards. They de-
manded the state of Serbia to adequately and efficiently protect human 
rights defenders assaulted for standing for and promoting human rights. 
Except for the Office for Cooperation with the Civil Sector, quotes the dec-
laration, not a single governmental agency has condemned the black list 
by “Naši,” which may make them “accomplices in violence against all hu-
man rights defenders.” The declaration was signed by Women in Black, 
Regional Center for Minorities, Women’s Fund “Reconstruction,” Civic In-
itiatives, Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Dokunino, Helsinki Commit-
tee for Human Rights in Serbia, YUCOM, Autonomous Women’s Center, 
Center for Advanced Legal Studies, Human Rights House, Labris, Bel-
grade Center for Human Rights, Gay-Strait Alliance and Center for Cul-
tural Decontamination.35
33  Ibid.
34  Ibid.
35  Ibid.
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In the meantime “Naši” announced that it would request the state to 
respect the Constitution and “strongly ban any form of gay-pride propa-
ganda and any gay parade in the next hundred years, including a ban on 
flags in the colors of a rainbow in public spaces, other gay-pride symbols 
and the use of the foreign term ‘gay.’” Citizens of Serbia have clearly man-
ifested over the past years that they would not want their state to promote 
“gay-pride” ideology as a value but wanted a social climate in which Serb 
children would be raised in the spirit of Christianity and in a morally up-
right environment, says the movement’s release.36
As publicized at the “Naši” website, Ivan Vejvoda is the best paid for-
eign agent. The movement, therefore, demands the government to have 
the office of Balkan Trust for Democracy closed down, given that this or-
ganization promotes Kosovo’s independence and finances “Shiptar” NGOs. 
It also demands the arrest of Ivan Vejvoda and others responsible of “grave 
crimes of years-long undermining of the constitutional order of the Re-
public of Serbia.”37
The Belgrade-seated office of Balkan Trust for Democracy, claims 
“Naši,” is an operations center with the budget of over 50 million US dol-
lars to finance the entire “Shiptar NGO sector in the occupied Serb territory 
of Kosovo and Metohija meant to strengthen the quasi-state of Kosovo, all 
of which is coordinated by Ivan Vejvoda.”38
Among the projects financed by Balkan Trust for Democracy is the 
one titled “Support to the Finalization of the Supervised Independence of 
Kosovo” that is realized by Kosovo Institute for Political Research and De-
velopment, explains “Naši.” Other beneficiaries, according to the website, 
are Kosovo Democratic Institute, Kosovo Initiative for Stability, Inter-news 
Kosovo, Kosovo Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Kosovo Foundation 
for Civil Society, Kosovo Youth Council, etc. All in all, BTD has financially 
assisted over 30 projects and “Shiptar” NGOs over the past three years. 
“From Belgrade Ivan Vejvoda and Balkan Trust for Democracy coordinate 
36  http://www.novimagazin.rs/vesti/snp-Naši-trazi-zabranu-prajda-na-100-godina.
37  http://ceas-serbia.org/root/index.php/sr/home-sr/93-preuzeto/642-snp-
Naši-ivan-vejvoda-najplaceniji-strani-agent , December 17, 2012.
38  Ibid.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 40 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 41
41Extreme Right-Wing: A Value System Imposed on the Society
the budgets of tens of million US dollars to finance Shiptar organizations 
and projects aimed at strengthening Kosovo’s independence.”39
The Office for Cooperation with the Civil Society released that with its 
“black list of NGOs” “Naši” was disgracing Serbia and the entire civil sector. 
Responding to it, “Naši” said that the Head of the Office Ivana Ćirković and 
her associates were “obviously nervous” about its “disclosure of a hotbed 
of corruption and criminal hookup between governmental agencies and 
the non-governmental sector.” It, therefore, called upon Vice-Premier Al-
eksandar Vučić to urgently depose Ivana Ćirković.40
In response to “the scandalous campaign meant to pass on late Pre-
mier Zoran Đinđić as a visionary and a model politicians to generations to 
come,” “Naši” pasted up posters saying “A Foreign Agent, Not a Hero” in 
Aranđelovac, Mladenovac and Novi Sad.41
Democratic Party /DS/ called upon relevant authorities to remove the 
posters and punish perpetrators, emphasizing, “The shameful campaign 
against the assassinated president of DS and Premier, ‘Naši’ pursues its 
activism that brims with hatred, violence, lynch calls and persecution of 
people its dislike for one reason or another.” DS release also reminds that 
Đinđić has paid with his life the idea of a society that is diametrically op-
posite to everything “Naši” and similar “extremist and retrograde” organ-
izations advocate.42
“Đinđić was murdered in same climate of hatred today created by the 
organization that has compiled lists of unwelcome media and NGOs, dis-
rupted round tables, exhibitions, concerts and meetings it disliked, threat-
ened with its troikas patrolling the streets to prevent events it considered 
unsuitable, held out threats to political opponents…,” quotes the party 
release.43
39  Ibid.
40  http://www.pressonline.rs/info/politika/252030/pokret-Naši-
trazi-smenu-ivane-cirkovic.html , November 12, 2012.
41  http://www.novimagazin.rs/vesti/ds-trazi-zabranu-rada-snp-Naši.
42  Ibid.
43  Ibid.
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The State and Extremism
The Republican Public Prosecutor initiated the procedure for the ban 
on the “Serb People’s Movement Naši 1389” association. However, having 
deliberated the case the Constitutional Court decided on November 15, 
2012 that the Constitutional and the legislation provide no ground for the 
procedure since the said organization was not registered – and then it dis-
missed the case.
According to the Constitutional Court the specific case did not “meet 
the constitutional requirements for banning organizations,” whereas a 
ban on any organization has to be an unavoidable measure by a demo-
cratic society. Such a measure, explained the Court, is taken only when ac-
tivities of an organization or its members seriously and intensively violate 
constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms, whereby these activities 
“are obviously after violent destruction of the constitutional order, vio-
lation of guaranteed human and minority rights or incitement of racial, 
national or religious intolerance.” The Court dismissed the Public Prosecu-
tor’s claim that the activities of “1389” and “Naši” were blatantly breach-
ing Article 55, para 4 of the Constitution.44
When many public figures criticized the government’s failure to take 
measures against “Naši” activities, Nikola Selaković, Minister of Justice 
and SNS official, denied that the movement was the ruling coalition’s trip-
wire on Vojvodina. Neither SNS nor the ruling coalition as a whole plans 
to annul the province’s autonomy, he explained. He added that relevant 
authorities were investigating the “black list case.” “I am against any witch 
hunt whatsoever as such practice benefits no one,” said Selaković.45
Be it as it may, the Republican Public Prosecution again initiated pro-
ceedings against “Naši.” Tomo Zorić, spokesman for the Prosecution, said, 
“The case has been prepared. Activities by this organization have been 
followed by some time now. We are in the process of double-checking 
44  http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/view/sr-Latn-CS/88–101728/ustavni-sud-
odbio-predlog-za-zabranu-rada-udruzenja-graana-srpski-narodni-pokret-
1389-iz-beograda-i-udruzenja-graana-snp-Naši-iz-aranelovca.
45  http://www.nuns.rs/info/news/18461/selakovic-Naši-nisu-udarna-pesnica-sns.html
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everything. The Prosecution will act according to the Constitution and 
the law, as usual, and put on trial every suspect proved beyond doubt to 
have breached the law.”46 Vladimir Cvijan, member of SNS Presidency, con-
firmed that on the basis of new aggravating circumstances a ban on “Naši” 
could be initiated again with the Constitutional Court.47
The Appeals Chamber of the Appellate Court suspended the two-year 
jail sentence to Mladen Obradović, leader of the banned “Obraz,” punished 
for the violence accompanying the 2010 Pride, and called for a retrial on the 
basis, as it put it, “crucial irregularities of the criminal procedure.” In mid-No-
vember 2012 the Appellate Court suspended yet another sentence to Mladen 
Obradović – a 10-month jail sentence for racial and other discrimination. 
 In June 2012 the Constitutional Court banned the organization 
“Obraz.” The Appellate Court suspended several other sentences and called 
for retrials. This includes the 8-month jail sentence to Marko Vučković, 
leader of the Red Star football fan club, punished for extremely violent 
behavior. The Appellate Court also demanded a retrial to Lazar Malović, 
conditionally sentenced for fraud (by presenting himself as a close relative 
to Snezana Malović, the then minister of justice).
The state has no clear-cut criteria when it comes to the threat posed by 
extreme right-wing groups. It is often lenient to their activism arguing that 
“everyone has the right to free expression.” In many cases some political 
parties have been in hookup with these groups ideologically close to them.
Inadequate response by domestic authorities indicates that a situa-
tion as such suits them. On the other hand, distribution of funds to the 
civil sector illustrates the extent to which it is marginalized.
The Office for Cooperation with Civil Sector conducted a survey on 
ministries’ and governmental agencies’ subsidies to the civil sector. The 
findings showed that the great majority of all subsidies (93.2 percent or 
2.8 billion RSD) came from the budget item for non-governmental organ-
izations. About 3.5 percent of the total sum went to social insurances pay-
ments, around 2.5 percent to cover the expenses of non-profit enterprises, 
46  http://www.kurir-info.rs/tuzilastvo-zabranjuje-pokret-snp-Naši-clanak-604073.
47  Ibid.
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and about the same percentage was spent on contractual services.48 The 
findings also indicated that considerable sums were distributed without 
invitations to tender. The Ministry for Youth and Sports topped the list of 
institutions operating this way.
In 2012 the government subsidized 1,428 projects by 1,178 non-gov-
ernmental organizations, quotes the relevant report. Some 1,000 NGOs 
were funded for one project each, 114 for two, 28 for three, 12 for four, 3 
for six, whereas the rest received seven, eight, nine or even more grants. 
Over 10 million RSD went to 56 organizations: the biggest beneficiaries 
were sports organizations.
The Ministry for Youth and Sports distributed grants amounting to 2.1 
billion RSD, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy about half a billion, 
while the Fund for the Protection of Environment about 130 million. The 
rest of institutions allocated funds totaling 276 million RSD.
The biggest beneficiary was the Olympic Committee of Serbia, having 
received 284 million RSD for its annual program of activities. The second 
on the list was the Sports Association of Serbia with a 117-million-grant, 
the third the Volleyball Association (88 million), the fourth the Tennis As-
sociation (75 million), etc. Considerable grants were also given to the EXIT 
festival (about 30 million), Citizens’ Association “Young Serbia” (12 mil-
lion), “Palacea Solution” (11 million), Beer Festival (8 million), SUBNOR 
(about 10 million), Scout Movement of Vojvodina (13 million), Association 
of War and Peacetime Invalids (about 10 million), Association of Veterans 
of 1990s Wars (9 million), Belgrade Open School (10 million), etc. Several 
associations assisting persons with various types of disabilities were bene-
ficiaries of substantive grants.49
48  http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/273692/NVO-od-
Vlade-dobijaju-pare-na-rec , 30. November 2012.
49  Ibid.
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Transitional Justice: 
Inappropriate and Inconsistent
Over the past decades transitional justice has been a major trend of the 
international law. As defined by the International Center for Transitional 
Justice, it is not “a ‘special’ kind of justice, but an approach to achiev-
ing justice in times of transition from conflict and/or state repression. By 
trying to achieve accountability and redressing victims, transitional jus-
tice provides recognition of the rights of victims, promotes civic trust and 
strengthens the democratic rule of law. Transitional justice is crucial in the 
process of political, social and moral restoration of societies and also to 
their international democratic legitimacies.”.”50
All the experience so far testifies that transitional justice implies a 
thorny and painful process the outcome of which pivots on specific circum-
stances and the character of post-conflict transition, political choices made 
and the political will for a society’s moral and political reconstruction.
Serbia has not adopted a national strategy for transitional justice. 
Transitional justice exists in the societies with governments that have de-
fined and, above all, implemented some form of transitional justice. Dif-
ferent elements of a transitional justice policy, practiced so far, include 
truth and reconciliation commissions, criminal prosecutions before do-
mestic and international courts, reforms of the security sector, memori-
zation such as various efforts to keep the memory of the victims alive 
through the creation of museums, memorials, and other symbolic initia-
tives, etc.
Except for individual initiatives not a single Western Balkan country 
has adopted a generally acceptable concept of transitional justice. Some 
elements of transitional justice are implemented at national levels such as 
war crime trials. Reforms of security sectors – the army and the police – 
are still in process. Civil society organizations and activists work on issues 
50  http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 46 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 47
46 serbia 2012 : INTRODUCTION
states would not deal with: they analyze the general context of the crimes 
committed and the origins of wars and systemic crime, publicize docu-
ments compiled during the wartime, publish books, produce documen-
taries, and speak openly in the public thus trying to incorporate the facts 
about victims into “collective memories.”
ICTY and the International Court of Justice have not fully accomplished 
their primary tasks. On the other hand, no other court could have done 
what they did: remove main actors of the war from public life. Unfortu-
nately, when it comes to Serbia, the effects of their work have not changed 
the public opinion about the 1990s wars and Serbia’s responsibility.
Serbia’s cooperation with ICTY has been complex and under strong 
pressure from the international community. Refusing to submit to ICTY 
documents dating back in 1990s and testifying of ex-Yugoslavia’s disinte-
gration and the wars, Serbia has often obstructed its functioning. ICTY has 
raised 161 indictments. Thirty-five trials are in process.
As the weakest link in the chain of ICTY operation, its Outreach Pro-
gram was hardly a success story. Some war crime trials have been broadcast 
live but the broadcasts as such have not effectuated a change in the public 
opinion or raised citizens’ awareness about the wars. The live broadcasts 
of the trial of Slobodan Milošević before ICTY were more channeled to-
wards arousing sympathy for Milošević than imparting information about 
the roles of Serbian institutions in the wars. Testimonies by witnesses of 
the prosecution were treated as insignificant. Lawyers and other experts, 
commenting the trial during the breaks, were after diminishing Serbia’s 
role and minimizing possible damage.
Well-organized in this regard, Serb elites have prevented the effects of 
ICTY decisions from changing the public opinion. The sentenced criminals 
have never been morally condemned. Many of them, like Biljana Plavšić, 
have been welcomed as heroes. Once in Serbia they never said they were 
sorry what they had done. The manner in which they were treated upon 
release actually invalidated ICTY functioning.
Serbia established its war crimes court under the pressure from the 
international community and with its assistance. Unfortunately, the court 
proved to be in the function of the state strategy for minimizing Serbia’s 
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responsibility. Although unbiased in some cases, the court was, generally, 
under the political influence.
Hardly any progress has been made in the domain of reparations, 
another element of transitional justice. Given the entire region’s devasta-
tion and impoverishment it can hardly been expected from countries in 
question to compensate civilian victims of the wars. Therefore, the inter-
national community had to lend a helping hand. While the international 
community financed return of refugees through grants for houses and 
small businesses, the process of the return was strongly obstructed – and 
more by civil society organizations than domestic governments.
The very approach to justice is flawed. For instance, Serbia that had 
“not waged wars” totally neglected the problem of veterans and civilian 
victims, especially victims of sexual abuse. Over 40,000 veterans have been 
left in the lurch. The Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg decided that 
the state was duty bound to reimburse the veterans of the war in Kosovo.
Serbia has no law on reparations to victims. Victims of torture, sex-
ual abuse and prisoners of concentration camps go to a lot of trouble to 
evidence injustice before Serbian courts. Besides, unless they initiate pro-
ceedings within the period of five years their cases are time-barred under 
limitation act.
The issue of missing persons is still highly politicized and thus stands 
in the way of regional cooperation between expert commissions. More 
than 30,000 persons are registered as missing.
The process of facing the past froze up with the change of the regime 
and has been regressing since. The “torchbearer” of the regression, Presi-
dent Nikolić, managed to impair relations with almost all ex-Yugoslav re-
publics as soon as elected. In addition, many problems remained unsolved 
in 2012. Protection of witnesses is still the Achilles’ heel of proceedings 
before domestic courts. Masterminds of war crimes among high-ranking 
military and governmental officers are still not called to account. Repara-
tions are still not available to the great majority of plaintiffs. They were 
compensated in two cases only. It remains to be seen whether these two 
court decisions will be adopted as a practice in the period to come – to 
compensate victims both financially and morally.
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War Crimes Trials
In 2012 thirteen procedures were before the War Crimes Department 
of the Higher Court, Belgrade. The court decided in seven cases, sentenc-
ing 37 defendants and acquitting eight.51
In 2012 the War Crimes Department of the Appellate Court in Bel-
grade made four decisions concerning the appeals against sentences ruled 
by the Higher Court and the Appellate Court. It confirmed the sentences 
ruled to four accused persons and acquitted two.52
In the past year Serbia’s general jurisdiction courts decided in two 
cases of war crimes against civilians: the Orahovac case processed before 
the Higher Court in Pozarevac and the Kusnin case before the Higher Court 
in Niš.53
Serbia’s War Crimes Prosecutor raised two indictments against 7 per-
sons for the crimes against civilians and/or prisoners of war in 2012.54 Ever 
since establishment the Prosecution Office has not indicted such a small 
number of people over a year.55 Out of these seven indictments the cases 
of Prizren, Tenja II and Bosanski Petrovac are new while those in the cases 
of Ovčara V and Ćuška had resulted from the proceedings before the War 
Crimes Department of the Higher Court in Belgrade. However, even the 
“new” indictments were not the products of the Prosecutor’s independent 
investigation: the Bosanski Petrovac case had been transferred to it by the 
Bihac Canton Municipal Court, while the Tenja II case by the Public Attor-
ney Office of the Republic of Croatia.56
Evidently, Serbia’s courts are still “passing over” high-ranking police 
and army officers (of Serbia and former FR of Yugoslavia) despite all ev-
idence. From its establishment in 2003 till 2012 the Prosecution has in-
dicted only three noncommissioned officers. In 2012 the Prosecution was 
51  www.bg.vi.sud.rs.
52  www.bg.ap.sud.rs.
53  Humanitarian Law Center, 2013.
54  www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs.
55  Ibid.
56  Report on War Crimes Trials in Serbia in 2012, Humanitarian Law Center, 2013.
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criticized for the first time ever by a trial chamber.57 Nevertheless it has 
not indicted a single person on the account of command responsibility 
up to now.
Witness protection program is still a major stumbling bloc. The pro-
gram has not yet been transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice.
War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukčević and Main Prosecutor of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina Goran Salihović signed a protocol on cooperation in the 
prosecution of suspects of war crimes, crimes against humanity and geno-
cide on January 31, 2013 in Brussels.58 The protocol with Bosnia rounded 
off the “frame for achieving justice” in the region. The document provides 
exchange of evidence and information between the two prosecutors, espe-
cially in the cases of parallel investigations. The protocol was enforced on 
February 28, 2013.59
Institutional Reforms
No major reforms aimed at achieving transitional justice were un-
dertaken in 2012. The faulty witness protection program still rests on the 
legislation passed in 2006 providing protection to parties involved in crim-
inal proceedings, especially witnesses.60 The newly adopted Law on Crimi-
nal Procedure also lays down the criteria for the protection of witnesses.61 
Also relevant to this domain is the Regulation of the Higher Court in Bel-
grade – it envisages the establishment of a department for assistance and 
support to witnesses and damaged parties.62 ICTY has established major 
mechanisms for the protection of witnesses and victims. However, the 
57  Ibid.
58  http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/VESTI_SAOPSTENJA_2013/VS_2013_01_31_CIR.pdf.
59  http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/VESTI_SAOPSTENJA_2013/VS_2013_02_28_CIR.pdf.
60  Law on the Protection Programs for Parties in Criminal 
Procedures, (Official Gazette, No 85/2005).
61  Law on Criminal Procedure (Official Gazette, No. 72/2011 and 101/2011).
62  Regulation on Management and Job Descriptions of the Higher 
Court in Belgrade, No. 9/10 – 2, April 30, 2010.
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experience of ICTY in this sensitive area has not been adequately used over 
war crimes trials in Serbia.
Over the tripartite summit with members of the Presidency of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina on February 3, 2012 at Mt. Jahorina, presidents of Croatia 
and Serbia, Ivo Josipović and Boris Tadić agreed to sign a memorandum 
on cooperation in war crimes proceedings.63 The objective of the memo-
randum was to prevent political influence on war crimes trials and secure 
fair trials before domestic courts. In 2012, the only form of bilateral co-
operation envisaged in the memorandum was the one between national 
judicial bodies.
Facts and Testimonies
Little was done to attest new facts in 2012. The process of facing the 
past that would lean on the testimonies by victims and war criminals was 
not launched. The situation in the domain of transitional justice worsened 
after the general elections of May 2012. Statements by newly elected Pres-
ident Nikolić denying or marginalizing the crimes committed in 1990s im-
paired Serbia’s relations with the region. At the same time the very idea 
of facing the past was seriously relativized: developments in the WWII that 
were combined with the transitional justice emerging from ex-Yugoslavia’s 
disintegration further undermined unbiased research of the recent past.
The trial in the case of rehabilitation of Draža Mihailović before the 
Higher Court in Belgrade opened on May 11, 2012. Taking the stand, his-
torian Slobodan Marković claimed that the summations by Mihailović be-
fore the court in 1946 had been changed.64
While 40-odd followers of the Tchetnik ideology assembled in front of 
the court on the occasion, activists of the organization “Women in Black” 
were protesting across the street against the attempt at rehabilitation of a 
war criminal. Apart from members of the Ravna Gora Movement, activists 
of “Obraz” were among and their leader, Mladen Obradović, were in the 
crowd of Mihailović’s supporters. They were chanting Tchetnik songs and 
63  Balkan Insight, February 3, 2012.
64  RTS, April 11, 2012.
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hailing Mihailović and ICTY indictees Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić and 
Vojislav Seselj.65
Despite all the pressure from extreme rightist organizations, the pro-
cess was ended on February 22, 2013. When the First Basic Court in Bel-
grade decided that Mihailović had been executed by firing squad on July 
31, 1946, plaintiffs requested a new hearing claiming that he had been 
killed on July 17, 1946. President of Trial Chamber Aleksandar Ivanović 
said the procedure was suspended until a higher instance decided on the 
exact date of Mihailović’s death.66
In addition to the attempt at rehabilitation of the Tchetnik movement, 
ICTY acquittals of high officials from Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo negatively 
affected the process of facing the past. On November 16, 2012 ICTY Ap-
pellate Chamber acquitted Croatian generals Ante Gotovina and Mladen 
Markac on all counts of the indictment for the “Storm” operation. The 
verdict caused strong reactions in Serbia – by governmental institutions, 
political parties and the media. Even the great majority of non-govern-
mental organizations, advocating for the respect for ICTY over the past 20 
years, criticized the verdict.
“This verdict only proved that decisions by ICTY are more often than 
not political rather than judicial. We are disappointed with such attitude 
of international institutions towards the Serb nation, their neglect of facts 
and disrespect for the victims of the ‘Storm’ operation, the biggest crime 
committed since the WWII,” released the ruling Serb Progressive Party.67
On the day the verdict was publicized the Serbian government held a 
meeting to discuss it. In addition to strong criticism of the verdict, the gov-
ernment threatened with reducing the cooperation with ICTY to a “tech-
nical level.” “This decision is a slap in the face of international justice 
and regional reconciliation, and will not contribute to normalization of 
the relations between states and nations in the territory of the former 
65  Ibid.
66  RTS, February 22, 2013.
67  RTVB92, November 16, 2012.
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Yugoslavia,” said President of the National Council for Cooperation with 
ICTY Rasim Ljajić.68
Thirteen days later, on November 29, 2012, ICTY acquitted Ramush Ha-
radinaj, former commander of KLA, accused of war crimes in Kosovo. This 
only added fuel to the fire of the campaign against ICTY. Even the more lib-
erally-minded RTV B92 commented the verdict by the following headline: 
“Another Slap in the Face: Haradinaj Acquitted.”69
Commenting the Haradinaj case, Rasim Ljajić said that credibility of 
ICTY was further undermined. The ruling Serb Progressive Party called for 
the end of any communication with ICTY, while War Crimes Prosecutor 
Vladimir Vukčević labeled the acquittal unjust and a result of unprofes-
sional protection of witnesses.70
President Nikolić was the fiercest critic of all. He revived the populist 
and right-wing criticism of ICTY by saying, “The latest decision by the Tri-
bunal has nothing to do with the law and justice, and fundamental princi-
ples by which this international court should operate. To all appearances, 
the Tribunal was established in defiance of international law and to try 
Serbs only. It was established to attain the goals the Serb public is well 
aware of.”71
On February 28, 2013 the ICTY Appeals Chamber acquitted the for-
mer head of the General Staff of the FRY Army, Momčilo Perišić. Despite 
the fact that this time a high officer of the Yugoslav Army was acquitted, 
politicians in power did nothing to change “the bad image” of ICTY they 
had worked on at the time of the acquittals of Kosovo’s and Croatia’s mili-
tary commanders. The government welcomed the decision by the Appeals 
Chamber – it even sent a plane to bring General Perišić back from The 
Hague.72 Premier Dačić seized the opportunity to question FRY’s role in the 
wars in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. The decision by ICTY is of major sig-
nificance to Serbia and the Serb people as it negates all the accusations of 
68  Večernje Novosti, November 16, 2012.
69  RTVB92, November 29, 2012.
70  Ibid.
71  Ibid.
72  RTV B92, March 1, 2013.
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the Yugoslav Army and its alleged aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Croatia, he said.73 In Serbia as a whole, Perišić’s acquittal was barely 
commented – it was overshadowed by earlier acquittals of Gotovina and 
Haradinaj.
Reparations
On March 29, 2012 the government adopted the Program for the Re-
turn of Bosniak Refugees and IDPs from the Priboj Municipality in the Period 
1991–99. The Program envisages “creation of infrastructural conditions” 
for the return of Bosniaks, citizens of Serbia, who had fled this part of 
Sandžak or had been expelled from it in the next four years. For the first 
time ever, the state terror against Sandžak Bosniaks was recognized in an 
official document. “This is a way for remedying the injustice done to cit-
izens from the above-mentioned villages of the Priboj municipality, who 
fled their homes under threats or out of fear in the period 1991–99,” quotes 
the Program. According to the Program, those citizens of Kukurović, Sje-
verin and other villages bordering on Bosnia-Herzegovina are entitled to 
reparations and sustainable return to their homesteads.74
Since the adoption of the Program, courts have made two decisions 
in favor of damaged parties. On the one hand, this stands for a progress 
when compared with the previous period. On the other, two decisions are 
insufficient when compared with numbers of requests for reparations still 
waiting to be settled. One of the two decisions was made by the First Ba-
sic Court in Belgrade on September 10, 2012, obliging the state of Serbia 
to compensate 360,000 RSD to Sead Rovcanin, a Bosniak from Prijepolje, 
for police torture he suffered in 1993. Gordana Vuković, spokeswoman for 
the court, explained that the state was duty bound to pay 160,000 RSD to 
Rovcanin on account of “mental pain” plus 200,000 RSD for “the fear he 
was exposed to.”
According to the decision, on October 27, 1993 officers of the Ministry 
of the Interior of Serbia arrested Rovcanin, beat him in the police station 
73  Večernje Novosti, February 28, 2013.
74  E-novine, April 5, 2012.
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and forced to confess that he had arms in his possession. Further, the de-
cision underlines that the amount of reparations would only partially in-
demnify Rovcanin who had waited 19 years for the justice to be meted 
out, while perpetrators have never been punished and were still in police 
forces. The torture he underwent left serious and lasting consequences on 
the health of Sead Rovcanin.75
On September 26, 2012, the Appeals Court in Belgrade decided that 
Ivica Bačić, a resident of Split, Croatia, should be compensated for the 
property YPA confiscated from him in November 1991. On his way to hos-
pital to cater for his injured neighbor, Bačić had been arrested and the 
army confiscated his vehicle and other personal belongings. The decision 
of September 2012 was the first ever to recognize that Serbia’s present-day 
army was responsible for YPA’s doings. As such it paves the way to many 
other complaints by citizens of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
against Serbia and its army.76
On the occasion of the 13th anniversary of NATO intervention, on 
March 24, 2–12, commemorations for victims of bombardment were or-
ganized throughout Serbia. A memorial was held in the town of Alek-
sinac where 11 civilians had been killed and 50 wounded. Addressing 
the audience President Tadić called NATO bombardment “a crime against 
our country and our people.”77 Neither Tadić nor other officials attending 
these commemorations touched on Albanian civilians killed in the period 
March-June 1999. The anniversary and hardships of Albanians at the time 
seemed to be totally unrelated.
Marking the 13th anniversary of NATO intervention Belgrade city au-
thorities announced funding for a memorial to “victims of the war and 
homeland defenders in the period 1991–99.” Strongly responding to the 
announcement, CSOs and families of the victims released that a monu-
ment as such would relativize crimes, fabricate the history and harm the 
dignity of the victims.78 “The cynical fabrication of the history whereby 
75  Danas, September 10, 2012.
76  Radio Free Europe, September 26, 2012.
77  Večernje Novosti, March 24, 2012.
78  E-novine, February 17, 2012.
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the criminals from the aggressive armies of the state of Serbia are passed 
on as homeland defenders must be ended. A monument to participants in 
Serbia’s aggressive wars, who left the trail of victims, the killed, the crip-
pled, the raped and destroyed and plundered homes would be a crying 
shame,” quotes a release by the Women in Black.79
In response to public protest Deputy Mayor of Belgrade Zoran Alip-
mpić told the Radio Free Europe, “All the monuments worldwide to sol-
diers in wars are in a way also monuments to people who were shooting 
and killing. This goes without saying. Whoever lights a candle at the bot-
tom of this monument or lays a wreath on it, will understand in his or 
her own way.”80 Accordingly and despite all protests Belgrade authorities 
headed by Mayor Dragan Đilas unveiled a memorial at the Sava Square 
in Belgrade on March 24, 2012. Three weeks later, however, the memorial 
corroded and was removed. City authorities commented it was all about a 
“conceptual installation.”81
Serbia’s relations with its neighbors (especially the countries emerg-
ing from ex-Yugoslavia) are closely related to the process of facing the past 
and the responsibility for the bloodshed of 1990s. This is about a pain-
fully slow and inconsistent process that is constantly obstructed. In only 
a couple of statements and in a handful of interviews the newly elected 
President Nikolić managed to annihilate Serbia’s (modest) achievements 
in the domain of regional reconciliation. His statements about Vukovar as 
“a Serb town” and Srebrenica in which “genocide was not committed” trig-
gered off strong reactions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.82 Leaders 
from the region, therefore, boycotted Nikolić’s presidential inauguration. 
Only Montenegrin President Filip Vujanović and Milorad Dodik, president 
of the Serb entity in Bosnia, attended the ceremony. Croatian President 
Ivo Josipović said he would not meet with Nikolić until the later changed 
his stands about the past. The two presidents have not met yet.
79  Ibid.
80  Radio Free Europe, February 16, 2012.
81  Danas, April 11, 2012.
82  Al Jazeera, Balkan, May 25, 2012.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 56 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 57
56 serbia 2012 : INTRODUCTION
Premier Dačić paid an official visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina in Septem-
ber 2012. Over the meeting with Bakir Izetbegović, member of the Bosnian 
Presidency, in Sarajevo on September 12 he said Serbia would respect the 
state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.83 The two leaders agreed that their countries 
should upgrade mutual cooperation.84 Only a day later, on September 
13 the governments of Serbia and Republika Srpska held a joint session 
in Banjaluka – and confirmed “special relations” between Belgrade and 
Banjaluka.85
Dačić’s attitude towards Montenegro was more clear-cut than towards 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Premier emphasized the significance of the co-
operation between the two countries, which, as he put it, should not be 
burdened by emotions.86 He reiterated that Serbia’s fully respected Mon-
tenegro’s independence.87
At the meeting with the head of the probe into the Kosovo organ traf-
ficking case, Williamson, Dačić said he fully supported the investigation of 
the crime and promised assistance from Serbia’s institutions.
However, he said nothing about the readiness of the same institutions 
to probe into the crimes Serbia’s citizens had committed in Kosovo, arrest 
them and put on trial.
83  „Press, September 12, 2012.
84  Kurir, September 13, 2012.
85  Kurir, September 16, 2012.
86  Press, September 13, 2012.
87  Press , September 14, 2012.
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Snail-Paced Reform
The international community was critical about Serbia’s judiciary re-
form enforced on January 1, 2010. In the meantime Serbia adopted and 
amended scores of legislation aimed at efficient implementation of the 
reform, strengthening of judicial bodies and their independence and effi-
cient trials. However, the reform has not been rounded off yet.
The snail-paced reform of the judiciary resulted in spiraling corrup-
tion. According to Transparency International’s report for 2011, Serbia 
lags behind in the struggle against corruption. A faulty judiciary reform, 
breaches of anti-corruption laws and influence of political parties on the 
public sector are stressed as major obstacles. Out of 182 countries on the 
list of Transparency International Serbia had been on the 86th place with 
the corruption perception index /CPI/ of 3.3 percent. In the past two years 
it was on the 71st place with 3.5% CPI.88
Participants in the debate “Judiciary in the Trap of Corruption and Par-
tisan State,” Conrad Adenauer Foundation organized in Belgrade, agreed 
that the judiciary reform had flopped and that everything should start 
from scratch. Commenting on frequent criticism from Brussels, Danilo Šu-
ković, member of the Anti-Corruption Council, said, “The reform failed be-
cause of the hookup between parties, tycoons, executive branch, crime and 
the judiciary, which holds hostage the entire society. The judiciary contrib-
utes to the endemic corruption permeating all the spheres.”89 According to 
him, the judiciary reform was in the hands of incompetent people, the ju-
diciary legislation had been passed without a through analysis of the sit-
uation in the domain and the judiciary has to have a budget of its own, as 
envisaged by the Strategy for the Struggle against Corruption /2005/ that 
remained a dead letter.90
88  http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/sr_Latn/
features/setimes/features/2011/12/06/feature-04.
89  Danas, April 26, 2012.
90  Ibid.
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In 2011 the Disciplinary Prosecutor of the High Judicial Council /VSS/ 
received 168 complaints alleging misconduct against judges or prosecu-
tors. For his part, the Disciplinary Prosecutor submitted only one case 
for the consideration of the Disciplinary Commission – the case closed in 
2012 with deposal of a justice of the Appellate Court protracting a trial for 
eight years.91 A survey conducted by Transparency Serbia and Balkan Trust 
for Democracy shows that the number of complaints by litigants averages 
5,000 each year and has rapidly grew since the beginning of 2012. Ten-odd 
complainers in the first 8 months in 2012 were either acting presidents 
of courts or public prosecutors. Researchers explain the fewness of acting 
presidents of courts among the total number of complainers by their un-
willingness to stand up against their colleagues, as well as awareness that 
many judges are “backed up by politicians.” For their part, incumbent act-
ing presidents of courts claimed all complaints so far had been against mi-
nor shortcomings and they would have submitted complaints had there 
been major breaches of law.92 According to the survey, judges think as one 
about the necessity of clear-cut criteria for the cases of presidents of courts 
submitting complaints against judges – without clear-cut criteria any com-
plaint could be interpreted as someone’s personal vendetta.
Apart from the growing corruption, the snail-paced reform of the ju-
diciary badly affected functioning of courts of law. Against the backdrop 
of the faulty reorganization, pending cases are being accumulated while 
the number of judges to tackle them has been reduced. Fewer judges have 
to cope with overdue cases that had to be closed in the shortest possible 
while. Besides, they worked under the pressure of submitting weekly re-
ports reflecting the number of cases closed. As they had to race against 
time the number of complaints by litigants only logically grew.
Despite all reformist moves, the reorganized network of courts imply-
ing fewer courts and judges, the state did not manage to cut down costs. 
Moreover, it had to set aside more money for the judiciary in 2010. On the 
basis of information obtained for the Ministry of Finance the Anti-Cor-
ruption Council was unable to assert how costly the new network of courts 
91  „Mechanism for Judges’ Responisiblity in 2010–2012.”
92  Ibid.
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was. In its report of September 2010 the Council of Europe pointed out to 
non-existent information about the costs of the newly arranged network. 
For it part, the Ministry of Justice keeps no records about judges and pros-
ecutors entitled to bonuses for rents in towns away from their residences, 
extra costs of lives separate from their families and transportation. How-
ever, some information is available: bonuses for “separate lives” amount 
to 25,000 RSD, the same as bonuses for rents. Therefore, the state pays each 
judge or prosecutor working away from his or her hometown 50,000 RSD 
in addition to salary, plus costs of transportation on weekends. For in-
stance, bonuses paid to five deputy prosecutors of the Appellate Prosecu-
tion in Novi Sad, without transportation costs, average 250,000 RSD each 
month. Some judges or prosecutors working in places not that distanced 
from their homes are even driven to and fro at the government’s expense. 
In addition, judges and prosecutors who had not been reelected in 2009 
have been entitled to regular salaries in the past three years.
Despite the fact that Serbia obtained an EU candidacy on March 1, 
2012, European Parliament’s resolution of March 29, 2012 expressed 
concern over the judiciary reform and struggle against corruption. The 
resolution calls the Serbian government to ensure independence and pro-
fessionalism of courts and prosecution offices, and finalize the reform of 
the judiciary. On January 25, 2012, the Parliamentary Assembly of CoE 
also adopted a resolution on Serbia (No. 1858) to note a considerable pro-
gress Serbia has made in fulfilling obligations but also to express concern 
over the parliaments’ and the President of the Republic’s influence on the 
judiciary. This resolution also appealed to the High Judiciary Council and 
the State Council of Prosecutors to round off the reelection procedure by 
clear-cut and undisputable criteria, in accordance with European stand-
ards and in within reasonable period of time. It requested Serbia to adopt 
and implement a judiciary legislation providing judges’ and prosecutors’ 
independence from political influence. .93
The Judges’ Society of Serbia /DSS/ turned to Ombudsman Saša Jank-
ović to complain against VSS for discrimination and violating the right to 
fair trial to judges who had not been reelected, breaching the reelected 
93  Politika, April 17, 2012.
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judges’ constitutional right to unlimited terms of office, and depriving cit-
izens’ of the right to fair trial. DSS especially questioned the legitimacy of 
VSS after resignation of Justice Milomir Lukić and arrest of Justice Blagoje 
Jakšić who used to be in its membership. All this, pointed out DSS, affected 
not only revision of the decisions non-reelected judges had complained 
against but also the ongoing election of presidents of courts.
The Ombudsman agreed that VSS was rump and hence illegitimate. 
In a letter to the parliament he said that VSS should stop operating un-
til the problem of membership was solved and that all decisions it made 
with only a part of its original membership should be annulled. He also 
pointed to the case of Justice Predrag Dimitrijević who had been in the 
membership of VSS for more than a year since the Anti-corruption Agency 
decided that his term of office had ended.
The Ombudsman also criticized the amended Law on Judges94 provid-
ing that VSS shall be authorized to decide on complaints against the de-
cisions it had made. He pointed out that VSS worked behind closed doors 
although the law explicitly provided that its sessions should be open to 
public, and that over the revision process it denied access to information 
to all candidates for judges without exception.95
In response to the Ombudsman’s criticism, the Ministry of Justice 
asked for an amendment to the Law on Ombudsman to restrict his com-
petences. On January 19, 2012 State Secretary Slobodan Homen put his 
signature under the draft amendment, quoting, “The Ombudsman shall 
not be authorized to control the work of the People’s Assembly, the Pres-
ident of the Republic, the government, the Constitutional Court, courts 
of law and public prosecution offices, the High Judicial Council and the 
State Council of Prosecutors.” However, in its draft resolution on Serbia, 
94  In late 2010 the Constitutional Court held open sessions in 50-odd cases. 
Judiciary legislation was then amended under summary procedure, 
providing that VSS should be authorized to reconsider its original decisions. 
All the complaints filed with the Constitutional Court were “transferred” 
to VSS. After months-long debate on the reconsideration procedure two 
commissions of VSS began reviewing complaints on June 15, 2011.
95  Politika, January 15, 2012.
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the European Parliament especially commended the Ombudsman and de-
manded Serbia’s authorities to fully support his work.
In a letter to President of VSS Nata Mesarović Head of EU Delegation 
to Serbia Vincent Deger also expressed concern over the body’s function-
ing and its quorum.96 He reminded that EU, in its Serbia 2010 Progress 
Report, had criticized the process of reelection of judges and prosecutors, 
and that on several occasions EU had drew the attention of Serbia’s author-
ities to this pressing problem. In response, President of VSS Nata Mesarović 
claimed that VSS decisions and functioning were not disputable because 
of its incomplete membership given that the law provided that decisions 
were made by majority vote. VSS had received complaints from 824 judges 
and prosecutors who had not been reelected. Only 78 of complainers were 
reappointed till December 8, 2011. VSS informed the Ombudsman and the 
Head of EU Delegation that, having completed the review of complaints, 
it would make all the decisions by the end of February 2012. It also in-
formed them that it had called the elections for VSS members from the 
ranks of judges of appellate courts.97
At the meeting in Brussels on March 1, 2012 two close associates of EU 
Commissioner Stefan Fule were most critical about Serbia’s judiciary re-
form and were clear-cut in their demands: VSS should revise all the deci-
sions made without a quorum (given that EU considered them illegal and 
shared the Ombudsman’s criticism) and EC representatives should attend 
all the VSS sessions deliberating reelection of judges and prosecutors in 
the process of revision. They also insisted on access to the files of judges 
and prosecutors who had not been originally reelected. EC also criticized 
all the decisions on reelections by the State Council of Prosecutors /DVT/ 
as contrary to its guidelines. EC’s final opinion about the judiciary reform 
will depend on the quality of VSS and DVT argumentation for reelected 
judges and prosecutors.98
Regardless of all the criticism from EC, Snezana Malović, former Min-
ister of Justice, argued that EU’s opinion about the judiciary reform was 
96  Danas. January 13, 2012.
97  Blic, January 19, 2012.
98  Danas, March 1, 2012.
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evidenced by the fact that Serbia obtained candidacy and that some me-
dia outlets had published out-of-date stories about EC’s stance with a view 
of promoting certain political parties.99 Serbia’s Public Prosecutor Zagorka 
Dolovac said the judiciary reform had been a great challenge for Serbia 
but Serbia had “followed the voice from Europe” and duly responded to 
all suggestions.100
After a three-month recess, the newly formed VSS convened its first 
session on March 8, 2012 to discuss complaints filed by 18 judges from 
Belgrade. VSS will also reconsider all the decisions on judges elected for 
the first time after January 1, 2010. In March 2012 the Constitutional Court 
discussed, at an open session, complaints by judges and prosecutors DVT 
and VSS had turned down (136 complaints against VSS ad 123 against DVT).
Busily correcting the shortcomings of the judiciary reform VSS adopted 
the rules for reconsideration of original decisions in March 2012. The 
rules provide two commissions that will scrutinize professional capacities 
and moral integrity of the judges reelected for the three-year term. Three 
members of each commission will not come from the ranks of “original” 
decision-makers.101
  Besides, the funds for the judiciary were transferred from the Min-
istry of Justice to a “judicial budget” to be managed by VSS. A separate 
budget managed by VSS is meant to strengthen the independence of the 
judiciary branch.102
Addressing the press during their visit to Serbia in two judges of the 
European Association of Judges – Simon Gaborio from France and Hans 
Ernst from Germany said they were shocked by the situation of Serbia’s 
reformed judiciary.103 They put their impressions in black and white after 
inspecting documentation and talking to judges, VSS members, non-gov-
ernmental organizations and governmental agencies. Their report stated 
that implementation of the judiciary reform, started back in 2009, was con-
99  Politika, March 9, 2012
100  Novi Magazin, March 8, 2012.
101  Večernje Novosti, March 20, 2012.
102  Politika, March 16, 2012.
103  Vreme, April 19, 2012.
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trary to the principles laid down in the European Convention of Human 
Rights and recommendations from EU, Council of Europe and Venice Com-
mission. Citizens of Serbia, they pointed out, cannot possibly place their 
trust in the judicial system incapable of respecting fundamental rights of 
its own judges and prosecutors.
Serbia received the official version of the expert report in late June 
2012. The report quotes that the entire process of the judiciary reform 
should be revised and implemented anew by different standards – in 
other words, that the problem of judges and prosecutors deposed contrary 
to fundamental principles should be solved first. Serbia should take many 
other steps as well to restore the trust in its judiciary at national and in-
ternational level, emphasized the report. The report also refers to Serbia’s 
Constitution the Venice Commission was most critical about, especially in 
the matter of judges’ and prosecutors’ independence.104
A couple of days later, Serb Progressive Party /SNS/ announced that the 
revision of the reelection process would be on the new government’s pri-
ority agenda and that all judges and prosecutors, not reelected in the first 
round, should be given the opportunity either to resume their offices or 
get compensated. This corresponded to the report’s recommendation to 
the parliament: to amend the “reelection” law so as to make it possible 
for all professionals to resume their offices if they wished so.105 Comment-
ing SNS announcement, Professor Vesna Rakić Vodinelić said the judiciary 
would find itself in an even worse situation than before – it would have 
judges loyal to the former government on the one hand, and those siding 
the government to be on the other.106
104  Politika, June 30, 2012.
105  Večernje Novosti, July 4, 2012.
106  Blic, July 13, 2012.
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Reelection of Judges Reviewed
Having reviewed the complaints filed by deposed judges in two 
months only (March – April 2012), VSS voted down all 200 pending com-
plaints. The percentage of the complaints sustained in the period June – 
December 2011 was much higher – out of 318 complaints, 235 were turned 
down and 74 judges were reappointed.
In May 2012 the President of the Judges’ Society of Serbia said the re-
vision had been “turned into a farce” and “a race against time,” given that 
VSS wanted to cement the situation till formation of a new government. 
According to her, VSS and the Ministry of Justice, having realized that too 
many decisions had been annulled, decided to put an end to the story. At 
35 sessions discussing 636 out of 836 complaints VSS had sustained 100 or 
16 percent.
In September 2012 the Judges’ Society of Serbia and the Association 
of Prosecutors and Deputy Prosecutors called the authorities to look into 
the responsibility of VSS and DVT membership for the manner in which 
the reelection had been conducted. The two organizations invoked the 
July decisions by the Constitutional Court in favor of 120 litigant judges.107 
In late May 2012 VSS completed the revision sustaining only 28 out of 753 
complaints. The rest of complainers, totaling 650 former judges, turned to 
the Constitutional Court.108
Even before VSS completed its revision, the Constitutional Court 
opened its sessions to discuss these complaints. VSS representatives did 
not show up at a single session out of six. DVT representatives attended 
nine out of 27 sittings. While DVT explained that its absence from sessions 
meant not disrespect for the Constitutional Court, VSS denied any com-
ment.109 Dragana Boljević, president of the Judges’ Society of Serbia, called 
107  Ministry of Justice warned that reappointment of 120 
judges would cost the state 33.6 million Euros.
108  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=07&dd=11&nav_
category=12&nav_id=625799.
109  Politika, April 28, 2012.
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VSS attitude inappropriate, adding that VSS members had been obviously 
shunning embarrassing questions about discrimination against judges.
Having observed that the same shortcomings were characteristic of 
all cases discussed, the Constitutional Court stopped discussing individual 
complaints and made a full-scale decision: given the lack of evidence that 
all judges who had not been reelected were incompetent and unworthy of 
their office, the court decided that all of them should be reappointed. Only 
VSS is authorized to assign them to the courts by the criteria they meet.110 
Although some among the newly reelected judges were proven unworthy 
of their office, President of the Judges’ Society of Serbia Dragiša Sljepčević 
argued these reelections could not be defied – only VSS, while deciding on 
their new assignments could suspend them until the procedure for their 
deposal ended.
On the list of judges whose reelection was deliberated by VSS was 
Časlav Maslaravić, former prosecutor, standing trial for 30,000-Euro-bribe 
at the time. He had not been reelected in the first place because of the 
500-Euro-bribe he received in his capacity as prosecutor and for which he 
had been sentence to 4 years in jail. Judges Tatjana Sunjka and Dragomir 
Milojević were also on the list – they had not been reelected because they 
had turned the case of priest Ilarion statute-barred. Justice Paločevic had 
been sentenced for family violence, while his colleague from Kragujevac, 
Ivan Milojević had been in jail at the time of reelection. When it comes 
to prosecutors, VSS will be discussing the case of Aca Stojev whose role in 
the investigation of Dejan /Bugzy/ Milenković has not been clarified yet. 
Allegedly, in February 2003 Prosecutor Stojev decided not to press charges 
against Bugzy for the assassination attempt at Premier Zoran Đinđić. These 
are only some names of on said list.
The fact that 20-odd reassigned judges and prosecutors were promptly 
suspended because they were standing trial at the time testifies that they 
had not been reelected in the first place as incompetent and unworthy of 
their office. This confirmed EC’s suspicion about VSS being unselective in 
its decision-making.
110  Politika July 22, 2012.
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In July 2012 the Constitutional Court decided in favor of 303 judges 
– 350 complaints were still pending at the time. The Ministry of Justice, 
therefore, asked the Constitutional Court to set a deadline for all reassign-
ments.111 VSS asked for extra time to conduct a survey among judges and 
see how many of them wanted to return to their office. The Constitutional 
Court turned down this request.
According to the Bar Chamber of Serbia, about one third of judges 
who had not been reelected have become lawyers – 269 of them from Jan-
uary 2010 till early August 2012. The figure is higher considering “new” 
lawyers of the Bar Chamber of Vojvodina that has not compiled the infor-
mation yet.112
In September 2012, 303 newly reelected judges and 122 prosecutors 
resumed their offices. All the prosecutors announced to sue Serbia for 
compensation.
In November 2012 the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of another 
202 complainers.
In August 2012 DSS put forth amendments and supplements to the 
Law on VSS. The Ministry of Justice said the amendment of the law was 
unnecessary.
After a meeting with Head of EU Delegation Vincent Deger in Sep-
tember 2012, Minister of Justice Nikola Selaković announced a strategy 
for the judiciary and an action plan by the end of year. He said that all 
stakeholders would be included in the development of the two documents 
– DSS, DVT, trade unions within the judiciary, NGOs, especially those con-
cerned with corruption and organized crime, Council of Europe, OSCE 
and representatives of EC.113 The meeting laid down three priorities for 
the Ministry of Justice: reintegration of the newly reelected judges and 
prosecutors, finalization of numbers of pending cases before courts of law 
and rearrangement of the existing network of courts and prosecution of-
fices. VSS and DVT should clearly define the criteria for performance assess-
111  All newly reelected judges must take their reassignments within 
60 days from the day of VSS and DVT decisions.
112  Večernje Novosti, August 24, 2012.
113  Politika, October 1, 2012.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 68 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 69
69Snail-Paced Reform
ment of the reelected judges and prosecutors, and disciplinary liability of 
all judges and prosecutors, as well as secure relevant mechanisms, added 
Minister Selaković.
In April 2013 the government adopted draft laws on amendments of 
and supplements to laws on network of courts, judges and public prosecu-
tion offices. Should the parliament vote in the first law, the number of “ju-
diciary units” would be reduced from 102 to 14, while the number of basic 
courts would grow from 33 to 73. According to the draft law on judges, VSS 
shall nominate only one candidate for one post. If the parliament turns 
the candidate down VVS shall have to nominate another, which, the draft 
explains, eliminates the possibility of political influence. The draft also 
envisages different criteria for evaluation of judges’ performance by es-
tablishing commissions composed of, say, judges of higher courts evalu-
ating the work of their colleagues from lower courts. Dissatisfied judges 
shall have the right to complain and, if necessary, initiate administrative 
procedure.
In a year from now EC will scrutinize the progress made in the judiciary.
Deposal of the President of the 
Supreme Court of Cassation
Revanchism was obvious at the political scene after the change of the 
regime. On several occasions did the newly appointed Minister of Jus-
tice Nikola Selaković announce a showdown with former governmental 
officials /from DS/ involved in the faulty judiciary reform. Associations of 
judges and prosecutors sided with him, emphasizing that that those im-
plementing the judiciary reform should be called to account.114
In May 2012 the Anti-corruption Council demanded the government 
to depose the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation Nata Mesarević 
and all members of VSS. It also called for a review of the role the former 
Minister of Justice Snezana Malović played in the disputable reform. The 
Council’s report stressed that the reform opened the door to the executive 
114  Danas, October 18, 2012.
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branch’s influence on the judiciary and that “the reelection of judges bla-
tantly violated the constitutional principle of permanence in judicial of-
fice.” “With its law the executive branch has bribed members of VVS by 
excluding them from reelection and making it possible for them to be pro-
moted to higher courts after the end of their terms.”115
On January 23, 2013 VSS, at Minister Selaković’s suggestion, called 
upon the parliament to depose Justice Nata Mesarović under summary 
procedure following the Constitutional Court’s decision that her election 
to the office had been unconstitutional. Explaining its request, VSS said 
that on November 30, 2009 the parliament appointed Nata Mesarević, act-
ing president of the Supreme Court, the President of the Supreme Court of 
Cassation, without consultation with the general session of this court, as 
provided under the Constitution.
It should be noted that back in 2011 Serb Progressive Party /SNS/ initi-
ated the procedure before the Constitutional Court defying the provisions 
of the law on judges under which Nata Mesarević had been appointed. 
The Constitutional Court independently decides whether or not to proceed 
along an initiative. And so, on October 2012 – when SNS was already in 
power – it decided to proceed along SNS initiative and on December 2012 
proclaimed the two provisions unconstitutional.
In September 2012 DSS excommunicated Justice Lidija Đukić while Jus-
tice Branka Bančević resigned her membership shortly before DSS planned 
to excommunicate her as well. In a letter to Justice Bančević of August 28, 
VSS said she would be excommunicated for participating in VSS at the time 
it was violating her colleagues’ right to fair trial.116
Functioning of Courts of Law
According to the Ministry of Justice, over 8,600 appeals against the 
state of Serbia are pending with the European Court of Human Rights. 
By the number of appeals Serbia takes 6th place on the list of all CoE 
member-states.
115  Politika, May 3, 2012.
116  Danas, September 22, 2012.
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Nevena Petrušić, commissioner for equality, commented that so many 
appeals to the European Court testified of the situation of human rights 
in Serbia. The great majority of the cases taken to Strasbourg are about 
unduly protracted trials and nonobservance of court decisions. It is esti-
mated that labor disputes take 3–5 years on average. Litigations, according 
to Dragana Boljević of DSS, take 7 years on average.
Having met with judges of the Supreme Court of Cassation in Septem-
ber 2012, Sir Nicolas Bratza, president of the European Court of Human 
Rights, said that 9,500 cases from Serbia were awaiting trial in Strasbourg 
and that the biggest number of them related to nonobservance of court 
decisions on payment of salaries overdue to persons who used to work in 
state-run enterprises. Sir Bratza pointed out that Serbia should start im-
plementing in full the European Convention on Human Rights and of-
fered his court’s assistance.117
According to 369 rulings of the European Court, Serbia owes 642,990 
Euros to its citizens as compensation for immaterial damages and over 41 
million RSD as compensation for material damages.118
By introducing a new network of courts within the judiciary reform 
and shortening the periods within which some proceedings should be 
over, the government wanted to reduce the number of cases taken to court, 
accumulated because of courts’ inefficiency. As a result the growing num-
ber of people was appealing to higher courts because the decisions by 
lower had been made hastily and without respect for proper procedure.
On the other hand, the first verdict ruled in the case of threats to 
LGBT population publicized at Facebook – and the first ruling ever for vi-
olation of law and order via internet in Serbia – was a positive step the 
judiciary made in March 2012. Namely, the Higher Court in Belgrade pun-
ished one Sima Vladičić to three-month imprisonment for threatening 
LGBT population at the Facebook profile named “500,000 Serbs against the 
Gay Parade.” Human rights organizations welcomed the court’s efficiency, 
117  Danas, September 28, 2012.
118  Blic, September 28, 2012.
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although taking that punishment should have been more severe (Vladicic 
got a minimal sentence for this type of offense.)119
At the beginning of 2012 the Appellate Court in Belgrade finally made 
a decision in the case of the murdered French national, Bruce Taton. It cut 
down sentences to two defendants – originally punished to 35 and 32-year 
imprisonment – to 15 and 14-year imprisonment. The two have been fu-
gitives from justice since the murder of Taton. It also halved the sentences 
to the rest of the accused. Explaining its decision, the Appellate Court re-
leased that the Higher Court in Belgrade had not considered alleviating 
circumstances. The Taton family sued the state of Serbia for compensa-
tion. The trial for compensation opened in October 2012 before the Higher 
Court in Belgrade.
Fresh initiatives and amendments
Laws that are not implemented also worsen the situation of Serbia’s 
judiciary. Addressing the meeting “Challenges of European Integration,” 
Vlatko Ratković, president of the parliamentary committee for the judici-
ary, said that 25–30 percent of laws were not implemented mostly because 
relevant ministries had failed to pass regulations and bylaws enabling 
their implementation. Judging by the fact that the parliament passed 
more than 1,000 laws in the past three years, there are some 250–300 laws 
that cannot be implemented at all. In his view, no public debates on draft 
laws and “ministries holding monopoly of the process,” failures to prop-
erly analyze the effects of certain regulations in practice and incompetent 
governmental official are only some of the problems plaguing the process 
of development and adoption of legislation.
Initiatives launched in 2012 for adoption or amendment of legisla-
tion related to criminal law, law on criminal proceeding, law on litigation, 
law on private investigators, law on extrajudicial proceedings and law on 
free legal aid.
Only three years after the amendment of the Criminal Law, the new 
government amended it anew: it introduced ten “new” crimes. The newly 
119  Danas, March 3–4, 2012.
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amended law provides punishment for sports fraud (up to ten-year im-
prisonment), terrorism (up to 40-year imprisonment), misconduct in pub-
lic procurement, considered the biggest source of corruption, etc.
The amendment to the Criminal Law decriminalized libel, which is 
now subject to litigation. Besides, it provided “special circumstance in de-
ciding on punishment for hate speech:”120 special circumstance here re-
lates to hatred based on another person’s race, religion, ethnic origin, 
gender and sexual affiliation.
Although EU officials – including Jelko Kacin and Drago Kos of GREKO 
– warned Serbia on several occasions that, according to European legis-
lation, the Criminal Law should not include misconduct, the offense re-
mained in the draft amendment. EU criticized the provision for being 
loosely and anachronously defined.121 On September 11, 2012 the Minis-
try of Justice decided to form a work group to draft the amendment to the 
Law on Criminal Proceedings that would abrogate the term “disturbing the 
public” as a reason for someone to be kept in custody (under the Law on 
Criminal Proceedings enforced on January 15, 2012). The term, according 
to the work group, could be arbitrarily used for putting someone “behind 
the bars.”
As for other changes, the government plans to “strengthen” the prin-
ciple of truthfulness, though not in its absolute sense. Courts of law will 
not have to examine evidence submitted by the prosecution but will have 
to examine facts if they benefit defense. This will secure equality of par-
ties in criminal proceedings, as Prof. Milan Skulić put it, and will be in 
accord with the Constitution providing the right of any party to question 
reasoning behind allegations. The point of the planned amendment of 
the Law on Criminal Proceedings is that investigation rests on public pros-
ecutor, while courts of law can either sustain or overrule appeals against 
investigation orders.122 As of mid-January 2012 prosecutors for organized 
crime and war crimes are duty-bound to collect evidence and on ground of 
120  Izmene predliga zakona na inicijativu YUCOM-a i Gej-strej alijanse.
121  Danas, 19. oktobar 2012.
122  Vreme, 18. oktobar 2012.
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which to decide whether or not to raise indictments. Investigation judges 
will no longer assist them in the process.
The killing of nine Serb nationals on August 8, 1995 in Dvor na Uni 
was the first case in which Serbia’s Prosecution for War Crimes imple-
mented the provisions on investigation of the new Law on Criminal Pro-
ceedings. War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukčević said the new model of 
investigation was a challenge, adding that it also opened the door to the 
institute of pleading guilty. The new law also provides prosecution meth-
ods such as intercepted communications, tailing and tape-recording, un-
dercover investigator, etc.
Commissioner for Information of Public Interest Rodoljub Šabić and 
Ombudsman Saša Janković initiated reconsideration of the Article 286 of 
the Criminal Law before the Constitutional Court. The said article provides, 
“At the order of the Public Prosecutor, the police, as laid down in para 1 of 
this Article, obtain an overview of electronic communication or locate the 
places wherefrom the communication is conducted.” The Article 41, points 
out Šabić, provides confidentiality of all means of communications un-
less a court of law decides otherwise. For the same reasons the Constitu-
tional Court has already been asked to consider the constitutionality of the 
Law on Military-Intelligence Agency /VOA/ and the Law on Military-Secu-
rity Agency /VBA/. The Court decided that disputable provisions of the two 
laws were unconstitutional.123 In January 2013, Jovan Stojić, head of the 
Office of BIA Director, said that in 2012 the percentage of intercepted com-
munications was almost halved when compared with the same time a year 
before. Janković, nevertheless, warned that despite all this the police con-
tinued to bug citizens. A decision by the Constitutional Court is pending.
War Crimes Prosecution
In 2012 the Prosecution raised seven indictments against 29 persons 
for crimes against prisoners of war (Art. 144, Criminal Law) and against ci-
vilians (Art. 134 of the same law).
123  Blic, September 24, 2012.
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In February 2012 Serbia’s War Crimes Prosecution raised its first in-
dictment under the new Criminal Law – against two former members of 
the Territorial Defense, municipality of Tenja, Croatia. They were accused 
of war crime against a prisoner of war. The “Tenja” case was handed over 
to Croatia’s Prosecution under a bilateral agreement on cooperation in the 
prosecution of war criminals.
In June 2012 the Prosecution an appeal against the sentence the Trial 
Chamber of the Higher Court, Belgrade, ruled to Dragan Jović, Zoran 
Đurđević and Alen Ristić, former members of the volunteer unit within 
YPA. The three had been punished with total 40-year imprisonment for a 
war crime against civilians, committed on June 14, 1992 in Bijeljina, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina. The “Bijeljina” case had been handed over to Serbia’s 
Prosecution by its Bosnian counterpart under the Law on International 
Legal Aid in Criminal Cases.
In June 2012 the Prosecution also announced an appeal against the 
sentence the Trial Chamber of the Higher Court, Belgrade, ruled to four 
former police officers in Beli Manastir, punished for a war crime against 
civilians in this Croatian municipality in October 1991. The case had also 
been handed over to the Prosecution by its Croatian counterpart in 2008.
On June 26, 2012 the Trial Chamber of the Higher Court, Belgrade, 
passed a sentence in the “Lovas” case. Fourteen YPA officers, members 
of local territorial defense and members of the paramilitary formation 
“Dušan the Great” were punished to total 128-year imprisonment for a war 
crime against civilians in the village of Lovas, Croatia, in October-Novem-
ber 1991. “The Prosecution is satisfied with the sentence that adequately 
punishes perpetrators of one of the biggest war crimes in ex-Yugoslavia in 
1990s. Serbia’s judiciary passed across a clear message of respect and apol-
ogy to victims,” said Deputy Prosecutor Bruno Vekarić.
On September 20, Miroslav Jegdić, brother of Ratko Mladić’s wife 
Bosiljka, entered a plea agreement whereby admitting his guilt to the 
charge of complicity in hiding ICTY fugitive Mladić. The plea bargain en-
tailed a 6-month imprisonment.
In September 2012 the Prosecution indicted Dejan Bulatović, former 
member of the paramilitary formation “Jackals,” of a war crime against 
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Albanian civilians in the villages of Ćuška, Ljubenić and Zahač on April 1 
and May 14, 1999.
In October 2012 the Trial Chamber of the Higher Court, Belgrade, 
agreed to amend the indictment against Srećko Popović et al. adding new 
charges on the war crime against Albanian civilians in these villages. The 
new indictment charges 12 persons of killing at least 73 civilians.
In October the Prosecution indicted Petar Ćirić of a war crime against 
at least 193 prisoners of war at the “Ovčara” farm near Vukovar on No-
vember 21, 1991. This was the fourth indictment in the “Ovčara” case. Out 
of 20 defendants, 15 have been sentenced to total 207-year imprisonment 
and five acquitted up to now.
On December 17, 2012, Serbia’s Chief War Crime Prosecutor Vladimir 
Vukčević and Croatia’s Chief Public Prosecutor Mladen Bajić participated 
in the investigation against yet another two members of the Danish battal-
ion camping in Dvor at Una at the time unknown perpetrators in military 
uniforms killed 12 civilians, most of whom had been mentally or physi-
cally disabled. On the occasion the two prosecutors discussed their future 
cooperation. Later on, in January 2013, representative of the two prosecu-
tion offices participated in the investigation against another four members 
of the Danish battalion. Investigation and interrogation of witnesses of 
the crime are continued in Serbia and Croatia. 124
124  www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs.
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Anti-Crime Campaign: Between 
Self-Satisfaction and the Realities
The new government has placed the fight against the corruption and or-
ganized crime on the top of its agenda – at least in words. The same as its 
predecessor it claims that the effects of the campaign are more than good. 
In early 2012, the Democrats (and their coalition partners) argued than 
over the past years of their rule the state won a war against mafia: after al-
most 20 years all gang leaders were in jail, either at home or abroad, and 
the “Zemun clan” had been destroyed at long last.
According to many observers, the new regime’s anti-corruption cam-
paign topped the list of its successes. Public opinion polls show that cit-
izens’ support to the government’s efforts spiraled. On the other hand, 
independent analyst and experts warn that the struggle against corruption 
takes time – one cannot just arrest people but has to prove them and their 
accomplices guilty before courts.
The fact is that, in tandem with their colleagues from the region and 
beyond it, Serbia’s police have managed to tighten their grip on leading 
mafia clans. And yet, one would exaggerate by stating that the organized 
crime in Serbia has been uprooted. New generations gangsters, closely 
connected with their predecessors, have emerged in the meantime – mak-
ing up the so-called third ring of the Zemun clan. Moreover, shootings, 
murders, robberies, sexual abuses or human trafficking make breaking 
news on daily basis.
Corruption: no sequels in courts
For months now politicians, the media and the general public have 
been preoccupied with various corruption affairs. From June 2012 when 
the newly formed government proclaimed “a war on corruption” till early 
2013 many persons were taken into custody or interrogated. On the other 
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hand, EU officials, including those from the European Parliament, have 
been warning the official Belgrade that corruption stands in the way of the 
country’s accession to, let alone the membership of EU.
All in all, once it obtains a fixed date for the beginning of accession 
negotiations Serbia will have to open the most challenging chapters, 23 
and 24, that deal with the judiciary, human rights, rule of law and struggle 
against corruption and organized crime. All this, stress EU officials, implies 
coping with “preconditions” – systemic reforms, adequate legislation and 
empowered control mechanisms.
Jelko Kacin, EP rapporteur for Serbia, said, “Unless it goes against sys-
temic corruption from the very beginning the new government of Serbia 
will neither survive its full term nor meet EU expectations – prove that it 
has sufficiently reformed the country to make it compatible with other 
member-states.” New political leaders, he added, “could maintain and 
strengthen the trust placed in them and establish the rule of law” only 
if they go against the organized crime and corruption within their own 
parties and in their closest circles. Boasting about numbers of persons ar-
rested is not what EU expects of them or what citizens of Serbia expect hav-
ing voted for them as they looked forward to a novel circle of investment 
in development and new jobs rather than moneys going to political par-
ties and individual purses, he explained.125
In late March 2012 the European Parliament adopted a resolution 
calling for urgent review of 24 disputable privatizations and cases of high-
level corruption. The European Commission released it was concerned 
with illegal privatizations especially referring to big companies such as 
“Sartid,” “Jugoremedija,” “Mobtel, “C-Market,” “Belgrade Port,” National 
Savings Bank, “Večernje Novosti,” “Pančevo Nitrogen Plant,” “Nuba In-
vest,” etc. “126
125  Danas, August 29, 2012.
126  Politika, April 16, 2012.
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Investigations, detentions and arrests
Having announced that no one would be “untouchable” in the war 
on corruption, the new government, under the leadership of Vice-Pre-
mier Aleksandar Vučić, began opening investigations, arresting people 
and keeping them in custody. Many of the scandals that broke in the pro-
cess are intriguing by the very fact that suspects had been “protected” 
long before as politicians or tycoons with strong political ties. No wonder, 
therefore, that citizens were taken by surprise when “the richest Serb,” 
owner of “Delta Holding Co.” Miroslav Mišković and his son Marko, to-
gether with seven other persons were taken into custody. All of them were 
accused of misconduct. In early October 2012, the Organized Crime Pros-
ecution opened investigation for misconduct against Oliver Dulić, ex-min-
ister of environmental protection and urban planning. Dulić was accused 
of entrusting Slovenian company “Nuba Invest” with networking Serbia 
with fiber optic cables without a public tender or a license from the RATEL 
Agency – an enterprise worth tens of million Euros.
However, rather than against Dulić indictments were raised against 
his associate Nebojša Janjić and former director general of “Serbia’s Road-
ways” Zoran Drobnjak. The original indictment had been amended after 
police investigation into unpaid taxes in the process of issuing construc-
tion permits for fiber optic cables – an amount of over 2.5 million RSD at 
the detriment of Serbia’s budget. Presently the police investigate into the 
flow of 5.6 million Euros paid to sister companies in Cyprus, Seychelles 
and Netherlands instead of being invested into the network of fiber op-
tic cables, while the Prosecution waits for results of the investigation of its 
Slovenian counterparts into the dealings of “Nuba Holding Co.”127
Following the investigation into “Pančevo Nitrogen Plant” affair, Saša 
Dragin, ex-minister of agriculture, was arrested on November 24, 2012. He 
was charged with malversation involving subsidized fertilizers. Pavle Mil-
jković, director of “Cargo Logistic Center of Belgrade Shipyard,” and Joran 
Janjušević, special adviser for the same company, were also arrested in No-
vember under the charge of misconduct.
127  www.rts.rs/, October 29, 2012.
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Joszef Kasa, vice-premier in the cabinet of Zoran Đinđić, ex-leader of 
the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians and mayor of Subotica, was also ar-
rested for misconduct on November 20, 2012. He was specifically charged 
with malversation involving loans and distribution of bank funds while in 
the office of the director of the Subotica branch of “Agrobank.” His deputy 
at the time, Zoran Milošević, owner of several companies, Peđa Mališano-
vić and expert witness Miomir Paovica were also arrested in the police 
action.128
The “Agrobank” affair opened the Pandora’s box: Dušan Antonić, chair 
of the Management Board, and seven of his associates were arrested in Au-
gust 2012. The bank had bankrupted for having given millions and mil-
lions of uncovered loans. The Prosecution indicted the total of 21 persons 
for 5.7 million RSD damage to the bank. In the meantime Jozsef Kasa was 
released.129
Then, in the last quarter of 2012 with corruption affairs in full swing, 
“Jugoremedija’s” turn came up. Jovića Stefanović, ex-director of this phar-
maceutical company, was arrested on November 7, along with several 
other persons, all of whom suspected for misconduct.
Dušan Borovica, owner of “Vojvodina Roadways” and another big-
wig, was put behind the bars on October 11 together with the company’s 
director and a director of another state-run enterprise. All of the were ar-
rested for misconduct – allegedly for issuing false invoices to the munic-
ipality of Srpska Crnja and thus inflicting 3.1-million-RSD damage to the 
community.130
Miroslav Čutović, owner of “MB Consulting,” was arrested for miscon-
duct on November 26 – he is suspected of selling apartments under con-
struction that have never been constructed. His company went bankrupt.131
Police actions and arrests for corruption, misconduct, crime and or-
ganized crime found an echo in communities across the country to the 
128  www.telegraf.rs, January 1, 2013.
129  Kurir, February 2, 2013.
130  www.telegraf.rs, January 1, 2013.
131  Ibid.
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benefit of Serb Progressive Party /SNS/ and, especially, First Vice-Premier 
Aleksandar Vučić.
The arrest of the year: Miroslav Mišković and son
Miroslav Mišković, the wealthiest man in Serbia, has never been after 
a political career: instead he has indirectly controlled the political scene 
by financing its players. Given that Serbia’s corruption triangle involves 
ruling parties, powerful individuals and the rest tasked with “covering up” 
under-the-counter deals, Mišković’s arrest was the event of the year and, 
as some papers put it, “Vučić’s biggest trump in the war on corruption.”
Mišković, his son Marko and seven other people were arrested on 
December 12, 2012. The event, along with detention of Milo Đurašković, 
owner of “Nibens Group,” was breaking news in all media. They are sus-
pected of a 30-million-Euro worth misconduct involving privatization of 
road construction companies.132
Officials from the ruling coalition pointed out that the state had put 
across a clear-cut message: no one is untouchable and the law applies 
to all without exception. Vice-Premier Vučić confirmed that the case was 
among 24 other cases the work group had investigated. Addressing the 
press he said the prosecution would not have to work hard considering “as 
clear as day” evidence against the “Nibens Group.”
Among other things, Mišković is suspected of 1.5-million-Euro illegal 
profit on just one business transaction with a sister company “Hemslade 
Trading Ltd.” in Cyprus.133
Organized Crime Prosecutor Miljko Radosavljević announced a finan-
cial investigation into the case. Police Director Milorad Veljović pointed 
out that no one was “exempt” from the war on corruption. “The struggle 
will continue without respite,” said Prosecutor Radisavljević.134
Mišković’s lawyers tried to bail him out at any amount the court sets. 
Their plea was turned down in January 2013 and Mišković’s got another 
132  www.rts.rs, December 12, 2012.
133  Ibid.
134  Ibid.
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three months in custody. “The struggle against corruption has just begun. 
Only five out of 24 cases of disputable privatizations have been opened – 
19 of them are pending,” said Aleksandar Vučić.135
In response to the arrest of Milošević, EC released that it was “encour-
aged by the steps Serbian government took in the struggle against corrup-
tion.” The spokesman for the Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Fule 
underlined the struggle against corruption was among main challenges 
facing Serbia. World news agencies reported “he /Mišković/ was often re-
ferred to by the governmental anti-corruption agency, although some 
Western governments are worried that the government is more concerned 
with political showdowns then with radical reforms.”136
Public procurements: corruption 
under the auspices of the state
Each year corruption “eats up” between 800 million and one billion 
Euros – out of which 600 million goes on public procurement. In late 2012, 
Director of the Public Procurement Department Predrag Jovanović warned 
that in one year only the number of tender applicants dropped by 20 per-
cent due to growing distrust in the system and laws.137
Millions of Euros are flowing out of the budget as various groupings 
in charge of public tenders use loops in the law. The State Auditor came 
public that only in 2011 irregularities in public tenders cost the state some 
800 million Euros. However, no one has been called to account. No admin-
istration would give up the practice of appointing partisan cadres who are 
solely tasked with collecting moneys for parties through public tenders.138
Dr. Slaviša Joković, public tenders consultant, takes that the problem 
is in centralized public tenders – in the domains of healthcare, railroad 
system, education, etc. – in which the state is the main supplier and often 
the main tenderer. Unnecessary things are being bought, he says, while 
135  http://www.naslovi.net/, December 16, 2012.
136  Novi Magazin, December 12, 2012.
137  Blic, November 18, 2012.
138  www.slobodnaevropa, June 21, 2012.
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bids are unrealistically high from the very beginning. Contractors insist on 
conditions only one bidder can possibly meet. Contracts are signed under 
summary procedure. The state spends some 3.5 million Euros on public 
tenders each year. And there is no telling how much of these moneys end 
up in private purses.139
In the first half of 2012, adds Joković, only 2.6 bidders on average 
competed in a tender. About one-third, 31 percent, of public procurements 
was made without a public tender. Most potential bidders believe that 
public tenders are rigged.140
In late December 2012 the parliament adopted the Law on Public Pro-
curement providing a partial centralization of the process to be managed 
by the Administration Department. The main goal of the new legislation 
is to secure transparent public procurement and market competition so as 
to suppress corruption. It also provides a “civilian supervisor” for public 
procurements higher than one billion RSD, including those for the mili-
tary and the police. The law invests the Public Procurement Department 
with more authority.
Aleksandar Vučić: praises and criticism
People react differently at Aleksandar Vučić’s great media exposure 
and almost daily announcements of new investigations and arrests for 
corruption (tabloids named him “Serbian Eliot Nes): some praise his cour-
age, persistence and uncompromising attitude, while others are critical 
and suspicious.
UNDP Resistant Representative William Infante commended the gov-
ernment’s efforts and said UNDP research on corruption in Serbia had been 
practically a referendum on the government’s performance. “Serbia is on 
the right track. The government proved to be unbiased and unselective in 
its struggle against corruption. This is what we want to see – zero tolerance 
for corruption,” he said. Since the change of the regime in mid-2012, 150 
139  Večernje Novosti, November 7, 2012.
140  Ibid.
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corruption cases involving governmental officials and others have been 
opened, he stressed, explaining that suspects were from SNS, DS and SPS. 141
Erharhd Busek, Austrian politician and expert for the Balkans, com-
mented, “Apart from Kosovo, EU carefully observes Serbia’s reformist moves, 
above all the steps taken against corruption. First Vice-President Aleksan-
dar Vučić is obviously active and these activities find an echo in EU.”142 In 
six months only Vučić became a favorite of political and cultural circles, 
even of his political opponents and international representatives. He is 
showered with compliments for “energy and courage” from all sides. Some 
compare him with late premier Zoran Đinđić and call him “a young lion.” 
Even Goran Vesić, formerly a high official of Democratic Party, “explained” 
that “Vučić’s campaign against corruption is important not only because EU 
asked for it but also because of powerful cartels that have had their hand 
in everything in the past 10–12 years.”143 Vesna Pešić, former high official 
of LDP, remarked, “Dačić and Vučić’s government is the first to follow on the 
footsteps of Đinđić’s cabinet, leading Serbia towards EU indeed and trying 
to solve the Kosovo issue with realism.” Jelko Kacin of European Parliament, 
commenting Dačić’s and Vučić’s addresses to a meeting, said, “My colleagues 
are impressed by their dedication and argumentation.”144
On the other hand, Bojan Pajtić, vice-president of DS, said that com-
paring Vučić with the assassinated premier and DS leader Zoran Đinđić was 
“insulting.” “If they really think Vučić and Đinđić are comparable, those 
intellectual elites are of questionable intellectual ability.”145
Most of Vučić’s critics argue that this is all about self-promotion and 
political ratings. They disapprove his premature announcements of crimi-
nal proceedings, arrests, prosecution motions and punishments. Nada Kol-
undzija of DS said, “Aside from media hullabaloo the effects of the struggle 
against corruption can be evaluated only once courts of law have their say. 
Extreme rightist groupings are encouraged and institutions, media and 
141  RTS, January 28, 2013.
142  Večernje Novosti, January 15, 2013.
143  Blic, January 28, 2013.
144  Ibid.
145  www.blic.rs/, March 10, 2013.
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individuals systematically threatened – and the government supports this 
in a way by the very fact that it does not condemn such developments.”146
In the opinion of Zoran Ivošević, former judge of the Supreme Court, 
Vučić puts courts under pressure with his frequent statements about 
whether or not someone committed a crime. “Vučić says he thinks that a 
person has not committed a crime but his opinion means little, for pros-
ecutors and judges are there to have a last say. If that’s so, why does he 
voice his opinion at all?” says Ivošević. He added that judges are fright-
ened and under stress as their status has not been solved yet – presidents 
of courts have not been appointed, there are only acting presidents and 
the situation of the judiciary is “deplorable.” “Vučić is plenipotentiary and 
everything he says affects everyone, including trembling judges.”147
Miroslav Prokopijević, economist, says, “Big business companies and 
politics are inextricable in Serbia. Therefore, any anti-corruption cam-
paign implies a simple question: ‘How deep will they dig and will anyone 
be ready to investigate people known as party financiers? Tomislav Nikolić 
admitted once that tycoons such as Milan Beko and Miroslav Mišković had 
financed Serb Radical Party /SRS/ but the manner in which political parties 
are financed is still a secret.” He doubts, as he put it, that no one will be 
untouchable in the struggle against corruption.148
According to the public opinion survey conducted by CeSID and UNDP 
in January 2013 citizens’ support to the government’s anti-corruption 
campaign spiraled in the past six months. The number of those taking 
that the government does the right thing doubled, while 50 percent of 
interviewees believe that the level of corruption would be lowered. Such 
optimistic findings are unprecedented when compared with five earlier 
polling cycles, quotes CeSID report.149
Findings of the survey conducted by “TNS Media Gallup” in June 2012 
corruption “champions” are doctors, political parties, judges, prosecutors, 
customs officers, local administration, the police, the media and tax agencies.
146  Danas, January 8. 2013.
147  www.blic.rs, February 14, 2013.
148  www.dw.de, September 21, 2012.
149  www.rts.rs/, January 28, 2013.
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Questionable Privatizations: 
Still in EU’s Focus
Numbers of privatizations in the past decade have been proclaimed state 
secret. Since 2002 Serbia has cashed in some 11 billion Euros on all pri-
vatized companies. Property that has secretly changed ownership is 3-bil-
lion-Euro worth.
In a resolution adopted on March 29, 2012 the European Parliament re-
ferred to 24 questionable privatizations and appealed to Serbia to urgently 
declassify relevant documentation.150 Commissioner for Information of 
Public Significance Rodoljub Šabić had already argued that documentation 
on disputable privatization could not be labeled “state secret” – not only be-
cause the practice contradicted EU standards but also domestic legislation. 
He also underlined that EU warning should be taken seriously – Rumania 
and Bulgaria, he said, had missed the opportunity of using EU funds just be-
cause their struggle against corruption had been inadequate.
In the matter of questionable privatizations EC has used the report of 
the parliamentary Council for the Struggle against Corruption. The police 
and the prosecution have been collecting the evidence when Aleksandar 
Vučić announced a war on corruption. According to Vučić, from August 
1, 2012 till March 10, 2013 115 persons were reported against and 89 of 
suspects arrested. Total damage was estimated at almost 78 billion Euros, 
while profit at 60 billion.
Investigations in 24 questionable privatizations, said Vučić, can be 
considerably slowed down by the very fact that there were not enough 
judges and prosecutors to devote themselves completely to the issue. 
Judges and prosecutors in the Special Court were preoccupied with ongo-
ing trials to Sreten Jocić, accused of the murder of Croatian journalist Ivo 
Pukanić, to Luka Bojović, charged with a number of crimes, to Darko Šarić 
accused of drug traffic, retrial to “Red Berets” for the armed mutiny, etc.
150  Article 19 of the Resolution.
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Prisons: Overcrowded 
and Inadequate151
The effects of the Amnesty Law passed in 2012 were not as expected – the 
problem of prison overcrowding was not solved. According to the Central 
Prison Administration, 3,600 prisoners could have been amnestied at the 
time 11,500 persons were either under sentence or awaiting trial while the 
accommodation capacity of prisons was 7,000 persons. In late 2012 1,050 
prisoners were granted pardon. However, 450 persons awaiting imprison-
ment took their place.
Overcrowding chronically plagues Serbia’s prisons: the right to early 
release is rarely exercised on the one hand and, on the other, courts of law 
frequently rule detention. The number of prisoners awaiting trial is huge 
considering slow-paced legal proceedings.
Due to insufficient accommodation capacity and overcrowding, pris-
oners are classified into those under sentence and those awaiting trial. 
Generally, persons imprisoned for misdemeanor are not separated from 
those with longer criminal records, and juveniles from adults, mentally ill 
and prisoners dependent on psychoactive substances. Whenever these cat-
egories of prisoners are separated, this is done for security reasons rather 
than by the criteria of treatment.
Prisons are understaffed and this relates to all departments, especially 
to security services. In some prison institutions the ratio between security 
officers and prisoners is 1:30. Besides, security officers often work long and 
double shifts and have not undergone systematic medical examinations in 
the past ten years.
Healthcare services are among the weakest links in the chain of prison 
structure. Their independent and professional treatment of prisoners is 
151  Helsinki Committee has been monitoring the situation of human rights in prisons 
for years. In 2012, with the assistance of Civil Rights Defenders, the Committee’s 
team toured 5 biggest prison institutions in Serbia. As a strategic member of 
NPM, the Committee participated in monitoring of several closed institutions.
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questioned by the very fact that they are under the jurisdiction of the Min-
istry of Justice rather than the Ministry of Healthcare. As these services are 
understaffed as a rule, security officers are additionally burdened with dis-
tribution of medicines to prisoners.
All this is further aggravated by the state of living areas and dormi-
tories (bunk beds, humidity, inadequate access to daily light, bathrooms 
and general hygiene), inadequate meals (monotone with almost no fruits 
and vegetables at menus), unorganized recreation and poor work engage-
ment of prisoners.
However, despite all these serious problems plaguing prisons, the 
government decided to place personnel issues in the Central Prison Ad-
ministration on the priority agenda. In October 2012 Milan Stevović was 
appointed the new director and several prison managers were replaced (in 
prisons in Niš, Zabela/Požarevac and women prison in Požarevac).
Amnesty law and alternative sanctions
The Amnesty Law was passed in late 2012 without a public debate. 
The purpose of the law was to solve the problem of overcrowding. Over 
his presidential campaign Tomislav Nikolić had promised to pass the law.
Although expert circles, judges, police officers and even victim of tor-
ture were critical about the draft, the law was adopted under summary 
procedure. Minister of Justice Nikola Selaković argued that the new law 
would help to solve the problem of overcrowding, improve living condi-
tions (in accordance with European standards) and decrease the expend-
iture. No official information about positive effects of the law is available 
although it has been in effect for eight months. On the other hand, over-
crowding persists.
The law provides immediate amnesty for persons punished with up 
to three-month imprisonment. It also provides halving of three to six-
months prison sentences, the possibility of reducing over 6-month sen-
tences by one fourth, as well as amnesty for all prisoners above 70. Exempt 
from amnesty are persons punished for organized crime, terrorism, mur-
der, violent crimes, war crimes, drug traffic and bribe, as well as recidivists.
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According to the Central Prison Administration (April 15, 2013), about 
2,000 persons have been released under the law since October 2012. Di-
rector Milan Stevović informed the parliamentary Commission for the 
Control of Execution of Criminal Sentences that “the number of persons 
deprived of their liberty has been reduced from 11,300 to 10,228.”
No official information have been released about the number of per-
sons under sentence awaiting imprisonment at the time the law was en-
forced and the number of those who have been actually imprisoned since.
As a side effect, numbers of sentenced persons awaiting admission 
showed up in prisons on their own free will hoping to be immediately am-
nestied under the law – and this only added to overcrowding. So it hap-
pened that the Women’s Penitentiary in Pozarevac had to put extra beds 
in the anyway overcrowded dormitories to accommodate newcomers. As 
many as 5 “volunteers” showed up at prison gate each day. Dormitories 
for 71 women prisoners at most accommodated 85 women.
Another adverse effect of the law’s implementation is that more pris-
oners were entitled to have their sentences shortened than to be amnes-
tied. Even the right to amnesty raised many questions. For instance, it 
applied to Miladin Kovačević, punished with 27-month imprisonment for 
brutal beating of an American student in Boston (he was released under 
the law in November 2012 instead of January 2013) and to Uroš Mišić, 
sentenced to prison for brutal violence against a police officer during a 
football match. Sentences passed to well-known mafioso Sreten Jocić and 
murders of French resident Brice Taton were shortened by 10 percent.
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III – THE SECURITY 
SYSTEM:  
 SLOW ADJUSTMENT TO 
EUROPEAN STANDARDS
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Serbia’s Military Neutrality and 
EU Security and Defense Policy
The process of Serbia’s institutional cooperation with NATO began on 14 
December 2006 when Serbia became a member of the Partnership for 
Peace programme. On 26 December 2007, Serbia declared its military neu-
trality in a single sentence in the National Assembly’s resolution on the 
protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional or-
der of Serbia. The National Defence Strategy was adopted in April and the 
National Security Strategy in October 2009. The previously adopted pol-
icy of military neutrality is not only not worked out in any detail but not 
even mentioned in either strategy. A foreign policy strategy – one of the 
most important strategic documents of every country – has not yet been 
adopted.
The militarily neutral countries of Europe cannot be compared to Ser-
bia in any context. The differences between these countries and Serbia 
are enormous. Culturally they have always been considered as belonging 
to the Western civilization and are treated as friendly countries by NATO. 
Apart from that, they are rich countries and therefore can finance their 
neutrality. The majority of these militarily neutral states are members of 
the EU. The EU founding treaties and other acts regulate the areas of for-
eign policy and security and defence, with the Treaty of Lisbon renaming 
the European Security and Defence Policy Common Security and Defence 
Policy to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
Starting with the Treaty of Maastricht, all ratifying states assume the 
obligations stemming from all the treaties including the Treaty of Lisbon 
unless there is an explicit arrangement to the contrary. For instance, under 
the 1992 Treaty of Edinburgh, Denmark was exempted from participating 
in the CSDP. All member states of the EU must abide by the provisions of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. However, some of these provisions, particularly those 
concerning the CSDP, are not as rigid and narrowly standardized as those 
concerning the application of certain legislation within the ‘first pillar’ of 
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the EU. States are required to take part in creating and implementing the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but that is all. Participation is 
based on the principle of cooperation and solidarity which is not strictly 
and precisely laid down.
Both the CSDP and CFSP are formulated wherever the EU deems it nec-
essary, though member states are still sovereign makers of their foreign, 
security and defence policies. It is not before they ‘sanction’ in EU bodies a 
EU action within the framework of the CSDP and CFSP that a ‘common pol-
icy’ comes into play and becomes binding.
Some experts in Serbia consider that these new developments have 
put small states in a situation where they must follow and support the 
foreign policy of the ‘big’ EU members although they may not agree with 
every decision of ‘vital interest’, but that agreement on a ‘common’ policy 
could not be achieved in any other way.
The object of this policy is to ensure EU’s operational capacity to carry 
out specific military and civilian missions throughout the world. The Treaty 
of Lisbon introduces an enlarged list of the Petersberg tasks: along with 
traditional operations such as humanitarian missions, they now include 
rescue missions, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, crisis manage-
ment operations, joint disarmament operations, military advice and as-
sistance and anti-terrorist operations. The Treaty formulates a ‘common 
defence clause’ which obliges EU member states which have agreed to the 
provisions of the Common Security and Defence Policy to come to the aid 
of an EU member in case it is attacked.
Because it does not specify what kind of assistance a state is obliged to 
render in such a case, this provision can in no way be likened to Article 5 
of the Treaty of NATO. There is also a ‘solidarity clause’ which obliges states 
to render possible military assistance to a member affected by a man-
made or natural disaster or terrorist attack. The Treaty provides for ‘per-
manent structured cooperation’. It is open to any country wishing to be 
part of the European military armament programme and to make availa-
ble its combat effectives ready for immediate action. The ‘solidarity clause’ 
of the Treaty implies obligatory though vaguely defined military assis-
tance between EU member states.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 96 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 97
97Serbia’s Military Neutrality and EU Security and Defense Policy
The new meaning a country’s military neutrality acquires once the 
country becomes a member of the EU is the subject of a wide debate be-
cause, inter alia, the Treaty of Lisbon itself says: ‘...while the inclusion of 
the clause on mutual defence does not prejudice the specific character of 
the security and defence policy of certain member state, it is questionable, 
taking account of the very substance of the clause, whether it will be pos-
sible to preserve the neutrality of those states.’
The Swedish Ambassador to Serbia, Christer Asp, says that Sweden 
would not remain passive in the event of an attack on a EU member state 
and that its policy of neutrality in the new circumstances would be of no 
relevance. The clauses in no way imply that aid and assistance must be 
limited to military means. In the event of an attack, military assistance to 
a EU member under attack probably would not have to be regulated by the 
CSDP in order to be realized. Although the Treaty of Lisbon entered into 
force a month after the adoption of strategic documents of the Republic of 
Serbia, there was no expert debate on the innovations the document intro-
duces in the areas of security and defence. It is little known in Serbia that 
the Treaty of Lisbon reaffirms that NATO remains the pillar of collective se-
curity of those NATO members which are also members of the EU. This does 
not apply to non-NATO members of the EU which do not want this.
What is also insufficiently known in Serbia is that for the present the 
CSDP does not aspire to turn into a defensive functional structure which 
could become an alternative to NATO. Contrary to what certain politicians 
and analysts in Serbia argue, the CSDP cannot be an alternative to mem-
bership of NATO because it has no common chain of command.
As mentioned before, membership of the CSDP does not mean that a 
member must renounce its military neutrality. Nevertheless, some provi-
sions of the CSDP, notably those concerned with the common interests and 
missions, such as the functioning of EULEX, are inconsistent with the way 
in which Serbia has defined its military neutrality and foreign policy. The 
previous government took account of this in Chapter 31 when it filled out 
the European Commission questionnaire.152
152  Jan Litavski: ‘Kontroverze vojne neutralnosti Srbije’, Novi Vek quarterly, CEAS, 
No.1, August 2012. http://ceas-serbia.org/root/tromesecnik/novi-vek-broj-02.pdf.
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Before adopting a policy of military neutrality, one should answer the 
following crucial question: is a militarily neutral Serbia, regardless of all 
its bilateral cooperation agreements in the area of defence, able to address 
by itself every security challenge, risk and threat in the new century? The 
globalization has turned the spotlight on many transnational processes 
such as the development of communications, transport, a free and liberal 
market and the porosity of interstate borders. Also, new threats are emerg-
ing to the security of states such as states in the process of dissolution, in-
ternational terrorist organizations and organized transnational criminal 
groups. Because most states belonging to the political West consider that 
in such circumstances they cannot confront such threats on their own, 
they are trying to bolster their security and defence through joint action, 
cooperation and membership of alliances.
The concept of military neutrality in circumstances such as those 
mentioned above implies that Serbia should develop a system of defence 
which would enable it to rely on its own military forces. This in turn im-
plies a redefinition of its security and defence strategy. In this connec-
tion, many important issues relating to defence of the country are being 
raised such as those concerning the organization of the army and its nu-
merical strength, the reintroduction of compulsory military service and 
extensive studies which entail substantial expenditure. If Serbia wishes 
to be taken as a serious militarily neutral state, it must have its own au-
tonomous military forces to guarantee its undisturbed functioning. This 
necessitates a huge defence budget, something overindebted and demo-
graphically threatened Serbia cannot afford.153
For Serbia, which is not part of NATO integrations which have played 
an important role in Eastern European countries in reforming their se-
curity systems, it is very important to continue the process of European 
integration and assume the obligations stemming from the CSDP, which 
implies, inter alia, the implementation of the much-needed reforms in 
the security sector (strengthening the institutions for democratic over-
sight of the security sector, reform of the judiciary, etc.), something which 
153  Jan Litavski: ‘Kontroverze vojne neutralnosti Srbije’, Novi Vek quarterly, CEAS, 
No.1, August 2012. http://ceas-serbia.org/root/tromesecnik/novi-vek-broj-02.pdf.
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self-declared military neutrality does not necessitate. The former State 
Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, Tanja Miščević, says: ‘Although it re-
quires economic integration above all, the European Union in its Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy requires future members to align with 
the rules existing in this field. The content, concept and logic of these rules 
are highly varied and are based on standards and political criteria as well 
as on international and regional treaties and arrangements. It is therefore 
very important to understand the very logic of this common EU policy and 
the obligations stemming from it before Serbia receives a start date for EU 
membership negotiations.154The specific provisions regarding foreign pol-
icy and common security indicate that the Union’s activities on the inter-
national scene are based on the principles, adjusted to the objectives and 
conducted in accordance with the Union’s general foreign policy provi-
sions (under Article 23 of the Treaty on European Union).
The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security 
policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to 
the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common de-
fence policy which may lead to a common defence. Since the adoption of 
acts of a legislative nature is ruled out, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union has no competence over the provisions relating to this area. The Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Commission play specific roles in this area laid 
down by the founding acts. Within the framework of the principles and 
objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and im-
plement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development 
of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of 
questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing 
degree of convergence of Member States’ actions (Article 24) ... Such defi-
nition of this policy is the outcome of agreements among member states; 
what is of special interest to a state wishing to become an EU member is 
how to comply with the obligations in this segment of the activity of the 
Union.
154  Tanja Miščević: ‘Obaveze prema Zajedničkoj bezbednosnoj i odbrambenoj politici u 
daljem procesu evropske integracije Srbije’, Novi Vek quarterly, CEAS, No.2, November 
2012. http://ceas-serbia.org/root/tromesecnik/Novi-vek-broj-2-Tanja-Miscevic.pdf.
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This is not a matter of adopting technical standards existing in, for 
example, the area of agriculture or trade, because the EU has actually de-
veloped no such standards in the area of defence and security (or, more 
precisely, it has not developed too many of such standards). Besides, it 
is necessary that some obligations from this common policy should be 
adopted and implemented at an early stage of integration, such as the po-
litical principle of democratic and civilian control of the security sector, 
while others can wait until a later phase of accession to the Union. As a 
state wishing to be granted a start date for EU membership accession nego-
tiations as soon as possible, the Republic of Serbia must be aware of what 
the process of European security integration entails. While some of these 
requirements have already been the subject of reforms and assessments 
of the European Commission, some of them (actually, the majority of re-
quirements or obligations) will be brought up during negotiations when 
the negotiation Chapter 31 relating to the Common Foreign, Security and 
Defence Policy is opened.
The first group of obligations – political criteria: A general obligation 
of every future member of the EU is to respect European values, which 
by all means include general democratization and the prohibition of dis-
crimination. Civilian and democratic control of the security forces (armed 
forces, police and security forces, both civilian and military) is certainly 
the most significant requirement in this regard in the area of security. 
Since this obligation is regarded as a democratic achievement of devel-
oped European societies, it becomes a political criterion for every state 
wishing to become a member of the EU.
In Serbia, the legal basis for such control is established by the consti-
tutional provision according to which the country’s armed forces are un-
der democratic and civilian control. Their use outside the borders of the 
state must be sanctioned by the National Assembly. These provisions are 
further elaborated in relevant legislation (the Law on the Army, Law on 
Defence, Law on Basic Principles of Establishment of Security Forces, Law 
on the Military Intelligence and Military Security Agencies, Law on the 
use of the Serbian Armed Forces (VS) and other defence forces in multina-
tional operations outside the borders of the Republic of Serbia and other 
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laws), strategic documents (the defence and national security strategies) 
and the Decision on Abolishing Compulsory Military Service.
The area of law enforcement has been regulated in a similar manner 
by adopting the Law on the Police and the strategy of development of the 
Ministry of the Interior (MUP) for the period 2011–2016. Although the le-
gal basis is adequate, there is much room for its improvement in this seg-
ment, particularly towards strengthening the sector for internal control of 
the MUP and the anti-corruption sector. Investigative actions by the secu-
rity services are a matter of particular concern because these services can 
control intelligence used in criminal investigations.
Nevertheless, the key role in democratic and civilian control is played 
by the National Assembly and its Committee for Defence and Internal Af-
fairs and Committee for the Oversight of Security Services. In the assess-
ment of the European Commission, as expressed in its opinion on Serbia’s 
candidate status and the 2012 Progress Report, the lack of recourses, ex-
pertise and qualified staff is the key problem and weakness of the As-
sembly’s oversight function. Owing to these limitations the competent 
authorities cannot carry out their duties as they should within the scope 
of their competences, their work being for the most part of a reactive na-
ture and limited to periodical routine hearings. Consequently, this mat-
ter will continue to be analysed by the European Commission during all 
upcoming phases of Serbia’s integration process and therefore must not 
be neglected by the Assembly and the competent ministries and services.
There is another very important matter in the area of political criteria; 
it concerns the general rule of non-discrimination and is also of consider-
able relevance to the security sector. This matter concerns the position of 
women wearing uniform. While there are no EU nor NATO standards in this 
segment, this is a general direction of the democratization and the use of 
all available capacities. Hence the emphasis of implementing UN Security 
Council Resolution 1325 concerning the security of women in conflict and 
in peace conditions.
Although there is no implementation obligation in this case, on the 
basis of this Resolution Serbia in 2011 adopted its National Action Plan 
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and began its successful implementation – an element of proactivity which 
is highly appreciated in the process of European integration.
The second group of obligations comprises direct obligations in the 
area of defence and security. The negotiation Chapter 31 covers several 
segments all of which are very diverse. They may be viewed as obliga-
tions related to trade in armaments and military equipment, multi-sec-
toral obligations linked to this trade, prohibition of proliferation of arms 
for mass destruction as well as advancement of special purposes industry 
and research in this field and, finally, contribution to EU missions. As a pri-
marily economic integration, the EU is very interested in, inter alia, trade 
in armaments and equipment; however, in this case it has to deal with 
scant legislation at the international level as well as complex and with fre-
quently conflicting rules existing at the regional and national levels.
The Union sees a way out of this in adopting an arms trade treaty, the 
subject of talks conducted during June 2012 on the basis of a report by the 
UN Secretary-General. At present, the EU is encouraging work on drawing 
up an arms trade treaty with the prime object of defining standards con-
cerning arms imports, exports and trade.
EU members stress the importance of a coherent and effective sys-
tem of controlling the contracting parties, lying emphasis on the licensing 
system, improving border controls and oversight of arms trade, enhanc-
ing the transparency of the Arms Register and assisting states in the fight 
against illicit trade in arms. It goes without saying that the outcome of 
these negotiations within the UN will be obligatory for Serbia as a member 
of the world organization, without any pressure from the EU. At present, 
Serbia is regularly discharging its obligation to submit information to the 
UN Register of Conventional Arms.
Preventing arms smuggling as well as preventing trafficking in illegal 
arms and dangerous substances is a component part of the second seg-
ment of issues relating to arms trade within the framework of the negoti-
ation Chapter 31, which pertain to trade in dual-use goods. Because these 
goods are encompassed by the general regime subject to the rules of com-
petition, implementation of the provisions is very strictly controlled. The 
basic regulation is the Council Regulation 6/2002 which defines dual-use 
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goods as objects which may be used for civilian and military purposes and 
include computer programs and technology. Exporting these goods to the 
territory of a non-EU member is subject to special export licences (this is 
regulated in more detail in the Annex to the Regulation) which must also 
be obtained when exporting to a state subject to a UN or OSCE embargo. 
The obligation to apply for export licences applies to exporters who are 
brokers but not to a state-owned company. In respect of them, a state may 
adopt legislation to extend the controls established under this Regula-
tion. A state may also make it necessary to obtain export licences for other 
goods if the interests of public security and protection of human rights so 
require, but it will have to notify the European Commission thereof.
Export licences are issued by the competent authority of the state in 
which the exporter or broker is registered, which means that such an au-
thority must exist in the state and be able to issue licences. The authority 
must additionally keep current with the list of dual-use products for which 
licences are issued by the EU itself (the list is defined by Annex II to the 
Regulation) because states have no competence to do that. Furthermore, 
there is the possibility of another member requesting that a licence be not 
issued in view of overriding security interests. Rules governing exports 
of military technology and equipment are the prime requirement in this 
segment; their lack is also the most serious deficiency in Serbia at present 
which requires special attention in the period ahead. The Council Com-
mon Position 944/2008/CF SP, which defines the common rules governing 
control of exports of military technology and equipment, updates and re-
places the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports which had been in oper-
ation since 1998 and observed by Serbia too. The amendment introduced 
in the Council Common Position of 2008 aims to improve the existing in-
struments within the system of control of arms exports because it expands 
them to encompass brokering, questions of transit and transactions and 
the area of technology transfer.
The criteria which must be met in the process of issuing export li-
cences are reiterated and insistence is made on continuance of regular no-
tification and Common Military List of the European Union as a reference 
document for interpreting embargoes on arms exports. Although Serbia 
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 104 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 105
104 serbia 2012 : THE SECURITY SYSTEM: SLOW ADJUSTMENT TO EUROPEAN STANDARDS 
accepts the Common Military List, it does not accept the Council Common 
Position; this therefore will be a very important aspect of future reforms 
and adjustments in this area.
There are two very important intersectoral issues closely linked to 
trade in armaments and military equipment as well as to questions of de-
fence and security. The first is the question of public procurement in the 
area of defence and security, which regulates procurement of arms, mil-
itary equipment, works and services in the area of security and defence. 
The Directive requires EU members to announce a public competition at 
the level of the EU regarding any supply or service contract exceeding 
€412,000 and/or €5 million for contracting work. There are two reasons for 
this requirement: the interoperability of European forces (identical equip-
ment and joint action) and protection of data at the level of the Union. An 
EU member may be exempted from this method of contracting for supplies 
and work only if it proves that such contracting could endanger its crucial 
security interests (this being confirmed by Article 346 of the Treaty of Lis-
bon), such exemption being under control of the European Commission 
and the International Court of Justice.
Data protection is very highly ranked in the EU system of defence and 
security for reasons other than public procurement.
The procedure for handling classified information and making rules 
for their use by establishing minimum security standards (personal and 
physical) is set out by EU Council Decision 8. Under this decision, classified 
information encompasses all data and materials having EU security classi-
fication. At the level of the EU, their protection is the responsibility of the 
Council’s General Secretariat and their unauthorized disclosure may cause 
damage to the Union or its members of various degrees.
Serbia’s commitments in the area of protecting classified information 
began by concluding an agreement to participate in EU missions, under 
which Serbia agreed to abide by the procedures for protecting and safe-
guarding classified information in accordance with Union rules. This, on 
the other hand, implies the existence of a complete structure necessary 
for compliance, especially in case of participation in EU peacekeeping mis-
sions. A structure of this kind is difficult to establish within a short time 
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frame; until it is fully in place, problems relating to access to classified in-
formation will be regulated in accordance with the Agreement on security 
procedures for exchanging classified information, which provides for tech-
nical arrangements for every individual participation of soldiers, police-
men or civilians in these EU missions.
There is one very important aspect of this for Serbia’s defence indus-
try, i.e. being able to participate in competitive bidding in the Union, an 
activity where, it is stressed, secrecy of information must be respected. 
This matter is directly linked to the area of industrial security where data 
protection is a matter of course and obligatory for companies with which 
the EU has a contract or is negotiating on concluding a contract. The lack 
of legislation to regulate this matter in Serbia is a limitation on domes-
tic companies wishing to do business in the EU market and a serious flaw 
when it comes to approximation with the EU acquis.
The danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
is a challenge recognized by every strategy including the security strat-
egy of the EU. In addition, the European Council has adopted a Strategy 
against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction designed to op-
erate preventively against programmes aimed at developing, proliferating 
and delivering WMD. The Strategy promotes a comprehensive approach to 
the fight against the proliferation of all kinds of weapons. This also in-
cludes control of exports of dual-use goods and fight against the smug-
gling of light weapons and small arms as well as biological and chemical 
weapons. The Strategy against the proliferation of WMD is based on multi-
lateralism because it consolidates the legal framework of conventions and 
the operation of international organizations. As regards the WMD, Serbia’s 
commitment to the EU Strategy in this area began with the conclusion of 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement, its Article 3 providing for an 
obligation to this effect as a fundamental element of the Agreement (a 
failure to comply with the obligation would constitute the basis for sus-
pending the Agreement).
Serbia has acceded to the most important international conventions 
and organizations concerned with atomic, chemical and biological weap-
ons. In 2006 it also acceded to the Initiative against the proliferation of 
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weapons of mass destruction. What is still missing and must be aligned in 
this area is joining the following international control regimes: the Was-
senaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime – MTCR, Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and Chemical Weapons Convention-CWC.
Serbia’s obligations will also relate to the area of atomic, chemical and 
biological security, in particular concerning prevention, early detection 
and response to possible threats, above all from terrorist groups. Chemical 
weapons control is another important obligation. It is exercised through 
the work and activities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) whose activities the EU supports as part of its joint action. 
Special attention is paid to the fight against illicit acquisition and smug-
gling of light and small arms. This is a good example of Serbia’s proactive 
action and acceptance of obligations already at an early stage of its EU in-
tegration. In the assessment of the European Commission, Serbia namely 
complies with the most important EU act and mechanism in this area, the 
EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms 
and light weapons and their ammunition It is especially important to note 
that Serbia complies with control of manufacture of and trade in weapons 
as well as with control of surplus stockpiles and their destruction (mainly 
with help from international organizations and partner states). What is 
also important is the existence of national coordinating mechanisms for 
implementing control made up of representatives of competent institu-
tions. What still remains to be done in this area is the marking of weapons 
at the time of their import; this is required under the UN Protocol for the 
purpose of codification in accordance with NATO standards which Serbia 
adopted only recently.
The area of the defence industry and the strengthening of its base are 
of great significance both for the Union and for its members as a condition 
of strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. This 
is not so only because the defence industry is an industry making consid-
erable profits, but also because it and technological innovation can help 
the Union to prove itself on the global market and increase its influence 
throughout the world. The central body responsible for strengthening this 
segment and coordinating members’ activities is the European Defence 
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 106 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 107
107Serbia’s Military Neutrality and EU Security and Defense Policy
Agency (EDA), which aims to strengthen defence capabilities and promote 
research and development in the areas of defence and armaments coop-
eration. The EDA’s main priorities are detection and removal of explosive 
devices, medical support, information, surveillance and reconnaissance, 
helicopters, cyber defence, multinational logistic support, exchange of in-
formation, strategic and technical management, fuels and energy. Because 
these priorities are also compatible with the needs of the special purposes 
industry and of the establishment of cooperation with the EDA is one of 
the VS’s main priorities.
In order to establish cooperation with the EDA, it is necessary to con-
clude a technical arrangement. The EDA Steering Board (made up of 26 
Defence Ministers of EU Member States and chaired by the High Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs) gave the green light for this 
in March 2012. By concluding an arrangement with the EDA Serbia will 
find itself among the top partners in the area of special purposes indus-
try research and development in the region as well as in Europe. It will 
be the only country in the region of the Western Balkans and, besides 
Norway and Switzerland, the third in Europe to have concluded such an 
agreement. Key areas in which Serbia and the EDA could cooperate include 
technology research and development (in line with the European Defence 
Research and Technology Strategy), development and procurement of ar-
maments and military equipment and development of the European De-
fence Technological and Industrial Base.
Finally, as a high point of joint action and also to prove its operational 
capacity, every state wishing to join the Union will be expected to partic-
ipate in crisis-management operations and missions as well as in Union 
combat groups. In our view, such operational activity not only proves that 
one has adopted standards and measures existing in the EU, it also brings 
multiple political benefits. The legal basis for Serbia’s integration was set 
by the signing of the Framework agreement on the participation of Serbia 
in EU crisis management operations (the Framework Agreement) and the 
Agreement on security procedures exchanging and protecting classified in-
formation. The basis also comprises the internal law of Serbia which per-
mits the participation of its defence forces in multinational operations. 
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However, the existence of a legal basis alone does not amount to much 
unless there is the necessary interoperability with the armed forces of the 
states taking part in such operations – the requirements include opera-
tional and material standardization and knowledge of foreign languages 
and general procedures. The EU does not define nor determine the inter-
operability required for its operations and is guided by the rules defined 
within the framework of NATO.
In order to apply successfully for membership of the EU, Serbia must 
respect the rules regulating the relations of partnership with NATO. Ser-
bia’s operational participation in EU missions is possible by achieving 
the partnership objectives within the Partnership for Peace programme, 
designating units and developing an Operational Capabilities Concept 
programme. We wish to point out that this involves a very effective and 
‘practical approach because the capacities are not duplicated but rather 
strengthened’.155
The European Union, European Commission 
and security system in Serbia in 2012–2013
Serbia was granted candidate status for membership of the European 
Union at the beginning of March 2012. The granting of a date for the start 
of accession talks was put off and will depend on the implementation of 
the Belgrade-Pristina agreement initialled on 19 April 2013.156The Euro-
pean Commission’s annual reports on Serbia’s progress in the European 
Integration Process show a disproportionate lack of reference to, and an 
absence of critical comments on, the state affairs in the security system and 
the need to reform the security system (RSB) compared to other fields.157 
155  Tanja Miščević: ‘Obaveze prema Zajedničkoj bezbednosnoj i odbrambenoj politici u 
daljem procesu evropske integracije Srbije’, Novi Vek quarterly, CEAS, No.2, November 
2012. http://ceas-serbia.org/root/tromesecnik/Novi-vek-broj-2-Tanja-Miscevic.pdf.
156  Radio Slobodna Evropa, 19 April 2013. ‘Brisel: Beograd i Priština parafirali 
sporazum o severu Kosova’. http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/eston-
beograd-i-pristina-parafirali-sporazum-o-severu-kosova/24962174.html .
157  Report ‘Sektor bezbednosti kao Prvi glas Srbije, CAES, March 2013. http://
ceas-serbia.org/root/prilozi/Izvestaj-sektor-bezbednosti-Srbije.pdf.
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Portions of the 2012 Report published in October pertaining to the secu-
rity system158 and the RSB are to be found in the following chapters:
Political criteria: Democracy and the rule of law 
Civilian oversight of security forces
There was little progress on civilian oversight of security forces. A spe-
cial parliamentary committee for civilian oversight of security services was 
set up in July, in line with the 2010 rules of procedure. Parliamentary 
oversight remained limited in practice. The legal framework for the mon-
itoring of communications by security and intelligence services needs to 
be clarified. Provisions of the Law on Military Security and Military Intelli-
gence Agencies which allowed sensitive data related to citizens’ communi-
cations to be monitored without a court order were ruled unconstitutional 
by the Constitutional Court in April 2012. There are allegations that the 
unclear legal situation has led to abuses. A law on access to state security 
files remains to be adopted.
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security
The capacity of the police to carry out, independently of the security 
intelligence agencies, certain special investigative measures in criminal in-
vestigations needs to be established in line with EU standards. Overall, 
Serbia is moderately advanced as regards police cooperation and the fight 
against organized crime.
Conclusion Serbia made some progress in the area of justice, freedom 
and security. Serbia is actively involved in international police and judi-
cial cooperation and law enforcement agencies generally have sufficient 
capacity to carry out standard investigations. Additional efforts are needed 
to increase capacities to carry out complex investigation and to strengthen 
coordination between law enforcement agencies and the judiciary. A track 
record of proactive investigations and final convictions in organized crime 
cases needs to be built up. Overall, preparations in the area of justice, free-
dom and security are moderately advanced.
158  For the purposes of this report the term ‘security system’ means 
the army, police and intelligence and security services.
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Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy
As regards security measures, in February 2012 Serbia ratified the 
May 2011 agreement with the EU on security procedures for exchanging 
and protecting classified information. Concerning the common security 
and defence policy (CSDP), in February 2012 Serbia ratified the June 2011 
agreement establishing a framework for Serbia’s participation in civilian 
and military crisis management operations. Serbia is participating in the 
EU Navfor-Atlanta Somalia operation and EUTM Somalia operation with 
one member each. Serbia attended the EU Battlegroups conference in April 
2012. Following the granting of candidate status, Serbia started to partici-
pate in meetings of the EU Military Committee in March 2012.
Conclusion Serbia significantly improved its alignment with EU dec-
larations and Council decisions in the area of CFSP and showed continued 
commitment to participate in EU civilian and military crisis management 
operations. Overall, preparations in the area of foreign, security and de-
fence policy are well on track.159
Serbian media have reported much more extensively on almost all 
other parts of this year’s Serbia Progress Report, as well as those from pre-
vious reports, than on parts directly or indirectly relating to the security 
sector.
The security system in the 2012 electoral campaign 
and during the first months of the new government
In spite of the obvious need to continue the reform of the security 
system in Serbia, a need also highlighted by the European Commission, 
during the electoral campaign preparatory for the presidential and par-
liamentary elections in 2012, the politicians standing for elections hardly 
ever made a reference to this reform. For their part, the media also did 
not deem it necessary to discuss the matter with the candidates during 
the campaign. The outcome of the elections resulted in a re-distribution 
159  CEAS, excerpts from the European Commission’s 2012 report concerned with the 
security sector. http://ceas-serbia.org/root/index.php/sr/home-sr/93-preuzeto/486-delovi-
godisnjeg-izvestaja-evropske-komisije-za-2012-godinu-vezani-za-sektor-bezbednosti.
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of political power. The parties making up the ruling majority never men-
tioned the reform of the security sector as a priority either during the elec-
toral campaign or as a priority in the new government’s agenda.
The media coverage of a wide range of topics was adapted to the cir-
cumstances of the campaign until the end of the presidential elections. 
The topics, which were for the most part forced by the contestants them-
selves, did not include the state of the security sector. Unfortunately, the 
media made far less use than they could have of their right and of the new 
circumstances to problematize other topics which they believed merit at-
tention and to let the public know what the participants in the election 
process thought about those topics. Unfortunately, the large majority of 
Serbian media failed to see the situation in the security sector, the results 
of the reform of the security system and the possible further steps to be 
taken as topics of general social interest.160
The establishment of a parliamentary majority was followed by a 
number of problematic laws and decisions relating to the security system. 
They are mostly at variance with the democratic practice and the achieved 
level of democratic control of the security system.
The amendments to the Law on the Basic Regulation of the Security 
Services were adopted without a wider professional and expert debate. The 
legislative proposal provides that in future the Secretary of the National 
Security Council (NSC) will be appointed by the President of the Repub-
lic, rather than the post being automatically filled by the President’s Chief 
of Staff as had been the practice so far. This gives the President of Serbia 
wider powers although these powers should be laid down solely by the 
Constitution. The autonomy of work of the civilian Security-Information 
Agency (BIA) was destroyed by the appointment of Minister of Defence 
Aleksandar Vučić as coordinator of the work of all intelligence services, 
this duty being the main responsibility of the NSC Secretary. Experts in-
terviewed for the purposes of this report point out that Vučić has consid-
erably expanded what is usually regarded as ‘coordination of the work of 
security services’ or political responsibility for coordinating the work of 
160  Report ‘Sektor bezbednosti kao Prvi glas Srbije, CAES, March 2013. 
http://ceas-serbia.org/root/prilozi/Izvestaj-sektor-bezbednosti-Srbije.pdf.
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security services without interfering with the content of their active opera-
tions. The customary level of political coordination implies above all mak-
ing sure that there is no overlap of ongoing cases and investigations and 
that there is adequate exchange of information thereon.
The hitherto good democratic practice where the president of the par-
liamentary committee charged with overseeing the security sector was a 
member of the opposition has been abandoned; now representatives of 
the newly-established ruling majority have been appointed to head both 
parliamentary committees for defence, security and control of intelligence 
and security services.
The people at the head of the Security-Information Agency and the 
National Bank of Serbia were dismissed at almost the same time. Although 
the terms of office of the heads of these two institutions is longer by a year 
than that of the government (5 years compared with 4) for the purpose of 
ensuring the independence of work of these institutions, the new govern-
ment continued the negative practice established during the term of office 
of President Boris Tadić, who ‘curtailed’ his term, i.e. resigned a year too 
early. The Governor of the National Bank of Serbia was replaced by Jorgov-
anka Tabaković, a high-ranking member of the Serbian Progressive Party 
who ‘froze’ her function and position in the party; the BIA Director, Saša 
Vukadinović, during whose term of office ICTY fugitives Ratko Mladić and 
Radovan Karadžić were arrested, was sacked without any explanation from 
the government and replaced by Nebojša Rodić, a person discredited by 
his participation in election fraud during 1996.161
The formal lack of interest in and silence about the situation in the 
security system which characterized the pre-election period on the one 
hand, and the speed with which the legislation regulating the work of the 
security system was amended following the establishment of the ruling 
majority on the other, is a clear confirmation that reform itself was not an 
objective; the objective was to strip the competent bodies of control of the 
security sector and place it under tighter party control.
161  Report ‘X Faktor Srbija’, CEAS, April 2013. 
http://ceas-serbia.org/root/images/CEAS_IZVE%C5%A0TAJ_-_X_FAKTOR_SRBIJA.pdf.
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EU officials have voiced concern that amendment of the Law on the 
National Bank of Serbia would limit the independence of the central bank. 
Although they pointed out that Serbia is a candidate for membership of 
the EU and that the independence of institutions is a fundamental prin-
ciple of the EU, they did not publicly comment on the bad legislative and 
political moves of the new government concerning the security system.
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Major Challenges for the Ministry of 
the Interior and Law Enforcement
EU officials did not react to the growing problems in the security system 
even after it became apparent that some parts of the Ministry of the Inte-
rior (MUP) were operating independently of the formal command system 
under Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister Ivica Dačić.
People interviewed for the purposes of this report believe that some 
MUP employees do not respect the formal chain of subordination and very 
probably act on instructions from the BIA and/or the Office of the Minister 
of Defence, Aleksandar Vučić. They say that because of this, inter alia, the 
government had been unable to appoint the new police General Director 
(chief operative) for months.
During the term of office of the previous government too the MUP was 
the scene of visible and considerable political friction over real control of 
the police. As a result, the recently reappointed police Director, Milorad 
Veljović, worked as acting police Director for over a year because there was 
no agreement on whether to reappoint or dismiss him. Instead of working 
to strengthen the MUP institutionally, the feuding political parties left Niš 
and Novi Sad, two large Serbian cities, without chiefs of police for three 
years. While Niš only got a chef of police in March 2013, Novi Sad is still 
without one. There was an increase of crime in both cities during the pe-
riod. There are serious indications that members of the MUP are directly 
involved in the growing number of unclarified serious incidents in Niš 
and Vranje.
At the end of 2012, President Tomislav Nikolić and First Deputy Prime 
Minister Aleksandar Vučić themselves raised a scandal alleging that the 
MUP Crime Police Administration had been tapping their calls without au-
thorization. The scandal was closed by Nikolić and Vučić themselves with-
out having been fully clarified. It remains unclear whether someone in 
the crime police broke the law and, if they did, was punished for that, or 
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whether the scandal was suppressed because something illegal was discov-
ered about Nikolić and Vučić.
The Law on the Basic Regulation of the Military Security Services was 
again amended in the winter of 2013, only after the Constitutional Court 
of Serbia declared some provisions of the Criminal Code unconstitutional. 
The request for a constitutional review of the provisions was filed by the 
Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data 
protection and the Ombudsman, who had been drawing attention to their 
flaws for more than a year and a half.
In disregard of the foregoing, a 14-point comprehensive proposal for 
regulating surveillance of electronic communications put forward by Ro-
doljub Šabić and Saša Janković in the summer of 2012 was never seriously 
considered either by the ruling majority or by the opposition.162
Ivica Dačić, the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior and Presi-
dent of the Socialist Party of Serbia as well as Serbia’s chief negotiator 
in Brussels, is under investigation over suspicious meetings with Rodol-
jub Radulović. Radulović, who is at large, was later charged with narcotics 
smuggling. The scandal was raised in February 2013 by the daily Informer, 
which is believed to be controlled by y portion of the leadership of the 
Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and a portion of the leadership of the 
BIA. The State Secretary in the Serbian MUP and an SNS member, Vladimir 
Božović, said at the end of March 2013 that the matter was being investi-
gated ‘very intensively regardless of name, surname, function and office 
and no one will be protected against investigation.’ In connection with the 
scandal, mention was again made of Branko Lazarević, the former chief of 
staff and closest associate of the then Minister of the Interior, Ivica Dačić. 
In 2010 Lazarević transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSP). Dačić 
was said to have broken with Lazarević over his alleged earlier friendly re-
lations with people who had fallen foul of the law. Lazarević’s transfer to 
the MSP was arranged in order to hush up matters. The Prosecutor’s Office 
162  Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data 
protection, ‘Faktičko stanje u oblasti zaštite privatnosti u značajnom 
raskoraku sa ustavnim garancijama’, 6 November 2012. http://www.
poverenik.rs/yu/aktuelnosti/1386-konferencija-za-medije.html.
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for Organized Crime announced in February 2013 the launching of pre-
trial proceedings against Branko Lazarević and at least five high-ranking 
MUP officials for having contacts with Rodoljub Radulović, a member of 
the criminal group of narco boss Darko Šarić.
The credibility of the Minister of the Interior as well as that of the Ser-
bian MUP as a whole was further called in question by the prospect of inves-
tigations being carried out against members of the Gendarmerie following 
allegations from the MUP itself and the daily Informer that members had 
been involved in criminal acts particularly in the south of Serbia. Inter-
estingly enough, at the height of the scandal the portal of Pravda, which 
is close to the SNS, published a series of articles criticizing the work of the 
policemen who had accused the gendarmes and defending the Gendar-
merie’s commander. The Gendarmerie commander, Bratislav Dikić, whose 
authoritarian and arbitrary manners had already became publicly known, 
made highly problematic statements on his Facebook profile which no of-
ficial had the courage to condemn.
The State Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, Vladimir Božović, 
said at the end of March 2013 that first results of the investigation into 
the alleged abuses by members of the Gendarmerie could be expected 
soon. Shortly before this, Informer wrote that the police leadership had 
called for the dismissal of Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime Miljko 
Radisavljević.
The serious indications of criminal conduct on the part of members 
of the Gendarmerie had not been investigated as of the end of May 2013. 
The MUP leaders did not respond to the sharp criticism of their work made 
by members of the Gendarmerie in interviews and on social networks. 
The Commissioner for Free Access to Information of Public Importance 
and the Ombudsman pointed out that as of mid-2013 eavesdropping by 
the Crime Police Administration and the Gendarmerie was far beyond the 
scope of any legislation.163
163  Tamara Marković-Subota: ‘Komandant Žandarmerije tajno 
prisluškivao najbliže saradnike’, Blic, 22 April 2011. Miloš Vasić: 
‘Izlistavanje listinga’, Vreme, 8 November 2012.
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The controversy about the establishment 
of Civil Protection headquarters
At the beginning of January 2013, the Chief of the MUP Sector for Emer-
gency Management, Predrag Marić, announced that the year would be a 
year of rebuilding Civil Protection in Serbia after 25 years. Marić expressed 
satisfaction that RSD10 million had been earmarked from the budget for 
the service in 2013, saying that that would be adequate for buying new fire 
engines and starting to rebuild the country’s Civil Protection.164
Only a few days later there was a serious incident during the visit 
to Gračanica by Aleksandar Vulin, Director of the Government Office for 
Kosovo and Metohija. Vulin was told by the Kosovo police that he would 
have to be escorted out of Kosovo. According to the news agency Tanjug, 
Vulin intended to pay a visit to the police station in Gračanica in which 
several Serbs had been detained. Kosovo’s Minister of the Interior Bajram 
Rexhepi said that nine persons had been arrested for wearing Civil Protec-
tion insignia. The arrested persons, who were said to have belonged to Vu-
lin’s escort, were detained for questioning. There were allegations of some 
of them having been subjected to violence at the hands of the Kosovo po-
lice. Although the allegations gave rise to an understandable uproar in 
the Serbian media, it was never reported afterwards that anyone had been 
punished.
In February 2013, the head of the Civil Protection headquarters in 
Kosovska Mitrovica, Krstimir Pantić, reacted angrily to accusations made 
by KFOR commander Volker Holbauer concerning the legitimacy, legal sta-
tus, activities and weapon-carrying of Civil Protection members. Holbauer 
said that KFOR would act resolutely if members of the Civil Protection be-
came a threat to the freedom of movement and the safe and peaceful 
environment.165Under the Serbian Law on Emergency Situations in force, 
members of the Civil Protection are not entitled to carry arms.
164  Blic, 18 November 2012. ‘Održana vežba Civilne zaštite u Mitrovici’.http://www.
blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/353660/Odrzana-vezba-Civilne-zastite-u-Mitrovici.
165  Report ‘X Faktor Srbija’, CEAS, April 2013. http://ceas-serbia.org/root/
images/CEAS_IZVE%C5%A0TAJ_-_X_FAKTOR_SRBIJA.pdf.
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At the end of March 2013, the Head of the Department for Civil Protec-
tion in the Sector for Emergency Management of the Serbian MUP, Brati-
slav Rančić, said that the first course of training of members of specialized 
units of the Civil Protection would start in mid-May and that those eligible 
would be called up by the Ministry of Defence. It is considered that this 
will mark the start of the regeneration of the service in Serbia.
In an interview with the daily Politika, Bratislav Rančić said, ‘Those 
who did their military service without carrying arms, that is, those who 
served as “civilians” as it was popularly called at the time, will make up 
the bulk of the trainees. During their military service they underwent ap-
propriate training and were all assigned as Civil Protection reservists. Let 
there be no misunderstanding: this is not a mobilization, not a military 
exercise but training for humanitarian duty in case of need.
During the course of the sweeping reform of the system for emer-
gency situations, this service, which had been in the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Defence until a few years ago, has now been transferred to the 
jurisdiction of the Serbian MUP.
The time has come to train Civil Protection units so that in case of 
need they could be employed as additional support to professional fire-
fighting-rescue units. We are currently training specialized Civil Protec-
tion units. Our plans are to train 1,400 Civil Protection members. At the 
end of the process, specialized Civil Protection units should have more 
than 11,000 members throughout Serbia. There are also general-purpose 
Civil Protection units, but their organization is the responsibility of local 
self-governments. A rule-book on Civil Protection uniforms and emblems, 
badges of office, speciality and ID cards was adopted recently. After a lapse 
of many years the members of the Civil Protection will be distinguished 
by modern uniforms.
The preconditions for the start of training were met early this year 
with the adoption of a rule-book on training, curricula, training material 
programmes and standards and training equipment for the training of 
Civil Protection members. The first specialist units to be trained, starting 
with those in Kruševac and Valjevo, will be those specialized in fire pro-
tection. Civil Protection reservists from these towns will undergo five-day 
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training coursed. Training will then continue in other parts of Serbia, with 
two units trained every week.
As regards Civil Protection specialized units, there are plans to train 27 
fire protection units belonging to all the area administrations of the MUP 
Sector for Emergency Management. Nine rubble search-and-rescue units 
will be trained in Užice, Šabac, Kikinda, Zaječar, Vranje, Novi Pazar, Pirot, 
Valjevo and Sremska Mitrovica. Belgrade and Sombor will have water-res-
cue units and Čačak and Prokuplje units for administering first aid. There 
are plans to train a rough-terrain rescue unit in Valjevo and a unit for ra-
diological-chemical-biological protection in Kruševac.
An active Civil Protection reserve is also planned. These units will en-
gage about 500 people. They would be engaged on a contractual basis. 
Members of these units should receive regular monthly payments and 
would have to report for duty, if necessary, in any part of Serbia. These 
units will recruit the best members of specialized units.166
On the other hand, some 500 members of the so-called Civil Protec-
tion under control of Serbian government official Krstimir Pantić have 
long operated in the north of Kosovo.
Article 3.1.G. of Annex III of the Ahtisaari Plan, which defines the com-
petences of municipalities, includes the term ‘local emergency response’ 
which is believed to refer to the function of Civil Protection.
Other Challenges
In its report published in January 2013, the international organiza-
tion Transparency International assigned Serbia to group D+ along with 
Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya and Mexico – countries with high 
corruption risks in their security systems.167
166  Politika, 27 Mart 2013, ‘Počinje obuka rezervista civilne zaštite’. http://www.
politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Pocinje-obuka-rezervista-civilne-zastite.lt.html.
167  ‘Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index’, Transparency International, 2013. 
http://ceas-serbia.org/root/images/Government_Defense_Anti-Corruption_Index.pdf
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Even at the height of the ostensible all-out fight against corruption, 
Serbia’s public officials ostensibly conducting this fight hardly ever men-
tioned corruption in the security sector.
In an essay entitled ‘Vrtlozi korupcije u sektoru bezbednosti’,168 Pro-
fessor Dr Miroslav Hadžić draws attention to the fact that high-level cor-
ruption in the security system is a prelude to political abuse of the state 
apparatus of coercion as well as its direct consequence. Hadžić writes, ‘The 
danger of the criminalization of politics and the politicization of crime for-
ever lurks on the fringes of political and other corruption, particularly in 
a post-conflict and post-authoritarian system such as the one in Serbia’.169
A major anti-corruption campaign was launched at the end of 2012. 
It is spearheaded by the First Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the fight 
against organized crime and corruption, Defence Minister Aleksandar 
Vučić, who directs the work of the working groups set up for this pur-
pose. Quite unusually, the working groups are composed of MUP members. 
The ‘hero’ of the fight against corruption, as he has been hailed also by 
the majority of international community officials, Aleksandar Vučić never 
made any reference to the systemic sources of corruption in the security 
system, notably the impermissible lack of transparency of public procure-
ment. The government, which he effectively runs, failed to pass legislation 
designed to improve the management of public companies,170 which are a 
vast breeding ground of corruption. Serbia is still the only country in the 
region without a final budget account.
There is a large discrepancy between the reports of the State Auditor 
on the extent of irregularities found in the operation of public companies 
and the penalties prescribed by law, with no one officially announcing 
amendments of these provisions. At the same time, the MPs of the rul-
ing parliamentary majority are pressing for further ‘obfuscation’ of the 
168  Miroslav Hadžić: ‘Vrtlozi korupcije u sektoru bezbednosti’, Peščanik, 17 March 2013.
169  Ibid.
170  Kenan Hajdarević: ‘Dinkićeva verzija departizacije u praksi’, LDP blog, 27 May 2013. 
http://istina.ldp.rs/Ostali/17398/Dinkiceva-verzija-departizacije-u-praksi.shtml
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budget lines concerning the security system on the grounds that the pres-
ent level of transparency might become a security threat.171
Serbia is still the only country in South-East Europe without an ap-
propriate legal framework for regulating the private security sector (PSS), 
which currently employs between 25,000 and 60,000 people.
Further, the PSS is believed to be in possession of some 47,000 pieces 
of weapons and its annual income estimated at up to €180 million. By 
comparison, the MUP officially employs 35,000 police officers and the Ser-
bian Armed Forces has 28,000 military staff.172
171  Open Parliament, records of the session of the National Assembly of 15 May 2013 on 
the Draft decision on the use and participation of member of the Serbian Armed Forces 
in the EU mission to train military and security forces of Mali, Report of the Security 
Services Control Committee on supervision carried out of the work of the security 
services in 2012, and the draft decision on adopting the Report. 
http://otvoreniparlament.rs/2013/05/15/475940/
172  Report ‘X Faktor Srbija’, CEAS, April 2013.
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The Situation of the Ministry of 
Defence and Serbia’s Armed Forces
There is far less information about the situation in the Ministry of Defence 
(MD).173 A likely explanation is that Aleksandar Vučić is paying the least at-
tention to his function as Minister of Defence owing to the many other 
duties he performs. The central features of the MD policy change since the 
2012 change of government in Serbia include strong emphasis on Serbia’s 
military neutrality and the need to strengthen cooperation with Russia 
in order to ‘redress the balance’ disturbed by the previous government. 
According to the information obtained by the Helsinki Committee, the 
MD is in a very unenviable financial situation. The two series of promo-
tions and retirements of higher and high-ranking military officials indi-
cate the growing role of the Chief of General Staff, Ljubiša Diković, who 
was discredited during the conflict in Kosovo, and of personnel loyal to 
him. (ovde ili dodati spisak ili nek Sonja vidi)
As stated above, in spite of the huge omissions in democratic control, 
lack of transparency of budget use, questionable personnel choices and 
other problems, the security and defence sectors were hardly mentioned 
by any of the parties that contested the 2012 presidential and parliamen-
tary elections during their pre-election campaigns.
The Law on the Basic Regulation of the Security Services was amended 
as soon as the new parliament was constituted. Aleksandar Vučić, the new 
SNS president, First Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the fight against 
organized crime and corruption and Minister of Defence, was appointed 
and given wide powers to coordinate all the services. This was a severe 
blow to the autonomy of work of the BIA, the agency established by the 
Serbian government.
173  The work of the services operating as part of the Ministry of Defence, Military 
Intelligence Agency and Military Security Agency is dealt with in the preceding section.
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When the new parliamentary committees for security and for security 
services control were established, both of them also responsible for the 
situation in the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces (VS), 
MPs from the ruling parties were placed at their head. This violated the 
good parliamentary practice of appointing opposition MPs to these posts.
The newly-established Security Services Control Committee is man-
aged by Jadranka Joksimović, a member of the SNS leadership and a close 
associate of the Minister of Defence and SNS President, Aleksandar Vučić. 
(The 2011 Report explains how the Committee was established by amend-
ing the parliamentary Rules of Procedure.) The discredited member of the 
Socialist Party of Serbia and director of Srbijagas, Dušan Bajatović, was ap-
pointed president of the Committee for Defence and Security.
Thus both posts went to ruling party members in disregard of dem-
ocratic practice. This only goes to prove that the new government has no 
intention of continuing the process of reforming the security system and, 
in particular, placing it under democratic control, the intention being its 
further control by the party and individuals.
Personnel changes in the Serbian Armed Forces
The new Serbian government has clearly demonstrated a readiness 
to dismiss personnel which is not to its liking in the security sector, par-
ticularly in the BIA but also in the police and the Ministry of the Interior. 
However, it has made no changes at all at the top of the General Staff or 
at the top of the Military Security Agency (VBA), although both employ 
people who have been discredited as professionals, if for no other reason 
than because war crimes were committed under their command or in their 
zones of responsibility. What is more, Chief of General Staff Ljubiša Dik-
ović was promoted although many war crimes were allegedly committed 
in his zone of responsibility during his term of office in Kosovo. His closest 
associates were also promoted.174
174  RTVB92, 13 February 2013, ‘Nikolić unapredio Dikovića’. http://www.b92.net/info/
vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=02&dd=13&nav_category=11&nav_id=686626.
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Members of the diplomatic community in Serbia believe that the po-
sition of General Diković and his circle has strengthened considerably 
through other personnel changes in the Serbian Armed Forces (VS) includ-
ing promotions and retirements. They believe that Diković is effectively 
running the Ministry of Defence.175
The period from mid-2012 to mid-2013 was marked by, inter alia, in-
cidents and an occasional celebration: a combat plane crashed with a fatal 
outcome; several members of the VS lost their lives in accidents attrib-
uted to the human factor; the 100th anniversary of ‘Serbian military avia-
tion’ was marked amid much euphoria; and the 100th anniversary of the 
First Balkan War celebrated amid somewhat less euphoria. In that war, ac-
cording to the publications issued for the occasion,176 the Serbs not only 
‘avenged themselves on the Turks in the battle of Kumanovo for their 1389 
defeat in Kosovo, the Serbs delivered a blow to the Turks from which the 
Ottoman Empire was never able to recover’.
The generals and politicians together succeeded in whitewashing the 
situation in the sphere of defence, particularly with regard to the ‘work re-
sults in the Army and the Ministry of Defence’. The lack of critical attitudes 
to the VS and the ‘sweeping under the carpet’ of the blunders, the slovenli-
ness and particularly bad decisions of the political-military leadership are 
a general character trait of domestic generals and politicians regardless of 
which party they belong (or belonged) to and when they held the reins of 
power in their hands.
175  Blic, 4 January 2013, ‘ Imenovanja, razrešenja i penzionisanja u Vojsci Srbije’. 
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/361119/Imenovanja-
razresenja-i-penzionisanja-u-Vojsci-Srbije.
176  For example the 24-page offprint included in the military magazine 
Odbrana on 1 November 2012, superscript headline ‘Sto godina od 
Prvog balkanskog rata’, headline ‘Savezništvom do slobode’.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 126 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 127
126 serbia 2012 : THE SECURITY SYSTEM: SLOW ADJUSTMENT TO EUROPEAN STANDARDS 
The period under Minister of 
Defence Dragan Šutanovac
Dragan Šutanovac became Minister of Defence on 16 May 2007, a year 
after Montenegro became independent. In the aftermath of the dissolu-
tion of the union, the Serbian army became ‘purely Serb’ under the name 
Serbian Armed Forces (VS).177Working in the new minister’s favour was Ser-
bia’s admission to NATO’s large family, the Partnership for Peace (at the 
summit in Riga in 2006, with Serbian President Boris Tadić signing the so-
called Framework Document in Brussels on 14 December 2006).178
Another circumstance in favour of the Minister was that he found at 
the head of the General Staff Zdravko Ponoš, an educated and competent 
General with modern political and military views. As chief architect and 
initiator of the reform of the defence system (mostly of the Army), he got 
the process going although the parliament (within whose competence this 
important responsibility lay) had not yet adopted the strategic doctrinal 
documents and appropriate legislation. Addressing the government, he 
made a convincing case of his rather bold plan to launch a ‘reform adven-
ture’, outlining what he proposed to achieve, how and with what human 
and material resources.179
Dragan Šutanovac successfully adapted himself to Ponoš’s plan and 
to the tempo of its implementation until they clashed at the end of 2008. 
Speaking as a matter of principle, Zdravko Ponoš publicly levelled very 
sharp criticism at the Minister of Defence with the following complaints: 
177  Colonel Dr Borisav Grozdić, a senior lecturer at the Military Academy in 
Belgrade, rhapsodized in a signed text with the following highly patriotic 
headline ‘Duhovna vertikala srpstva’: ‘Today Serbia again has an army, which 
ceased to exist on 1 December 1918 when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes was created...’, Odbrana magazine, No. 33, 1 February 2007.
178  Homepage of the Ministry of Defence: www. mod.gov.rs; website contents: 
sections ‘Međunarodna vojna saradnja’, subsection ‘Partnerstvo za mir’.
179  Zdravko Ponoš published a detailed plan for reforming the Serbian Armed Forces, 
with emphasis on its first stage, in the magazine Vojno delo, 3/2007, entitled 
‘Transformacija Vojske Srbije – izazovi i odgovori’. There was also an extensive and 
fully argumented interview given by Ponoš to the weekly Vreme: Filip Švarm and 
Dejan Anastasijević: ‘Vojska Srbije pod NATO standardina’, Vreme, 19 July 2007.
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first, the military reforms have been halted; second, Serbia has no policy 
of defence; and third, resources from the military budget are being spent 
uneconomically and the Army is losing large amounts of money through 
exchange rate differentials when procuring equipment.180
Nevertheless, Šutanovac continued along the reform path. This was 
confirmed by, among others, General Dr Božidar Forca, a leading theorist 
in the VS General Staff, who wrote in one of his texts: ‘The defence sys-
tem is being reformed and developed in three compatible spheres: stra-
tegic-doctrinal, legal-normative and organizational-functional...’181 The 
Minister crowned his reform work by completing the professionalization 
of the VS. The last group of young men liable for six-month compulsory 
military service was called up in December 2010. In this connection, on 30 
November 2010, Šutanovac spoke in parliament about the Draft Decision 
of the Ministry of Defence, i.e. the government, to suspend compulsory 
military service. He made the following points: ‘the professionalization of 
the Serbian Armed Forces was one of the most comprehensive reforms in 
the past period’; ‘the strategic framework was rounded off’ as part of that 
process; ‘the military education and health care systems were upgraded’; 
‘women were admitted to the ranks of professional soldiers for the first 
time’; ‘the establishment of a defence university is expected’; ‘laws on mil-
itary agencies – security and intelligence – were passed’; ‘intensive inter-
national cooperation was established’.182
Šutanovac’s presentation in parliament commanded respect and cred-
ibility. The National Alliance for Local Economic Development declared 
Šutanovac ‘reformer of the year’, stressing that the ‘professionalization 
of the Serbian Armed Forces was one of the largest and quickest reforms 
in 2010’.183 However, there was no debate on whether Serbia needed a de-
180  Ljubodrag Stojadinović: ‘Politika odbrane zemlje ne postoji’, 
Ponoš’s interview with the daily Politika, 24 December 2008; Filip 
Švarm: ‘Ponos i Ponoš’, Vreme weekly, 25 December 2008.
181  Dr Božidar Forca: ‘Korak napred’, Odbrana magazine, No. 152, 15 January 2012.
182  Radenko Mutavdžić: ‘U vojsku samo dobrovoljno’, Odbrana 
magazine, No. 126, 15 December 2010.
183  A. Petrović: ‘Za bolju Srbiju’, Odbrana magazine, No. 126, 15 December 2010.
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fence university and whether having one would be a rational solution. Es-
tablished by decision of the government on 24 February 2011, the Defence 
University began work early in 2012. Its Rector, General Dr Miodrag Jevtić, 
gave several reasons to justify the establishment of the University includ-
ing, ‘Universities of this kind exist in all large states in the world, as well 
as in several countries in the neighbourhood...’184
The Law on the Military Intelligence and Military Security Agencies 
was presented to the public only formally, with hardly any debate in spite 
of the fact that the heads of these agencies and the Minister of Defence had 
been feeding the public contradictory information. The Law was adopted 
by the parliament with hardly any amendments. Very soon a flaw was re-
vealed in practice and was only eliminated in the first months of 2013. 
Before the Law was amended, approval by the Military Security Agency’s 
Director (the untouchable, formally retired General Svetko Kovač!), natu-
rally in conjunction with lawful support from the telecommunications op-
erators, was all Military Security and Military Intelligence Agency agents 
needed in order to be able to monitor electronic communications of any 
Serbian citizen deemed to be of ‘interest for security processing’. In this 
way, the military agencies grossly violated one of the basic human rights, 
the right to privacy. The Proposal for Amending the Law on the Military 
Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency was adopted in Feb-
ruary 2013.
The Proposal was approved by parliament and the Law on Amend-
ments to the Law on the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelli-
gence Agency was adopted on 20 February 2013.185The Law has 19 Articles. 
From the point of view of protection of citizens’ privacy, Article 8 is proba-
bly of the greatest importance because it prevents agents from having ac-
cess to citizens’ electronic mail without authorization from a ‘higher court’.
After the end of the process of professionalization of the Army (argu-
ably Dragan Šutanovac’s biggest achievement), the military reform first 
came to a halt and then very soon afterwards started to go downhill. The 
184  Sandra Gucijan: ‘I budući oficiri studiraju po Bolonji’, Politika, 24 February 2012.
185  www.parlament.gov.rs.
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new Minister of Defence does not appear interested in continuing the 
reform.
As Minister of Defence, Dragan Šutanovac was severely criticized every 
year, both by the relatives of the Radio Television Serbia employees killed 
during the NATO intervention in 1999 and by prominent media and other 
personalities, for allegedly withholding evidence from the families. The 
accusers insisted and said they had proof that Šutanovac was keeping from 
the public evidence on the basis of which one could establish exactly who 
was responsible for sacrificing those people and for what purpose.1
Šutanovac was also similarly criticised on every anniversary of the 
death of two guardsmen, Dražen Milovanović and Dragan Jakovljević, who 
lost their lives in the Topčider barracks in Belgrade on 5 October 2004. In 
spite of the findings of an independent state committee of enquiry that 
the soldiers were shot dead by a third person and the confirmation of the 
findings by other control bodies, no responsible person in the VS was ever 
called to account for the numerous procedural omissions established dur-
ing the investigation, let alone for the killings. It was only in February 
2013, following a long and determined struggle by the families’ lawyers, 
that the Constitutional Court of Serbia established that the families’ right 
to a fair trial and right to life had been violated.
On this occasion, the Centre for Euro-Atlantic studies in Belgrade said; 
‘This finding is a major victory for the families and their legal counsel who 
can now continue to seek justice before the court in Strasbourg.
This finding is also a new weapon in the hands of all serious politi-
cal actors and civil society organizations willing to launch a sustained co-
ordinated campaign, something which unfortunately has been lacking all 
these years, in order not to allow these killings to remain unsolved. The 
Topčider affair must be solved even if it turns out that foreign elements 
were involved in it unconstitutionally’.186
Unfortunately, these questions, as well as the matter of hiding of Ratko 
Mladić and the role of the VS therein, continue to escape the attention of 
186  Statement to the public, ‘Povodom odluke USS u slučaju Topčider’, 
CEAS, 24 February 2013. http://ceas-serbia.org/root/index.php/sr/
saopstenja/841-povodom-odluke-uss-u-slucaju-topcider.
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the professional and wider community and, regrettably, the international 
public.
Retired Lieutenant-Colonel Lakić Đorović has been saying, especially 
after the appointment of Ljubiša Diković as Chief of General Staff, that Šu-
tanovac ‘does not know what he is doing’, that ‘he is not equal to his func-
tion and I am afraid that he is only a plaything in the hands of Svetko 
Kovač, various generals, colonels, politicians, businessmen...’ 187
Đorović’s public statements have all been dismissed as worthless and 
slander by the military and political authorities and by Šutanovac in par-
ticular. Nevertheless, Đorović’s allegations should not be dismissed out of 
hand: during the 10 years of war under the Milošević regime, he served as 
a military prosecutor and an authoritative prosecutor at that; however, he 
never toed the official line, either then or later, and this may account for 
his relatively low military rank. On the other hand, the arrogant and out-
of-hand dismissal of Đorović’s statements and testimony, which he also 
presented as witness for the prosecution at the Hague tribunal, speaks 
more about the impotence of the political and military leaders than about 
the former military prosecutor!
187  At the end of 2011, Diković succeeded Chief of General Staff Miloje Miletić in spite 
of accusations made in public that as commander of the 37th Motorized Brigade he 
bears responsibility for grave war crimes against the civilian population in Kosovo 
committed by members of his unit. In this context, the RTS journalist, Olivera 
Kovačević, invited to her ‘Da, možda ne’ show Lakić Đorović, who had testified about 
the crimes in question before the Hague tribunal. What Đorović said during the 
show was a serious indictment of both Diković and the political-military leadership 
which had appointed him to the post in the General Staff. The testimony also led 
the journalist with the Sarajevo weekly BH Dani, Tamara Nikčević, to interview 
Đorović and publish the interview in the weekly. With the author’s permission the full 
interview was carried in two instalments by e-novine on 16 and 18 February 2012.
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Aleksandar Vučić: No change in the military 
and defence policies of the country
Besides occupying other high state offices and assuming the presi-
dency of the Serbian Progressive Party, Aleksandar Vučić took over as 
Minister of Defence. The transfer of duties between Šutanovac and Vučić 
attracted hardly any media attention. This was an indication that Vučić 
would follow in the path trodden by Šutanovac. However, during the 
course of the year Vučić laid increasing emphasis on intensifying military 
cooperation with Russia. He argued that this cooperation had been mar-
ginalized during the previous period compared to cooperation with other 
partners of the VS. Vučić let it be known repeatedly that Serbia is militarily 
neutral and will remain so: ‘Our army will not become a member of any 
military alliance; however we are a member of the Partnership for Peace 
and will continue to establish cooperation within the framework of that 
partnership.’ At the start of his term of office, he announced some person-
nel changes and said that he and President of the State Tomislav Nikolić 
were pleased with the way Chief of General Staff Ljubiša Diković was per-
forming his duties.188
During the pre-election campaign Nikolić and Vučić said in a shy way 
and not too often that, should they win the elections, they would ‘revert 
the army’ from the professional to the compulsory recruitment system of 
replenishing its units. However, something like that is clearly impossible 
for at least three reasons: first, it would entail enormous financial costs; 
second, such a collapse of reforms would be understood or accepted by 
hardly anybody abroad; third, Nikolić, Vučić and their party could hardly 
survive that politically.189
188  The Beta agency item published by the daily Danas, 1 January 2012.
189  S. Sikavica: ‘Ipak značajan iskorak’, Helsinška povelja, January-February 2013.
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An ersatz reform instead of the real thing
The Serbian Armed Forces (VS) (as well as the Ministry of Defence and 
the defence system as a whole) has made significant strides towards sys-
temic optimization, though this only partially fits into the reform process. 
It made important moves in an organizational-technological-technical 
sense, i.e. in adopting organizational, technological and technical stand-
ards which the state and the VS could afford. The professionalization of the 
VS was the greatest achievement. Nevertheless, that was only the begin-
ning of fundamental transformation because the ‘reform above all calls 
for and demands changes in the political and cultural pattern of society 
and the armed forces...’190
In order for reforms in the defence sector to continue, it would be 
necessary, inter alia, for the political-military leadership of the state to 
make an honest and unambiguous balance sheet of the participation of 
Serbian regular and paramilitary formations in the wars in the former Yu-
goslavia and to make it public. Back in 2007, General Ponoš said publicly 
that it must be admitted that ‘our army’ was ‘used’ and ‘abused’ in these 
wars throughout the 1990s191 and that, judging by how things stood at the 
time, changes in this regard were unlikely.
The military traditions and the SPC
On its website the Ministry of Defence published the following run-
of-the-mill report on a meeting which, judging by the subject matter 
discussed, was of paramount importance for the country’s defence and 
security and for the state in general: ‘The regular [annual] analysis of the 
operational and functional capabilities of the Serbian Armed Forces in 
2011 was made today in the House of Guard in Belgrade... It was assessed 
that the security situation in Serbia was stable and that the Serbian Armed 
190  Dr Miroslav Hadžić: ‘Potraga za bezbednošću’, Dan-Graf and Centre 
for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2004, pp. 47–51.
191  Dragana Marković: ‘Više nema čekanja’, Ponoš’s interview 
to Odbrana magazine, No. 31, 31 January 2008.
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Forces had maintained the achieved level of operational and functional 
capabilities, and that in the period ahead it will enhance its capabilities 
and interoperability by increasing the number of Army members in mul-
tinational operations.’192
After Montenegro split from the State Union with Serbia, Serbia’s wise 
men determined at long last that ‘for our political and military traditions 
it is most appropriate’ that ‘we should mark Statehood Day and Day of the 
Serbian Armed Forces on Sretenje [the Presentation of Jesus in the Tem-
ple], 15 February’ in memory of the date on which the first Serbian Con-
stitution was adopted and, at the same time, in memory of the outbreak 
of the First Serbian Uprising. The then President of Serbia and Supreme 
Commander of its Army, Boris Tadić, as good as built up Karađorđe, the 
leader of the uprising, as a saint and the Marićević ravine, the place where 
the uprising decision was made, as a holy shrine. Later, in 2012, Tadić, Šu-
tanovac and their associates changed their minds and decided that cele-
brating Day of the Serbian Armed Forces on the same day as Statehood 
Day was actually ‘not the best solution’ because that left the Second Ser-
bian Uprising, its venue Takovo and its leader Miloš Obrenović unjustly 
neglected.
For the first time Day of the Serbian Armed Forces was formally 
marked on 23 April (on this occasion the central celebration was moved 
from Belgrade to Leskovac). Thus in future this date will be observed to 
mark another ‘great and significant dates in our history’ – the decision to 
start the Second Serbian Uprising.193
Other than proclaiming 23 April the new Day of the Serbian Armed 
Forces, the public was informed that the VS had ‘received new Rules of 
Service’. ‘The professionalization of the Army, introduction of religious 
service, participation in multinational operations, increased number of 
women in the defence system, as well as the numerous organizational-for-
mational changes of the military units and adjustment to contemporary 
192  Item from the Ministry of Defence website, 21 March 2012.
193  Odbrana magazine team of journalists, No. 159, 1 May 2012: ‘Obeležen Dan Vojske 
Srbije’ – ‘Elitni ešaloni’ ; regular column in the daily Danas ‘Pitanje – odgovor’, 25 
April 2012, answers to the question: ‘Da li će (novi) Dan Vojske zaživeti u narodu?’
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social trends necessitating amendment of one of the most important reg-
ulations in the military organization – the Rules of Service.’194
Nearly every military formation or special unit, as well as VS and 
Ministry of Defence institutions, celebrates its own day. The year 2012 
abounded in this regard, with Serbia marking the centenaries of its Air 
Force, the Battle of Kumanovo and the First Balkan War. On this occasion, 
the Media Centre Odbrana offered the public two special publications. In 
a special feature of the magazine Odbrana commemorating the anniver-
sary of ‘Serbian military aviation’, the Commander of the Air Force and 
Anti-Aircraft Defence, Major-General Ranko Žižak, began the text as fol-
lows: ‘We have the privilege of marking a truly significant anniversary – 
the centenary of Serbian military aviation, as well as a double obligation. 
Above all, [an obligation] towards the many generations of airmen who 
devoted their expertise, energy and working life, and many of them also 
their lives, to its development and to the execution of their duties, but 
also towards the generations who will follow after us. The need to keep 
abreast of the times, contemporary trends, new scientific and technolog-
ical achievements as well as the creativity and visionariness of state and 
military leaders, made it possible in Serbia in 1912, a mere ten years after 
the first flight of the Wrights Brothers, to establish the Aviation Command 
with its headquarters in Niš...‘.195
The marking of the centenary of the Battle of Kumanovo brought 
together Serbia’s state and military leaders, with President of the state 
Tomislav Nikolić running the show. In his speech on the occasion, he 
said, ‘It was at this place a century ago, on 23 and 24 October, that youth, 
strength and love took wing. Filled with pride, descendants of the heralds 
of freedom, we stand on Zebrnjak Hill, the spot where the fate of the Ot-
toman Empire was sealed...’.196
The Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) was present at every event. Un-
officially, the SPC has long been in contact with all categories of VS 
194  Mirjana Borovina: ‘Novo Pravilo službe Vojske Srbije’ – ‘Okvir za sliku 
moderne vojske’, Odbrana magazine, No. 161, 1 June 2012.
195  Special printoff in Odbrana magazine, 1 August 2012.
196  Special printoff in Odbrana magazine, 1 November 2012.
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members.197Since the SPC last year gained access to the barracks and to 
all units and institutions of the VS, with every military formation having 
a post for a priest (also for other churches and religious communities in 
Serbia in proportion to the number of their members in the VS), the coop-
eration between the VS and the SPC has been raised to a higher level. For 
instance, the head of the Military Academy, General Mladen Vuruna, and 
the Bishop of Hvosno, Atanasije, at the beginning of 2012 signed a coop-
eration agreement designed to fortify the presence of religious instruction 
in the educational process in the Military Academy.198 Religious instruc-
tion gained access to the Military Grammar School (as part of the Military 
Academy) as a compulsory subject back in 2007. The hall of the Military 
Medical Academy in Belgrade, which hosts a rather spacious chapel as well 
as other church rooms added to it, is dominated by a mosaic representing 
St Sava.
Such symbiosis between the VS and the SPC would not be questiona-
ble if the Church were to confine itself to religious matters. However, the 
SPC is not only conservative (it opposes the otherness – ethnic, religious, 
sexual), it also interferes in all affairs of the state. Thus Colonel Stevica 
Karapandža said, ‘The performance of religious service is not envisaged as 
serving the purpose of missionary work by churches and religious com-
munities in a military environment, but solely with a view to developing, 
building up, maintaining and increasing the operational capabilities of 
the Serbian Armed Forces’!199
197  E.g. Dušan Glišić: ‘Regulisanje verskog života u VSCG’ – ‘Traganje za 
identitetom’, Odbrana magazine, No. 6, 15 December 2005.
198  e – novine, editorial text: ‘Pomoli se i počni’, 4 January 2012.
199  Mirjana Borovina. ‘Formacijsko mesto – sveštenik’, Odbrana magazine, 1 June 2012.
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The ‘superiority’ of the Serbian army
Military officials often stress that the Serbian Armed Forces (VS) can 
achieve better results with its obsolete technical-technological combat 
systems (e.g. in tactical exercises or shooting exercises with live ammu-
nition) than armies equipped with the most up-to-date equipment.200For 
instance, one often hears statements that in military terms Serbia is a 
‘leader in the region’ and that the VS has the ‘greatest combat capability 
and operational preparedness in the region’ and is therefore capable of 
taking up battle positions in a short time. Such statements are characteris-
tic of right-wing and pro-fascist non-governmental organizations and re-
tired generals and colonels.
In addition to weapons, the VS and the Ministry of Defence offer the 
services of the Military Academy (since recently the Defence University) 
and several other school and training laboratories and premises.
One of the first visits the new Chief of General Staff, Ljubiša Diković, 
made abroad was a visit to the armed forces of neighbouring Croatia. On 
this occasion, reporters of the magazine Odbrana reported, ‘General Dik-
ović stressed that the Serbian Armed Forces were offering its capacities for 
active military cooperation, above the ABH [Atomic, Biological and Chemi-
cal] Training Centre in Kruševac and the ‘Jug’ base near Bujanovac’.201
200  In this connection, the ‘war against NATO’ in 1999 is very characteristic. Until 
Milošević’s political fall, the then Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of Serbia 
and Montenegro (VSCG), Nebojša Pavković, his Supreme Commander Slobodan 
Milošević and the entire political-media-propaganda apparatus liked to point out with 
great relish that the VSCG, in spite of being vastly inferior in armaments, was superior 
when it came to imagination and skill in combat, and that it made a fool of the NATO 
pilots by fobbing them off with mock-ups and digging in and well camouflaging the 
real guns, transporters and tanks. However, the enthusiasm culminated not only in 
the army but also across the length and breadth of the Serbian-Montenegrin state 
when, on the night of 26–27 March 1999, men of the Air Defence (PVO) battalion of 
the 250th PVO brigade, firing obsolete Russian-made Neva missiles near the village 
of Buđanovac in Srem, brought down a US F-117 stealth fighter that was supposed 
to be ‘invisible’. It is both interesting and indicative that although the commander of 
the battalion and the hero of the day, then a mayor and now a colonel, Zoltan Dani is 
not a Serb but a Hungarian by birth, he had a Serb nom de guerre: Gvozden Đukić!
201  Editorial text in Odbrana magazine, No. 165, 1 August 2012, ‘General 
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In an interview with the daily Danas, Dragan Šutanovac commended 
the Army and the Ministry as follows: ‘The Ministry of Defence and the 
Serbian Armed Forces were among the first to establish EU standards 
within their structures. Our continuous progress has been registered each 
year by the European Commission, among others, and on 14 March our 
General Nebojša Đukanović was the first official representative of Serbia in 
a Union body, namely the EU Military Committee. So, the Army of Serbia 
was the first to enter Europe...’202The Vs was also commended by the Bel-
grade daily Politika in an editorial article: ‘Serbia is today a factor of sta-
bility in the region and its army a mainstay for developing good bilateral 
relations in Europe and beyond... Today no one either in the country or in 
the world thinks ill of our army, it seems to me that we are more respected 
than ever before.’203
Army members in international missions
Although the Partnership for Peace is ‘not of a clearly binding char-
acter in an international-law sense, but is based solely of the principle 
of voluntariness and autonomous commitment,’204 it might be argued 
that the Presentation Document of the Partnership for Peace is a basis 
for the military-political cooperation of Serbia, its Army and its Ministry 
of Defence with partners at the regional and broader international mil-
itary-political level. The Document states, inter alia: ‘In its Presentation 
Document Serbia expresses readiness to assume a share of the responsibil-
ity for a stable and lasting peace in the region, participate in UN-mandated 
Diković u poseti Hrvatskoj’ – ‘Jačanje regionalne stabilnosti’.
202  Boxed item entitled ‘Vojska Srbije prva ušla u Evropu’ was published in 
the weekend issue of the daily Danas, 17–18 March 2012, as part of the 
daily’s interview with the then Minister of Defence Dragan Šutanovac.
203  Editorial text: ‘Vojska faktor stabilnosti’, Politika, 13 February 2013; editorial text, 
Politika, 11 March 2012: ‘Srbija uskoro u Evropskoj odbrambenoj agenciji’; P. D. 
: ‘Srbija partner s Evropskom agencijom za odbranu’, Danas, 23 March 2012.
204  Homepage of the Ministry of Defence website www.mod.gov.rs; website contents: 
‘Međunarodna vojna saradnja’, section ‘Partnerstvo za mir’, subsection ‘Vodič kroz PzM’.
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peacekeeping operations and achieve armed forces interoperability with 
NATO Member States...’205
According to the website of the Ministry of Defence,206 the deployment 
of members of the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces in 
multinational operations as of the end of 2012 was as follows:
1.  Democratic Republic of Congo – MONUSCO – 8 members: 2 doctors, 
4 medical technicians and 2 members as part of the headquarters 
group (aerial evacuation medical team and headquarters group);
2.  Liberia – UNIMIL – 4 officers, military observers;
3.  Ivory Coast – UNOCI – 3 officers, military observers:
4.  Cyprus – UNFCZP – 46 members: 1 staff officer, 2 military observers 
in MOLO liaison team, 6 members of infantry patrols (4 non-com-
missioned officers and two professional soldiers) and a platoon 
consisting of 37 soldiers in accordance with appointments within 
the contingent of the Serbian Armed Forces in UNFCZP;
5.  Lebanon – UNIFIL – 47 members: 6 staff officers, 5 NEP members, 
an infantry platoon of 36 soldiers in accordance with appointment 
within the contingent of the Serbian Armed Forces in UNIFIL;
6.  Middle East – UNTSO: 1 officer, military observer;
7.  Uganda – EUTM: 1 medical service officer – peacekeeping mission 
medical service chief;
8.  EUNAVFOR – Somalia – Operation ATALANTA: 1 staff offices for civil-
ian-military cooperation at Operational Command;
9.  Total: 111 members.
The number of members of the Ministry of Defence and the VS in in-
ternational missions is not constant; since their first participation in these 
missions in 2007 their number has varied from one year to the next as 
well as within a single year, in keeping with Serbia’s needs and possibil-
ities. Shortly after Serbia began to participate in peacekeeping mission, 
the Centre for Peacekeeping Operations of the General Staff of the Ser-
bian Armed Forces was established to prepare candidates for such duties. 
205  Ibid.
206  Ibid.
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The year 2012 was significant in that women from the ranks of the Army 
and the Ministry of Defence participated in international operations from 
the first time in March. Colonel Jelesije Radivojević, who heads the Centre, 
said: ‘VS members chosen to participate in missions include women. The 
practice so far has been for at least two women to join a mission and that 
they stay together. Due account is taken of gender equality. The general 
criteria for joining a mission are health status, official appraisal, positive 
vetting, physical fitness checks and other special criteria laid down in re-
spect of each multinational operation.’207
Explaining the importance of participation by Serbian military per-
sonnel in peacekeeping operations, Colonel Radivojević said, ‘The interest 
in participation in missions is huge, with more than 10 members of the VS 
applying for each post... one does not leave for a mission in order to fight 
a war for NATO, as some analysts allege, but to acquaint our members with 
NATO standards and training methods and to apply that in concrete situa-
tions.’208To be sure, this alone is not the only reason for the huge interest 
in these operations; there are also the financial benefits, which for many 
may be the overriding motive. Colonel Radivojević presented a very con-
vincing description of the direction which the next very important phase 
of the reform should take.
Vladimir Počučić wrote the following in the magazine Odbrana: ‘It 
should be borne in mind that classic multinational operations have long 
ceased to exist. They are multidimensional, so it is hard to tell the differ-
ence between military, civilian and police duties. This is why interaction 
with all the actors on the ground takes place constantly and at all levels. 
The Serbian “blue helmets” face yet another challenge – the prejudice of 
both the local population and the members of other peacekeeping contin-
gents about the people and the country they come from, which is a con-
sequence of the earlier conflicts in the territory of the SFRY. This makes 
their task harder and their obligation greater.’209The author summed up 
some of the Colonel’s points in the sub-headline: ‘Presenting to the public 
207  Ivana Pejčić: ‘Učešće u misijama nije vojnički turizam’, Danas, 30 July 2012.
208  Ibid.
209  Vladimir Počuč: ‘Povratak budućnosti’, Odbrana magazine, No. 174, 15 December 2012.
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the importance of our participation in multinational operations required 
much energy and knowledge in order to avoid, in the aftermath of the 
tragic war events, misconceptions and equating departures for peacekeep-
ing missions to ‘military tourism’ or ‘mercenaries’. These efforts are also 
important for reasons of interoperability with other armies, getting to 
know other peoples and their cultures...’210
Incidentally, there is a conspicuous trend in public of misnaming in-
ternational operations as ‘peacekeeping’ operations. This trend dates back 
to the term of office of the former Minister of Defence, Dragan Šutano-
vac. The object was, in setting forth the reasons for adopting legislation 
approving participation in missions, to throw dust in the eyes of the MPs 
and the public at large as to the real nature of the missions in question, 
namely that most of them were peacemaking missions and implied com-
bat of some sort.
Interestingly, members of the VS alone use the correct terms in ref-
erence to the nature of these missions. On the occasion of dispatching 
troops for Operation Atalanta, Colonel Milivoje Pajović, Head of the Cen-
tre for Peacekeeping Operations of the Serbian Armed Forces, said: ‘We ex-
pect that our officers from the river units will be engaged on the crews of 
vessels in the Indian Ocean. We are ready to engage autonomous combat 
teams within the brigade protecting shipments of the UN World Food Pro-
gramme. Encounters with the pirates will be a real test for these anti-ter-
rorist and commando units. They will be testing their capabilities in a real 
context, something for which they are being trained. One can easily figure 
out of what benefit their experience will be to the security forces of Serbia 
once they return to their homeland. After all, we are talking about the elite 
forces of our army.’211
Unfortunately, because this crucial distinction is also lost on the mem-
bers of the democratic opposition in the Serbian parliament, they are not 
informing the public about the true nature of the missions.
The Annual Plan for the use of the Serbian Armed Forces and other 
defence forces in multinational operations in 2013, which has passed the 
210  Ibid.
211  Novi magazin, March 2013.
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parliamentary procedure, envisages participation in six UN-mandated and 
two EU-mandated operations. The UN operations are taking place in Cy-
prus, Lebanon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Middle East and Congo. The signed 
Framework Agreement with the EU this year envisages participation in the 
naval Operation Atalanta and a mission to train Somali forces in Uganda.
Although the operation in Mali is not included in the Annual Plan, 
the Serbian parliament approved it in May 2013. The full name of the mis-
sion is ‘European Union Training Mission in Mali’. The mission’s terms of 
reference state clearly that the EU mission in Mali will not conduct combat 
operations. The General Staff of the VS is planning to dispatch a six-mem-
ber medical team and five training instructors. They will be engaged as 
part of the forces of an EU Member State chosen to lead the mission. The 
instructors for individual training will probably be led by a major from 
the Peacekeeping Operations Centre. The team will be made up of mem-
bers of the Military Police and probably someone from the special units. 
The medical team may include women working as doctors and medical 
technicians in an aerial evacuation medical team. Besides requiring the 
approval of the Serbian parliament, it will be necessary to ‘confirm the 
preparedness of the Serbian team at the forthcoming Force Generation 
Conference in Brussels.
At the level of international military cooperation, special importance 
is attached to the State Partnership Programme between Serbia and the US 
state of Ohio, i.e. between the Serbian Armed Forces and the Ohio National 
Guard. The programme is being implemented on the basis of the Status of 
Forces Agreement signed in Washington on 7 September 2006 by the then 
Serbian President Boris Tadić and the then US Secretary of State Condo-
leezza Rice. The cooperation is deemed to have started with the first visit of 
the then Ohio National Guard Commander, Major-General Gregory Wayt, to 
the Serbian Armed Forces in September 2007. Since then the two forces have 
cooperated in various ways. At the beginning of December 2012, the Army 
and Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia were visited by a delega-
tion of the National Guard of Ohio led by Brigadier-General Maria Kelly, 
commander of the Special Troops Command of the Ohio National Guard.212
212  Sanja Savić: ‘O razlikama u najboljem smislu’, Odbrana 
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The Serbian Armed Forces and NATO
Surveys carried out in 2013 show that 14 per cent of respondents ap-
prove of Serbia’s membership of NATO. At the same time, 160 items of ar-
maments and military equipment in use by the Serbian Armed Forces (VS) 
were included in the NATO Codification System.213
The mission of the NATO Military Liaison Office (MLO) was enhanced 
early in 2012 in order to reinforce NATO’s public diplomacy in the region. 
Along with a supervision and counselling group within the MLO, which 
closely cooperated with the Department for International Military Coop-
eration of the Serbian Ministry of Defence, a public relations group was 
formed with the object of enhancing publicity through cooperation with 
other ministries, media and non-governmental organizations.
Brigadier General Ornello Baron, the Head of the MLO in Belgrade, 
in his first interview with the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies in the sum-
mer of 2012, said that Serbia was committed to training its military units 
for deployment in multinational peacekeeping operations in accordance 
with UN Security Council decisions or decisions of other international bod-
ies. He said that his necessitates transforming the defence structures into 
a modern system which is interoperable with all international partners. 
Baron said that in order to achieve that Serbia is using NATO mechanisms 
available to member states of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. 
With this aim in view, numerous military tasks have been set within the 
framework of the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), with emphasis 
on development and achieving interoperability with NATO forces. There-
fore, the cooperation is currently focused on designing and implementing 
activities in line with the agreed objectives of the partnership.
These objectives encompass a wide range of activities including de-
fence preparations, keeping the public informed, managing human rights 
resources, defence against cyber attacks, medical support, gender equality 
issues, special operations units, training for air operations, etc. 
magazine, No. 174, 15 December 2012.
213  Ratko Femić: ‘Briselski sporazum – korak prema NATO?’, 
Novi magazin, No.104/105, 25 April 2013.
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Experts from the NATO headquarters and from NATO and PfP member states 
have organized numerous meetings to help the VS to achieve these ob-
jectives. A special team arrives from Brussels once every three months to 
evaluate the progress of the reforms. Additional support is provided by all 
military attaches from NATO member states accredited in Serbia.
The VS participates in the Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation 
and Feedback OCC E&F programme which includes a three-year evalua-
tion programme implemented by a multinational team. The programme 
involves nearly 400 Serbian infantry, military police and medical corps 
members. By 2014, all of them are expected to receive NATO certificates de-
claring them fit to take part in operations abroad. The PARP was an initial 
step in the process of expanding and deepening military cooperation with 
Serbia. In April 2011 the North-Atlantic Council granted Serbia’s applica-
tion for an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO. A proce-
dure for approving the plan by all 28 NATO member states is under way. 
When the plan enters into force, it will provide a general framework for 
cooperation between Serbia and NATO in new areas such as foreign and se-
curity policies, human and minority rights, anti-terrorism, fight against 
corruption, etc.
As part of the preparations for the IPAP, NATO’s Ambassador for integri-
ty-building projects, Jan Lucas Van Horn, visited Belgrade a few weeks ago 
for meetings with senior officials from the parliament, Ministry of Defence 
and General Staff responsible for the fight against corruption.
Deputy Legal Adviser Eddie Grunen and representatives of the min-
istries for internal affairs, foreign affairs, defence and justice recently dis-
cussed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), a very important document 
which clarifies matters of jurisdiction over forces serving in another coun-
try. These are among the latest examples of cooperation in various fields. 
The reforms of the defence and security sectors are the main elements 
of the cooperation between Serbia and NATO. The Serbia-NATO Defence 
Reform Group extends support to the Serbian authorities in reforming 
and modernizing Serbia’s armed forces and developing liaison with NATO 
through the PfP, as well as advice on military aspects of the reform of the 
security sector.
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The Serbian reforms are supported by a series of training courses and 
exercises aimed at building up a modern, economically viable and demo-
cratically controlled defence structure.
NATO as a whole as well as its members individually possess a sub-
stantial expert base which can help Serbia to reform its defence and secu-
rity sectors. The Defence Reform Group has intensified its activities since 
2010 and meetings are taking place regularly. All the planned assistance 
projects for 2011–2011 have been carried out successfully, on time and 
with support from partner states including Norway, the Czech Republic, 
Canada and other NATO members. A five-year project managed by Norway 
and worth €9.6 million is especially noteworthy. Thanks to the project, 
6,000 people laid off in the Serbian defence sector have been able to start 
small businesses. As part of the NATO Science for Peace and Security pro-
gramme, Serbia has received grants for a number of cooperation projects 
including seismic risk reduction studies and anti-terrorism workshops. 
NATO will additionally reinforce its scientific cooperation with Serbia, with 
new security issues in the region and ecology initiatives being the likely 
key areas of development.
Serbia and NATO are expected to sign in mid-2013 an IPAP, which is 
considered an excellent framework for cooperation within the PfP pro-
gramme. A draft IPAP is said to have been approved by all the relevant 
ministries already in the spring of 2013.
An IPAP can help Serbia to standardize its forces, participate in joint 
missions and use the advantages of joint exercises. An IPAP is at present 
the highest level of cooperation within the PfP programme which does not 
imply membership of NATO. The next stage would be a Membership Action 
Plan, which is regarded as a NATO ante-chamber. However, an IPAP also of-
fers a wealth of opportunities for cooperation. Considering that the Law 
on the use of the Serbian Armed Forces and other defence forces in mul-
tinational operations outside the borders of the Republic of Serbia does 
not limit participation in UN-mandated missions, it may be expected that 
the VS will take part in a future NATO mission. It is indicative that there is 
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hardly any mention of the signing of an IPAP. The weekly Novi Magazin is 
one of the very few media outlets systematically monitoring the topic.214
Regarding the references to an early signing of an IPAP, Jelena Milić, 
the Director of the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies in Belgrade, brought 
up the problem of the self-isolation of the VS in regional cooperation ar-
rangements especially over the participation of the Kosovo Security Force. 
‘Serbia should not continue to isolate itself and to refuse to participate 
in regional emergency response exercises involving the participation of 
Kosovo forces, when that comes on to the agenda,’ she said.215
Serbia and the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization
During Prime Minister Ivica Dačić’s visit to Moscow on 10–11 April 
2013, Serbia was granted observer status at the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The SCTO Secretary Gen-
eral, Nikolai Bordyuzha, said on the occasion that it was still too early for 
talking about Serbia’s full membership of the Russian military alliance. 
He explained that Serbia had not been granted observer status ‘in the 
organization itself’ but ‘only within the framework of activities of it leg-
islative bodies’. Observer status in the SCTO itself factually implies partici-
pation of an observer country in the activities of the organization, ‘but for 
Serbia there is going to be no such status,’ Bordyudzha said.
The security and defence cooperation 
of Serbia and Russia
True to the promise he gave at the beginning of his term of office, 
Minister of Defence Aleksandar Vučić during his visit to the Russian 
Federation in May 2013 agreed to raising the level of military coopera-
tion between the two countries. Vučić and his Russian opposite number, 
214  Ratko Femić: ‘Briselski sporazum – korak prema NATO?’, 
Novi magazin, No.104/105, 25 April 2013.
215  Ibid.
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Sergei Shoigu, prepared a defence cooperation agreement which should 
be signed during Shoigu’s visit to Belgrade early in October 2013. They 
discussed purchases of combat systems, cooperation of defence industries 
in realizing joint projects and appearance on third markets. Interestingly 
enough, the two ministers also discussed the Regional Centre in Niš, os-
tensibly a Russian-Serbian humanitarian centre for emergency situations 
response. In Serbia, the centre is the responsibility of the Ministry of the 
Interior and in Russia of a special ministry; in either case it not under a 
defence ministry.
On his return from Russia, Vučić announced that Serbia would buy 
from Russia six combat aircraft and a missile system without recourse to 
the public procurement procedure, something the law unfortunately al-
lows but is uncommon. Repayments will be made through a commodity 
credit to be approved by the Russian side.216
A portion of the Serbian Armed Forces personnel belongs to the ‘Rus-
sian school’; retired members of that generation are very active in various 
think tanks and other organizations with which the Ministry of Defence li-
aises closely. This, however, is not the case regarding cooperation with civil 
society organizations with no such background.
Generally speaking, the X Factor Russia, including the so-called Inter-
national Humanitarian Centre in Niš and the degree of Russia’s influence 
on political developments in Serbia, is far from having been dealt with an-
alytically and systematically to the necessary extent, including with regard 
to the viability of a possible agreement with Pristina.217
216  ‘Vučić: Ruski lovci MIG 29 biće plaćeni robnim kreditom’, Tanjug, 23 May 2013. 
Marko R. Petrović: ‘Vojska Srbije kupuje šest novih aviona mig 29’, Blic, 24 April 2013.
217  Report ‘X Faktor Srbija’, CEAS, April 2013. http://ceas-serbia.org/root/
images/CEAS_IZVE%C5%A0TAJ_-_X_FAKTOR_SRBIJA.pdf.
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Serbia in international armaments 
and military equipment markets
Compared with the previous three or four years, 2012 was nowhere 
near as successful from the point of view of exports of products of the do-
mestic military, i.e. special purposes or defence industry.
Referring to the possibility of Serbia’s integration into the European 
Defence Agency, Defence Minister Šutanovac said in March 2012, ‘These 
days we are looking forward to a letter from Catherine Ashton, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and 
we are going to reply to it positively. We expect that, with the assistance 
of the Military-Technical Institute, our military industry will begin to pro-
duce more up-to-date hardware than ever before which could find buy-
ers outside the borders of our country. Last year we earned a record $250 
million from exports; however, we expect to further increase the business 
because we will be branching out to new markets as from this spring or 
summer. I wish to recall that in the last four years we have increased our 
exports of armaments and military equipment several times over and 
that, bearing in mind the numbers of the workforce, we have become a 
power when it comes to exports of military equipment and armaments. 
Armaments production contracts concluded in four years are worth $1.5 
billion. We are selling aircraft, guns and ammunition to the Americans, 
Afghans, Iraqis...’218
The Utva factory in Pančevo turned out a new military aircraft under 
an ‘original’ name, Kobac [hawk]. On this occasion, the Belgrade daily Blic 
wrote: ‘The Serbian defence industry has enriched itself with yet another 
type of aircraft. After presenting the Lasta [swallow], the Utva factory in 
Pančevo yesterday unveiled the Kobac, an airplane intended for combat 
training and anti-terrorist operations. The aircraft is expected to become 
airborne early next year. Minister Šutanovac says that it will be the best 
product of the Serbian industry...’ Blic writes that ‘Utva is the only factory 
in South East Europe making military aircraft from start to finish...’219
218  M. Milivojević: ‘Vojska prva ulazi u EU’, Narodne novine (Niš), 28 March 2012.
219  A. Savić: ‘Kobac novi avion’, Blic, 3 April 2012.
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Tanjug news agency reported that the Krušik factory in Valjevo had 
presented to Minister Šutanovac a new anti-armour missile system called 
Bumbar which, it is said, will ‘find itself among the armaments of our 
army’ as early as mid-summer 2012.’220It was also said that the system 
would be exported at €35,000 and that a French product of the same kind 
sells in the international arms market for €90,000.
Aleksandar Vučić continued with praises in almost the same style and 
at the same tempo: ‘We will do everything to sell throughout the world 
what we produce in the seven factories of the special purposes industry 
and to find more work for our people, to keep the factories going, by pro-
viding more money for investments. So far only 5 per cent of the budget 
of the Ministry of Defence has been earmarked for investment. This per-
centage must be increased without in the least compromising the material 
obligations towards the employees or with regard to procurement of ma-
terial-technical resources.’221However, military analyst Aleksandar Radić 
predicted that the domestic ‘defence industry will develop according as 
how much is invested in it’.222
New unsolved deaths of members 
of the Serbian Armed Forces
In 2012, accidents in the Serbian Armed Forces (VS) followed one an-
other in three summer months: one in June, another in August, and yet 
another in September. Accidents in the VS (in common with those in other 
segments of society) are relativized and played down to a maximum de-
gree, especially accidents with fatal outcomes.
On the eve of an air show, the military magazine Odbrana carried an 
interview with the Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence (ViPVO), 
Major General Ranko Živak.223Živak said, ‘Symbolically, the year which 
220  Tanjug news agency, 27 April 2012.
221  Biljana Mijić: ‘Naoružanje i oprema prioriteti’, Odbrana 
magazine, No. 166, 15 August 2012.
222  A. Savić: ‘Kobac novi avion’, Blic, 3 April 2012.
223  Radenko Mutavdžić: ‘Spektakl dostojan jubileja’, Odbrana 
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marks the centenary of Serbian military aviation is also a new beginning. 
Our domestic new aircraft for initial training, Lasta, is being introduced 
into the armaments of the ViPVO in the course of 2012, with the air show 
providing an opportunity to introduce it to the widest public in the air and 
at the exhibition’.
On 26 September, Major Goran Savić flew a V-54 Lasta in the company 
of Lieutenant Colonel Tomislav Bećagović. While overflying Nova Pazova, 
the aircraft broke down. Lieutenant Colonel Bećagović bailed out and sur-
vived in spite of suffering serious injuries while Major Savić was not as 
lucky: in order to prevent the plane from crashing into a densely popu-
lated part of the town, he succeeded in directing it into a garden at the cost 
of his own life.
Sergeant Major 1st Class Nebojša Milić and Sergeant Major Slaviša 
Marković lost their lives on Mount Kopaonik shortly after 10 a.m. on 1 Au-
gust 2012.224The new Minister of Defence, Aleksandar Vučić, appeared at 
the scene shortly in the company of Chief of General Staff Ljubiša Diković 
and a retinue of generals and colonels. Cluster bombs regularly take their 
toll in Serbia, for which the director of the Mine Clearing Centre, Petar 
Mihailović, might be held responsible, among others. Furthermore, one 
may well ask why Serbia is not a signatory of the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions.
On 18 June 2012, two cadets of the Military Academy, Milena Miletić 
and Filip Milivojević, lost their lives in a most bizarre incident during 
a routine tactical exercise called Diplomac 2012. A statement appeared 
on the website of the Ministry of Defence only after two months, stat-
ing, ‘Following the tragic deaths of the cadets of the Military Academy at 
the Pasuljanske livade inter-arm military exercise ground, the Head of 
the Military Academy, acting in accordance with the Law on the Serbian 
Armed Forces and the Rules on Military Discipline, has instituted an ex-of-
ficio disciplinary inquest against six persons (two colonels, two majors and 
magazine, No. 167, 1 September 2012.
224  K.Ž.and agencies: ‘Poginula dvojica podoficira VS’, Danas, 2 August 2012; editorial 
text ‘Danak opasnoj profesiji’, Odbrana magazine, No. 166, 15. August 2012; M. 
Galović: ‘Komisija ispituje uzroke pogibije pirotehničara’, Politika, 3 August 2012.
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two lieutenants) with a view to establishing the responsibility...’225At the 
funeral of Filip Mladenović, his father turned towards the Chief of Gen-
eral Staff, General Diković, who was heading a military delegation and ob-
served bitterly: ‘My impression is that the army has no (metal) detectors, 
something even scrap-iron thieves have. Therefore, the generals had best 
put their uniforms away and leave them on hangers!’ ‘He then called on 
his friends and family members to chip in towards a metal detector’ and 
present it to the army ‘to prevent similar tragedies from taking place’.226
From the ‘General Ljubiša Diković’ file
Early in 2012, the Humanitarian Law Centre accused General Ljubiša 
Diković, the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, ‘by 
virtue of command responsibility’227 of being responsible for serious war 
crimes committed in Kosovo in 1999 by members of the unit under his 
command; indirect moral responsibility also attaches to then Minister of 
Defence Dragan Šutanovac and then President of the state and Supreme 
Commander of the Serbian Armed Forces (VS) Boris Tadić, who appointed 
General Diković as Chief of General Staff of the VS.
‘The evidence which forms the basis for the judgment of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Milutinović 
et al, the surviving victims from Drenica who gave evidence before the 
ICTY or made statements to the Humanitarian Law Centre, as well as the 
documents filed in the ICTY’s public Database, point to numerous serious 
and massive war crimes committed against Albanian civilians in the zone 
of responsibility of the commander of the 37th Motorized Brigade of the 
Armed Forces of the FRY (VJ), the newly-appointed Chief of General Staff of 
the Serbian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Ljubiša Diković.
225  Ministry of Defence website, 14 August 2012.
226  D.S.V: ‘Sahranjeni kadet Vojske Srbije’, Politika, 22 June 2012.
227  Nataša Kandić: ‘Provera demokratije prema vojnom uputstvu’, Danas, 11–12 
February 2012; The ‘Ljubiša Diković File’, published by the Humanitarian Law 
Centre on 23 January 2012 has raised the matter of war crimes again.
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During the NATO bombing, war crimes committed by members of the 
VJ and the MUP [Ministry of the Interior] occurred repeatedly. Although it 
was his duty to prevent the commission of war crimes, the commander of 
the 37th Motorized Brigade did not do that. The members and command-
ing officers of the units that took part in the commission of war crimes in 
Ćirez, Staro Čikatovo, Baks, Vrbovac and Glogovac, where at least 200 ci-
vilians were murdered within four weeks, remain unprocessed to this day. 
The Humanitarian Law Centre considers that an officer like Ljubiša Diković 
is not fit to be Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic 
of Serbia.’228
‘As from May 1998, in the 37th Motorized Brigade under Diković’s 
command, several Military Security officers including lieutenant colonels 
Slobodan Stošić and Miodrag Đorđević, instructed and trained groups of 
murderers, criminals and even scores of convicted murderers from the 
Sremska Mitrovica prison. In July 1998, they began transferring them to 
Kosovo as volunteers and members of the VJ. On requests from military 
services and police secret services, many of the convicted murderers had 
the remainder of their prison sentences suspended and were freed by Ser-
bian courts. Colonel Stošić supplied them with uniforms, the most lethal 
weapons, chemical and other means for silent liquidations and badges of 
members of Military Security...’229
In an interview with Radio Slobodna Evropa, Nataša Kandić said, ‘As 
regards the 37th Motorized Brigade, we monitored its movements very 
closely on the basis of evidence given by a large number of witnesses, par-
ticularly before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia. Also, the testimony of Diković himself, as witness for the defence 
before the Hague tribunal, is rather clear. Although he claimed at first that 
his brigade stayed in the area of Izbica, he admitted after being confronted 
with individual items of evidence that his units did actually enter the vil-
lage of Izbica. He also said that they had contacts with civilians and sus-
pended operations in order to evacuate civilians. At some point during the 
228  Bojan Tončić: ‘FHP optužuje Ljubišu Dikovića (1)’ – ‘Načelnik 
Generalštaba – heroj ili zlikovac’, e-novine, 25 January 2012.
229  Ibid.
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examination, when asked a question by the prosecution, witness Diković 
shot back very nervously: “Are you accusing me of war crimes?”’230
Retired Lieutenant Colonel Lakić Đorović, who was a military pros-
ecutor at the time of the commission of the crimes in Kosovo attributed 
to Ljubiša Diković, among others, gave an interview to journalist Tamara 
Nikčević. She published the interview in the Sarajevo weekly BH Dani. ‘The 
military career of General Ljubiša Diković is very problematic. As a for-
mer military prosecutor, I insist that the incumbent Chief of General Staff 
of the VS, who was from 1993 on duty in the Užice Corps and later in the 
6th Infantry Brigade which controlled two border crossings with BiH, is in 
some way jointly responsible for the arrests of Muslims who were running 
away from the Army of Republika Srpska in 1994 and trying to find refuge 
in Serbia,’ he said.231Question: ‘What do you know about the role of Gen-
eral Diković during the intervention of the NATO forces in 1999?’ Answer: ‘I 
know a lot. To begin with, there was a plan called Grom 98, signed by the 
then Chief of General Staff of the VJ, Momčilo Perišić, in which there were 
orders to the army, subject to prior approval from the state leadership and 
the President of the Republic himself, to go into action in June 1998 for 
the purpose of restoring order and mopping-up the territory of Kosovo, 
especially the area of Drenica.
The plan envisaged the engagement, in the first operations of re-
storing order, of the 37th Motorized Brigade from Raška led by Dik-
ović...’232Đorović said that combat groups consisting of ‘between 150 and 
200’ criminals of various kinds had been released from prison long before 
that. They gained considerable experience in committing heinous crimes 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and finally found themselves un-
der the command of the 37th Motorized Brigade, i.e. under the command 
of Ljubiša Diković, for the purpose of ‘combat action’ in Kosovo, he said. 
Because they were directly trained by colonel Miodrag Đorđević and Lieu-
tenant Colonel Slobodan Stošić, who were in turn directly subordinated 
230  Branka Trivić: ‘Kandić: Kod nas generali ne odgovaraju’, Nataše Kandić’s 
interview with Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2 February 2012.
231  See footnote 21.
232  Ibid.
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to Diković, Đorović concluded that ‘Diković’s command responsibility is 
indisputable’.
In the interview, Đorović spoke about the role of Diković in The Hague 
as witness for the defence in Milutinović, Šainović et al. Paragraph 644 of 
the judgment in that ‘case’ states, inter alia: ‘Diković conceded that, de-
spite all the measures he took, some of his soldiers committed crimes in 
the first half of April.
Priština Corps records show that from 10 to 15 April a number of indi-
viduals from Diković’s unit participated in the killings of Kosovo Albanian 
men in the area of Gornja Klina/Klina e Epërme, and then disposed of the 
corpses by throwing them into wells.233
Diković’s state and media defence built on sand
The publication of the ‘Diković File’ provoked a public outcry through-
out Serbia – to be sure, with appropriate support from the media. The tar-
get of the media campaign were the Humanitarian Law Centre and its 
Director Nataša Kandić.
Minister Dragan Šutanovac not only denied the allegations set out 
in the ‘File’ but also called them ‘absolute untruths’ and ‘monstrous 
lies’.234Kandić replied as follows: ‘I consider that rash and very thoughtless 
on the part of Minister Šutanovac. None of our statements, none of our 
reports has even been described by anybody, not even in Milošević’s time, 
as a false document. This is the first time in the past twenty years that I 
have heard someone say that a report by the Humanitarian Law Centre is 
false. Šutanovac’s reaction is misplaced because we append the source to 
every citation’.235
At the end of January 2012, Blic suggested that Nataša Kandić ought to 
be sentenced. If she is not, the author of the commentary, Ranko Pivljanin, 
233  Ibid.
234  N. Tomić: ‘Diković podnosi tužbu po svih sedam tačaka “dosijea” FHP’, 
Danas, 26 January 2012; Branka Trivić: ‘Kandić: Kod nas generali 
ne odgovaraju’, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 30 January 2012.
235  Ibid.
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argued, that would mean that she is right, and that would be a ‘path to-
wards the destabilization of the state’. ‘Either the leadership of this state 
which appointed him made a mistake – we doubt that something like 
that could have been done, even in Serbia, without proper checks of Dik-
ović’s files and misdeeds, if any – or the ‘centres’ somehow missed the 
mark along the way. The matter will most probably have to be resolved 
by a court decision because a lawsuit has been announced against Nataša 
Kandić: and on a court decision will depend the honour of the Army and 
state as well as the credibility of Kandić’s “tribunal”. Or, in reality show 
parlance, there can only be one winner!’
The Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia, i.e. 
its spokesman Bruno Vekarić, said this in an interview with Radio Slo-
bodna Evropa: ‘The Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of 
Serbia has carried out checks of the allegations of the Humanitarian Law 
Centre by examining all the war crimes cases cited by the Centre in the 
“Ljubiša Diković File” and established that there are no grounds whatever 
for criminal responsibility for war crimes on the part of the Chief of Gen-
eral Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, General Diković. During the course 
of the pre-trial proceedings in respects of the events at the locations indi-
cated in the Centre’s file, we examined 120 witnesses including 10 Kosovo 
Albanians; in none of their statements is General Diković mentioned as a 
man who did anything wrong out there; on the contrary, he is only men-
tioned as a man who saved, that is, helped three or four Roma children 
who happened to be in the wrong place at that terrible time...’236
General Diković gave interviews to the magazine Odbrana on 1 Feb-
ruary, the weekly Vreme on 2 February and the daily Politika on 16 April 
2012. The last interview, to Večernje novosti, was given a year later, on 15 
February 2013. His key argument was: ‘There has been much talk these 
days about the allegations of the Humanitarian Law Centre set forth in 
the so-called file on Ljubiša Diković. A whole lot of untruths were writ-
ten, which I think is a blow aimed at the Serbian Armed Forces as a stable 
and reputable institution and a blow at the office of the Chief of General 
236  Branka Trivić: ‘Slučaj Diković – general za primer ili za 
sud’, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 25 January 2012.
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Staff...237Nataša Kandić and her associates were not at all aware of the 
power they possess, otherwise they would not have been able to aim a 
blow at a respectable army such as Serbia and at its able, honourable and 
respectable chief in the person of Ljubiša Diković.’
Although General Diković filed a lawsuit for libel with the First Ba-
sic Court in Belgrade against Nataša Kandić as early as the end of March 
2012, the court sat on it until mid-February 2013 and then discontinued 
the proceedings. The Belgrade press wrote that the proceedings had been 
discontinued ‘due to amendments to the Serbian Criminal Code and the 
decriminalization of the criminal offence alleged against Kandić by the 
General’.238
Nataša Kandić said she was sorry that the proceedings had been dis-
continue without actually having started. ‘I personally think it’s a great 
pity that the Humanitarian Law Centre and I personally should have 
missed an opportunity to bring before the court all the relevant evidence 
we have gathered and disclosed in the ‘Diković’ file,’ she said.239It was at 
about the time the proceedings were discontinued that the Chief of Gen-
eral Staff of the VS gave his interview to Večernje novosti. There was not a 
single reference to the discontinued proceedings either in the questions 
or in the answers.
237  Radenko Mutavdžić: ‘Čast kao jemstvo’, Odbrana magazine, No. 153, 1 February 2012.
238  M.D.Milikić: ‘Obustavljeno suđenje general Diković protiv 
Nataše Kandić’, Danas, 20 February 2013.
239  Ibid.
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Conclusions
The practical moves of the Serbian government show no intention to 
reform the security sector but rather to place it further under party con-
trol. One also notices the absence of intentions to set up permanent in-
stitutions and mechanisms to fight corruption. On the contrary, the fight 
against corruption is used, above all through media controlled by por-
tions or whole security services, for political showdowns and elimination 
of business competition. The security sector which remains unreformed, 
chiefly because of the unfinished and legally uncoordinated system of 
democratic control and discredited personnel, a sector itself affected by 
corruption, will not be equal to the ambitious tasks allegedly set before it. 
The same goes for the judiciary.
The international community should obtain a more objective picture 
of developments in Serbia, above all about the chaotic and dangerous 
state of affairs in the security system. This is all the more important be-
cause the viability of agreements between Kosovo and Serbia is vital for 
the normalization of their relations. Many more and different things need 
to be done because the current approach not only does not guarantee via-
bility but is dealing serious blows to the achieved level of democratic pro-
cedure and practice in Serbia.
The new government has manifested no intention to seriously ad-
dress the circumstances making it possible for Ratko Mladić and Radovan 
Karadžić to hide successfully for many years. There are a good many indi-
cations that they were assisted by portions of the security system, among 
others, in particular the Serbian Armed Forces. Unfortunately, the interna-
tional community itself no longer pays any official attention to this issue.
The Humanitarian Law Centre has been warning against a noticea-
ble trend of decreasing numbers of trials of war crimes before domestic 
courts in Serbia.240 Unfortunately, the number of crimes committed by 
the security forces of the state of Serbia and its predecessors is in sharp 
disproportion to the number of finally sentenced persons for war crimes.
240  Marija Ristić: ‘Mali broj suđenja za ratne zločine u 
Srbiji’, Balkan Insight, 18 January 2013.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 156 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 157
157The Situation of the Ministry of Defence and Serbia’s Armed Forces
Objective complaints of politicization of the work of the Serbian Office 
of the War Crimes Prosecutor are growing in number and are increasingly 
better argumented.
The case of the US citizens brothers Bytyqi, who were killed in Serbia 
in 1999, as well as the recent decision by the Appellate Court to uphold 
an earlier decision acquitting police officers Sreten Popović and Miloš Sto-
janović of the charges of aiding in their killing in the village of Petrovo 
Selo, illustrate the bad practice of the Prosecutor’s Office.241
Transitional justice mechanisms and especially the obligation to coop-
erate with the Hague tribunal were the only available mechanisms, other 
than retirement, for personnel changes in the security system. Consistent 
implementation of transitional justice and, above all, trials of war crimes 
before domestic courts and the Hague tribunal are the best and sometimes 
the only mechanism for creating substantial conditions for reforming the 
security system. An unreformed and crime-ridden security system is of-
ten the main obstacle to stabilization and democratization in post-conflict 
countries.
241  The ‘BYTYQI (Sreten Popović i Miloš Stojanović)’ case, Humanitarian 
Law Centre, http://www.hlc-rdc.org/Transkripti/bitici.html.Un
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Extreme Multipartism
Serbia’s parliament resembles the Titanic: it is too large, tardy, hard to 
maneuver and avoids icebergs with more and more difficulty. This is how 
Neven Cveticanin, fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences and MP from 
Social Democratic Party, described the parliament in the article penned 
for the Vreme weekly.242 He might have exaggerated a bit but has vividly 
described this institution.
Bearing in mind such a description of the highest legislative body, no 
wonder that citizens’ trust in the parliament has been so low ever since 
October 2000 – ranging from 15 to just 2 percent, according to some pub-
lic opinion polls.
“When it comes to ratings, the parliament has been lagging far behind 
the President of the Republic and the government, let alone the army and 
the church, even individual politicians,” wrote Cveticanin.243
Despite some progress made in the past couple of years (MPs behave 
more decently, elections are fair and results no more rigged), Serbia’s par-
liamentarism develops slowly and incompletely when compared with de-
veloped democracies.
In Serbia, where no one pays heed to institutions, democracy is actu-
ally in embryo. As long as Serbia remains a partocracy – which it is – the 
parliament will be nothing but a voting machine under the baton of party 
headquarters rather than a mouthpiece of those having voted for MPs to 
stand for them.
The new parliament was constituted on May 31, 2012. What marked 
its very first session (July 23) were quarrels and insults between the rul-
ing coalition and the opposition. Later on the atmosphere became more 
or less peaceful as the ruling majority – Serb Progressive Party, the SPS-
PUPS-JS coalition and United Regions of Serbia – turned out to be stable 
while the opposition (DS, LDP and DSS) anemic, disoriented and at odds.
242  Vreme, February 21, 2013.
243  Ibid.
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The newly composed parliament showed that extreme multipartism, 
as some analysts put it, adds confusion to Serbia’s anyway confused po-
litical scene. Forty-five political parties are represented in the parliament 
– which is more than in India with 150 times bigger population.244 The 
previous parliament was composed of 22 parties and the one constituted 
in 2004 of only 17. When one adds various groups, associations and trade 
unions to present-day parliamentary parties the number of “representa-
tives” multiplies at 123.245
“Dwarfish parties were foxy clever to join pre-election coalitions and 
thus skip over the 5-percent threshold and find their way to the parlia-
ment. This is how the parliament became a meeting place of numbers of 
parties that, once in, separated from their original coalitions unpredict-
ably, often not by ideological and political criteria. And this only fueled 
the uncertainties of political life,” says Vladimir Goati of “Transparency 
Serbia.”246
Speaking of the number of MPs, analysts believe the parliament would 
be more efficient and representative with 150 MP seats (instead of 250). 
Some think it could function well with only 100 MPs considering their 
loyalty to party headquarters rather than citizens who voted them in. A 
smaller parliament would be not only more efficient but also more ra-
tional saving Serbia’s budget some 3 million Euros, some say.247
“Magnification” of the political scene would solve the problem. In 
December 2011 Serb Progressive Party (opposition party at the time) pro-
posed that the number of MP seats should be reduced to 125, backing 
its initiative with the petition signed by 280,000 citizens. In mid-March 
the parliamentary Committee for Constitutional Matters placed the ini-
tiative on its agenda – but that was all.248 In the meantime SNS argued 
that amendment of the Constitution was much too complicated given that 
244  Politika, July 23, 2012.
245  Novi Magazin, June 21, 2012.
246  Blic, June 25, 2012.
247  Blic, January 17, 2012.
248  http://www.kurir-info.rs/vesti/politika/tomislav-Nikolić-
smanjiti-broj-poslanika-80266.php.
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two-thirds of MPs had to vote for it. Besides, the Constitution will not be 
amended just for the sake of the number of MPs – if amended at all that 
would be for other issues necessitating a political consensus.249
Legislative activity
Serbia has set itself a goal – to adjust its entire legislation to European 
by the end of 2012. The previous parliament had worked busily indeed 
and rather contributed to the said adjustment (with the exception of regu-
lations adopted off-handedly that were impossible to implement). As such 
the previous parliament was among the most efficient institutions.
On the account of numbers of numbers of laws passed (more than 
one thousand in three years and a half) ex-speaker Slavica Đukić Dejano-
vić proclaimed Serbia “a champion of Euro-integration.”
However, the parliament slackened its pace when parliamentary elec-
tions were called in mid-March. Tens of drafts on its agenda were “frozen:” 
in the period between calling and holding elections the parliament, by an 
unwritten rule, deals with administrative issues, except in the event of a 
state of emergency.
In the past seven months – from May 31 till December 29, 2012 – the 
present parliament adopted more than 70 laws and about 40 bylaws and 
regulations.250 And yet, EC Serbia Report of October 2012 notes “a slowed-
down legislative activity” and no progress made in the establishment of a 
functional market economy.251
The present parliament was not immune to the practice of passing 
laws offhandedly – the laws that uncritically copy-paste other countries’ 
solutions and are, therefore, either impossible to implement or the en-
forcement of which has had to be postponed several times.
According to Momčilo Grubač, law professor at the Union Univer-
sity, some of the adopted laws were of extremely poor quality, even fit for 
249  Politika, April 1, 2013.
250  Večernje Novosti, December 29, 2012.
251  http://www.europa.rs/mediji/najnovije-vesti/1674/
Klju%C4%8Dni+delovi+Izve%C5%A1taja+o+napretku+za+Srbiju.html.
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nothing and in collision with human rights.252 This is what ministries and 
the parliament are fully aware of, he says, but share the same, unques-
tionable political goal: to pass as many laws as possible.
Dr. Vesna Rakić Vodinelić, law professor at the same university, who 
has alarmed previous legislators of the problem, takes that Serbia’s laws 
are often products of casualness and laxity. “The parliament is on the verge 
of abusing its right to pass laws under summary procedure. In saying this I 
bear in mind the fact that some laws (to be adjusted to EU law) under sum-
mary procedure although some of instruments they introduce are either 
novelty over here or we are hardly familiar with them,” she says.253 MPs 
can hardly influence on the contents of the laws they have to give their 
vote to – for the parliament simply adopts the government’s drafts, show 
the findings of the survey “How MPs Pass Laws?” conducted by the Open 
Parliament.254
As many as 37 percent of laws are passed under summary procedure. 
At the time of the previous parliament – that has passed 807 laws and 217 
bylaws, and discussed 22,251 amendments – MPs had less than four hours 
to discuss one act and give it their vote.
The findings of a survey conducted by the Group for Development In-
itiative indicate an extremely partisan cohesion in the vote. Only in three 
cases MPs from one party have voted differently than the majority of their 
party colleagues – or six MPs have voted against the predominant view (2 
from SRS, 1 from LDP and 3 from SPS).
“Legislators, MPs, are not exactly countering such a role of the leg-
islative branch – for, they are either overburdened with tons of drafts, 
inadequately capacitated or get no professional support,” concludes the 
above-mentioned survey.255
252  http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Tema-Dana/310289/Naši-zakonodavci-su-losi-prepisivaci.
253 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Tema-Dana/310289/
Naši-zakonodavci-su-losi-prepisivaci.
254  Danas, November 21, 2012.
255  Ibid.
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Deposal of the Central Bank Governor
Having launched the procedure for deposal of the Central Bank Gov-
ernor shortly after constitution, the new parliament began undermin-
ing the institution’s independence, laying bare, at the same time, that the 
pompously announced departisation would come to nothing. Not even 
the warning of Deputy Head of EU Delegation Adrian Martins that the 
draft law on the amendment of the law on the Central Bank “gives cause 
for deep concern as some provisions could undermine the principles of 
the Central Bank’s independence” had prevented the ruling coalition from 
adopting the amendment in early August 2012.256
Dejan Šoškić – independent expert and university professor elected 
the Governor on July 28, 2010 – foreran the deposal by submitting his 
resignation of the very day the parliament discussed the amendments. In 
his letter of resignation he said he wished to forestall political coercion in 
the matter of the head of an independent institution such as the Central 
Bank of Serbia as the only reason for passing a bad law that may have ad-
verse consequences on the country’s financial stability and credibility.
The law was adopted regardless of all of its questionable provisions. 
Among other things, the law provides that the parliament shall elect and 
depose Central Bank officials, including the Governor, as well as that the 
Governor, vice-governors, directors of the newly established department 
of supervision and members of Central Bank’s council shall be elected 
within 90 days from the day the law is enacted.
Promoters of the draft (105 MPs from the ruling coalition) argued that 
the amendments were meant to strengthen the parliament’s control over 
the Central Bank and entitle the parliament to elect all officials, as well as 
to establish the Department of Supervision of Financial Institutions.
Only four days after the law’s adoption (August 6, 2012), the parlia-
ment elected Jorgovanka Tabaković the Central Bank Governor. Ms. Tab-
aković, vice-president of the ruling SNS, has been frequently mentioned in 
the context of the office ever since the establishment of the new regime. 
Once elected, she promptly announced that her office in the party would 
256  Blic, August 2, 2012.
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be “frozen.” His announcement, however, did not remove all doubts over 
the future hookup between the Central Bank and the ruling party.
However, having to amend the already amended law the new regime 
practically admitted that the law had been passed for political reasons in 
the first place. Under the pressure from EU, the parliament had to amend 
the law on the Central Bank twice in three months. It usually explained 
these changes by “adjustment to the EU regulations and securing continu-
ity of the Central Bank’s functioning.”257
The new parliament also deposed President of the Supreme Cassation 
Court Nata Mesarović. It was Minister of Justice Nikola Selaković who initi-
ated her deposal on the ground of the Constitutional Court’s decision that 
her election had been unconstitutional. And it was SNS that initiated re-
consideration of constitutionality before the Court.
The Court’s decision triggered off the procedure for deposal of Ms. Me-
sarević, the judge known for pronouncing a brave and well-argued verdict 
to Zoran Đinđić’s assassins, but later on also by allegations of involvement 
in the failed judiciary reform and enormous payments she collected hav-
ing taken several offices.
Her deposal was voted in by 138 MPs of the ruling coalition, while 
45 MPs coming from DS, LDP, LSV and SVM voted against. The opposition 
labeled her deposal “a legal violence,”258 whereas proposers argued this 
had nothing to do with revanchism but with respect for the Constitutional 
Court’s opinion.
The story headlined “Political Use of Nodders” published in the Vreme 
weekly probably best illustrates the manner in which the present parlia-
ments, as well as its predecessor, behave in situations like this one: “Nata 
Mesarević was deposed with the same arrogance and by the same loop-
holes she had been appointed by the former parliament and the Ministry 
of Justice. Witnessing one unconstitutional act replaced by a political un-
lawfulness is hardly a comfort.”259
257  Večernje Novosti, October 4, 2012.
258  Blic, February 15, 2013.
259  Vreme, February 28, 2013.
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Kosovo – multiplication of resolutions
The Resolution on Kosovo (eleventh in the past ten years), adopted in 
mid-January 2013, was the one with a turbulent history that laid bare dif-
ferent perceptions of the Kosovo issue, between the President of the Re-
public and the Premier in the first place. Kosovo talks, raised on the highest 
political level, had been constantly pictured in dramatic terms (that never 
touched on actual problems), while Premier Dačić and Vice-Premier Vučić 
had argued without respite that they would readily accept certain conces-
sions for the sake of obtaining a fixed date for the beginning of accession 
negotiations with EU.
The former government’s mantra “Both Kosovo and EU” resulting in 
to many failures was not abandoned officially. And yet, the steps made 
and statements given by the new government prioritized EU over Kosovo 
promising to touch “the threshold” (which actually happened in the last 
round of negotiations on April 2) just to obtain the date in June 2013.
Suzana Grubješić, the vice-premier for European integration, said in 
early December 2012, “The policy of parallel rails – both Kosovo and EU 
– can hold on no more. These two parallel rails have melted into a single 
one. This means that Serbia’s movement towards integration into EU com-
pletely and exclusively depends on the settlement of the Kosovo issue.”260
The platform on Kosovo drafted in the Presidential Office in late 2012 
considerably stirred up the political scene. It caused a clamor in the oppo-
sition and international community but also – true, a milder one – within 
the ruling coalition, especially SNS, among its fiercest hard-liners. Political 
analysts did not spare it as well.
Vladimir Gligorov of the Vienna Institute of International Economic 
Studies commented, “This platform questions the entire process of Eu-
ropean integration. It seems to me that this is what Nikolić is after –and 
that’s a serious risk. Acceptance of his proposal – adoption of a law on 
territorial arrangement of the so-called substantive autonomy – would 
260  http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.289.html:409748-
Suzana-Grubješić-Isprepletena-dva-koloseka.
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disturb Serbia’s relations with EU and call into question continuation of 
the talks. And that would put an end to Serbia’s movement towards EU.”261
The opposition called the paper populist and unrealistic, warning 
against its paragraph on termination of the “technical” dialogue with 
Kosovo (Dragan Đilas, DS leader),262 while the West especially argued 
against its phrase “nothing is agreed until agreed on” (taken over from 
the model of two Germanies) – a position leading to endlessly dragged 
out talks between Belgrade and Prishtina and their suspension. EU and 
Washington officials also criticized the paper’s solutions for the Serb insti-
tutions in Kosovo.
The platform was also testing political power and influence of each of 
the three major players (Dačić, Vučić and Nikolić). Some said Nikolić’s plat-
form had been meant for “domestic use,” rather than put forth as a basis 
for Belgrade-Prishtina talks. The Blic daily quoted sources close to the rul-
ing coalition claiming that “More concerned with his own political stand-
ing than with the problems on the table, Nikolić tried to distance himself 
from the government that was negotiation concrete issues…Aware that 
the platform would be turned down, he wanted Dačić to be the only with 
the hot potato of negotiations with Kosovo.”263
Citizens were informed about this “classified” document in dribs and 
drabs (although Nikolić had showed it to ambassadors of Russia, China, 
Great Britain and EU to start with). The top leadership waited until the last 
minute to decide whether or not to present it to the parliament.
At long last – after a meeting of all bigwigs (December 16, 2012) and 
a tête-à-tête between Dačić and Vučić – the document was tailored to 
the West: the annoying paragraph was blotted out and the platform was 
turned into a resolution that was hotly discussed in the parliament and 
then adopted. At DS request, the platform had been declassified.
261  http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/360372/Vučić-je-mocniji-
od-Dačića-i-popularniji-od-Nikolića.
262  http://www.pressonline.rs/info/politika/256061/Đilas-
platforma-o-kosovu-populisticka-i-nerealna.html.
263  http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Tema-Dana/359523/Vlada-ce-ignorisati-Nikolićevu-platformu.
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Speaking of the talks with Prishtina, Serbia is “ready to make fur-
ther concessions but not at the detriment of state and national interests,” 
quotes the resolution – voted in by 175 MPs and against by only 19 (LDP, 
LSV, DSS and independent MP Riza Hallimi).264
Addressing the parliament Premier Dačić said that Serbia needed 
pragmatism (“No longer can we speak of Kosovo at the level of myths and 
fairytales”). This is why he would insist on the establishment of an auton-
omous community of Serb municipalities, he underlined. Although the 
resolution reiterates that Serbia will not recognize Kosovo, it offers, for the 
first time ever, a solution to the problem of parallelism and paralyzed in-
stitutions in Kosovo.
Extreme rightists of the “No to Borders” movement and of the na-
tionalistic, non-parliamentary Serb Radical Party /SRS/ announced rallies 
in front of the parliament. The police banned both protests. Radicals did 
show up nevertheless and protested surrounded by police cordons.
Budget
After many years the parliament made a point of adopting the budget 
in due time. December 15 was the deadline: the new parliament adopted 
it on December 1, 2012. The budget was passed with 138 votes of MPs from 
the ruling coalition; 19 MPs from the opposition were against it and 3 did 
not have a vote.
As usual, MPs from the ruling coalition and the opposition crossed 
swords over the budget meant to halve deficits. Mlađan Dinkic, the min-
ister of finance, argued that the budget as this one was the foundation 
for the country’s economic stabilization, whereas the opposition called it 
unrealistic.
The 2013 budget stands for a U-turn in Serbia’s public finance pol-
icy, insisted Dinkić. For their part, MPs from DS, Mirko Cvetković (ex-pre-
mier) and Božidar Đelić told a press conference that the proposed budget 
did not entail unexpended balance. The government counts on a growing 
264  http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/skupstina-srbije-
odlucuje-o-kosovskoj-rezoluciji/24822196.html.
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inflation, they said, living standards will fall and the burden of crisis will 
be thus on citizens’ shoulders.265
The opposition called the adopted budget unsustainable and argued 
that citizens would have to should the financial crisis. Labeling all the crit-
icism unjustified, the ruling parties argued on the contrary: the budget is 
sustainable and all that matters now is to realize it.266
While MPs from DS were referring to the governmental 145-Euro-loan 
per second in the past months, Minister Dinkić was putting the blame on 
the former government.267 By the way, Dinkić had been the minister of 
economy and regional development in the former cabinet until deposed 
in February 2011.
What also marked the parliamentary debate on the budget was pi-
quancy: at one point the session had to be called off because of – Twitter. 
Namely, during the session Minister Dinkić placed on this social network a 
photo showing just a handful of DS MPs attending to the debate.
“Tweeting the budget” is not to put up with and Dinkić must apolo-
gize, said the Democrats. “As the parliament, or a part of it, seems to be 
insulted by my ‘tweet,’ let me tell you I have expected a packed house of 
critics during the debate on the budget. I only wished to share my amaze-
ment with others: seats of the once biggest party were practically empty.”268
The season of turncoats and the code of ethics
MPs were changing parties and coalitions almost on daily basis when 
a new cabinet was about to be formed. The amended law on mandates 
passed by the previous parliament providing “mandate-ownership” of 
MPs instead of parties turned to be half-done.
265  http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1216400/
Tvitovanje+Bud%C5%BEeta,+prekinuta+sednica+++.html.
266  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=12&dd=01&nav_
category=11&nav_id=665058.
267  http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Poslanici-o-
budzetu-izvinjenjima-i-odgovornosti.lt.html.
268  RTS, November 23, 2012.
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Marko Blagojević of CeSID had warned against the amendment saying, 
“Before the election legislation was amended MPs used to have strong, ‘Si-
amese’ connection with their parties and that was all wrong and contrary 
to all democratic principles and standards. No doubt that this called for a 
change, but the manner in which it was changed now backfires on those 
who did it.”269
Now MPs are neither connected with their voters – therefore, the law 
has to be amended once again to ensure MPs’ principled behavior and a 
parliamentary representative of every single region in Serbia, explained 
Blagojević. This is why, as he put it, voters must be given the opportunity 
to choose candidates of their own rather than placing their trust in voting 
lists with 250 anonymities, as he put it.
According to Đorđe Vuković of the same organization, a bad law guar-
anteeing a free mandate to every MP is not the root of the problem, “as 
some parties are arguing now.” The problem is in partisan lists with names 
of people who have not been carefully selected by parties themselves, he 
says, adding that the phenomenon of turncoats is to be ascribed to non-
existent democratic procedure in selection of candidates, that is to nega-
tive selection.270
Adoption of a code of ethics by the model of the European Parliament 
has been planned for long now. In late 2011 the parliament formed a work 
group tasked with drafting the code providing MPs’ decent behavior (no 
insults, profane words, bribes, obstruction of parliamentary proceedings, 
etc.) and sanctions, including fines, for disregard of the code.
In early 2013 another work group was formed to amend the draft code 
of ethics – it was composed of representatives of all caucuses except for LDP 
which refused to participate. LDP takes the parliament needs not “school 
rules” that could “deeply undermined MPs’ rights” and allow “the regime’s 
arbitrary rule to humiliate the opposition.”271
The code to be adopted by the end of 2013 is supposed to serve as 
a model of behavior for all public officials. Most observers doubt its 
269  Danas, July 25, 2012.
270  http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/335864/Preletaci-se-sami-nude.
271  http://www.dnevnik.rs/politika/po-novom-kodeksu-ponasanja-verovatno-od-septembra.
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effectiveness without radical changes in the society, a change of the elec-
tion system and a considerably smaller parliament in which MPs are 
elected by the people.
Conclusion and recommendations
The parliament turned to be an efficient “manufacturer” of laws, 
which is almost a closed chapter in the context of the country’s move-
ment towards EU. This is why Brussels is now focused on adjustment of 
the passed legislation and the judiciary reform where Serbia is lagging 
behind.
Serbia parliament should, therefore:
• Speed up its legislative activity and better prepare draft laws; in-
sist that the government and ministries submit their drafts in due 
time so as to make it possible for MPs to prepare themselves for 
discussion or initiate public hearings;
• Establish a mechanism of control over the implementation of its 
decisions, including sanctions against those disregarding them (a 
conclusion of the conference “Systemic Approach to the Struggle 
against Corruption”);272 an efficient mechanism would prevent 
perpetuation of the problems generating corruption the new re-
gime declared a war against;
• Have an ear for the suggestions of the independent regulatory 
agencies and their reports; control the implementation of agen-
cies’ suggestions it gave a green light to;
Serbia’s entire political system, including the parliament, calls for re-
shuffle, considerable reconstruction and rationalization. So thoroughly re-
constructed system would imply a smaller parliament – more efficient and 
less costly. Unreasonably many parties participate in elections and obtain 
parliamentary seats through a variety of combinations. The entire election 
system should be adjusted to European standards, while the number of 
MPs to the country’s size.
272  Danas, March 20, 2013.
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The Impact of the Economic 
Crisis on Election Results
The ruling coalition led by the Democratic Party (DS) failed to prevent the 
culmination of the economic crisis that began to stifle Serbia as early as 
2008, when the financial crisis began to shake the whole world. This situ-
ation coincided with the election year 2012 or, more precisely, the time set 
for regular parliamentary elections. At the same time, presidential elec-
tions were also scheduled (six months before the expiry of President Boris 
Tadić’s term).
Despite efforts to at least keep public sector salaries and pensions at 
the same level until the elections (in May) and increase public consump-
tion based on additional foreign borrowing, thus maintaining demand on 
the internal market and saving the general economic situation as much 
as possible, due to which Serbia suspended its agreement with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (in February 2012), a deep economic depression 
and further rise in unemployment could not be kept within acceptable 
limits.273 In the end, such an economic crisis, coupled with the hesitancy 
of the leading Democratic Party to take further steps towards solving the 
Kosovo problem and conduct a more resolute EU accession policy, resulted 
in the collapse of the current coalition and the Democratic Party, its lead-
ing member, lost power in the summer of 2012.
This is what actually contributed to the “crucial” election defeat of 
the leader of the coalition, Pesident of the Democratic Party and Serbian 
President Boris Tadić, brought about the change of the Serbian president 
– the newly elected president was Tomislav Nikolić, leader of the Serbian 
Progressive Party (SNS), as well as a change in the coalition making up the 
new Serbian government, with Ivica Dačić, leader of the Socialist Party 
273  In the spring of 2012, on the eve of the elections, a GDP fall of 1.3 per 
cent was recorded in the first quarter of the year. Over the same period, 
industrial production fell by about 6 per cent (intra-year level), while imports 
and exports decreased by 39 per cent and 44 per cent respectively.
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of Serbia (SPS), as the Prime Minister. However, it soon turned out that 
the Serbian Progressive Party imposed itself as the dominant party in the 
new ruling coalition. This political party also has the greatest number of 
seats in the Serbian Parliament and its new leader and First Deputy Prime 
Minister Aleksandar Vučić soon assumed almost all power, although he is 
nominally just the First Deputy Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Co-
ordinator of Intelligence Services.
It seems that over the longer term this transfer of power in the worst 
possible economic situation may turn out to represent a rather big change 
in the model of economic policy that will be effective in Serbia in the 
coming years, although the SPS representatives and representatives of the 
United Regions of Serbia (URS), led by new-old Finance Minister Mlađan 
Dinkić, remained (and “progressed”) in the new coalition. Although two-
thirds of the new ministers came from the former Government led by 
Mirko Cvetković, the Government still changed because the Prime Minis-
ter from the SPS and the SNS joined forces, so that one can expect a more 
radical shift in economic philosophy.
However, a shift in economic policy – from a relatively liberal model 
of market regulation, coupled with the unsustainably high share of the 
public economic sector in the market, to increased state intervention as 
the instrument of a “socially responsible state” – will still be restricted 
by the new coalition’s continuation of the general orientation towards 
European integration and this orientation, which initially seemed to be 
tactical, appears to have been strengthened by the May 2013 agreement 
between Belgrade and Pristina in Brussels, arranged by the European Un-
ion (and the United States).
At present it is certain that, soon after assuming power, the new coa-
lition tackled the Kosovo issue more resolutely in order to obtain the date 
for the beginning of negotiations on Serbia’s EU accession. However, it is 
uncertain to what extent the coalition is ready to relaunch comprehen-
sive social and economic reforms that have been “frozen” for a number of 
years, so that Serbia can finally surmount the period of “simulated transi-
tion” and adjust its system to that of EU member countries.
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Inaugural Speech by Prime Minister Ivica Dačić
Despite the proclaimed continuation of Serbia’s EU accession policy, 
the impression that the basic model of managing the economy and con-
sumption will tend to “return to the model of the welfare state” rather than 
to introduce a “private market economy”, was enhanced by the speech de-
livered by Serbia’s new Prime Minister Ivica Dačić on the occasion of the 
inauguration of the new government on 26 July 2012.
This is what Dačić himself emphasized being convinced that this was 
the latest trend in the world: “I understand the role of the state as the 
need to help both citizens and the economy as well as all others who need 
help”; “priorities of this government will be justice and equality for all, 
especially for those who lost their jobs and subsistence income in times 
of transition”, etc.274 In that sense, this inaugural speech would also be ac-
ceptable at every European social-democratic meeting thirty or so years 
ago, when the classical “welfare state” model was in fashion. Truly, the re-
turn to a similar model of economic policy and state is once again the sub-
ject of debate in the world in times of “protracted crisis”, especially in the 
eurozone, but not in the countries which, like Serbia, have the problem 
with a large budget deficit, in particular. It is a question of the countries 
where there is nobody to finance even small yet insufficient social con-
sumption – despite a huge number of those having no social protection 
(especially unemployed persons). However, the real welfare state is costly 
and this is why such a type of state was abandoned even in the world’s 
richest and most developed countries more than a decade ago.
Despite this important difference between Serbia and the countries 
that tried to implement the “welfare state” model, Prime Minister Dačić 
emphasized the following in his inaugural speech: “Whatever has been 
neglected, forgotten, abused or rejected in Serbia but is valuable, must 
resume the place it deserves. Some parts of Serbia must be revived. They 
must have infrastructure and the economy, as well as jobs, thus becom-
ing the places where people will return. Not to die but to live there”. By 
this and many other statements, which do not need to be citet any further, 
274  Vreme, 2 August 2012.
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Dačić announced return to the concept of “the state that helps everyone”; 
helps the physical regeneration and growth of the nation; helps deserted 
villages and neglected provinces survive; helps in principle “both the econ-
omy and citizens”, especially poor workers, peasants and transition losers 
(unemployed), due to which it allegedly retained the public economic sec-
tor in its ownership (“The Electric Power Industry of Serbia /EPS/, Postal 
Service, Serbian Railways and Belgrade Airport will not be privatized”, said 
the Prime Minister); faces the “challenge of reindustrialization” in order 
to enable Serbia to have “its economy and its workers”; earmarks enor-
mous funds for agricultural investments and encouragement in order to 
help Serbia become “the garden of Europe”; calls on the financial sector to 
“help” spur development investments; requests the central bank to main-
tain the dinar’s fixed exchange rate (in order to avoid the erosion of em-
ployees’ and pensioners’ incomes); requests businessmen to pay salaries 
to their employees and not to transfer capital abroad; reintroduces free 
health services for the sick and the like. This is how Dačić also sees the role 
of the government, which will ensure all this under a “social contract” with 
employers and employees, while an agreement with pensioners that no-
body’s income should be frozen, including theirs, was practically reached 
(this issue was already settled under the coalition agreement between the 
SPS and Party of United Pensioners of Serbia – PUPS).
After such an inaugural speech delivered by Ivica Dačić in the sum-
mer of 2012, observers put a plaintive question – whether the Prime Min-
ister called for the suspension of the transition process in his inaugural 
speech, since he explicitly said: “Changes in the social system have not 
produced the expected results. Serbia is still the country of unfulfilled ex-
pectations and missed opportunities. During the privatization of social-
ly-owned property serious errors were made, including some of a criminal 
nature, while the country’s enormous economic potential was ruined. We 
plunged into widespread poverty and experienced a fall in the living, eco-
nomic, cultural and civilizational standards of the Serbian society”.
This statement contains a dangerous mix of ideological manipulation 
and naked half-truth, but it cannot be simply claimed that Dačić called 
for a return to socialism. However, one might derive a conclusion that 
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capitalism was not good for Serbia and that privatization itself ruined 
some enormous economic potential of the country. As if its potential was 
not ruined before the privatization process. Truly, Prime Minister Dačić 
only said that “errors were made” during the transition process, but one 
gets an impression that he thought that privatization itself was a histori-
cal error.
However, Dačić did not repeat what he had said during the election 
campaign. Namely, he had rejected the assistance of the International 
Monetary Fund saying that it should go to other countries and perform 
its unsuccessful experiments in them. Instead, he immediately announced 
that the Government would ask for the continuation of negotiations with 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank because he was 
probably aware that, for the time being, Serbia should cooperate with “old 
capitalism” in order to get out of financial abyss.
In his inaugural speech in 2012, Ivica Dačić most concretely criticized 
the hitherto monetary policy: “As of late the national currency has dra-
matically weakened. Compared to September 2008, its value has dropped 
by 53 per cent. Salaries and pensions have been devalorized; housing and 
other loan instalments paid by citizens have been greatly increased, while 
the balance sheets of many firms have been irrevocably impaired.
This is absurd in view of the fact that foreign exchange reserves in-
creased during the same period. The state simply cannot turn a blind eye 
to this fact. The failure of the National Bank and the Serbian Government 
to defend the national currency has directly contributed to the impover-
ishment of Serbian citizens and the national economy.
Serbia needs a plan for the stability of its currency. This plan must 
be based on the coordinated and common policy of the Government, 
monetary authorities and economy. The most important elements of this 
plan include the efficient use of monetary policy instruments, more active 
method of attracting foreign investments, prevention of foreign currency 
outflows through grey channels, work with the Serbian diaspora, discour-
aging unnecessary imports, encouraging import-substituting firms and 
serious export strategy”.
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It remains to be seen whether and how Dačić’s cabinet will observe 
these economic policy guidelines, which he had presented as the Govern-
ment’s programme. In the second half of 2012, when the new Government 
assumed power, it behaved as a “consolidation government” forced to im-
plement emergency measures during the first one hundred days, so that 
at present one cannot be certain about its real “economic philosophy”. If 
it has such philosophy and if it can adjust it with its own ruling coalition, 
which is dominated by old “left-wing phrases” and the ideas of classical 
right-wing nationalism and in which one can also observe the old fascina-
tion of Serbian politicians with Russia and its allegedly “protective role” 
vis-à-vis Serbia.
What Led to the Culmination of the 
Crisis in Serbia and Why
Accordingly, what did the crisis, which drove Serbian citizens into ever 
deeper poverty, uncertainty and apathy, look like? Let us first consider the 
basic economic indicators proving that things were not going well in the 
Serbian economy in 2012.
It is estimated that total economic activity in 2012, expressed in terms 
of gross domestic product (GDP) and in 2011 prices, declined in real terms 
by 1.9 per cent compared to the previous year. The largest fall in gross 
value added was recorded in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, services indus-
try, and accommodation and food services industry.275
Industry, which is the most important sector of every contemporary 
economy and has an impact on the overall national economy through 
numerous links, recorded a further decline in 2012, after a very slow, 
decade-long recovery following the catastrophe in the late 20th century. 
Namely, from January to December 2012, industrial production declined 
by 2.9 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. The greatest impact 
on the fall in industrial production in 2012 was attributed to basic metal 
275  During the four-year term of the previous government led by Mirko Cvetković, the 
rate of GDP varied as follows: +3.8% in 2008, – 3.5% in 2009, +1% in 2010 and 
+1.62% in 2011. See: Mirko Cvetković, Argumenti i predrasude, Belgrade, 2012, p. 60.
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production, electric power production, production of chemicals and chem-
ical products, and coal mining.276 It should be noted that even the begin-
ning of the large Fiat Serbia Project in Kragujevac in mid-2012, with the 
initial monthly output of about 10,000–15,000 automobiles, failed to off-
set the suspension of production in the Smederevo Steelworks, which was 
completely abandoned by the American company US Steel in late 2012, so 
that production was practically terminated.
In 2012, industrial production in Serbia could not be saved either by 
automobile production, which began under the Fiat Serbia Project, or by 
the reconstruction of the Pančevo Refinery – almost only two large indus-
trial projects completed that year.
Namely, on 4 July 2004, almost four years after the signing of the 
agreement on the formation of the new joint company, Fiat Automobiles 
Serbia (FAS), in which the Serbian government has a 33 per cent stake and 
the Italian automobile manufacturer Fiat a 67 per cent stake, the mass 
production of the new Fiat car model 500 L started as well. It is estimated 
that the Kragujevac factory produced 30,000 such cars by the end of 2012 
and it is planned to produce 160,000 in 2013. It immediately started to 
work two shifts and employed about 2400 workers by the end of 2012. Fi-
nance Minister Mlađan Dinkić estimated that as early as 2013 Serbia’s for-
eign exchange receipts from Fiat 500 L exports would amount to over 1.5 
billion euros.277
After the sale of NIS to Russia’s Gazprom Neft, which was realized in 
2009, it was constantly expected that the company would make a major in-
vestment in the modernization of production, which was one reason why 
the Serbian side agreed to a relatively low sales price when the deal was 
concluded. The first such step was made on 1 November 2012 when the re-
constructed Pančevo Oil Refinery was formally put into operation.
The value of this investment is estimated at 547 million euros of which 
397 million euros were spent on the construction of the hydrocracking 
complex and about 150 million euros on the modernization of factory in-
frastructure and environmental protection.
276  Based on the data of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia.
277  Vreme, 27 December 2012.
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As emphasized by its General Manager Kiril Kravchenko at the formal 
opening of the reconstructed Pančevo Oil Refinery, the annual production 
of Euro-5 standard petrol and diesel increased to 638,000 tons and 1,538 
million tons respectively. He added that NIS investments in 2013 would 
be significant – 300–500 million euros. The modernization of production 
would enable NIS to expand its exports, so that Gazprom Neft bought sig-
nificant petrol station chains in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and 
Bulgaria as early as 2012. It is expected that as early as 2013 exports would 
be worth more than 600 million euros.
These two big industrial deals could not start Serbia’s industrial pro-
duction. Another misfortune that befell the national ecoomy was an un-
precedented drought which hit agriculture in 2012. Due to a long drought 
and extremely high temperatures, total damage suffered by Serbian agri-
culture, i.e. a direct decline in field crop yields, was estimated at 2 billion 
dolars. Naturally, this assessment should also take into account serious 
consequences that will later be felt in livestock breeding and dairy indus-
try, as well as in the overall food industry, which is rather developed in 
Serbia.278
Namely, according to the calculations made by experts from the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia (PKS), the gross value of 
agricultural production in 2912 declined by almost 25 per cent compared 
to the previous year. According to PKS expert Voja Stanković’s assessment, 
this value was about 5.2 billion dollars in 2011, while in 2012 it declined 
to about 3.9 billion dollars. Field crop and vegetable production faced real 
disaster – the value of gross production dropped by more than 37 per cent. 
For example, the value of grain production fell by 37.5 per cent, while the 
decline in the value of vegetable production was even 40 per cent. This 
triggered a sharp increase in the prices of goods on Serbia’s green markets 
even by 30–40 per cent.279
278  A big scandal involving the increased level of aflatoxin in milk – caused by large 
amounts of mouldy feed (corn), which always occurs after a period of severe drought 
– will break out only in the spring of 2013. The economic impact of this scandal, 
which halved milk and corn consumption and exports, has not yet been assessed.
279  The 2012 Agriculture Performance Report by the Chamber 
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Stagnation or decline in most sectors of the economy, on the one 
hand, and the great intertia of public and other consumption (addition-
ally stimulated by the pre-election manoeuvres of the authorities), on the 
other hand, led to a further rise in inflation. It was estimated that in 2012 
the annual rate of inflation was 13 per cent, although some experts hold 
that it was actually higher. This level of inflation was the highest in reces-
sion-hit Europe, which only points to the conclusion that inflationary hot-
beds in Serbia’s market system have not been eliminated. It must also be 
borne in mind that the prices of electricity, gas, heating and other utilities 
were artifically kept at an unrealistically low level.
As for the fight against unemployment, which synthesizes all devel-
opment problems of the Serbian economy, almost nothing was achieved 
in 2012. Namely, the number of employed persons in 2012 was smaller 
by 1.1 per cent (i.e. 20,000 workers), compared to the previous year. Since 
2012 was an election year, the government allowed salaries (excluding 
taxes and contributions) to be higher in nominal terms by 9.3 per cent 
and in real terms by 1.4 per cent relative to 2011 (the average salary was 
slightly higher than 300 euros), while the purchasing power of pensions 
was declining.
The government used the global financial crisis and recession in the 
European Union, in particular, as the main excuse for the country’s reces-
sion. In 2012, foreign trade was valued at 30,366.9 million dollars of which 
exports and imports accounted for 11,353.6 million dollars and 19,013.3 
million dollars respectively. Compared to 2011, exports and imports de-
creased by 3.6 per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively. The coverage of im-
ports by exports was 59.7 per cent, thus being higher than in 2011. More 
than half of Serbia’s total foreign trade accounted for trade with EU coun-
tries. Thus, in 2012, the share of these countries in Serbia’s total foreign 
trade was 58.1 per cent.280
of Commerce and Industry of Serbia.
280  In 2008, Serbia recorded a 3.8 per cent increase in its GDP; in 2009, it recorded 
a 3.5 per cent decline; in 2010 a 1 per cent increase and in 2011 a 1.62 per 
cent increase (Mirko Cvetković, Argumenti i predrasude, Belgrade, 2012).
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External and Internal Financial Crisis
Although these indicators support the mentioned “excuse” for the 
fall in economic activity, they do not explain the country’s recession com-
pletely, because the calculation must also take into account the internal 
financial crisis caused by stagnation in commercial banks’ extension of 
credit to the domestic economy, mostly due to heavy government borrow-
ing through the continuous issue of dinar-denominated interest-bearing 
government bonds, with the interest being determined using the central 
bank’s relatively high reference interest rate (which was kept above 15 per 
cent for too long). Namely, the attempt to accelerate the current devalua-
tion of the dinar relative to other currencies (under the flexible exchange 
rate regime of the dinar) in order to encourage exports, made the lend-
ing contracted by the economy (which anticipates the foreign currency 
clause and, frequently, “cross-border” credits) too risky, while old liabili-
ties became exorbitantly “expensive”. Therefore, the rate of non-perform-
ing loans sharply increased, even up to 20 per cent, which resulted in a 
significant increase in banks’ loan losses and retained the current inter-
est rates at a high level (coupled with the 1 per cent fall of the country’s 
credit rating).
This is what caused stagnation in foreign borrowing by the economy 
and increased government borrowing on the international financial mar-
ket. This also caused a real public debt explosion. Namely, during the year, 
according to the assessment by the new Minister of Finance and Economy, 
Mlađan Dinkić, public debt increased from about 49 per cent of GDP to 
nearly 65 per cent of GDP and was showing upward trend.
Serbia’s Fiscal Council headed by Pavle Popović was the first to draw 
attention to the problems related to a rapid rise in public debt and the vul-
neranbility of public finance in 2012. In early 2013, the Fiscal Council re-
ported that Serbia’s public deficit in 2012 amounted to 217 billion dinars 
or 6.6 per cent of GDP, thus greatly exceeding the budget projections. Pub-
lic revenues were lower than planned by about 25 million dinars, which 
was especially due to an underperformance in excise tax and VAT revenue 
collection.
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Altogether, Serbia borrowed the amount of 4.5 billion euros in 2012. 
The major portion of this amount was used for the repayment of existing 
loans and replenishment of the budget deficit, since only 20 per cent of 
the borrowed amount was earmarked for public investments and govern-
ment guarantees.
Great financial strain felt by Serbia and its economy in 2012 was fur-
ther aggravated by increased losses in the banking sector, caused by a 
sharp increase in the rate of non-performing loans, which only illustrates 
the poor financial condition of the overall economy. As reported by the As-
sociation of Serbian Banks, about 19,000 firms and 16,000 entrepreneurs 
were in arrears with the repayment of their loans, so that their total liabil-
ities are estimated at 250–300 billion dinars. The total amount now in ar-
rears for more than 90 days is about 3 billion euros which, together with 
the “earmarked funds” amounting to 3 billion euros in banks, means that 
the credit potential of about 6 billion euros is “blocked” (otherwise, the 
total capital of Serbian banks is only 5.5 billion euros).281
The swinging of banks under the pressure of “non-performing loans” 
was also caused by the relatively unsuccessful performance of all banks 
in 2012, although their total profit amounted to 8.4 billion dinars (about 
80 million euros) that year. However, their profit was lower by 64 per cent 
compared to that made by banks in 2011. Out of a total of 32 commer-
cial banks operating in Serbia, even 11 banks ended with losses, while 13 
banks lost three times the amount of their current earnings.282
This relatively unfavourable picture of the banking system was espe-
cially contributed by the collapse of Agrobanka in which the state held a 
20 per cent stake. In this case, the state made a very expensive attempt to 
“save” the bank’s clients. The collapse of Agrobanka in two stages (on 26 
May, when an attempt was made to found Nova Agrobanka, and on 26 Oc-
tober, when this new bank was liquidated) probably represented the cru-
cial financial event of the year – not so much because of the large volume 
of such a financial operation, but because of the significant impact of this 
scandal on raising awareness that the fight against high-level corruption 
281  Politika, 3 May 2013.
282  Blic, 4–5 May 2013.
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should not be delayed any longer. This knowledge was skillfully used by 
the opposition in the election campaign, primarily by the SNS, which was 
the first to realize the possibility offered by such a fight for increasing 
popularity.
Although the story about the collapse of Agrobanka in Belgrade al-
ready began in late 2011, when the National Bank of Serbia (NBS) placed 
this bank under receivership, the general public became aware of the pro-
portions of its collapse only over the weekend, on 26 May, when it was 
announced that old Agrobanka was liquidated and that fully state-owned 
Nova Agrobanka was founded. Within the scope of this operation, which 
took place only a few days after the elections, on 24 May, Cvetković’s “tech-
nical government” first made the decision to issue long-term securities 
worth €85 million, with a maturity in 2015, for Nova Agrobanka. The fol-
lowing day, on 25 May, the then NBS Governor, Dejan Šoškić, brought the 
decision on the liquidation of Agrobanka, while the new bank, Nova Agro-
banka, was founded on 26 May. This bank was financially backed by gov-
ernment bonds and “alive” 25 million euros from the budget by means of 
which the Serbian Government enabled it to conntinue its daily operations 
in some way. In its official statement, the NBS emphasized that “thanks to 
the establishment of Nova Agrobanka with the state capital amounting to 
10,417,990,000 dinars, the savings of 165,367 citizens were protected and 
the stability of 4,872 firms was preserved”. It turned out, however, that 
all this was not sufficient. Moreover, there emerged the problem with old 
co-owners of Agrobanka, since their assets were practically expropriated 
by this decision and they complained about losing 70 million euros.
Five months later, again shortly before the weekend, on 27 October 
2012, the new Serbian Government, led by Ivica Dačić, brought the deci-
sion on the liquidation of Nova Agrobanka and the transfer of its depos-
its and assets to the Postal Savings Bank (Postanska Stedionica), including 
total liabilities amounting to 392.2 million euros of which 238.5 million 
euros accounted for insured deposits which, as was announced at that 
time, were to be covered in cash from the Deposit Insurance Agency. Un-
insured deposits and other liabilities, covered by securities that had al-
ready been issued by the Cvetković Government, were also transferred. 
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 186 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 187
187The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Election Results
The Postal Savings Bank also acquired about 60 bank branches and alleg-
edly healthy assets amounting to 65 million euros. It also took over 300 
employees, while 500 lost their jobs.
On this occasion, Prime Minister Ivica Dačić said that the collapse of 
Nova Agrobanka would have had enormous and severe consequences not 
only for the financial market, but also for Serbian citizens and firms hold-
ing their deposits in Agrobanka, so thatthe Government’s reaction was al-
legedly necessary.
However, the Agrobanka case was not closed with this action and not 
all those responsible for its collapse were arrested after the apprehension 
of General Manager of Agrobanka Dušan Antonić. So far, 16 officials and 
certain members of the Board of Directors of Agrobanka have been ar-
rested on embezzlement charges, while some tabloids insist that Agro-
banka was the “milking cow” of the SPS and the Cvetković Government. 
Some stories about the extension of excessively large loans to lenders pro-
viding almost no security, or providing very dubious security, had a great 
impact and caused such public outrage that they destroyed the credibility 
of supervisory and control bodies and firms, as well as of government in-
stitutions themselves.
In early 2013, the collapse of Agrobanka was followed by the collapse 
of the Vojvodina Development Bank as well as KBC Banka in Belgrade. Al-
together, the liquidation of these two banks will cost Serbian taxpayers 
about 600 milion euros. However, it must be acknowledged that the cred-
ibility of the banking system was saved and this is certainly significant.
Replacing the Governor of the National Bank 
of Serbia and Public Debt Explosion
The collapse of Agrobanka was primarily used to justify the forced re-
placement of the Governor of the National Bank of Serbia, Dejan Šoškić, 
immediately after the new coalition assumed power. This was the sign that 
the SNS and its group had no respect for independent institutions and that 
they could replace all independent officials at their discretion by changing 
laws, which is in direct opposition to European laws and standards.
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The outgoing Governor Šoškić could not be helped even by public in-
tervention against the Law on the National Bank of Serbia on the part of 
of the high representatives of the IMF, World Bank, European Commission 
and the United States, since the aim of the ruling coalition was more sig-
nificant and more lucrative than their commitment to Serbia’s accession to 
the European Union and the announcement of a new arrangement with 
the IMF. They only nominally abandoned (in an interesting way) the in-
clusion of the new legal provision that the central bank could buy securi-
ties issued by the government and other public bodies or, more precisely, 
that it could even buy treasury bills issued by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy should the latter be short of money to cover budgetary costs. 
What is perverted here is the fact that the political party led by Finance 
Minister Mlađan Dinkić proposed the amendment to the “deputies’ law 
project”, waiving the Government’s authorization to “print money” but not 
the authorization of the Institute for Manufacturing Banknotes and Coins. 
In the end, Dr Jovanka Tabaković, economics professor, who little known 
for her scientific papers and much better known as an activist of the SNS 
(former Seselj’s Radicals), was appointed as new Governor.
The protest against the National Bank started parallel to the already 
mentioned “silent devaluation” in early 2012, when the euro rose in value 
in Serbia by about 10 per cent from 1 January to 31 May 2012. When con-
sidering the interannual period (from end-May 2011 to May 2012), it can 
be determined that the exchange rate of the euro to the dollar increased 
by about 20 per cent, while the exchange rate of the dollar to the dinar 
even increased by about 37 per cent. To tell the truth, a considerable part 
of this decrease became evident only after the elections.
On the other hand, some analysts held in mid-2012 that euroization 
in Serbia was a natural process after Milošević’s debacles and hyperinfla-
tion, pointing out that one of its good points was relative ease with which 
– under the flexible exchange rate regime – it was possible to reduce un-
realistic, “pre-electionally” increased salaries and excessive domestic con-
sumption without cover, while salaries and pensions in other countries 
had to be literally cut, which would usually trigger big waves of citizens’ 
protests.
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When the Dačić-Vučić Government was installed in the summer of 
2012, the question that imposed itself was how to consolidate the govern-
ment’s financial balance sheets and this debate in Serbia coincided with 
a comprehensive debate in Eutope about the bailout plan for Greece, as 
well as a number of other countries facing with financial problems (Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, Cyprus). This debate (actually, the world one), which was 
devoted to the anti-crisis economic policy to be conducted and economic 
philosophy to be adopted in order to come out of a severe recession and 
financial crisis, had a great impact on Serbia which found itself amid the 
public finance crisis and low economic activity like many other countries.
As is well known, in 2012, in the world debate about the directions 
for reversing the current unfavourable economic megatrends, including 
specifically the eurozone crisis, there emerged the well-known dilemma 
of whether to reduce public and private consumption, so that the econ-
omy could be laid on a sound foundation tomorrow, or to pump money 
into the stalled economy in order to revive it at the cost of inflation risk 
and large debt, which will be dealt with by future generations in some 
better economic circumstances. In other words, two distinct approaches 
appeared in Europe and the rest of the world concerning the treatment 
of recession paralysis, tightening financial flows and narrowing the pos-
sibility of economic policy makers to spur a new development cycle. The 
first was expressed by the slogan “both savings and development”, imply-
ing that it would be necessary to control the government’s budget defi-
cit, while at the same time providing businesses and vulnerable national 
economies in the eurozone with enough money, that is, enough cheap 
money. It was thus necessary to provide joint and several security for the 
new issue of paper money.
In Serbia, the problem seemed to be similar – the state was facing a 
deficit, while its economy was plunging into recession. In such economic 
circumstances, in late May, when the current government became a “tech-
nical” one, the Fiscal Council led by Pavle Petrović stepped on the scene. 
This advisory body shocked the public by its prediction that, if nothing 
was undertaken, the budget deficit would increase to about 210 billion 
dinars by the end of the year, compared to the planned amount of 152 
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million dinars, because the deficit already increased to more than 80 bil-
lion dinars in the first four months.
How to Achieve Fiscal Consolidation
Due to such a bleak prediction of the state’s current and future con-
dition, the Fiscal Council proposed a set of necessary measures, including 
specifically tax reform or, more precisely, an increase in both value added 
tax rates (lower from 8 to 10 per cent and higher from 18 to 22 per cent), 
freezing pensions and salaries in the public sector during 2012 and 2013 
(or, in other words, freezing the incomes of more than 2 million people), 
as well as the “establishment of a sustainable system of fiscal decentraliza-
tion”, as fiscal “recentralization” was called. In fact, these measures would 
not be short-term ones because, as emphasized by Pavle Popović, Presi-
dent of the Fiscal Council, it would be necessary to save about one billion 
euros in 2012 and 2013 and then another 1.1–1.2 billion euros from 2014 
to 2016. The Fiscal Council’s proposal triggered the debate similar to that 
in Europe – whether it would be necessary to restrain public consumption 
or try to provide new incentives for economic activity, implying the deep-
ening of Serbia’s indebtedness.
In September 2012, this debate was terminated by new (old) Finance 
Minister Mlađan Dinkić, who revised the budget in accordance with exist-
ing circumstances and mostly met the Fiscal Council’s requirements in the 
2013 budget projection. The revised 2012 budget anticipated increases in 
revenues and expenditures by about 20 billion dinars and by about 25 bil-
lion dinars respectively. In other words, total revenues for 2012 were pro-
jected at about 830 billion dinars, while expenditures amounting to about 
1,033 billion dinars were legalized, implying that the deficit of about 
200 billion dinars was anticipated. According to the official estimates, it 
amounted to over 6 per cent of GDP (it was previously planned that the 
deficit should account for 4.25 per cent of Serbia’s GDP for 2012).
The IMF mission paid a fact finding visit to Belgrade in early Septem-
ber and its statement (issued on 14 September) was really depressing. In 
the “letter” to the Government (and the Serbian public) concerning the 
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“draft 2012 supplementary budget”, it was literally said that the mentioned 
draft supplementary budget “would not achieve this objective”. Then it was 
bluntly added: “The mission recommends additional spending restraint 
to be considered before the 2012 supplementary budget is enacted “, etc.
As for the projected 2013 budget, which was also presented to the IMF 
mission during its five-day visit to Serbia, it should be pointed to the fol-
lowing three views expressed in the mentioned statement. The IMF’s first 
view is that it holds that “the external current account deficit is expected 
to reach double digits this year”. The second interesting view is that the IMF 
representatives expect the “prompt adoption of a clear and realistic medi-
um-term fiscal consolidation program to reduce public debt below 45 per 
cent of GDP as required by the Budget System Law”, which should be com-
plemented by a “wide-ranging ambitious structural reform agenda”.
The difficulty of this task is evident from the assesssment made by the 
Fiscal Council that even in 2013, with the fiscal deficit amounting to 3.5 
per cent, the share of public debt in GDP will increase to 62.6 per cent and 
that by reducing the budget deficit to zero, over the next two years, that is, 
in 2016, this share will still account for even 57.2 per cent. The third view 
presented in Murgasova’s letter points to the conclusion that the IMF will 
not easily forgive the Serbian Government for changing the Law on the 
National Bank, thus “impairing” its independence, since it “emphasizes 
the need for corrective measures to help strengthen NBS autonomy”.
On 1 December 2012, within the prescribed time-limit after a number 
of years, Minister of Finance and Economy Mlađan Dinkić also received 
the Serbian Assembly’s support for the 2013 budget. It adopted the pro-
jection of total budget expenditures amounting to 1,067 billion dinars, for 
which total revenues of 956 billion dinars will be collected. Accordingly, 
the projected budget deficit will amount to a little more than 120 billion 
dinars, which means that it is expected that in 2013 the budget deficit will 
be reduced to a little more than 40 per cent.283 Apart from the Ministry of 
Finance, which prepared the 2013 budget, it was also positively assessed 
by the Fiscal Council.
283  Vreme, 6 December 2012.
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Parallel to the 2013 budget, the strategy of fiscal consolidion until 
2020 was also adopted. Its objective is to contain the increase in the share 
of public debt in the country’s GDP by 2014, while its reduction to the legal 
ceiling of 45 per cent of GDP can be expected in 2018 at best, but it is not 
realistic to expect it before 2020. However, after the first three months of 
2013, it was established that the projected budget was unrealistic and that 
the deficit was continously increasing.
Economic and Social Rights: Under the 
Impact of Crisis and Transition
The protracted economic and financial crisis is continuously erod-
ing citizens’ social and economic rights. This is evidenced by the data on 
the unemployment rate, average salary and average basket. Every fourth 
person cannot find a job, while the majority of the population can meet 
their essential needs like housing and food with great difficulty. Young, 
unskilled, uneducated and inexperienced workers, workers over 40 years 
of age and certain vulnerable social groups (women, Roma, unemployed 
persons and persons with disabilities) are in an even more difficult posi-
tion. There are no precise data on their situation or the data on homeless 
persons.
Serbia is the country whose citizens submitted the greatest number of 
complaints to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg – a to-
tal of 9,500. During his visit to Belgrade, the President of the Court, British 
lawyer Nicolas Bratza, stated that most cases referred to the non-enforce-
ment of court decisions relating to the payment of salaries to workers and 
per diem payments to former army reservists. Protector of Citizens Saša 
Janković also points to the problem of unpaid salaries, which is the conse-
quence of privatization carried out by enterprise restructuring. He empha-
sizes that citizens especially suffer from the lack of economic and social 
rights due to the collapse of the national economy.284
284  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=02&dd=23&nav_
category=12&nav_id=689333.
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Serbia is a signatory to numerous conventions relating to economic 
and social rights and one of the countries which, when ratifying the Euro-
pean Social Charter, the Council of Europe’s basic act in this field, accepted 
the greatest number of obligations – 88 out of 98 articles. According to 
the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, the major problem is posed by the 
fact that Serbia did not accept the possibility of submitting collective com-
plaints, in the concrete cases of violations of economic and social rights.
Serbia adopted the Labour Law in 2005, which was changed in 2009; 
the revised European Social Charter was ratified (2009); the Law on Em-
ployment and Unemployment Insurance and the Law on Professional Re-
habilitation and Employment of Persons with Disabilities were adopted 
(2009); the Law on the Fundamentals of the Education System regulating 
inclusive education and facilitating the enrolment of children from so-
cially vulnerable groups, was adopted (2009); the First National Report on 
Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction in the Republic of Serbia was pub-
lished (2011).
According to the unofficial data, in Serbia there are 700,000 persons 
moonlighting, while 100.000 persons do not receive their salaries. Work-
ers also face inadequate working conditions on a daily basis. They work for 
minimum salary, or even work without any remuneration or paid contri-
butions to health and pension insurance; they are also made to work over-
time and do nor enjoy social and economic insecurity, thus being socially 
marginalized and unified under the single name “precariat”.285
The labour rights in Serbia were also violated after privatizations be-
cause a number of enterprises disappeared, leaving their employees with-
out their jobs as well as severance pay to which they were entitled.
Health care and health insurance pose an urgent problem due to the 
violation of the rights of the workers whose employers do not pay the an-
ticipated contributions, so that they are actually punished by not being 
able to use health insurance. In addition, the health system is also under-
mined by widespread corruption.
The First National Report on Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction 
in Serbia shows that the poverty risk rate in Serbia is higher than in the 
285  http://www.sindikalizam.org/index.php?fullnews=1537.
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European Union. Roma people are more exposed to unemployment risk. 
Their poverty is especially pronounced because they practically live in a 
vicious circle due to the fact that their rate of education is lower compared 
to that of the general population.
Persons with disabilities and development disorders also have a more 
restrictive access to the education system and labour market. Inclusive 
education, which anticipates the inclusion of persons with disabilities in 
regular education, as well as the legal obligation of firms to employ per-
sons with disabilities, have been introduced only recently. However, it will 
take time to perceive the real results of those measures. The main obsta-
cles include the insufficient training of teachers and the ignorance and re-
sistance of the general public. Insofar as the employment of persons with 
disabilities is concerned, some firms still prefer to pay fines for not hiring 
persons with disabilities.286
Social dialogue, as a framework for the regulation of working condi-
tions, is not functional, while trade unions, in the opinion of most citi-
zens, do not discharge their duty to protect workers’ rights. Trade unions 
lack strategy as well as special funds for strikers and sick workers, as well 
as those who lose their jobs. Many trade unions are closer to political par-
ties and the state than to their members, thus turning into “silent observ-
ers” who have no wish or power to fight for workers’ rights. Serbia has the 
smallest number of strikes and protests in the region, although its citizens 
live significantly worse. According to sociologist Boris Jašović, the reason 
why there are no protests should be sought – apart from the “traditional 
lack of solidarity among trade unions” – in the fact that people are pre-
dominantly oriented toward satisfying their basic existential needs. He 
argues that “there is no much room for civil activism when the majority 
works only to survive”. He also emphasizes that priority was attached to 
the political issues (Kosovo, Europe) which an ordinary man could hardly 
influence them. He also argues that, considering the consequences, more 
than a million disempowered workers pose the problem not only for those 
who prepare these statistics, but also for society as a whole.287
286  http://www.euractiv.rs/ljudska-prava/4515-socio-ekonomska-prava-u-srbiji.html.
287  Ibid.
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The basic assumption for the effective enjoyment of human rights is 
to be acquainted with them. Most Serbian citizens are most likely unaware 
of the fact that their rights to work and enjoy just and favourable working 
conditions, social insurance and education are protected before the rele-
vant Council of Europe bodies. The multi-year demonization of non-gov-
ernmental organizations dealing with human rights in Serbia has affected 
the relationship between the civil sector and citizens in many respects. 
There are only few civil sector organizations specializing in socio-eco-
nomic rights issues, which is inter alia due to the fact that there are no do-
nors interested in supporting such projects.
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VI – RELIGIOUS 
COMMUNITIES: 
PRIVILEGED  
MAJORITY CHURCH
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Institutional Framework
The chronic problems related to the unconstitutional character of the Law 
on Churches and Religious Communities and its arbitrary implementation 
by competent institutions have not yet been solved. The same applies to 
the discriminatory provisions of the Rules on the Content and Method of 
Keeping the Register of Churches and Religious Communities. The solu-
tions contained in the Law on Churches and Religious Communities are 
contrary to the provisions of Article 9 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, provisions of Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Eights, and the provisions of Article 21, 43 and 44 of the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Serbia.
Formally, according to the last section of Article 7 of the Rules on the 
Content and Method of Keeping the Register of Churches and Religious 
Communities, “a religious organization that has not applied for entry and 
does not wish to be entered in the Register shall enjoy religious freedom 
in accordance with the Constitution and international conventions on hu-
man rights and religious freedom, in accordance with Article 1, 2 and 5 
of the Law, unless its activity is contrary to Article 3 of the Law”. However, 
although registration is not compulsory, unregistered religious commu-
nities encounter considerable problems when opening a bank account, 
buying and selling property, employing church staff, printing and pub-
lishing religious literature, paying value added tax and the like.
According to the official data available from the website of the former 
Ministry of Religion and Diaspora and pursuant to the Law on Churches and 
Religious Communities and the Rules on the Content and Method of Keep-
ing the Register of Churches and Religious Communities, legal subjectivity 
has been recognized to the following churches and religious communi-
ties: Serbian Orthodox Church, Roman Catholic Church, Slovak Evangelical 
Church of the Augsburg Confession, Christian Reformed Church, Evangel-
ical Christian Church of the Augsburg Confession, Jewish Community, Is-
lamic Community and the Roman Orthodox Diocese of Dacia Felix, with the 
seat in Deta (Romania) and administrative seat in Vršac.
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Pursuant to the Decisions on Entry in the Register of Churches and 
Religious Communities, the following religious communities have been 
entered in the Register: Christian Adventist Church, Evangelical Method-
ist Church, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Evangelical Church 
in Serbia, Church of Christ’s Love, Spiritual Church of Christ, Alliance of 
Christian Baptist Churches in Serbia, Christian Nazarene Religious Com-
munity, Church of God in Serbia, Protestant Christian Community in Ser-
bia, Brethren in Christ Church in Serbia, Free Church Belgrade, Jehova’s 
Witnesses – Christian Religious Community, Zion Covenant Church, Union 
of the Seventh Day Adventist Reform Movement, Protestant Evangelical 
Church Spiritual Centre and Christ Evangelical Church.
Some of the listed religious communities were entered in the Regis-
ter only after the relevant court decisions, while some are still involved 
in a lawsuit against the Ministry before domestic courts or the Interna-
tional Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg. Acquiring legal subjectivity 
is a prerequisite for solving numerous problems encountered by religious 
communities in performing their daily activities. One such problem is re-
lated to the restitution or return of illegally seized property. Property was 
also seized from many non-traditional religious communities, but their 
current legal (registration) status affects the realization of their right to 
property restitution.
The Ministry of Religion and Diaspora, formed by the merger of the 
Ministry of Religion and Ministry of Diaspora after the reshuffle of the 
Serbian Government in March 2011 and headed by the then Minister of 
Diaspora Srđan Cvetković, was abolished by the new Serbian Government 
after the May 2012 parliamentary elections. Under the Decree on the Of-
fice for Cooperation with Churches and Religious Communities,288 which 
was passed on 2 August 2012, its competencies were transferred to the 
newly formed Office for Cooperation with Churches and Religious Com-
munities. The decision to abolish the Ministry of Religion, although the 
previous, reshuffled Serbian Government had merged the Ministry of Re-
288  Decree on the Office for Cooperation with Churches and Religious 
Communities: http://www.vere.gov.rs/KSCVZ/uploads/Dokumenti/
UredbaOKancelarijiZaSaradnjuSaCrkvamaIVerskimZajednicama.pdf.
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ligion and Ministry of Diaspora into the Ministry of Religion snd Dias-
pora, was criticized by some church officials.289
The Decree anticipated that the Office would be managed by the Di-
rector appointed by the Government for a term of five years. His or her 
first duty would be to adopt the Rules on the Office’s Internal Organiza-
tion and Job Classification within 30 days of the coming into force of the 
Decree290. However, the Government did not respect its own decree and 
appointed the Director of the Office as late as 6 September 2012. The newly 
appointed Director is Mileta Radojević (born in 1955 in Mirosaljci near 
Lazarevac), a member of the Main Board of the Socialist Party of Serbia, 
Master of Engineering Science and the former Director of the Urban Pub-
lic Transport Enterprise “Beograd”.
The Agency for Restitution, which was aimed at facilitating and ac-
celerating the process of property restitution, was set up after the heated 
debate accompanying the Law on the Return (Restitution) of Property to 
Churches and Religious Communities, Privatization Law and Planning and 
Construction Law, as well as after postponing the appointment of the new 
Director of the state-run Directorate for Restitution and relativizing the 
implementation of replacement restitution during which the officials of 
traditional churches and religious communities levelled very sharp criti-
cism at the Serbian Government.
It should be noted that the Directorate for Restitution was established 
under the Law on the Return (Restitution) of Property to Churches and Re-
ligious Communities in 2006. However, it started to operate in late 2007, 
289  Metropolitan Amfilohije of Montenegro and the Littoral stated that the abolition of 
the Ministry of Religion was not good for Serbia and that it could have a negative 
financial impact on church life. (“Loše ukidanje Ministarstva vere”, B92, 22 July 
2012), http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=07&dd=22&nav_
category=11&nav_id=628743); “Reis-ul-Ulema of the Islamic Community of Serbia 
Adem Zilkić said today that the abolition of the Ministry of Religion left a large 
vacuum; however, he does not expect any great changes after the formation of the 
Office for Cooperation with Churches and Religious Communities.” (“Zilkić: Ukidanjem 
Ministarstva vera ostala velika praznina”, Blic, 2 August 2012, http://www.blic.rs/
Vesti/Politika/336169/Zilkić-Ukidanjem-Ministarstva-vera-ostala-velika-praznina).
290  Article 6 of the Decree on the Office for Cooperation 
with Churches and Religious Communities.
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after more than a year of delays due to administrative problems and omis-
sions. On 1 March 2012, the Agency for Restitution took over its records, 
files, equipment and staff pursuant to Article 63, section 2, of the Law on 
the Return of Seized Property and Compensation.
According to the official data available from the website of the Agency 
for Restitution, that is, Directorate for Restitution291, during a two-year 
deadline for the submission of restitution claims (1 October 2006 – 30 Sep-
tember 2008) all churches and religious communities submitted a total of 
3049 restitution claims to the Directorate for Restitution.
As the largest religious community in Serbia, the Serbian Orthodox 
Church submitted the greatest number of restitution claims (1602); most 
restitution claims were submitted by 4 out of 14 dioceses of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. Those are the Dioceses of Backa, Srem, Sumadija and 
Banat (a total of 1037 restitution claims). As for other churches and reli-
gious communities, the majority of restitution claims were submitted by 
the Jewish Community (520) and Roman Catholic Church (467).
Within the restitution process in the Republic of Serbia, churches 
and religious communities mostly received back forests and forest land 
(68.49%, then agricultural land (21.13%) and, to a much lesser extent, 
construction land (slightly over 7% of total land area claimed). As for 
the restitution of buildings, it accounted mostly for office buildings and 
premises (over 20%), compared to residential buildings and apartments 
(slightly over 6%).
Insofar as land restitution is concerned, 40% of total land area 
claimed was returned; also, 16.31% of all buildings claimed were re-
turned. One must bear in mind that this is the question of property re-
turned through natural restitution (in kind), while a considerable part of 
property (about 40–45% is expected) should be restituted through pecu-
niary compensation.
Until 1 March 2012, property was not returned to the Islamic Com-
munity, Evangelical Methodist Church, Christian Baptist Church, Union of 
Baptist Churches, Christian Nazarene Religious Community and Church 
291  “Direkcija za restituciju”, Agency for Restitution, http://www.
restitucija.gov.rs/direkcija-za-restituciju.php.
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of God. According to the Directorate for Restitution, property was not re-
turned to the Islamic Community because the two existing Islamic Com-
munities submitted restitution claims related to the same property in the 
capacity as the legal successor of the Islamic Religious Community of Yu-
goslavia, which operated as a single community both in the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia and post-war Yugoslavia. Thus, the question that imposes itself 
here is which of the two Islamic Communities should be recognized as the 
legal successor of seized property.
In view of the fact that each of the two Islamic Communities considers 
itself to be the legal successor of the Islamic Religious Community of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia and then the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via, seated in Belgrade and headed by the Reis-ul-Ulema whose seat was 
also in Belgrade, and whose legal subjectivity was already recognized un-
der the 1930 Law on the Islamic Religious Community of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, the question that imposes itself here is which of the two com-
munities is its legal successor.292
Relationship Between the State 
and Religious Communities
The report on religious freedom in the Republic of Serbia in 2011, 
which was published by the US State Department on 30 July 2012,293 pro-
voked a strong reaction from members of the Serbian public, primarily 
due to its assessment that among all countries in the region Serbia shows 
the least respect for religious freedom. According to this report, the Con-
stitution and other laws of the Republic of Serbia put some restrictions 
on religious freedom, which is also not respected in practice by the Ser-
bian Government. Among other things, it stated that in Serbia “there were 
reports of societal discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief or 
practice”.
292  Ibid.
293  “International Religious Freedom Report for 2011 – Serbia”, US Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?dlid=192859#wrapper.
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The State Department points out that in Serbia there are seven tradi-
tional churches, but there is no state religion. However, “the Serbian Or-
thodox Church receives preferential consideration”. It is also noted that 
benefits such as health and old-age pension insurance are not available to 
all and that it is necessary to change the Law on Churches and Religious 
Communities. It is also stated that the Serbian authorities still reject reg-
istration applications from the Baptist Union, Hare Krishna Movement, 
Pentecostal Church and Protestant Evangelical Church in Subotica.
The former Minister of Religion, Srđan Srećković, protested against 
the report and stated that religious freedom in Serbia was at the high-
est possible level and that the general assessment of all churches and re-
ligious communities was that the Serbian Government’s attitude toward 
them was good and tolerant.294 The former Minister of Religion, Milan 
Radulović, also reacted to the report. He said that the allegations made 
in it were not correct – the Pentecostal Church was registered as early as 
2006, while the Protestant Evangelical Church was among the first to be 
registered. He emphasized that the division into traditional and confes-
sional churches was customary under European state church law and did 
not imply discrimination of some at the expense of others. Radulović also 
pointed to the unfair analyses of the registration of churches and religious 
communities, since the legal provision concerning registration is Europe’s 
most liberal: “In our country, for example, it is necessary to have the sig-
natures of one hundred people, while in most other countries this num-
ber is much higher. The Hare Krishnas filed a registration application as 
early as 2006 but, according to the enclosed statute, they are not a church 
or religious organization; rather, they are some kind of philosophical so-
ciety or, better said, eastern philosophy society and this is why they have 
not been registered.”295 In this particular case, according to Milos Blanusa, 
the leader of the Hare Krishna Movement, which has been present in Ser-
bia since 1989, they have been told at the Ministry of Religion to register 
294  “Poštuje li Srbija verske slobode?”, B92, 31 July 2012, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/
index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=07&dd=31&nav_category=12&nav_id=631122.
295  “Zakon ograničava verske slobode”, Politika, 31 July 2012, http://www.politika.rs/
rubrike/tema-dana/SAD-Srbija-ne-postuje-verske-slobode-za-razliku-od-Pristine.lt.html.
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as a citizens’ association with the Ministry of Public Administration. There 
they have been told that this “goes against grain” and that “the Ministry 
of Religion intended to get rid of us easily”.296
Referring to the disputed report, Catholic Archbishop of Belgrade 
Stanislav Hocevar remarked that it was not all about registration. Accord-
ing to him, religious freedom in Serbia is guaranteed from a legal theo-
retical viewpoint, but the problem still exists in practice. In his interview 
for Danas daily, the Archbishop of Belgrade gave an example: “Every pol-
itician makes a decision at his own discretion and the same applies to re-
ligious communities. It happened to me that I went to see one city mayor 
who said: ‘We gave money for our church; we will see if there is some left 
for other ones’. This is impermissible.” In his opinion, relations with reli-
gious communities must be systematized and standardized due to which 
the Law on Churches and Religious Communities must be changed.297 
Commenting on the State Department Report, Mufti of Serbia Muhamed 
Jusufspahić said that he “feels shame about such meddling” because it was 
not mentioned, inter alia, that in the past period a hundred or so places of 
worship of all religious communities were built.298
Significance attached to the (non-)registration of a religious commu-
nity, especially to the status of a (non-)traditional religious community, is 
extremely important for financial support that can be expected from the 
state.
According to the Ministry of Religion and Diaspora, out of the to-
tal amount of 678 million dinars earmarked for such a purpose in the 
state budget in late January 2012, most of it went to the Serbian Orthodox 
Church (about 85%), while the remainder of about 15% had to be shared 
by Roman Catholics, Muslims, Jews and others. The amount of 55 million 
dinars was earmarked for the Serbian Orthodox clergy and monastic com-
munities in Kosovo and Metohija. Consequently, in addition to funding 
296  “Poštuje li Srbija verske slobode?”, B92, 31 July 2012, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/
index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=07&dd=31&nav_category=12&nav_id=631122.
297  “Ima li verske slobode u Srbiji?”, Danas, 31 July 2012, http://www.danas.rs/
danasrs/drustvo/ima_li_verske_slobode_u_srbiji.55.html?news_id=245106.
298  Ibid.
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for church building programmes, the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo 
and Metohija disposes of a total 75 million dinars from the state treasury. 
According to the Ministry of Religion and Diaspora, funds are not allo-
cated proportionally to religious communities; they are “won” in compe-
titions. Churches receive earmarked funds on the basis of the proposed 
projects; in addition, they must give a precise accounting of funds spent.299
As was announced and agreed the previous year, under the Decree on 
the Payment of Contributions to Pension, Disability and Health Insurance 
for Priests and Religious Officials300, which was passed by the Serbian Gov-
ernment on 4 May 2012, the state assumed the obligation to pay taxes and 
contributions to clerics in the Republic of Serbia. The Ministry of Labour 
and Social Policy pointed out that, apart from the Republic, contributions 
to pension and disability insurance could also be paid by local self-gov-
ernment units, provinces, as well as churches and clergy themselves. Taxes 
and contributions will be assessed on the minimum wage. According to 
the data provided by the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund, Serbia 
has about 2000 priests of all confessions, but most of them belong to the 
Serbian Orthodox Church (1700).
Until 1997, the state was paying a portion of taxes and contributions, 
which amounted to half the total pay, but this financial support was abol-
ished in 1997.301 In 2012, the lowest base for priests and religious officials 
amounted to 19,498 dinars.302
It should be noted that the practice of the government subsidizing 
contributions for a specified number of Serbian Orthodox priests contin-
ued through the relevant ministry, under the project “Assistance to the 
Clergy and Monastic Communities in Kosovo and Metohija”, thus pro-
viding insurance to all priests in this diocese, as well as under a similar 
299  “Džakovi para kraj oltara”, Večernje Novosti, 25 January 2012.
300  Decree on the Payment of Contributions to Pension, Disability and Health 
Insurance for Priests and Religious Officials, Službeni Glasnik RS, No. 26/2012.
301  “Stižu penzije za mantije”, Večernje novosti, 26 April 2012; “Zarade 
1.500 evra, a država im plaća staž”, Blic, 29 April 2012.
302  “Sveštenici na budžetu crkva odvojena od države”, Politika, 15 May 2012.
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project relating to the payment of contributions for priests from border 
and economically underdeveloped regions.
There are also traditional concrete forms of financial assistance to the 
majority church in Serbia. The Serbian Government passed the Decree on 
the Issuance of the Additional Postage Stamp “Construction of St Sava Me-
morial Temple”303 under which all users of postal services were obliged to 
pay an additional 10-dinar postage stamp for the construction of St Sava 
Memorial Temple. This compulsory postage stamp was printed in 8.2 mil-
lion copies. At the end of May 2012, the outgoing Prime Minister Mirko Cv-
etković signed a new Decree that would be valid from 11 June to 31 August 
2012. Pursuant to the Decree, all collected funds will be channelled to the 
Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church to finance finish-
ing works in St Sava Memorial Temple, including its interior decoration.
According to some media, the funds collected from 11 June to 31 Au-
gust 2012 amounted to about 65 million dinars (or €650,000), while the 
Serbian Government was a target of public criticism just because of this 
Decree. One argument was that the money was forcefully collected from 
non-believers and those belonging to other confessions. The Serbian Gov-
ernment responded that the completion of St Sava Memorial Temple “is 
not a matter of belief, religion or believers”; it is the national project ini-
tiated as early as 1939.304
From 2001 to the present day, the amount of over 462 million dinars 
– collected from the sale of additional postage stamps which citizens wil-
ly-nilly had to pay – flowed into the bank account of St Sava Memorial 
Temple in Belgrade. During the past period, at least 2.5 million postage 
stamps were printed each year. In 2001, for example, even 21.2 million 
were printed. In addition, only in 2010 the amount of 51.17 million di-
nars was earmarked in Serbia’s budget for the reconstruction of this build-
ing, while in 2011 this amount was 6.59 million dinars.305 The Association 
“Atheists of Serbia” appealed to the Constitutional Court of Serbia to ver-
303  “Sl. glasnik RS”, No. 53/12.
304  “Uskoro izrada mozaika u Hramu Svetog Save”, Danas, 13 January 2012; 
“Prikupljeno oko 65 miliona dinara”, Danas, 25 September 2012.
305  “Hram ’pojeo’ 462 miliona”, Alo, 27 July 2012.
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ify the constitutionality and legality of the then Government’s Decree con-
cerning the issuance of an additional postage stamp on two occasions. 
However, their initiative was rejected both times with the justification that 
the Government had acted within the limits of its legal competences.306
Apart from financial support, there are also other forms of institu-
tional cooperation in pursuing the joint mission aims of the relevant gov-
ernment institutions and majority church. So, for example, on 18 March 
2012, Patriarch Irinej and Interior Minister Ivica Dačić signed the Mem-
orandum on Cooperation Between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the 
Ministry of the Interior concerning the implementation of the Govern-
ment’s Anti-Drug Strategy, announcing that the drug rehab centres of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church should become part of the Strategy.307
The Majority Church in Serbia
Kosovo is still a dominant theme in the ideological and practical dis-
course of the Serbian Orthodox Church. At their regular meeting in Zve-
can in early 2012, KFOR representatives informed the leaders of the local 
self-governments of the four northern municipalities that the Kosovo Po-
lice Service (KPS) would protect the medieval Devič Monastery, but they 
stated that such a decision was unacceptable. A somewhat more moder-
ate and more realistic response came from Bishop Teodosije of Raska and 
Prizren. He said that Orthodox monasteries were protected by KFOR for 
more than 12 years and that it announced a long time ago that the time 
would come for its withdrawal.308 The problem related to the protection 
of Orthodox places of worship in Kosovo and Metohija has been topical 
over the past few years. In 2010, KFOR protected eight “active” monaster-
ies: the Patriarchate of Peć, Visoki Dečani, Gračanica, Holy Archangels near 
Prizren, Zočište, Gorioč, Devič and Budisavci, which represented the min-
imum level of acceptability for the Serbian Orthodox Church. However, 
306  “Prikupljeno oko 65 miliona dinara”, Danas, 25 September 2012.
307  “Saradnja SPC-a i MUP-a u borbi protiv narkomanije”, Ministry of the Interior of the 
Republic of Serbia, http://www.mup.gov.rs/cms_lat/aktivnosti.nsf/190312-saradnja.h.
308  “Zabrinut vladika Teodosije”, Pravda, 20 January 2012.
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KFOR now protects only three monasteries: Visoki Dečani (Italian troops), 
Patriarchate of Peć (Slovenian troops) and Devič (Moroccan troops that re-
placed French ones).309
The problem of Kosovo was especially topical in the church circles af-
ter the May 2012 elections, which resulted in political scene regrouping 
and a “radical” change in the power structure, accompanied by the state-
ments that the “vital problem of state and church” would be solved dur-
ing the term of office of the “new” political elite. Readiness to take a more 
realistic approach to solving the burning national issue, which was shown 
by Serbia’s newly elected President Tomislav Nikolić by his first state-
ments, sharpened the Serbian Patriarch’s rhetoric. Addressing the people 
gathered at Gračanica Monastery on St Vitus Day, he again emphasized 
the identity-related significance of “Serbian Jerusalem”, which we should 
never forget so as not to forget ourselves. He also said that as long as “the 
gusle and gusle players are heard in the great tribunal, it will remain only 
ours”.
Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić stated that he “will never again be 
the president in Pristina, or the president of the provisional government 
in Pristina, or the president in Kosovska Mitrovica”310, so that it would be 
necessary to redefine national policy toward the most difficult Serbian is-
sue and reconsider one’s own position in the negotiation process, based 
primarily on achieving the broadest possible consensus.311 One day after 
the publication of the President’s statement, the alleged statement of the 
renowned Academician Dobrica Ćosić that it was time for “a civilized sur-
309  “Crkva i Beograd za odlaganje”, Danas, 23 January 2012.
310  “Nikolić: Nikada više neću biti predsednik u Prištini”, S Media, 10 July 
2012, http://www.smedia.rs/vesti/vest/96030/Tomislav-Nikolić-Kosovo-
Nikolić-Nikada-vise-necu-biti-predsednik-u-Pristini-VIDEO.html.
311  Since the mentioned statement could be associated by inertia with the idea 
of dividing our soul and destiny, the Presidency of the Republic quickly 
issued a statement confirming the President’s unwavering patriotism and 
disputing any prejudice as to the change of the status of the southern province. 
“Predsedništvo: Ne prejudicirati izmenu statusa južne pokrajine”, S Media, 
10 July 2012, http://www.smedia.rs/vesti/vest/96056/Tomislav-Nikolić-Kosovo-
Predsednistvo-Ne-prejudicirati-izmenu-statusa-juzne-pokrajine.html.
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render”312 of the southern province immediately reverberated, stirring up 
the already heated passions of the highest majority church dignitaries.313 
In his fast and sharp response to the disputed statement, Patriarch Irinej 
said that “the Serbian Church will never reconcile with something we have 
heard about in today’s press, with a civilized surrender” of Kosovo and 
Metohija. “Who in the world has ever surrended his most important ter-
ritories to others and has called that ’civilization’. It is known how one’s 
territories are taken, how they are occupied – in war and by seizure. The 
Serbian Church will never reconcile with that.”314
The secular and spiritual authorities soon calmed down over this is-
sue and the Patriarch stated that the Serbian Orthodox Church supported 
the initiative of Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić to achieve a national 
consensus on the Kosovo and Metohija issue. He also announced that the 
Serbian Orthodox Church would accept Nikolić’s call to have one Church 
representative take part in the talks about Serbia’s most important issue: 
“We will demand of our politicians, negotiators, to fight against Kosovo 
and Metohija independence for the survival of Serbs living in the south-
ern Serbian province by all possible means.”315
However, the agreement on integrated control of administrative cross-
ings, which was topical in late November 2012, again provoked a sharp 
reaction from the officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church as well as the 
criticism of the secular authorities. In its letter to the President and Govern-
ment of the Republic of Serbia, the Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church voiced its position that “the establishment of borders 
at the administrative crossings between central Serbia and Kosovo is im-
permissible, all the more so because the Constitutional Court has not yet 
given its opinion on the issue” or, in other words, that “the establishment 
312  “Ćosić: Vreme je da civilizovano predamo Kosovo”, Press, 11 July 2012.
313  Dobrica Ćosić very quickly denied giving the alleged statement about “a civilized 
surrender”, “Ćosić: Nisam trgovao Kosovom”, Večernje novosti, 11 July 2012, http://www.
novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.289.html:388020-Ćosić-Nisam-trgovao-Kosovom.
314  “Irinej pozvao Srbe na jedinstvo po svim pitanjima”, Tanjug, 11 July 2012, 
http://www.tanjug.rs/videodet.aspx?galID=68517&videoID=366750.
315  “Patrijarh Irinej: Svi da pomognu Nikoliću da sačuva Kosovo”, Press, 2 August 2012.
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of the border between Kosovo and Metohija and the rest of Serbia under 
the guise of integrated control of administrative crossings is – impermissi-
ble”. In the letter it was also asked “why the representatives of the Serbian 
state negotiate with Taci for whom an arrest warrant for crime has been is-
sued, why there is no insistence on the investigation of crimes committed 
against Serbs and the processing of criminals on the Albanian side before 
continuing the negotiations with Pristina?” After receiving the Synod’s 
letter, President Tomislav Nikolić met with a three-member Church dele-
gation, including Patriarch Irinej, Metropolitan Amfilohije and Bishop Ir-
inej. Although the Office of the President informed that “the state is open 
to the active participation of the Church in solving the Kosovo problem”, it 
was speculated in the church circles that the meeting ended with no result 
because the top state officials claimed that they had no other choice and 
that the story about borders was finished.316
Naturally, Kosovo was also mentioned in Patriarch Irinej’s comment 
on the disputed verdict of the Hague Criminal Tribunal in the case against 
the Croatian generals. In his speech delivered in the Cathedral Church in 
Belgrade, after a memorial service to the Serb victims of the 1990s wars, 
Patriarch Irinej stated that by its decision to acquit the Croatian generals, 
the Hague Tribunal removed a mask from its face and finally showed that 
it was a political court, lacking basic legal and ethical norms, whose aim 
was to find those who are guilty innocent and declare innocent victims as 
perpetrators. The memorial service was attended by Prime Minister Ivica 
Dačić, First Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić, Serbian Parliament 
Speaker Nebojša Stefanović, Ministers, members of Parliament, represent-
atives of refugee aassociations and citizens. The Patriarch also said that the 
invitation to join the European community of nations should be accepted 
if they accept us for what we are, with our holy land, culture, religion and 
language because we are spatially in Europe. However, if they condition 
us with Kosovo, we should not accept the invitation. In the same speech, 
the traditional rhetoric thread linking Kosovo, Europe and The Hague was 
highlighted by referring to the ties with the brotherly nation: “Let us re-
turn to the spiritual values to which our spirituality and history have led 
316  “Susret sa Nikolićem bez rezultata?”, Danas, 3 December 2012.
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us. That faith has oriented Serbs towards the East. We must tie our small 
boat to the big boat of our great brotherly Slavic nation with which we are 
bound by blood and faith.” 317
The strong ties between the Serbian Orthodox Church and Russia, 
not only with the Russian Orthodox Church, are continuously acknowl-
edged and reinforced at various levels. In early February 2012, Russian 
Ambassador to Belgrade Alexander Konuzin was decorated with the Order 
of St Sava of the First Degree at the Patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church318. It must be noted that in 2008 this highest decoration of the Ser-
bian Orthodox Church was awarded to the then Russian Ambassador, Al-
exander Alexeev.319
The Russian state and Russian Orthodox Church provide intensive 
support to the construction of the Saint Sava Memorial Temple or, more 
exactly, to finishing works. There was talk that financial suport was rather 
large. After the meeting of the Serbian delegation with Metropolitan Hi-
larion Alfeyev in Moscow in September 2011, it was proposed that the 
Russians finance and make the mosaic floor of the Saint Sava Memorial 
Temple; this work would be carried out over the next eight years. Accord-
ing to the preliminary estimate, the project will cost €30–40 million and 
will be realized with the participatation of the Russian state and Russian 
Orthodox Church. After the return visit to Serbia in early 2012, Metro-
politan Hilarion Alfeyev confirmed the readiness of the Russian Ortho-
dox Church to support the continuation of finishing works. The mosaic 
will cover an area of 17,000 square metres and one square metre costs 
€2000–2500.320
In 2012, as in the previous year, the police banned the Pride Parade 
in Belgrade, while church officials pointed to the harmfulness of same-
sex marriage, homosexuality, etc. throughout the year. So, in his Easter 
message, Metropolitan Amfilohije warned that the sanctity of life was 
abused by infanticide, homosexuality, “proclaiming mindless lust divine 
317  “Ko je kriv za ubistva i progon?”, Večernje novosti, 26 November 2012.
318  “Konuzinu orden SPC”, Kurir, 4 February 2012.
319  “I ’crkvena diplomatija’ je između Kosova i EU”, Politika, 8 February 2012.
320  “Uskoro izrada mozaika u Hramu Svetog Save”, Danas, 13 January 2012.
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and deifying self-deceit and self-destruction”. The Metropolitan opposed 
the idea of legalizing same-sex marriage, which he called “suicidal and 
self-destructive urge”.321 In the midst of pressure against the Pride Parade, 
Patriarch Irinej said the following in an interview: “I do not condemn 
those people; I feel pity for them. That is probably something stronger 
than them. That is a deviation from human nature which cannot be seen 
anywhere in nature. I think that this is a disease and that such persons 
must be helped to overcome this unnatural anomaly. (...) The Church con-
demns sin, not the sinner. (...) These parades insult the morale of an ab-
solute majority, not just Christians, but also the representatives of other 
major religions and they must be banned. I respect everyone’s freedom, 
but not the freedom that leads to anarchy”. He also referred to the un-
pleasant scenes of violence, which regularly accompany any attempt to or-
ganize the disputed event: “No violence can be approved regardless of the 
perpetrator. I do not support violence in this case. If some priests partic-
ipated in it, they had no Church’s blessing for it. (...) In my opinion, one 
of the rather efficient methods by which we can oppose it is to have peo-
ple bypass the street where this manifestation takes place, should it take 
place.”322
Intra-Church Tensions
On the eve of the regular session of the Holy Assembly of Bishops of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church in May, there was a lot of public specula-
tion about possible radical changes such as: the removal from office and 
retirement of some bishops, redrawing of diocesan boundaries, formation 
of new organizational units and the like. At the very beginning of the ses-
sion, a group of believers from Priboj submitted to the Patriarchate the 
petition with a more than 4000 signatures supporting Priboj priests who 
fell out of favour with Bishop Filaret.323 This event was in line with the 
mentioned announcements, but during the second and third day of the 
321  “Istopolni brak samoubistvo”, Danas, 16 April 2012.
322  “Patrijarh Irinej”, NIN, 4 October 2012.
323  “Počelo zasedanje Sabora SPC”, Politika, 16 May 2012.
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Assembly session it became clear that nothing would happen. The state-
ment made by the spokesman for the Serbian Orthodox Church, Bishop 
Irinej of Backa, was also in such a spirit. He said that the session of the 
Holy Assembly of Bishops the Serbian Orthodox Church ended “without 
any scandals or divisions among the Bishops”. The composition of the 
Synod did not change, nor did the Dioceses of Buenos Aires and Aus-
tria-Switzerland obtain their Bishops (they are currently administered by 
Metropolitan Amfilohije and Bishop Irinej of Backa respectively). The divi-
sion of some dioceses was not on the agenda, nor did some bishops retire. 
According to the officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church, all talk was just 
media speculation and was not even mentioned during the session of the 
Holy Assembly of Bishops.324
According to the defence lawyers of the accused, the investigation 
into the case of defrocked Bishop Artemije of Raska and Prizren, who is 
charged, together with his associates, with misappropriating the funds of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church amounting to about 1.5 million dinars, had 
to wait for more than a year for the engagement of court-appointed finan-
cial experts, who would determine how many monasteries in the Diocese 
had been reconstructed and the cost of such work.325 In the meantime, 
on Miloje Stevanović’s private estate in the village of Loznica near Cacak, 
Bishop’s Artemije followers were building their church. In 2011, their host, 
Cacak businessman Miloje Stevanović, was excommunicated from the Ser-
bian Orthodox Church by the decision of the High Ecclesiastical Court 
because he received the fugitive hieromonks and monks – clerics from 
the Diocese of Raska and Prizren, who supported Bishop Artemije and 
“formed a cenobitic community on a private estate without the Diocesan 
Bishop’s blessing”.326
It was also reported that a larger group of priests from the Diocese 
of Zica, accompanied by the police, took over the Monastery of the As-
cension of Christ in the Ovcar-Kablar Gorge, because the sorority openly 
announced that they would leave this diocese of the Serbian Orthodox 
324  “Bez promene u Sinodu”, Danas, 24 May 2012.
325  “Istraga protiv Artemija na čekanju”, Danas, 17 April 2012.
326  “Artemije dobija svoju crkvu”, Blic, 12 May 2012.
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Church and join the “Diocese of Raska and Prizren in exile”, under the 
spiritual guidance of defrocked Bishop Artemije.327
After the officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church had sent him a “syn-
odal enactment urging him to return to himself and the Church through 
repentance”, Patriarch Irinej publicly expressed his doubts that monk Ar-
temije would want to repent and return to the Church, assessing that the 
path of schism he had taken is a tragedy for the frocked biship himself 
and that the next step could be his excommunication from the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. The Patriarch also pointed out that Artemije prevented 
the Synod from having insight into the work of the Diocese despite being 
entitled to it, so that the Holy Assembly had to remove him temporarily 
from leading the diocese.328
However, the case of the defrocked Bishop Artemije was overshad-
owed by one much more tragic event that shook the public in the summer 
of 2012. Due to its disastrous outcome, the Peranović case made headlines. 
The news that instantly made a sensation was that Nebojša Zarubac, a pro-
tégé of the informal drug rehabilitation centre in Jadarska Lesnica near 
Loznica, was found dead in the home of priest Branislav Peranović, man-
ager of this centre, after being severely beaten. The Diocese of Sabac under 
whose jurisdiction the disputed informal centre operated, expressed its re-
gret over the death of Nebojša Zarubac, announcing that the ecclesiastical 
court of the Diocese of Sabac would also step in should it be proven that 
Branislav Peranović killed the centre protégé. Let us recall that Peranović 
became publicly known as early as 2009 after severely beating one protégé 
at the Crna Reka Drug Rehabilitation Centre he had managed, and after 
the video showing this protégé being beaten with shovels was put on you-
tube.com. After severe condemnation by the Holy Synod of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, the then active Bishop Artemije, who was in charge of 
this drug rehabilitation centre, removed Peranović from office and closed 
the Crna Reka centre. The Municipal Prosecutor’s Office in Tutin brought 
criminal charges against Peranović for beating a drug addict but, although 
the trial was finished at the end of 2011, the verdict is still pending. In 
327  “Sabor SPC pozvao Artemija na pokajanje”, Danas, 26–27 May 2012.
328  “Patrijarh vladici preti izopštenjem iz SPC”, Press, 15 July 2012.
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2010, after leaving Crna Reka Monastery, Peranović went to Jadarska Le-
snica where he became the manager of the Sretenje Drug Rehabilitation 
Centre.
Among the reactions from the Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church it is worth to mention Bishop Porfirije’s statement that priest Per-
anović runs a private business and earns at least €50,000 a month and 
that the Bishop had no idea that Peranović opened a new centre in Jadar-
ska Lesnica.329 It is also worth to mention the statement issued by Bishop 
Lavrentije of Sabac in which he apologized to the public disturbed by the 
tragic event, and explained that the Sretenje Drug Rehabilitation Centre 
was formed at the request of drug addicts’ parents: “We have responded to 
their appeal and established the Centre. Had we rejected to give a blessing 
for its work, we would have probably been exposed to criticism and com-
plaints that the Church does not do anything, that it does not understand 
the times we live in, that it does not care about its people, that it is inac-
tive, that it is not conservative, that it is not like the churches in Europe.”330
Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić’s reaction to this tragic case was 
in proportion to its significance in the public eye. He said that something 
that happened yesterday in the drug rehabilitation centre in Jadarska Le-
snica represented violence and not treatment and that it was absolutely 
contrary to the Protocol signed by the Ministry of the Interior and Patri-
arch Irinej concerning coooperation in fighting drug addiction.331
It must be noted that the Church’s blessing is not sufficient for the 
operation of these centres; it is also necessary to have approval from the 
state and competent ministries. In other words, drug rehabilitation cen-
tres must be obligatorily visited by Health Ministry inspectors, but the Ja-
darska Lesnica centre had no operating licence. The Peranović case raises 
several questions. How could he obtain the operating licence for such a 
specific health institution, if he obtained it at all? What does the Ministry 
of Health think about such “health” institutions and how does it super-
vise them?
329  “Vladika Porfirije: Peranović zarađivao 50.000 evra mesečno”, Politika, 8 August 2012.
330  “Vladika Lavrentije: Centar za odvikavanje tražili roditelji”, Danas, 14 August 2012.
331  “Dačić: Suprotno dogovoru sa SPC”, Danas, 15 August 2012.
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The Serbian Orthodox Church and Its Neighbours
The attitude of the Serbian Orthodox Church towards the state of 
Montenegro is best represented by Patriarch Irinej’s interview with NIN 
weekly in early October 2012: “Montenegro is going its own way and we 
will see where they will go and whether they will become Italians, Vatican-
ers, or probably Albanians. (...) Had it not been for the Metropolitanate of 
Montenegro and the Littoral there would have been no Montenegro.”332
During the previous year, the key contentious issue was the legal sta-
tus of the organizational units of the Serbian Orthodox Church and its 
own status in Montenegro. The dispute between the Montenegrin Govern-
ment and the Serbian Orthodox Church Metropolitanate of Montenegro 
and the Littoral centred on different interpretations of the still effective 
1977 Law on Religious Communities. Rejecting the possibility of register-
ing the Serbian Orthodox Church in the manner required by the Montene-
grin authorities, Metropolitan Amfilohije of Montenegro and the Littoral 
stated in his letter to Montenegrin Prime Minister Lukšić that the Law was 
maliciously and erroneously interpreted and that the Serbian Orthodox 
Church was required to register in Montenegro despite its centuries-long 
presence in it. According to Metropolitan Amfilohije, the 1977 Law on Re-
ligious Communities prescribes the obligation to report oneself to the rel-
evant state authorities and not to register, which applies solely to newly 
established religious communities or, more precisely, those established by 
citizens after the coming into force of the Law.333
The disputed registration of a religious community, that is, legal entity 
also affected the status of the priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church or, 
more precisely, foreign citizens in Montenegro, because the requests of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church for the issuance of temporary residence permits 
for their officials in Montenegro were considered illegitimate by the Mon-
tenegrin Ministry of the Interior. Eight priests and monks from the Dio-
cese of Mileseva in Pljevlja were pressured by the Ministry of the Interior 
332  “Patrijarh Irinej – Intervju”, NIN, 4 October 2012.
333  “Amfilohije odbacuje mogućnost registrovanja SPC”, Politika, February 
2012; „Lukšiću, prekinite progon”, Novosti, 19 February 2012.
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to leave the country within three days in accordance with the Law on For-
eign Citizens, but Metropolitan Amfilohije’s intervention from the Monte-
negrin Prime Minister and Patriarch Irinej’s written appeal postponed this 
legal procedure for a month. 334
After the signing of the Fundamental Agreement with the Holy See in 
Rome in late 2011 and soon thereafter the agreements on the regulation 
of relations between the state of Montenegro and the Islamic and Jew-
ish Communities, Prime Minister Igor Lukšić announced the possibility of 
signing two agreements with the Orthodox churches due to the division of 
the Orthodox community in Montenegro.
According to Velibor Džomić, Coordinator of the Legal Council of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral, 
the Metrpolitanate advocates dialogue with the state of Montenegro, but it 
is acceptable only if “the agreement with the state presribes the same extent 
of rights like the Fundamental Agreement”. On several occasions, the Coor-
dinator of the Metropolitanate Legal Council emphasized that the Metropol-
itanate would not and could not “accept talks with persons who are devoid 
of the canonic possibility of being priests and bishops”, from the Non-gov-
ernmental Organization Montenegrin Orthodox Church.335 At some earlier 
date, Amfilohije, Archbishop of Cetinje and Metropolitan of Montenegro 
and the Littoral, repeated that “the canonically unrecognized Montenegrin 
Orthodox Church is merely a sect”, and appealed to its followers to return 
under the auspices of the canonic Orthodox Church in Montenegro.336
During the year, another chronic problem related to the canonic (non-)
recognition of the Macedonian Orthodox Church and status of the Orthodox 
Ohrid Archbishopric of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Macedonia, involved 
the imprisonment of Jovan Vraniskovski, Archbishop of Ohrid and Metropol-
itan of Skopje. Namely, the Court of Appeals accepted the complaint of the 
334  “Isteruju popove i decu na sneg”, Kurir, 12 February 2012; “Mantije ni privremeno”, 
Večernje novosti, 12 February 2012; “Politički udar na vernike”, Večernje novosti, 13 
February 2012; “Odložen progon srpskih popova”, Kurir, 15–16 February 2012.
335  “MCP želi dijalog sa Podgoricom”, Politika, 1 February 2012; „SPC 
traži tretman kao katolici”, Pravda, 1 February 2012.
336  Press, 8 January 2012.
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Public Prosecutor’s Office and returned the case for consideration, pending 
the validity of the decision of the Basic Court in Veles about a retrial, so 
that in mid-January 2012 Archbishop Jovan, the head of the Orthodox Ohrid 
Archbishopric of the Serbian Orthodox Church (whose activity the Skopje au-
thorities do not want to register), was transferred to Idrizovo Penitentiary. In 
2011, after two aquittals, Archbishop Jovan was convicted in absentia in Veles 
for allegedly misappropriating about €250,000 at the time he was the bishop 
of the canonically unrecognized Macedonian Orthodox Church.
This is Archbishop Jovan’s third imprisonment at Idrizovo. After en-
tering into the liturgical and canonical unity with the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, he was first sentenced to two and a half years in prison for alleg-
edly instigating racial, religious and national hatred, discord and intoler-
ance while preaching Orthodox faith and then received the same sentence 
for misappropriating the donation of €57,000 for the reconstruction of the 
Church of St Panteleimon in Veles.337 After four months the Basic Court in 
Veles sentenced Archbishop Jovan to two and a half years imprisonment 
charging him for alleged fraud and embezzlement. The Holy Assembly of 
Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church condemned the decision of the Ve-
les court “with the deepest moral indignation”. In their communique the 
Archbishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church stated that this was a staged 
pseudotrial of a “Stalinist type” organized “upon the blatant request of the 
schismatic organization calling itself ’The Macedonian Orthodox Church’”.338
During the year, the problem related to the settlement of the dec-
ades-long dispute between the Serbian Orthodox Church and canonically 
unrecognized Macedonian Orthodox Church, was reactualized on sev-
eral occasions. Among the potential mediators in their talks there was also 
mention of Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev of Volokolamsk, responsible for 
the foreign relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, who stated that the 
Russian Church was prepared to help find a solution for the status of the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church, which is not recognized by other Orthodox 
churches.339
337  “Za vladiku kazamat”, Večernje novosti, 20 January 2012.
338  “Presuđeno po porudžbini MPC”, Danas, 14 May 2012.
339  “Ruska crkva želi da posreduje”, Danas, 30 April 2012.
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However, much greater attention was attracted by the offer of Serbian 
President Tomislav Nikolić to mediate in this dispute. During his official 
visit to Macedonia, President Nikolić said in an interview with Macedo-
nia’s Sitel TV and Vecer daily that Macedonia now obtained an interlocu-
tor in Serbia and that he was prepared to talk about the relations between 
the Serbian Orthodox Church and Macedonia. This statement triggered 
an avalanche of both Church and secular reactions. So, Bishop Lavrentije 
of Sabac said that the problem related to the status of the Macedonian 
church should be solved by the Serbian Orthodox Church and canonically 
unrecognized Macedonian Orthodox Church without the involvement of 
the state authorities. On the other hand, the officials of the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church held that there was scope for the Serbian President’s 
role. The spokesman for the Macedonian Orthodox Church, Bishop Timo-
tej of the Ohrid Archbishopric welcomed the Serbian President’s call for 
talks about the status of that church and added that the problem could 
only be solved through dialogue. He positively assessed Nikolić’s offer, but 
pointed out that the condition set by the Serbian President – the acquit-
tal of Bishop Jovan Vraniskovski – was a state issue, not a church one.340
The debate triggered by the President’s offer turned into an in-
tra-church dispute or, better said, bishops’ dispute within the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. Commenting on the President’s offer for one Bel-
grade-based daily, Bishop Lavrentije of Sabac said that such an initiative 
would be welcomed with open arms in Macedonia and added: “Almost all 
Orthodox Churches are autocephalous, so why wouldn’t the Macedonian 
Church be also autocephalous, but this must be canonically regulated. 
They must be enabled to do that autonomously and not have someone 
else organize that. This is also better for the Church.”341 For another daily, 
the Bishop Lavrentije of Sabac confirmed his stance: “The Macedonian 
Orthodox Church has been autonomously operating for a few decades. 
Thus, it would continue to operate like that and there would be no radical 
changes. However, times have changed, this is the age of democracy and 
we must show good will and legalize its existence. This would strengthen 
340  “Može li predsednik da rešava crkveni spor”, Politika, 20 October 2012.
341  “Lavrentije: Dati Makedoncima nezavisnu crkvu”, Blic, 23 October 2012.
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our relations. If they could function independently so far, why can’t they 
continue like that.”342
Bishop Lavrentije’s statements provoked severe reactions from some 
Bishops of the Serbian Orthododox Church, including specifically Bishop 
Irinej of Backa. In a harsh open letter to Bishop Lavrentije, he emphasized 
that such a position was unacceptable from the ecclesiological and canon 
law and advised him to step down, that is, to ask to retire for the fourth 
and last time.343 Irinej assessed Bishop Lavrentije’s statement as “utterly 
thoughtless, flippant and ecclesiastically and canonically unacceptable”. 
In the opinion of Metropolitan Jovan of Zagreb, Ljubljana and All Italy, 
Bishop Lavrentije’s statement is “the product of his kindness and readi-
ness to forgive”, but is not in accordance with the canonical order of the 
Orthodox Church.344
In analyzing the status of the members of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church in Croatia in his Easter interview for Croatian Catholic Radio, Met-
ropolitan Jovan (Pavlovic) of Zagreb, Ljubljana and All Italia, said that 
the Metropolitanate maintained very good cooperation with the Catholic 
Church and Croatian authorities. Pointing out that in Croatia and Slovenia 
there are 250,000 and 40,000 Serbian Othodox Christians respectively, the 
Metropolitan also said that “in those places where we do not have our own 
temples, the Catholic Church has come to our assistance, so that worship is 
conducted in their churches. Cooperation at the ecumenical level is praise-
worthy.” He emphasized that “despite financial difficulties” the Croatian 
Government continued to provide funds for the reconstruction of Serbian 
churches and monasteries, in addition to supporting priests and impover-
ished parishes. Cooperation with government institutions concerning the 
issue of confiscated Church property was also “very good”.345
In early June 2012, the delegation of the Holy Synod of Bishops 
of the Serbian Orthodox Church, including Bishop Vasilije (Vadić) of 
Srem, Bishop Irinej (Bulović) of Backa and Biship Jovan (Mladenović) of 
342  “Od inaćenja nema koristi”, Danas, 25 October 2012.
343  “Vladika Irinej traži od Lavrentija da se povuče”, Politika, 26 October 2012.
344  “Lavrentije greši kada je u pitanju MPC”, Blic, 27 October 2012.
345  “U Hrvatskoj živi 250.000 pravoslavaca”, Danas, 16 April 2012.
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Sumadija, headed by Patriarch Irinej, paid a three-day visit to the Metro-
politanate of Zagreb and Ljubljana. The main reason for their visit to Cro-
atia was the opening of the new building of the Serbian Orthodox High 
School “Kantakuzina Katarina Branković” and spiritual centre, but the oc-
casion was also used for talks with Croatian government officials and the 
highest dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia. Zagreb-based 
media called this visit “historical” because this was the first visit of the en-
tire Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church to Croatia after 
the proclamation of its independence.346
However, there were also some disagreements between the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, on one side, and the Roman Catholic Church or the Cro-
atian state, on the other. The news that, on 23 March 2012, Serbian Min-
ister of Culture Predrag Marković and his Zagreb colleague Andrea Zlatar 
Violić signed the Protocol on the Return of Cultural Property from Serbia 
to Croatia, provoked a reaction from some experts on Serbian cultural her-
itage. The document was criticized because it formalized Serbia’s obliga-
tion to return the property belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church and 
expelled Krajina Serbs to Croatia. The Serbian Orthodox Church reacted 
strongly against the document emphasizing that relics and other art ob-
jects could only be returned to the churches and monasteries of the Ser-
bian Orthodox Church in Croatia from which they had originated.347
During the year, the Pope’s visit to Serbia for marking the 1700th an-
niversary of the Edict of Milan was a topical issue on a few occasions. 
Metropolitan Jovan of Zagreb, Ljubljana and All Italy stated that before 
visiting Serbia the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Benedict XVI, 
should go to Jasenovac. In his opinion, the Pope’s arrival for the celebra-
tion is an extremely complex issue not only because in such a case the 
Russian Patriarch might not come to Niš: “Should the Pope come to Niš, 
the whole celebration of marking the anniversary of the Edict of Milan 
would be overshadowed by him and all other church dignitaries would 
practically be reduced to the Pope’s train bearers”.348
346  “Doprinos razumevanju”, Danas, 8 June 2012.
347  “Hoće ikone, ali neće Srbe”, Večernje novosti, 18 April 2012.
348  “Mitropolit Jovan: Ako hoće u Srbiju, papa prvo mora 
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On one occasion, Archbishop of Belgrade Stanislav Hocevar com-
mented on Metropolitan Jovan’s statement saying that “it is not realistic 
to expect the Holy Father to visit Jasenovac as long as the two sides use 
this death camp for mutual bickering instead of fighting for the irrefuta-
ble truth”. He repeated that Pope Benedict XVI would like to visit Serbia, 
but a vital prerequisite was that the whole Serbian society was prepared 
for his visit, because the Pope would come not only as the head of the Ro-
man Catholic Church, but also as the first among the Christian churches 
and the highest Vatican representative.349
Speculation in the media about the talks concerning the arrival of 
Pope Benedict XVI for marking the 1700th anniversary of the Edict of Mi-
lan was finally dispelled by Father Federico Lombardi, Director of the Holy 
See Press Office, who said that “at the moment, Pope’s travel to Niš next 
year is not planned”. Finally, the Serbian Orthodox Church put an end to 
such speculation stating that Pope Benedict XVI never sent any message or 
signal to the Serbian Orthodox Church that he would wish to visit Serbia 
and that such an issue does not exist for the Church; thus, the media were 
asked not to create “false images and impressions”.350
As for the current relations, there is one more detail worth mention-
ing. Namely, the information that, during the prayer for Christian unity in 
the Cathedral of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Dubrovnik, 
Bishop Grigorije of Zahumlje-Herzegovina and the Littoral apologized 
to the Croats in Dubrovnik without concretely mentioning the war and 
conflicts, provoked different reactions within the church circles in Serbia. 
The ambivalent attitude of the Bishops towards Bishop Grigorije’s gesture 
is probably best illustrated by the statement of Patriarch Irinej himself: 
“Every apology is welcome, but forgiveness must be mutual”.351
During his four-day visit to the Metropolitanate of Dabar and Bosnia, 
Patriarch Irinej visited Sarajevo and attended the prayer for peace at the 
u Jasenovac”, Danas, 20 August 2012.
349  “Hočevar: Crkvi vraćeno 14% imovine”, B92, 23 December 2012, http://www.b92.net/
info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=12&dd=23&nav_category=12&nav_id=671442.
350  “Papa ne planira put u Niš”, Blic, 7 September 2012.
351  “Patrijarh Irinej: Bilo bi bolje da je izvinjenje obostrano”, Pres, 21 January 2012.
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Cathedral of Jesus’ Heart and sent an appeal for the survival of Christians 
in the city.352 Patriarch Irinej stated that Christianity in the city was “un-
der great threat” and that the Serbian population, which formed a “ma-
jority in Sarajevo”, did not live there any longer. Speaking to journalists, 
he emphasized that it was the most tragic thing that many Serbs could not 
return to that city, although they wanted to and this posed a special prob-
lem. The Patriarch said that this was his third visit to Sarajevo and em-
phasized that the first two were made under the circumstances that were 
much more favourable for the Serbian population in the city. He pointed 
out that he was acquainted with the problem concerning the restitution of 
the property of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Sarajevo, just like in Ser-
bia, but “it seems that here the Serbian people and Serbian Church have 
been marginalized, because something done for other churches and reli-
gious communities has not been done for them”.353
Apart from their criticism of the status of Serbs in Sarajevo, some 
bishops criticized the Riyaset of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Bishop Grigorije of Zahumlje-Herzegovina and the Litto-
ral criticized the head of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Reis-ul-Ulema Mustafa Cerić, because he had compared the Serbian 
and Croatian Presidents, Boris Tadić and Ivo Josipović, with Slobodan Mi-
lošević and Franjo Tudjman. In an interview for TV 1, Bishop Grigorije said 
that Tadić and Josipović were the two most peace-loving persons in the re-
gion over the last one hundred years. He also said that by his statements 
about Milorad Dodik, President of the Republic of Srpska, Reis-ul-Ulema 
Cerić exceeded all bounds of what was human, cultural and religious, and 
behaved as if Bosnia and Herzegovina was his private property.354
The President of the Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik, is a welcome 
guest at the Patriarchate and politician who is openly and uncondition-
ally supported by the Serbian Orthodox Church. During their meeting in 
Belgrade, Patriarch Irinej and President of the Republic of Srpska Milorad 
352  “Apel patrijarha da hrišćani opstanu u Sarajevu”, Blic, 10 September 2012; 
”Patrijarh na skupu mira u Sarajevu”, Politika, 10 September 2012.
353  “Hrišćanstvo u Sarajevu je veoma ugroženo”, Politika, 11 September 2012.
354  “Vladika Grigorije kritikovao Cerića”, Politika, 12 January 2012.
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Dodik agreed that the Church was one of the most important institutions 
for the strengthening of Serbian national identity. The secular interlocu-
tor also said that there was a very high level of synergy between the gov-
ernments of the Republic of Srpska and the Serbian Orthodox Church 
and that they were jointly working towards enhancing the role of the 
Church among all generations. Furthermore, the Republic of Srpska would 
also confirm its commitment to the Patriarch and the Serbian Orthodox 
Church by participating in the renovation of the Serbian Patriarch’s resi-
dence in Dedinje. Patriarch Irinej also emphasized the common aims stat-
ing: “With his wish, ideas and mission President Dodik reinforces the links 
between Serbs on both sides of the Drina and contributes to our nation’s 
preservation, while the Church supports this mission, doing its best to en-
sure that we remain one nation”.355 During his visit to the book stand of 
the Republic of Srpska at the Belgrade Book Fair, Patriarch Irinej repeated 
his impression about the political entity led by Milorad Dodik: “Today, the 
Republic of Srpska supports the best ideas of Serbdom in general and pre-
sents them to the world. We in Serbia should look up to the Republic of 
Srpska in many respects”.356
The recently settled dispute with the Romanian Orthodox Church was 
rekindled shortly before and after the May session of the Holy Assembly of 
Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church. In its communique concerning 
the May session, it was stated as follows: certain bishops and clergy from 
the neighbouring Romania still go uninvited to certain towns and villages 
in eastern Serbia or, more precisely, in the Dioceses of Timok and Bran-
icevo where they perform priestly activities. For this reason, the Assembly 
had to protest once more to Romanian Patriarch Daniel and his Synod; 
however, should the anticipated measures fail, the Assembly will be forced 
to break off its relations with the Romanian Orthodox Church.357 The activ-
ities of four priests and one deacon belonging to the Romanian Orthodox 
Church in eastern Serbia or, more exactly, in the villages populated mostly 
by Vlachs, threaten to sever the relations between the two Churches, since 
355  “Patrijarh Irinej i Dodik o duhovnom jedinstvu srpskog naroda”, Politika, 1 August 2012.
356  “Irinej: Srbija da se ugleda na RS”, Blic, 25 October 2012.
357  “SPC: Nevini stradaju u Makedoniji i Crnoj Gori”, Blic, 26 May 2012.
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the Serbian Orthodox Church considers such activities unacceptable. The 
activities of young priest Bojan Aleksandrović, the former cleric of the Di-
ocese of Timok and now the Protopresbyter of Dacia Ripensis of the Ro-
manian Orthodox Church, who conducts religious services in Romanian 
in the Vlach village of Malajnica, not far from Negotin, are especially dis-
putable .358
The long-standing problem related to the impossibility of entering 
the Romanian Orthodox Church in the Register of Churches and Religious 
Communities was solved in 2009, when the two Churches found the way to 
register the Diocese of Dacia Felix or, more precisely, Romanian Orthodox 
Church for Romanians in the Serbian Banat. Thereafter, Ministry of Reli-
gion and Diaspora entered those dioceses in the Register, thus giving it the 
same significance as to all other traditional churches and religius commu-
nities. On a few occasions the Centre for Civil Society Development turned 
attention to the fact that “Serbia’s failure to recognize the Romanian Or-
thodox Church is the factor behind Romania’s resistance to Serbia’s be-
coming a EU candidate in March 2012”.
Although its details were not published, the Brussels Protocol on the 
Observance of Romanian Minority Rights, signed on the eve of the ap-
proval of Serbia’s EU candidate status, also deals with one church issue 
– the rights of Romanians living in eastern Serbia to have church ser-
vices held in their language. The Protocol signed in Brussels on 1 March, 
thanks to which Romania gave its consent for Serbia’s EU accession, in-
fringes not only on the system of the Serbian Orthodox Church, but also 
on inter-church relations. It anticipates Serbia’s obligation to provide the 
Romanians living in Timocka Krajina not only with education, media 
and local administration, but also with church services in their language. 
Therefore, the Serbian Orthodox Church does not look favourably at gov-
ernment interference with liturgical issues.359
358  “Šta SPC zamera rumunskim sveštenicima”, Politika, 30 May 2012.
359  “Dunav podelio i crkve”, Večernje novosti, 31 May 2012.
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Muslims in Serbia
The suspension – or “postponement” due to the May elections, as re-
ported in the media – of the initiative to unify the Islamic Community, 
which was launched by Turkish Prime Minister Taip Erdogan, Turkish For-
eign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Mehmed Gomez, head of Turkey’s Is-
lamic community, returned the relations between the rival organizational 
structures to their previous level. The mentioned initiative to unify the 
Islamic Community in Serbia and Islamic Community of Serbia was tak-
ing place under very questionable circumstances. It should be noted that, 
apart from the lack of transparency in the whole process and the ques-
tionable role of government institutions in the creation of the relevant 
agreement360, one of the two parties, the Islamic Community of Serbia, was 
absent. On the other hand, a regular actor involved in these negotiations 
was Reis-ul-Ulema Mustafa Cerić, head of the Islamic Community in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and the main religious authority of the Islamic Com-
munity in Serbia, whose Meshihat operates within the Islamic Community 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The status of Muslims in the Municipalities of Bujanovac, Presevo and 
Medvedja is very specific because about 60 mosques and 70 imams are un-
der the jurisdiction of at least four organizational structures, which are 
individually linked to Pristina, Novi Pazar, Belgrade and even Riyadh.361 
None of these organizational structures was mentioned in the agreement 
on the unification of the Islamic Community.
In an interview for Blic daily, given at the beginning of 2012, Re-
is-ul-Ulema of the Islamic Community of Serbia Adem Zilkić confirmed 
that neither the Islamic Community of Serbia nor he personally were 
included in the reconciliation process. However, he emphasized that 
360  In late 2011, according to the media, the agreement was created at several 
meetings, which were attended, apart from the mentioned Turkish officials, by 
Serbian Minister without Portfolio Sulejman Ugljanin, Rasim Ljajić, Minister of 
Labour and Social Policy, Bakir Izetbegović, Bosniak Member of the Presidency 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Serbian President Boris Tadić and Foreign 
Minister Vuk Jeremić (“Potpis na jedinstvo u sredu”, Danas, 16 October 2011).
361  “Rijad i Kosovo bliži od Ankare”, Danas, 7 November 2011.
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reconciliation was necessary and expected the state to be a good service 
provider that would contribute to reconciliation, just as Turkey was ex-
pected to be an impartial mediator. He also said that unification should 
be based on the “comb overlapping” system, thus incorporating all insti-
tutions into each other without having to dissolve any of them. The Ryaset 
would act as an umbrella institution and such a model, in the opinion of 
Reis-ul-Ulema Adem Zilkić, would be acceptable to Albanians, Roma, Ash-
kali, Goranci, Turks and others, in addition to Bosniaks supporting the Is-
lamic Community of Serbia. On that occasion, the religious leader of the 
Islamic Community of Serbia also proposed that Zukorlić and he withdraw 
from the Islamic Community and thus open the door to reconciliation.362
It is worth to mention the statement of the then State Secretary at the 
Ministry of Religion and Diaspora, Bogoljub Šijaković, who emphasized 
that the Ministry was not included in “Turkey’s initiative to unify the Is-
lamic Community”. However, it appeared to him that, through the unifica-
tion process, Turkey pretentiously attempted to favour the organizational 
structure seated in Novi Pazar and led by Mufti Muamer Zukorlić. Šijaković 
pointed out that this religious community was acting as an explicit oppo-
nent of Serbia’s state policy for a few years already. He then made a very 
sharp assessment: “Sandžak separatists led by Zukorlić wish to divide the 
national wholeness of the Serbian people, so that one part remains in Ser-
bia and the other – in Montenegro and Herzegovina”.363
The status of Muslims in Serbia is still burdened by an organizational 
division within the Islamic community or, better said, the existence of 
two Islamic Communities, while their continuing and stubborn insistence 
on their positions resulted in the creation of parallel institutions, which 
only increases the current distance and makes reconciliation efforts more 
difficult.
Traditionally, Muamer Zukorlić, Chief Mufti of the Islamic Community 
in Serbia, was most often present in the media, especially in 2012, when 
362  “Zilkić: Zukorlić i ja treba da se povučemo sa svih funkcija”, Blic, 
3 January 2012, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/299448/Zilkić-
Zukorlić-i-ja-treba-da-se-povucemo-sa-svih-funkcija.
363  “Šijaković: Crkva treba da ima veću ulogu u javnom životu”, Politika, 5 March 2012.
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he came into the spotlight in Serbia on a few occasions due to his candi-
dacy for the Serbian President. According to Sarajevo-based daily Dnevni 
avaz, in mid-February 2012, it was plotted to assassinate Chief Mufti Zuko-
rlić; the assassination was planned in Sarajevo and its executors would be 
a group of Serbian criminals. According to the same daily, Serbia’s police 
and security services received the information about this plot two months 
earlier, but did not warn the Chief Mufti.364 Deputy Prime Minister and In-
terior Minister Ivica Dačić confirmed that he had received the letter from 
Hajro Tutić, President of the Assembly of the Islamic Community in Ser-
bia, asking him to verify the authenticity of the alleged death threat to the 
Chief Mufti.365
A few days later, the Security Information Agency (BIA) announced 
that there were no grounds for the claims about a plot to assassinate the 
Chief Mufti of the Islamic Community in Serbia and thus also responded 
to the request of Labour Minister Rasim Ljajić to investigate the allega-
tions appearing in the media in Serbia and the region about the plot and 
linking Ljajić to it. In its response, the BIA called such allegations “an am-
ateurish attempt by some individuals to destabilize the situation in our 
country”.366
In early April 2012, Mufti Muamer Zukorlić announced that he would 
run for President of the Republic of Serbia in the country’s elections 
scheduled on 6 May. He explained that his decision was based on the con-
viction that the state and society were on the verge of collapse and that 
it would be very selfish just to observe such collapse. The Chief Mufti an-
nounced an authentic salvation programme that would be acceptable to 
all citizens and would anticipate the overall revival of the state. On this 
occasion, Mufti Zukorlić also said that he would give up his position in the 
364  “Ugrožena sigurnost predsjednika Mešihata IZ u Srbiji: Pripreman 
atentat na muftiju Zukorlića!”, Dnevni avaz, 17 February 2012, http://
www.avaz.ba/vijesti/teme/80435-ugrozena-sigurnost-predsjednika-
mesihata-iz-u-srbiji-pripreman-atentat-na-muftiju-zukorlica.html.
365  “Ispitivanje pretnji Zukorliću”, Blic, 19 February 2012.
366  “Muftiji niko ne preti”, Pravda, 23 February 2012.
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religious community “when he wins the presidential election”.367 As could 
be expected, the announced candidacy provoked numerous reactions. 
One of the first came from Safet Softić, President of the Islamic Commu-
nity in Bosnia and Herzgovina, who pointed to the decision of the Islamic 
Community that religious officials should in no way promote any politi-
cal party or participate in election campaigns. He also recalled that at one 
time some imams of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were relieved of duty because of engaging in politics. In view of the fact 
that the Meshihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia, which is presided 
by Mufti Zukorlić, belongs organizationally and spiritually to the Islamic 
Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Softić says that the interpretation 
of his status following the candidacy falls within the competence of the Ri-
yaset of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. “The Assem-
bly of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has not received 
any official information about Mufti Zukorlić’s decision, so that I cannot 
comment on it from the aspect of his status in the Islamic Community. All 
this has come as a surprise to me”, said Softić. He also pointed out that by 
the decision of the Riyaset religious officials should not perform religious 
and political functions simultaneously.368
The Assembly of the Islamic Community in Serbia unanimously up-
held the Chief Mufti’s decision to run as a presidential candidate. On the 
other hand, the Reis-ul-Ulema of the Islamic Community of Serbia, Adem 
Zilkić, assessed Chief Mufti Zukorlić’s candidacy as a gross violation of the 
Islamic Community’s Constitution. He stated that by taking this action Zu-
korlić left the Islamic Community and ceased to be the Sandžak Mufti.369
According to the results published by the Republican Election Com-
mission, Chief Mufti Zukorlić won 54,492 votes, or 1.39 per cent of the 
367  “Zukorlić kandidat za predsednika Srbije”, S media, 7 April 2012, http://www.smedia.
rs/vesti/vest/90318/Izbori-2012-Zukorlić-se-kandiduje-za-predsednika-Srbije-Muamer-
Zukorlić-Predsednicki-izbori-Zukorlić-kandidat-za-predsednika-Srbije-VIDEO.html.
368  “Islamska zajednica u BiH iznenađena”, RTS, 9 April 2012, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/
sr/story/11/Region/1079432/Islamska+zajednica+u+BiH+iznena%C4%91ena.html.
369  “Zilkić: Zukorlić najgrublje prekršio Ustav IZ”, S media, 7 April 2012, http://
www.smedia.rs/vesti/vest/90338/Izbori-2012-Islamska-zajednica-Srbije-
Adem-Zilkić-Zilkić-Zukorlić-najgrublje-prekrsio-Ustav-IZ.html.
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vote.370 Thereafter he stated that he would not support any candidate in 
the runoff election and that the candidates would have to initiate the talk 
with him should they wish to benefit from his votes.371
Following its analysis of the election results, the Riyaset of the Is-
lamic Community of Serbia issued a public statement in which it pointed 
out that the results corroborated the earlier claims that Muamer Zuko-
rlić had no supporters in Sandžak since he won only 20 per cent of the 
vote, thus being totally defeated. It was further stated that 80 per cent of 
Sandžak citizens voted against his abuse of religion, religious institutions 
and symbols, as well as violence and arrogance. Thus, such voting results 
should be understood as the support of Sandžak Bosniaks to the concept 
promoted by the Riyaset. At the end of the statement, they appealed to 
the competent bodies of the Republic of Serbia to solve the problem con-
cerning entry in the Register of Churches and Religious Communities in 
accordance with the Law within the shortest possible time, thus enabling 
the Islamic Community of Serbia to enjoy the same legal status as other 
religious communities.372
The long-standing problem concerning the appointment of Islamic 
religion teachers was also topical at the beginning of the school year 2012–
2013, but the measures taken this year were more radical. Namely, pro-
voked by the appointment of Islamic religion teachers and supported by 
the Association of Islamic Religious Teachers, which also proposed such a 
measure in September of the previous year, Chief Mufti Zukorlić or, more 
precisely, the Fatwa Council of the Islamic Community in Serbia, issued a 
fatwa against Islamic religion classes in elementary and secondary schools 
in the Republic of Serbia, banning the attendance of religious classes 
conducted by unauthorized and incompetent teachers, demanding that 
370  “I krug: Tadić bolji za 0,26 odsto”, B92, 10 May 2012, http://www.b92.net/info/
izbori2012/vesti.php?yyyy=2012&mm=05&dd=10&nav_id=608132.
371  “Zukorlić: neću podržati nikoga”, S media, 8 May 2012, http://www.smedia.rs/vesti/
vest/92608/Izbori-2012-Muamer-Zukorlić-Zukorlić-Necu-podrzati-nikoga.html.
372  “Rijaset Islamske zajednice Srbije: Saopštenje za javnost”, Meshihat of the 
Islamic Community of Sandžak, 8 May 2012, http://www.mesihatsandzaka.rs/
vijesti/655-rijaset-islamske-zajednice-srbije-saopstenje-za-javnost.html.
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parents protect their children from attending disputed religious classes 
and enabling them to attend Islamic religious education in a mosque or 
mekteb. In the conclusion, it was pointed out that “school principals and 
teachers putting pressure on students to attend such religious education 
are doing evil and thus aligning with the enemies of Islam, the Islamic 
Community and Muslims.”373 In justifying the issuance of a fatwa it was 
stated that the Ministry of Religion or, more precisely, the Commission 
for Relations with Religious Communities, as well as the Ministry of Ed-
ucation completely ignored the list of religious teachers proposed by the 
Meshihat of the Islamic Community in Serbia and excluded almost all re-
ligious teachers belonging to this Community from conducting religious 
education, and that something proposed as Islamic religion teaching for 
this school year as Islamic religion teaching was actually “heresy” and “an 
attempt to teach children to be the slaves of Belgrade and its regimes”. Ed-
ucation Minister Žarko Obradović stated that the fatwa represented “deep 
meddling of religion and politics in Serbia’s education system”.374
The number of registered and reported incidents in Sandžak, espe-
cially in Novi Pazar where they used to be most frequent, has strikingly 
declined over the past years, so that it can be concluded that tensions 
were substantially eased or, better said, they took a certain institutional-
ized form. However, a few sporadic incidents were registered: as reported 
by the Meshihat of the Islamic Community of Sandžak, in the settlement 
of Bajevica, in late April 2012, imam Ahmedin Dervišević was verbally at-
tacked and physically abused, after which his car was stoned375; in the set-
tlement of Mur, in October 2012, a religion teacher was attacked in the 
373  “Fetva o pohađanju islamske vjeronauke u osnovnim i srednjim 
školama Republike Srbije”, Islamic Community in Serbia, 26 September 
2012, http://www.islamskazajednica.org/index.php?option=com_
ezine&task=read&page=2&category=12&article=6961.
374  “Novi Pazar: Poziv na bojkot vjeronauke”, Aljazeera, 4 October 2012, http://
balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/novi-pazar-poziv-na-bojkot-vjeronauke.
375  “Saopštenje za javnost”, Meshihat of the Islamic Community of Sandžak, 27 
April 2012, http://www.mesihatsandzaka.rs/vijesti/642-saopstenje-za-javnost—
placenici-muamera-zukorlica-izazvali-novi-incident-u-novom-pazaru-kada-je-
bez-razloga-napadnut-ahmedin-ef-dervisevic-imam-dzamije-u-bajevici.html.
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corridor of the Josanica Elementary School376; on 1 May 2012, according 
to the testimony of Novi Pazar Mayor Meho Mahmutović, the followers of 
Mufti Muamer Zukorlić were shooting in the direction of the Novi Pazar 
Municipality building and breaking billboards in the presence of the po-
lice, due to which the Mayor sharply criticized the police for inaction and 
called on Interior Minister Ivica Dačić to explain its behaviour.377
On 21 September 2012, Novi Pazar was the venue of a protest against 
the showing of the video (part of the film) titled “Innocence of Muslims” 
insulting the Prophet Muhammed. A protest walk started after the Juma 
prayer and ended with a gathering of several thousand people at the 
Square of Isa-beg Ishaković. The whole protest, organized by the fans of 
the Novi Pazar Soccer Club, known as Torcida Sandžak, passed without 
incident.
Chief Mufti Muamer Zukorlić stated that the Islamic Community in 
Serbia was not involved in the organization of this protest, but supported 
it: “I understand the right of Muslims to protest against insults. The Is-
lamic Community in Serbia did not organize a protest, but does not op-
pose such a method of expressing discontent about those insults, but they 
cannot be an excuse for violence”.378
During the year, the Riyaset of the Islamic Community of Serbia 
worked diligently on the revival of old institutions and strengthening of 
new ones, both from an infrastructural and institutional aspect. In early 
May 2012, thanks to donations from numerous benefactors, primarily 
the Government of Azerbaijan, the restoration of the Bajrakli Mosque 
was completed and the building, which will house the Belgrade mufti-
ate, medresa, library, Faculty of Islamic Studies and the like, was formally 
opened. It is the question of the building that was heavly damaged by fire 
376  “Napadnut imam i veroučitelj u Novom Pazaru”, Meshihat of the Islamic 
Community of Sandžak, 23 October 2012, http://www.mesihatsandzaka.
rs/vijesti/788-napadnut-imam-i-veroucitelj-u-novom-pazaru.html.
377  “Pucnji u centru Novog Pazara”, B92, 1 May 2012, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/
index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=05&dd=01&nav_category=16&nav_id=605615.
378  “Miran protest navijača u Pazaru», B92, 21 September 2012, http://www.b92.net/info/
vesti/index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=09&dd=21&nav_category=12&nav_id=644863.
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in March 2004. The ceremony was attnded by Patriarch Irinej, Archbishop 
of Belgrade Stanislav Hocevar, Rabbi Isak Asijel, Allashukur Pashaza-
deh, President of the Caucasus Muslim Administration, Bishop Alexander 
Shiein of the Russian Orthodox Church in Azerbaijan, Deputy Prime Min-
ister Elchin Efendiyev, the outgoing Serbian President Boris Tadić and dip-
lomatic corps representatives.379
In late October 2012, the Belgrade municipal authorities and Islamic 
Community of Belgrade agreed on the basis for solving the decade-long 
problem of refurbishing the Muslim cemetaries in the Serbian capital. Ac-
cording to the Deputy Reis-ul-Ulema, Mufti Muhamed Jusufspahić, agree-
ment was reached with Belgrade Mayor Dragan Đilas concerning the 
refurbishment of existing burial plots at the cemeteries and provision of 
new ones, as well as their uniformity, which can be regarded as the im-
provement of relations between the Islamic Community of Serbia and the 
City of Belgrade, as part of great efforts to enable Muslims to practice their 
religion more adequately in many towns in Serbia.380
In early December 2012, the representatives of the Government of the 
Republic of Serbia, Halal Agency of Serbia, USAID and Cluster “Guardians of 
Tradition – Pester, Golija and Kopaonik” signed the Memorandum on Coop-
eration enabling the opening of the first halal foods store in Belgrade. It is 
expected that the halal foods store will be opened in early 2013. 381
Intensive institutional cooperation between the Islamic Commu-
nity of Serbia and other traditional churches and religious communities, 
through participation in all meetings, conferences, round tables and de-
bates, was also confirmed by the fact that the Ryaset joined the request of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church and Dveri Movement to ban the photo exhi-
bition “Ecce Homo” because, as it was written in the statement issued by 
379  “Obnovljena Bajrakli džamija», RTS, 3 May 2012, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/
story/125/Dru%C5%A1tvo/1095712/Obnovljena+Bajrakli+d%C5%BEamija.html.
380  “Muslimani dobijaju groblja u Beogradu», Kurir, 24 October 2012, http://www.
kurir-info.rs/muslimani-dobijaju-groblja-u-beogradu-clanak-476456.
381  “Prva halal prodavnica u Srbiji”, Meshihat of the Islamic Community 
of Sandžak, 5 December 2012, http://www.mesihatsandzaka.
rs/vijesti/818-prva-halal-prodavnica-u-srbiji.html.
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the Meshihat, it defiles the image of Jesus Christ and insults Christian be-
lievers. The Ryiaset holds that the role models of believers must not and 
cannot be used as fictional objects that are contrary to their real lives and 
roles in society. It is further stated that “this is not art or the freedom of 
speech, it consciously and clearly insults believers and faith. Muslims feel 
just as hurt by the desecration of the image of Jesus as when this was done 
with the image of Muhammad the Blessed”.382
In early December 2012, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić awarded 
the Honorary Reis-ul-Ulema of the Islamic Community of Serbia, Ham-
dija Jusufspahić, with the Sretenje Order of the First Degree for his con-
tribution to inter-faith cooperation and tolerance and for his dignified 
presentation of Serbia and its citizens abroad. At the ceremony, which was 
held at the Islamic Centre operating within the Bajrakli Mosque, President 
Nikolić expressed his gratitude to Hamdija Jusufspahić, his long-standing 
friend, on behalf of all citizens of Serbia, emphasizing that Serbia knew 
how to appreciate those who loved and respected it. Apart from a great 
number of imams and clerics of the Islamic Community of Serbia, the cer-
emony, which also marked the 45th anniversary of Jusufspahić becoming 
the imam of Belgrade, was attended by Grand Mufti of Russia Sheikh-
ul-Islam Talgat Tajuddin, Patriarch Irinej, Culture Minister Bratislav Petk-
ović, Minister Sulejman Ugljanin, high dignitaries of traditional churches 
and religious communities, as well as diplomatic corps representatives, in-
cluding Turkish Ambassador Mehmet Kemal Bozay. That same day, in the 
Serbian Presidency building, President Nikolić awarded Serbian Orthodox 
Church Archimandrite Jovan Radosavljević, Odzaci Parish Priest and Dan-
ube Archpresbyter of the Catholic Church in Serbia Jakob Pfeiffer, Bishop 
Istvan Csete-Szemesi of the Reformed Christian Church in Serbia and Aca 
Singer, the long-time President of the Jewish Communities in Serbia, with 
the Sretenje Orders of the Second Degree.383
382  “Rijaset IZS traži zabranu izložbe „Ecce Homo”“, Blic, 3 October 2012, http://www.
blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/345975/Rijaset-IZS-trazi-zabranu-izlozbe-Ecce-homo.
383  “Nikolić uručio orden beogradskom muftiji Hamdiji ef. Jusufspahiću”, Mehihat 
of the Islamic Community of Sandžak, 6 December 2012, http://www.
mesihatsandzaka.rs/vijesti/821-Nikolić-urucio-orden-beogradskom-muftiji-hamdiji-
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The continuation of the “postponed” initiative, or the launching of a 
new one, for the consolidation or unification of the rival organizational 
structures of the Islamic Community, will encounter one more obstacle in 
the coming period. Two days before the expiry of his term of office. the 
outgoing Reis-ul-Ulema of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Mustafa Cerić, issued a fatwa proclaiming that “a believer is not jai’z 
(permitted) to listen to or follow Adem Zilkić”, or “perform the Jummah 
Namaz after Adem Zilkić, since he has no necessary ijāzah”384.
As was expected, the content and timing of the fatwa provoked nu-
merous reactions. The labelled Reis-ul-Ulema of the Islamic Community 
of Serbia, Adem Zilkić, also addressed the public. He said that a fatwa is-
sued against him represented an abuse of the ayets in Quran and holy 
norms, flagrant meddling in the internal affairs of the Islamic Commu-
nity of Serbia and malicious overlooking of the fact that he is not only the 
Reis-ul-Ulema of Bosniaks, but also of all other Muslims in Serbia. Reac-
tion also came from the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
itself. Halil Mehtić, Professor at the Islamic Theological Faculty in Zenica 
and one of the original five candidates for the position of Reis-ul-Ulema, 
said that the fatwa “does not have a basis in Sharia law and thus does not 
bind anyone”; in other words, it represents “one in a series of reckless acts 
by the outgoing Reis-ul-Ulema Cerić (…) and pouring oil on the fire rag-
ing over the past years within the Islamic Community of Serbia”, which is 
“a fully autonomous and independent community with all legislative and 
executive bodies”. He also said that the newly elected Reis-ul-Ulema Ka-
vazović and Zagreb Mufti Hasanović “have already planned to launch an 
initiative for the reconciliation of the two Islamic Communities in Serbia. 
ef-jusufspahicu.html; “Nikolić uručio orden Jusufspahiću”, B92, 6 December 
2012, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=12&dd=06&nav_
category=12&nav_id=666452; “Nikolić Jusufspahiću: Odličje pravom prijatelju”, 
Večernje novosti, 6 December 2012, http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/
aktuelno.290.html:409264-Nikolić-Jusufspahicu-Odlicje-pravom-prijatelju.
384  Ijāzah – a written certificate, authorization, Sharia document granting 
legal authority for the performance of any religious function.
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Unfortunately, Cerić’s fatwa will certainly slow down and make their noble 
efforts more difficult”385.
As long as this fatwa is in effect, it will be a big stumbling block in the 
future efforts to settle the dispute between the rival organizational struc-
tures of Muslims in Serbia, since it challenges the legality and legitimity 
of the highest authority of one negotiating party.
Instead of the Conclusion
The unconstitutional character of the Law on Churches and Religious 
Communities and its arbitrary implementation by the competent institu-
tions, as well as the discriminatory provisions of the Rules on the Content 
and Method of Keeping the Register of Churches and Religious Commu-
nities, pose insurmountable obstacles to the realization of religious rights 
and freedoms of a great number of citizens of the Republic of Serbia.
The problem related to the registration of a religious community en-
tails restrictions on its right to work, staff employment and legal protec-
tion. In addition, there is a property restitution problem.
The constitutional provisions on the relations between state and 
church are not implemented, the Law is selectively implemented, while a 
gap between the privileged traditional churches and religious communi-
ties, especially the majority church, and unregistered religious communi-
ties is deepening. Most Protestant churches remain unregistered and none 
of the polytheistic religious communities have been registered. The Protes-
tant religious communities are under pressure to unite under the control 
of those who will be elected by the administrative apparatus and will have 
the property and other resources of those discriminated against at their 
disposal. All this is aimed at reducing the actual number of nontraditional 
religious communities.
Insofar as physical assaults on priests, believers and facilities of reli-
gious communities are concerned, the fact is that the situation is improving 
385  “Reakcija: Fetva jedan u nizu nepromišljenih poteza Cerića”, Radio Free 
Europe, 14 November 2012, http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/reakcije-
fetva-jedan-u-nizu-nepromisljenih-poteza-Cerića/24771099.html.
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– the number of incidents sparked by inter-religious intolerance has been 
steadily declining. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that there 
are still various forms of discrimination.
So, for example, the decreasing number of physical assaults on Jew-
ish facilities, synagogues and Jewish municipalities, devastation of Jew-
ish cemeteries and destruction of tombstones, does not mean that there 
is no anti-Semitism, or that the writing of anti-Semitic graffiti, publishing 
of the lists of Jews and writing and sending of threatening letters to some 
members of the Jewish community, is acceptable only because there are 
no victims. So far, more than 120 anti-Semitic books have been published 
and sold in book shops in Serbia, while the Union of Jewish Municipalities 
of Serbia has filed dozens of criminal complaints or charges. According to 
Aleksandar Necak, Honorary President of the Union of Jewish Communi-
ties of Serbia, the explanation given to the Union of Jewish Municipali-
ties of Serbia for one acquittal was that the book in question did not stir 
more anti-Semitism than it already contains, so that the complaint was re-
jected.386 At the session of the Commission for Monitoring Anti-Semitism, 
which was held on the premises of the Union of Jewish Communities of 
Serbia on 1 June 2012, it was stated that right-wing forces in Serbia, in-
cluding specifically extremist pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic ones, were gain-
ing in strength. They also stated that Hungarian nationalist organizations, 
headquartered in that country, also operate outside its borders and are 
especially active in Backa. At this meeting, there was also mention of the 
rehabilitation of some collaborationists in World War II or, better said, at-
tempts to rehabilitate them. The Commission holds that such efforts must 
be opposed, adding that not all rehabilitation casess should be equalized 
(e.g. Nedić, Ljotić and others, on one side, and Draža Mihailović, on the 
other).387
386  “Vlasti ne reaguju na antisemitske pojave”, Danas, 23 November 
2012, http://www.danas.rs/dodaci/vikend/vlasti_ne_reaguju_
na_antisemitske_pojave.26.html?news_id=251626.
387  “Sastanak Komisije za praćenje antisemitizma”, CENDO, 11 August 
2012, http://www.cendo.hr/Novosti.aspx?id=1808&a=0.
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There is one more event worth mentioning. Namely, in early Octo-
ber 2012, the renovated building of the Christian Baptist Church in Bel-
grade or, more exactly, the First Baptist Church was formally opened. The 
Church waited for this moment since losing its first building in 1973 (the 
authorities demolished the partially confiscated building at Kralja Alek-
sandra Boulevard 264). In 1977, after four years of its “subtenant” status 
in the Reformed Church building, the Church bought a detached house 
in Zvezdara where it is still located, thanks to the financial support of 
churches in the United Kingdom, United States and others. However, the 
Church’s requests for approval to renovate the building in order to meet 
its needs were rejected until 1999, when approval was finally granted. The 
process for issuing the permit to renovate and remodel the building lasted 
until 2009 when building work finally started.388
388  “Otvorenje zgrade Hrišćanske baptističke crkve”, First Baptist Church, 7 October 2012, 
http://baptisti.rs/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=43&Itemid=1.
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Still Targeted by Nationalists
The exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of 
members of national minorities in Serbia is more or less regulated by the 
Constitution and a number of laws. According to the census of 2002, a total 
of 1,135,393 members of minorities lived in Serbia excluding Kosovo. The 
results of the 2011 census have not yet been made public.
The adoption of two key pieces of legislation concerning the exercise 
of minority rights – the Anti-Discrimination Law (26 March 2009) and the 
Law on National Councils of National Minorities (3 September 2009)389 – 
completes the legal framework as far as the minorities are concerned. The 
first law is important in that it guarantees the equality of the citizens; the 
second creates the prerequisites for overcoming the legal vacuum in which 
the national councils found themselves owing to the fact that the man-
dates of most of them had already expired. The first law was a prerequisite 
for including Serbia in the white Schengen list and the second for ensuring 
self-government by national minorities. A host of other laws were adopted 
including legislation on education,390 culture391 and the establishment of 
the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina,392 the Law on 
Amendments on the Law on Public Information,393 the Law on Textbooks 
and other Teaching Aids,394 the Law on Registers of Births, Marriages and 
389  The National Council is the body that represents its minority in the fields of 
education, culture, information in the minority’s language and official use of its 
language. The National Council participates in the process of making decisions of 
relevance to the minority’s rights. It also gives its opinions on draft legislation, 
measures and other legal acts of relevance to the situation of its national minority.
390  Službeni glasnik RS, 72/09.
391  Ibid.
392  Službeni glasnik RS, 99/09.
393  Službeni glasnik RS, 36/09.
394  Službeni glasnik RS, 72/09.
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Deaths,395 the 2011 Law on Population, Household and Housing Census396 
and the Law on the Prohibition of Manifestation of Neo-Nazi or Fascist Or-
ganizations and Associations and the Prohibition of the Use of Neo-Nazi 
and Fascist Symbols and Emblems.397
The situation of the minorities in Serbia has not changed for the bet-
ter because the state lacks an inclusive policy and because the implemen-
tation of the relevant legislation is beset with numerous difficulties and 
obstructions. Also, Serbia lacks a social ambience conducive to tolerance 
and coexistence.
During 2012, the majority of representatives of national councils of 
national minorities found the legal framework for the preservation of 
their rights adequate. However, they pointed out that major problems con-
cerning the implementation and enforcement of these rights still existed. 
Further, attention was drawn to instances of collision of various legal pro-
visions that prevent the enjoyment of guaranteed rights and necessitates 
adjustment or the adoption of an adequate law package. In some parts of 
the country, notably Temerin, Novi Pazar and Preševo, interethnic con-
flicts escalated and distrust between communities grew. The failure of the 
state authorities to react adequately in the majority of the cases rendered 
the situation even more unstable. The overall political situation prevailing 
in Serbia in 2012 also affected the situation of the national minorities in 
specific ways. The negotiations on Kosovo and Belgrade’s insistence that 
the north of Kosovo be granted the widest degree of autonomy provoked 
similar demands in the Preševo valley. Serbia’s maximum demands for the 
Serbs in the north of Kosovo could boomerang against Serbia itself, par-
ticularly as regards territorially compact minorities such as Hungarians, 
Albanians and Bosniaks.
As before, the situation of the national minorities in 2012 indicated 
that they continue to be used and abused by politicians and nationalists 
in their efforts to create states which are as ethnically pure as possible, 
which menaces the very survival of these communities. The main tools of 
395  Službeni glasnik RS, 20/09.
396  Službeni glasnik RS, 104/09.
397  Službeni glasnik RS, 41/09.
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this policy include the slow implementation of legislation or no imple-
mentation at all, the unfavourable social atmosphere and the worrying 
economic situation particularly as regards the minorities living near or 
on the economic fringes of society. Meanwhile, some minority communi-
ties have presented their own demands for territorial autonomy. In these 
demands, they do not have the support of the state. This is additionally 
widening the distance towards those minorities because autonomy of any 
kind is looked upon as separatism. It remains to be seen which of the two 
concepts – ethnic or civic – will prevail and where the point of integration 
of societies in South-Eastern Europe lies.
Political participation
Out of 91 registered political parties in Serbia, 52 are parties of na-
tional minorities. The Bosniaks have 12, the Roma seven and the Alba-
nians and Hungarians six each. The interests of the Vlach minority are 
represented by four parties, of which one has nothing to do with the Vlach 
community. The Bunjevacs and Bulgarians have three parties each, the 
Croats, Ruthenians, Slovaks and Romanians two and the Montenegrins, 
Macedonians and Gorani one each.
The 12th party of the Bosniak national minority in Serbia, the Bosniak 
People’s Party, was established in January 2012.398 This leaves every 10,000 
Bosniaks in Serbia with a party of ‘their own’ (there are 136,087 Bosniaks 
in Serbia accounting for 1.82 per cent of the population).
The Bosniak parties will have to fight hard to make it to the republic 
parliament considering that the Hungarians, who are the largest national 
minority (numbering 293,299 or 3.91 per cent of the population) have six 
registered parties.
The Hungarians, who are the largest national minority both in Vo-
jvodina and in Serbia, outnumber other minorities in terms of the num-
ber of representatives in the provincial government bodies, particularly in 
the last 12 years. In addition to being the most numerous in the Vojvodina 
parliament, they also control several secretariats, i.e. those in charge of 
398  Politika, ‘Zašto su Bošnjaci manjina sa najviše partija’, 25 January 2012.
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administration and regulations, economy, health care and education. In 
nearly every third municipality out of 45 in Vojvodina, the Hungarians 
share in government through their national or other parties. Also, the 
Hungarians have their parliamentary group in the Serbian Assembly.399
Besides the Bosniaks and the Hungarians, the Albanians are also rep-
resented in the national parliament. Some other minorities are also repre-
sented through members of coalition parliamentary groups.
Under the Law on the National Assembly, members of national mi-
norities are entitled to use their mother language in the Assembly. In 
2012, as in the two previous years, no minority representative in the na-
tional parliament exercised this right.
Serbian legislation allows national minority parties to contests seats 
in parliament by crossing the so-called natural threshold in elections; on 
the other hand, the national parties are subject to a 5 per cent parliamen-
tary threshold. Also, a minority party is required to collect 1,000 signatures 
in order to be registered whereas others need to collect 10,000 signatures. 
This positive legal framework, which is primarily designed to ensure posi-
tive discrimination and larger participation of representatives of minority 
national communities, was abused during the 2012 parliamentary elec-
tions. The Nijedan od ponuđenih odgovora party (None of the Listed Re-
plies – NOPO), whose articles of association do not include protection of 
the interests of a specific national community among its goals, was regis-
tered as a party of the Vlach national minority. The NOPO President, Nikola 
Tulimirović, himself acknowledged that the party’s election list comprising 
about 100 candidates includes only three Vlachs. ‘That was the only way to 
get registered because the new law drastically discriminates against small 
parties. We by all means protect the rights of the Vlach national minority. 
No one has the right to pronounce on our nationality by counting our num-
bers,’ Tulimirović said.400
He said that the list, which is headed by Đorđe Vukadinović, fully 
complied with the legal obligation and that there was no formal obstacle 
to it being a minority party. Within the meaning of the Law on Political 
399  Večernje novosti, ‘Čardaš po Ustavu’, 4 March 2012.
400  Večernje novosti, ‘Pod maskom manjina’, 21 April 2012.
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Parties, a political party of a national minority is a political party ‘whose 
activities...are in particular directed to presentation and representation of 
the interests of a national minority and protection and promotion of the 
rights of the persons belonging to that particular national minority in ac-
cordance with the Constitution, law and international standards, as de-
fined by the articles of association, programme and statute of the political 
party’.401
In spite of the legal and material deficiencies involved, the Republic 
Electoral Commission permitted NOPO to be registered as a national mi-
nority party.
At the parliamentary elections held in May 2012, NOPO won one par-
liamentary mandate. It is now represented in the Serbian Assembly by its 
President Nikola Tulimirović.
The use of minority languages and education
National minorities in Serbia are not equal in terms of the status and 
degree of standardization of their mother tongues. On the one hand, the 
Hungarians have a standardized language, education and personal docu-
ments in their own language and exercise their right to use their mother 
tongue in communities where they account for over 15 per cent of the 
population. Unlike the Hungarian national community, the majority of 
others have problems in exercising some of their rights guaranteed by law.
Pursuant to their status, representatives of Hungarians in Serbia were 
the first to raise the question not only of the rights of minority communi-
ties but also of the point of integration of different communities. For in-
stance, the academician and international law professor, Tibor Varadi, said 
that the Hungarian language was in much wider use at the Novi Sad Faculty 
of Law before the regime of Slobodan Milošević. Prior to that, instruction 
at the faculty was also available in the Hungarian language and the insti-
tution also had the post of Hungarian language instructor. The abolition 
of the Hungarian language was contrary to the community’s fundamental 
right to have the Hungarian language in use by the public administration 
401  The Law on Political Parties.
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and the judiciary. Representatives of the Learned Society of the Vojvodina 
Hungarians said they wanted the Faculty of Law, the National Council of 
Hungarians and the Learned Society to conclude an agreement on provid-
ing instruction in Roman law, international private law and civil law in 
the Hungarian language.
However, the Novi Sad University and Faculty of Law student associa-
tions had earlier sharply criticized the President of the National Council of 
Hungarians, Tamas Korhecz, for saying that the Hungarian language was 
not in use at the Faculty of Law and that the number of Hungarian schol-
ars at the Faculty of Law had declined drastically. The associations said 
that Korhecz’s allegations were untrue.402Reactions of this kind show that 
the majority Serb community is insufficiently supportive of integration.
Although Vlachs account for up to 35 per cent of the population 
of some municipalities in eastern Serbia, there is no education in their 
mother tongue and it is not in official use by local government bodies. 
The main problem is, the Vlach language had not been standardized by 
the start of 2012 and therefore could not have been in official use. On the 
other hand, Romanians living in Banat, who use the standardized Roma-
nian language, are able to use their mother tongue in local self-govern-
ment bodies and to receive instruction in it. This fact was highlighted in 
connection with Romania’s objections to the situation of the Vlachs in 
Serbia on the occasion of Serbia being awarded candidate status for Eu-
ropean Union membership. The Romanians living in Serbia themselves 
do not wish to become involved in the Vlachs’ identity issue. ‘Serbia pro-
vides European standards, and even more than that, as far as the protection 
of the cultural identity of the national minorities is concerned. We are very 
satisfied with this segment of the care for the rights of minorities, thanks to 
which we have an education system [in the Romanian language] in Serbia,’ 
said Marčel Dragan, the secretary of the National Council of Romanians.403
The National Council of Vlachs, at a session in Petrovac na Mlavi on 
24 January 2012, formalized the Vlach alphabet comprising 35 letters. Dr 
Siniša Čelojević, the President of the Committee for official use of language 
402  Politika, ‘Varadi: Vratiti mađarsku u nastavu na Pravnom fakultetu’, 28 February 2012.
403  Večernje novosti, ‘Čardaš po Ustavu’, 4 March 2012.
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and script of the National Council of Vlachs, said that the adopted variant 
had already been approved by the Executive Council of the National Coun-
cil of Vlachs on a proposal from the Gergina citizens’ association from Ne-
gotin. It consists of the Serbian alphabet to which five characters peculiar 
to the Vlach language have been added, he said.
‘What matters is that we are putting a stop to the years-long controversy 
as to whether the Vlachs who live in eastern Serbia south of the Danube 
speak in the Vlach or the Romanian language. Also, now there is nothing 
stopping us from starting to print a magazine and other literature in the 
Vlach language. This will enable us to present the richness of the Vlach spo-
ken language, which differs from the Romanian language to the same de-
gree that our Vlach origin does,’ Čelojević said.
The Gergina Society has complied a Vlach-Serbian phraseological 
dictionary, an authority on the expressions and phrases which are well 
known to both Vlachs and Serbs living in that part of Serbia. The Society is 
also busily working on completing a Vlach-Serbian dictionary.404
The regional TV channel Bor started to broadcast programmes with 
subtitles in the Vlach language. The subtitled programmes, dedicated to 
promoting and preserving national minorities’ music, folklore and cul-
tural heritage, were part of a 50 years of Tradition project financed by the 
Ministry of Culture.405
During 2012, the Bosniak National Councils petitioned the highest 
state institutions to introduce the Bosnian language with elements of na-
tional culture in the educational system of the Sandžak Bosniaks and to 
provide all instruction in the Bosnian language. Back in 2009, the ‘older’ 
Bosniak National Council (BNC) with a technical mandate submitted to the 
Ministry a Study of a Model of Education for the Sandžak Bosniaks in Ser-
bia. At the time, the leaders of the Bosniak Cultural Community (BCC) tried 
to call the initiative into question. The BCC leaders later became the lead-
ers of the BNC which is not recognized by the state. ‘Unfortunately, both 
the unrecognized BNC and the BNC with a technical mandate, that is, the op-
tions that stand behind them, wish to use the issue of the use of the Bosnian 
404  Politika, ‘Usvojena vlaška azbuka sa 35 slova’, 1 February 2012.
405  Politika, ‘TV Bor emisije titluje na vlaškom jeziku’, 29 February 2012.
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language for daily political purposes,’ said Sead Biberović, the programme 
coordinator of the Urban In organization.406
The Bosniak national community’s biggest problems concerned ed-
ucation in its mother tongue and the use of the Bosnian language in the 
local self-government bodies. Preparatory instruction in the Bosnian lan-
guage was introduced in several schools in the municipalities of Novi 
Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin and Prijepolje on 21 February 2013. Some 500 pupils 
in 12 preparatory classes will be instructed in the Bosnian language and 
literature. Lectures in this language are being prepared for teaching his-
tory, musical education and visual arts education.
‘As a matter of fact, the pupils will have instruction in Serbian accord-
ing to the schedule already in use as well as four to five classes in the Bos-
nian language. From 1 September, children who opt for Bosnian will have 
two lessons a week in the Serbian language and literature as a non-mother 
tongue,’ said Džudžević. He said that the Bosnian language would be 
taught by teachers who had previously taught Serbian and had in the 
meantime undergone training and been awarded certificates.407
The biggest problems concerning the use of the Bosnian language 
in local self-government bodies were registered in Priboj. According to 
the 2002 census, the municipality had 18.33 per cent Bosniaks. The law 
stipulates that a national community is entitled to the official use of its 
language and script in every local self-government body where the com-
munity accounts for more than 15 per cent of the total population. How-
ever, this positive legal norm has not been implemented by the municipal 
authorities in Priboj since this right was guaranteed by law back in 2002. 
Following many unsuccessful petitions to the municipal authorities by the 
citizens, on 22 August 2008 the Sandžak Democratic Party filed with the 
Constitutional Court a motion for an assessment of the constitutionality 
and legality of the disputed article of the municipal statute (Article 5). On 5 
November 2009, the Constitutional Court rejected the motion on grounds 
that it was not properly formulated. On 31 March 2010, the Ombudsman 
406  Danas, ‘Obrazovanje na bosanskom jeziku’, 28 August 2012.
407  Šumadija press, 21 February 2012. http://www.sumadijapress.
co.rs/index.php/od-danas-u-skolama-bosanski-jezik/
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recommended the municipal administration in Priboj to amend Article 5 
of the Statute by adding a provision which would bring into official use 
the Bosnian language and the Latin script. The time limit for complying 
with the recommendation was 60 days. However, the municipal author-
ities failed to reply to the Ombudsman’s recommendation and Article 5 
remained unamended.408In the meantime, according to the results of the 
2011 census, the number of Bosniaks in the municipality of Priboj fell un-
der 15 per cent.
The Albanian national minority living in the south of Serbia also had 
great problems in the field of education. Riza Halimi, an MP and an Alba-
nian leader in the area, saw the problems as relating to the contents of the 
textbooks used by Albanian children and to the fact that the national RTS 
channel has no programmes in the Albanian language.409The unavailabil-
ity of textbooks in the Albanian language was another persistent problem. 
In many classes, owing to the lack of textbooks in particular subjects, pu-
pils are forced to rely on their notes taken during the lectures.
Exercise of rights of national 
minorities in the field of culture
Under Article 18, paragraph 1 of the Law on National Councils of Na-
tional Minorities, a national council decides which institutions in the field 
of culture are of special importance for the preservation, promotion and 
development of the individuality and national identity of its national mi-
nority. Practice has shown that the provision’s main flaw lies in the lack 
of criteria needed to specify which institutions can be designated by a na-
tional council as being of special importance and on what grounds. This 
loophole in the law has made it possible to abuse the Law on several oc-
casions. The most drastic instance of this practice was registered in Sub-
otica where the national councils of Croats and Roma designated as an 
408  Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Ostvarivanje prava 
nacionalnih manjina, Belgrade, 2013.
409  Večernje novosti, ‘Čardaš po Ustavu’, 4 March 2012.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 252 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 253
252 serbia 2012 : ETHNIC MINORITIES
institution of special importance for the preservation, promotion and de-
velopment of their individuality and national identity the Palić Zoo.
As regards the transfer of ownership and the participation of repre-
sentatives of national minorities in the work of management boards of 
cultural institutions, problems stemming from the inconsistency of leg-
islation were noted. Although the Law on National Councils of National 
Minorities and the Law on Culture were adopted on the same day, they 
contain contradictory provisions on the participation of minorities in the 
management of cultural institutions While the Law on National Councils 
of National Minorities states that every national minority is entitled to 
one representative on a management board, the Law on Culture states that 
one member shall represent all the national minorities. The practice itself 
in this regard varies. For instance, the management board of the Subotica 
Children’s Theatre has one member each representing the councils of the 
Hungarian, Croat, Bunjevac and Roma national minorities. On the other 
hand, the Hungarian and Romanian national councils are represented on 
the management board of the Pančevo Historical Archives by one person 
they jointly elect.410
The declaration on the situation 
of the Sandžak Bosniaks
In mid-February 2012, the Bosniak National Council sent to many Eu-
ropean institutions and European embassies in Belgrade a draft declara-
tion on the situation and exercise of rights of the Sandžak Bosniaks. The 
document alleges that the Bosniaks living in Serbia have constantly and 
for decades been denied their right to a national identity and prevented 
from exercising their collective national rights. It says that the Bosniaks 
are denied the right to official use of the Bosnian language and script, ed-
ucation, information in own language and protection and promotion of 
the Bosniak cultural heritage.
410  Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Ostvarivanje prava 
nacionalnih manjina, Belgrade, 2013.
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The adoption of the final text of the declaration was originally sched-
uled for 15 February 2012. Although Esad Džudžević, the President of the 
BNC and an MP, tried to make the declaration acceptable to all Bosniak 
structures, the response to his efforts among the Bosniaks themselves var-
ied. Mufti Muamer Zukorlić and the President of the unrecognized BNC, 
Samir Tandir, argue that although the Bosniaks are deprived of their 
rights, the appeal was not necessary.
‘Džudžević is a member of parliament and a member of a party which 
forms part of the ruling coalition in Serbia. He and those who hold the same 
political views bear responsibility for the overall situation in Sandžak, for 
the disfranchisement of and discrimination against the Bosniaks and for 
the economic backwardness of this region. For this reason his present insist-
ence on the internationalization of this issue and call for a conference on the 
rights of the Bosniaks is an act of hypocrisy,’ said Tandir.411
The SDPS President and Minister of Labour and Social Policy, Rasim 
Ljajić, said that the Bosniaks’ right to respect for their national identity 
was not denied. ‘There are problems which are identical with the problems 
of all other citizens in Serbia: they are related to poverty and the econom-
ic-social status. Rights from the domain of identity are respected along with 
all international standards in that field,’ Ljajić said.412
On the other hand, BNC President Esad Džudžević pointed out that 
the legal framework which regulates these rights was good but was not be-
ing implemented. ‘We are denied the right to the Bosnian language. The 
Bosnian language should be in use in the five municipalities – Novi Pazar, 
Tutin, Sjenica, Prijepolje and Priboj – which have more than 15 per cent of 
the Bosniak population. We want the street names in both alphabets and 
we want the government to provide funds for the publication of Sandžačke 
novine. We also want the government to provide funds for the protection of 
buildings of cultural value,’ he said 413
411  Politika, ‘Koja prava Džudžević traži za Bošnjake’, 27 January 2012.
412  http://www.sandzaklive.rs/index.php/sandzak-politika/123-rasim-
ljajic-prava-bosnjaka-nisu-ugrozena 1 February 2012.
413  Večernje novosti, ‘Čardaš po Ustavu’, 4 March 2012.
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The LDP MP from Priboj, Kenan Hajdarevuć, denounced the Declara-
tion on the freedoms and rights of the Bosniaks in Serbia. He considers 
the initiative ‘belated, insincere and illegitimate’. ‘It is belated because al-
though the parties and coalitions rallied around Sulejman Ugljanin have 
been in power at the republic level for six years now, they only began talk-
ing about violations of the Bosniaks’ rights a few months before the elec-
tions. It is insincere because it comes from a political option which, at certain 
times, played a crucial part in denying the rights of the Bosniaks in Serbia 
through rotten political compromises and deals. It is illegitimate because it 
was launched by an institution elected eight years ago whose mandate ex-
pired when the BNC was elected in June 2010. With that document, its au-
thors are trying to whitewash their inactivity during the previous period of 
their power, to maintain the created parallel institutions and thereby to dis-
own the domestic and international publics,’ said Hajdarević.414
Hajdarević presented a 10-point charge sheet against the government 
led by Ugljanin’s coalition.
The charges include falsifying the results of the referendum on the 
2006 Serbian Constitution, creating a parallel Islamic community, eco-
nomically devastating the municipalities of Novi Pazar, Tutin and Sjenica, 
voting for the Srebrenica Resolution in the Serbian parliament, participat-
ing in the local government in the municipality of Priboj which refuses to 
introduce the Bosnian language into official use, avoiding participation at 
the constitutive session of the new BNC, supporting presidential candidate 
Velimir Ilić, taking part in the vote for the Law on Statistical Regionaliza-
tion of Serbia, failing to support the declarations on violations of the Bos-
niaks’ human rights and discrimination against the Bosniaks and Sandžak 
adopted between 2006 and 2011 and helping to obstruct religious instruc-
tion in Sandžak.415
Minister for Minority Rights Milan Marković dismissed the BNC decla-
ration that criticizes the status of the Bosniaks in Serbia as ‘their (pre-elec-
tion) campaign’. ‘The Bosniaks in Serbia enjoy all rights. That national 
community has two ministers in the government. Who are they complaining 
414  http://vesti.krstarica.com/raska-oblast/deklaracija-je-nelegitimna/ 9 February 2012.
415  Ibid.
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against? Against themselves? Those that are saying such things are MPs and 
have participated in the last three governments,’ said Marković.416
At the middle of March 2012, the BNC decided to adopt the Declara-
tion on the Situation of the Bosniaks albeit at regional level. In coopera-
tion with allied Bosniak institutions – the Bosniak Council of Montenegro 
and the Council of the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – the BNC in Serbia signed in Sarajevo on 28 June 2012 the 
Declaration on the Situation and Rights of the Bosniaks in Sandžak (in 
Montenegro and Serbia) and the Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Declaration supports and recognizes the integrity and sovereignty of 
the said states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia) and is 
asking the competent authorities to resolve the crimes committed against 
Bosniaks during the 1990s wars and satisfy the requirements of transi-
tional justice with regard to the victims. The Declaration also requests that 
Sandžak be defined as a separate administrative territory in future decen-
tralization processes in Montenegro and Serbia. It also insist on respect for 
the rights of the Bosniak minority, particularly in the field of education 
and the use of its official language.417
The conflicts and interventions
Besides sharing the problems of national minorities throughout 
South-Eastern Europe, a situation compounded by transition and the re-
cent conflicts, minorities living in Serbia in 2012 became major targets of 
nationalistic aspirations in the Balkans.
As the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina moved into high 
gear, Serbia began to place ever greater emphasis on a plan envisaging 
territorial autonomy for northern Kosovo (a status enjoyed by Republika 
Srpska). The Albanians in the Preševo valley responded in kind and asked 
to be represented in the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina. For 
a decade now, the Albanians in the south of Serbia and the Serbs in the 
416  Press, ‘Marković: Kampanja Bošnjaka’, January 2012.
417  BNV statement, 29 June 2012. http://www.bnv.org.rs/vijesti/potpisana-
deklaracija-o-polozaju-i-pravima-bosnjaka-u-sandzaku/
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north of Kosovo have been hostage to Serbia’s refusal to acknowledge the 
new reality in Kosovo. Both communities have been living in suspense in 
anticipation of an accommodation, a situation resulting in a political vac-
uum on both sides compounded by a legal vacuum in the north of Kosovo. 
Throughout 2012, the Albanians in the south of Serbia stepped up their 
actions and raised their demands. During the pre-election campaign early 
in 2012, the then Minister of the Interior, Ivica Dačić, raised tensions in 
the region by radicalizing his rhetoric. At the end of 2012, the Albanian 
local authorities in Preševo erected a monument to the Liberation Army 
of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac (UCPMB). The Belgrade authorities de-
manded the urgent removal of the monument on the grounds that it was 
erected illegally. Prime Minister Ivica Dačić said that unless the munici-
pality itself removed the monument, the state would do that. On the other 
hand, the former commander of the formation said that he and his fellow 
fighters would take up arms in case the government should try to tear the 
monument down.418Following a month-long standoff, the monument was 
removed by gendarmes in the presence of many residents of Preševo.419In 
the aftermath of the intervention, Albanians held protests in Preševo for 
several days.
In the context of Serbia’s efforts to be granted candidate status for 
membership of the EU, Romania and Bulgaria raised the issue of the situ-
ation of the Bulgarian and Vlach minorities.
In September 2012, media reported that Bulgaria might place obsta-
cles in Serbia’s and Macedonia’s path to European integration because of 
certain open bilateral issues. ‘There are indications that a number of Bul-
garian members of the European Parliament will raise the issue of the rights 
of the Bulgarian national minority in Serbia. We have an answer to that, be-
cause Serbia can serve as a role model for many countries in the matter of 
rights of national minorities,’ said Suzana Grubješić, Serbian Deputy Prime 
Minister in charge of European integration.420
418  RTS: ‘Preševo, spomenik i pretnje’, 26 December 2012. http://www.rts.rs
419  Alazeera, Preševo: ‘Uklonjen spomenik albanskim borcima’, 20 January 2013.
420  Press, ‘Grubješić: Bugari greše, Srbija poštuje manjine’, 18 September 2012.
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Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nikolai Mladenov said that Bulgaria 
should work out guidelines for its policy towards its neighbours within 
the framework of Balkan countries’ European integration. However, he 
did not elaborate. The Bulgarian Vice President, Margarita Popova told 
members of the Bulgarian minority assembled in Bosilegrad that Serbia 
would not become a member of the EU unless it resolved the problem of 
the Bulgarian minority.421Bulgaria had earlier raised the issue of the un-
resolved dispute between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church over the Bulgarians’ demand that divine service be per-
formed in their mother tongue.
During the deliberations on the candidate status, Romania presented 
its demand that Serbia should treat the Vlachs as Romanians. Romanian 
President Traian Basescu paid two visits to eastern Serbia where he said 
that all who declare themselves as Vlachs-Romanians should be provided 
education in the Romanian language.
‘All who declare themselves as Vlachs-Romanians need schools in Ro-
manian, but also churches and media in their mother tongue,’ he said.422
On 28 February 2012, Serbian President Boris Tadić described Roma-
nia’s objections about the situation of the Vlach minority as unjustified. 
He said that he was surprised at Romania’s position because he had dis-
cussed the matter repeatedly with President Traian Basescu before. Euro-
pean Commission diplomatic sources say that Romanian Foreign Minister 
Cristian Diaconescu insisted practically right up until the end of the meet-
ing that the Vlachs be designated as a Romanian minority in Serbia.
‘We are ready to discuss with our friends in Romania whether the Vlachs 
are Romanians or not, but in Serbia that is a matter of human rights. In a 
democratic country every person has the right to state their national affilia-
tion in a census in accordance with how they feel. This is a matter of individ-
ual human rights, and one of the fundamental individual rights is that no 
one may force you to declare yourself as belonging to a collectivity against 
421  Press, ‘Grubješić: Bugari greše, Srbija poštuje manjine’, 18 September 2012.
422  Politika, ‘Vlasi nisu iznenađeni stavom Rumunije’, 29 February 2012.
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your will. Serbia and Romania have a long record of friendly relations and 
the points being raised now are not justified,’ said Tadić.423
A group of Serbian MPs paid a visit to Bucharest on 24 February 2012. 
Their Romanian opposite numbers, both in government and opposition, 
insisted that the Vlachs are actually Romanians and that the issue must be 
resolved. The parliamentarians agreed at their meeting in Bucharest to set 
up a bilateral commission to address the matter.
‘We told them that while Serbia does not forbid any person from de-
claring themselves as this or that, it also cannot force any person to adopt 
any particular national affiliation. In conformity with the Constitution and 
international conventions, every person has the right to declare themselves 
according to their wishes. They talked about the question of the Vlachs in 
the context of Serbia’s European path; I think that they are merely bringing 
pressure to bear and will not block our candidacy,’ said Miletić Mihailović, 
an SPS MP and Vice-President of the National Council of Vlachs.
Teodor Baconschi, the former Romanian Foreign Minister, told 
Večernje novosti that his country supports Serbia’s candidacy and raised 
the question of minorities. ‘European integration is the best way to improve 
the standards of minorities in all EU countries,’ he said.424
On the other hand, the President of the National Council of Vlachs, 
Radiša Dragojević, insisted that Vlachs have no problems in Serbia and 
that the political conditions being set by Romania have nothing to do 
with the Vlach minority. ‘There is no problem regarding the situation of 
the Vlach minority in Serbia; the authorities in Bucharest are actually ask-
ing official Belgrade to pronounce us as Romanians, something our commu-
nity opposes. We regard Serbia as our mother country and, except for some 
common roots, we have no connections with Romania. Romania wants to 
be able to say that it has 100,000 Romanians in Serbia as well as to force 
its language on us as our mother tongue. According to the 2002 population 
census, there were 41,000 Vlachs in Serbia, whereas the last census shows an 
increase of 60 per cent. We are not forbidding those Vlachs who want to de-
clare themselves as Romanians to do so. As a minority in Serbia we have no 
423  Politika, ‘Tadić: Primedbe Rumunije su neopravdane’, 29 February 2012.
424  Večernje novosti, ‘Sada se Vlasi dosetili’, 25 Februar 2012.
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problems, not even with the Romanians, and we are not denied our rights,’ 
said Dragojević.425
Bucharest’s demand is not approved of by Romanians living in Ser-
bia either. The National Council of Romanians says it has not concerned 
itself with the idea. ‘The Constitution of Serbia guarantees that every citi-
zen has the right to freely state to which people they belong. Whether some-
one considers themselves a Romanian or a Vlach is a subjective feeling and 
should as such be respected. This is why Romania’s demand is not justified,’ 
said Marčel Dragan, the secretary of the National Council of Romanians.426
According to the census of 2002, there are just over 40,000 Vlachs in 
Serbia. The Vlach language, however, is spoken by 54,800 people, the dif-
ference being accounted by those who declared themselves as Serbs but 
whose mother tongue is Vlach. It is estimated that the number of Vlachs 
living in 19 municipalities in eastern Serbia has increased in recent years 
and now stands at about 64,000. The number of Romanians is far lower 
(30,419) and they live in Banat.
The Ministry for Local Self-Government, Human and Minority Rights 
says that a clumping together of minority communities would be impos-
sible because every citizen is guaranteed by law the right to declare them-
selves as belonging to a minority of their own choice.
Those who claim that the Vlachs in Serbia are deprived of their rights 
argue that they have no schools in their language, which cannot be said of 
the Banat Romanians who have regular education in Romanian. The main 
problem with the Vlach language is that it is not standardized and as such 
cannot be studied in schools.
However, not all Vlachs have the same attitude to Serbia. The Vlach-Ro-
manians living in the Timočka Krajina region, who number 1,500, insist 
that Romanian is their language. Their 10 or so parties and associations 
have turned for help to Bucharest on several occasions. On the eve of the 
last census, Romania made a number of unsuccessful demands including 
that the category ‘Vlach’ should be deleted.427
425  Danas, ‘Vlasi odbacuju zahtev Bukurešta da budu Rumuni’, 25–26 February 2012.
426  Večernje novosti, ‘Rumunija krši prava Vlaha’, 1 March 2012.
427  Večernje novosti, ‘Rumunija krši prava Vlaha’, 1 March 2012.
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At a press conference in the Media Centre in Belgrade on 20 Septem-
ber 2012, the President of the Vlach National Council, Radiša Dragojević, 
presented his perception of the problem. According to the 2002 census, 
there are about 45,000 Vlachs living in 19 municipalities in Serbia. Un-
officially, the results of the last census indicate that their number has in-
creased to 62 per cent. Also according to the 2002 census, about 57,000 
people said that Vlach was their mother tongue. Dragojević said he be-
lieved that this figure had increased proportionately at the last census 
and that the final census results would bear this out. However, even these 
figures are a far cry from the real state of affairs, given that there are es-
timates that there are some 200,000 Vlachs living in eastern Serbia. The 
Vlachs have only just begun to exercise their rights. He stressed, however, 
that the Vlachs’ relations with other ethnic groups, including Serbs, were 
good. In institutional terms, Serbia has taken a step back not only in the 
context of the Vlach national minority. The Ministry for Minority Rights 
has been abolished and the state office, which is after all at a lower insti-
tutional level, is only in the formative stage. He expressed his satisfaction 
that the Council of Europe has finally recognized the existence of a distinct 
Vlach national minority. ‘We respect and have good cooperation with the 
Romanian National Council; as regards Romania itself, we only regard it as 
a good neighbour. Serbia is our mother country and Vlach is our mother 
tongue,’ Dragojević said. A Vlach script (in both the Cyrillic and Latin al-
phabets) was adopted and a dictionary is being prepared. This is part of 
the standardization of the language and a pre-condition for introducing 
education in the Vlach language.
Prior to the summit of the EU member countries’ heads of state and 
government, Serbia and Romania signed an agreement on 1 March 2012 
whose provisions are designed to improve the situation and rights of the 
Romanian minority in Serbia and the Serb minority in Romania.
The agreement highlights the right to ‘free, personal choice regarding 
one’s membership of a particular national minority’ and specifies the fu-
ture moves of the Serbian government Serbian Orthodox Church and Ro-
manian Orthodox Church. The document also guarantees reciprocity of 
minority rights in both countries. Serbia and Romania agreed that all the 
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outstanding problems between the two churches should be resolved by 
themselves and that their dialogue should begin as soon as possible. The 
agreement envisages the taking of ‘measures to provide education, access 
to the media, public administration and service in the mother tongue to 
members of the Romanian national minority in eastern Serbia’. The two 
states’ agreement guarantees that the minorities will have textbooks in 
their mother tongues.428
Radicalization of the Hungarian minority
Interethnic conflicts involving Serbs and Hungarians in Temerin grew 
in intensity at the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013. Members of 
both ethnic groups were attacked. Nevertheless, when it came to arrest-
ing and processing suspects, the police and judicial authorities proved far 
more expeditious towards Hungarians suspected of attacking Serbs. This 
added to the tension and resulted in more violent and more frequent 
clashes. The media in both languages were of no help in the efforts to cool 
the tempers. By only reporting names and incidents relating to members 
of their respective communities and failing to issue denials of incorrect in-
formation, they painted a distorted picture of the incidents for the benefit 
of their respective ethnic groups.
Even violence involving groups comprising Serbs and Hungarians on 
both sides was portrayed as interethnic.429
In the past year more than 20,000 Vojvodinians applied for Hungarian 
citizenship and 2,000 were granted Hungarian passports. Given that there 
are nearly 300,000 Hungarians living in Vojvodina, the number of those 
who have applied for dual citizenship so far is lower than expected. How-
ever, since the procedure has been simplified and far fewer documents 
are required than before, it is assumed that the number of applications 
will reach 80,000 in the forthcoming period. The Hungarian ministries of 
428  Blic, ‘Srbija i Rumunija juče potpisale sporazum’, 2 March 2012.
429  http://www.helsinki.org.rs/serbian/doc/HB-Br92.pdf
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justice and foreign affairs have so far received about 180,000 applications 
for citizenship from all over the world.430
However, NSM President Tamas Korhecz, says that in comparison with 
the most developed European countries – if one excepts Temerin – Serbia 
assures to its minorities a position he would personally rate seven or eight 
on a scale of 10. ‘Serbia can be proud of its legal framework for protect-
ing the identity of the minority communities, particularly in education and 
the development and preservation of their cultural identity. The problem is, 
some laws and regulations are still being implemented with difficulty, such 
as the conduct of litigation in minority languages,’ he says.431
However, the incidents in the abovementioned Hungarian settle-
ments, as well as the discriminatory practice of the courts, have brought 
about a radicalization of the Hungarian minority. Neo-Nazis from the 
Hungarian majority towns of Senta and Ada went repeatedly to Temerin 
during the period in question and provoked anti-Serb incidents.
On 2 March 2013, the Hungarian extreme right-wing, anti-Jewish 
party Jobbik established in Subotica a Vojvodina branch with Gyori Endre, 
a teacher from Senta, at its head.
At the 23 March 2013 meeting in the Hungarian town of Martely of 
Hungarian leaders from Vojvodina, Romania and Slovakia, Istvan Pasztor, 
the leader of the strongest Hungarian party in Vojvodina, the Alliance of 
Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM), called for Hungarian territorial autonomy 
in Vojvodina for the first time. The SVM had not previously made such de-
mands publicly in Vojvodina but other Hungarian parties have, namely 
the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians, the Democratic 
Party of Vojvodina Hungarians, the Civic Alliance of Hungarians and the 
Hungarian Hope Movement.
430  Večernje novosti, ’Traže 20 000 mađarskih pasoša’, 4 March 2012.
431  Večernje novosti, ‘Čardaš po Ustavu’, 4 March 2012.
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Tensions in Sandžak
During 2012 Sandžak was another scene of ethnic and political ten-
sions between Bosniaks and the Serbian state. On 4 August 2012, the mu-
nicipal authorities in Novi Pazar dedicated a plaque in honour of Aćif 
Hadžiahmetović, better known as Ačif Efendi, in the town’s pedestrian pre-
cinct. The plaque was set up without following the prescribed procedure 
and obtaining the prior permission of the competent authority. The un-
veiling was attended by Sulejman Ugljanin of the SDA and the State Sec-
retary in the Ministry of Education, Muhedin Fijuljanin. The Ministry of 
Justice and State Administration on 28 August 2012 instructed the munic-
ipal authorities to remove the plaque within 13 days.432Aćif Efendi was a 
controversial person. While some Bosniaks regard him as a national hero 
who protected Bosniaks from the Chetniks of Draža Mihailović, the Serb 
community regards him as a criminal who took reprisals against Serbs in 
the Sandžak region during the Second World War.
The unresolved political problems escalated in the sports stadiums. 
During the eighth-finals Serbian Cup match in Novi Pazar on 24 October 
2012, hooligans belonging to the fan group Ekstremi displayed banners 
in praise of the ‘Yellow House’, a building in Albania in which, according 
to a report by Dick Marty, body organs were removed from captured Serb 
civilians. The public, police and prosecuting authorities reacted promptly 
and the suspects were processed.433The public in Sandžak and Serbia was 
agitated again when, during a match on 5 November 2012, supporters of 
the football club Novi Pazar, unfolded a banner reading ‘The Stadium of 
Aćif Efendi’.434
432  Danas, ’Ukaz u gradskoj upravi, a niko ne zna’, 28 august 2012.
433  Blic Sport, ‘Skandal u Novom Pazaru: Transparent “Živela Žuta kuća”’, 24 October 2012.
434  Press, ‘Navijači Novog Pazara slave ubicu Srba’, 5 November 2012.
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Conclusions
In spite of having an adequate legal framework and necessary legis-
lation, the state has no inclusive policy towards minorities. Indeed, a dis-
criminatory attitude towards nearly all the minorities is still in evidence. 
Implementation of legislation continues to be problematic due to the lack 
of political will. In addition, the situation of the minorities is additionally 
complicated by the poor functioning of the institutions, particularly the 
judiciary.
The situation of the minorities in Vojvodina is far better than in Serbia 
proper. Substantial differences persist regarding the scope and quality of 
enjoyment of minority rights in Vojvodina and Serbia. The rights of Hun-
garians, Slovaks, Croats, Romanians, Ruthenians, Bunjevacs, Macedoni-
ans, Ukrainians, Germans and other minorities in the fields of education, 
media, culture and religion are respected. However, anti-Hungarian inci-
dents, above all in Temerin, Bečej, Novi Sad, Srbobran and Subotica, have 
been characteristic of Vojvodina in the last year as well as before. This has 
resulted in a radicalization of the Hungarian minority.
In response to these incidents, Minister of the Interior Ivica Dačić and 
President of the Vojvodina parliament Istvan Pasztor on 16 February 2013 
agreed to employ the gendarmerie in municipalities in which inter-com-
munal incidents have occurred as and when necessary and to step up po-
licing in areas hit by an upsurge in crime in order to protect the citizens 
and their property.
In central Serbia, the minorities issue was only raised after the ouster 
of Milošević. Instruction in the Romanian language (for members of the 
Vlach minority) began to be introduced while that in the Bosnian lan-
guage was introduced in April 2013. Belgrade continues to encourage di-
visions within the Bosniak community and to favour the anti-Zukorlić 
faction. The question of the Romanian Orthodox Church, which continues 
to be discriminated against, is yet to be addressed. The Serbian Orthodox 
Church is sharply opposed to Romanian priests performing religious ser-
vices in Serbia.
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 There are potential security risks for the region stemming from Ser-
bia’s demand for Serb territorial autonomy in Kosovo. Demands for ter-
ritorial autonomy have also been made by the Hungarians in Vojvodina, 
the Albanians in the Preševo valley in southern Serbia (expressed in the 
9 March 2013 Declaration of all Albanian municipal deputies in Preševo, 
Medveđa and Bujanovac) and the Bosniaks in Sandžak (by the Bosniak 
Democratic Community on 14 March 2013). All these demands invoke the 
principle of reciprocity with regard to the claim for Serb territorial auton-
omy in Kosovo.
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The first year of the term of the new Serbian government (July 2012—May 
2013) was marked by the return and growth of hate speech. What is more, 
although the Serbian Constitution and laws guarantee freedom of expres-
sion, alternative thinking (which is in evidence in only a very few media 
outlets) is again discouraged while the number of attacks against people 
belonging to minorities and using minority discourse is on the increase. 
The media are used as a tool for further stripping Vojvodina of its auton-
omy and made to employ the same propaganda methods that were used 
in the 1990s to topple the Vojvodina leadership and establish a strong cen-
tral government in Belgrade, a policy jeopardizing, among other things, 
the security of the citizens.435
The hate speech is closely linked to the incidents targeting minorities 
(political and ethnic minorities as well as a number of media outlets and 
civil society organizations).436 The extremist organizations were strongly 
encouraged to carry out such attacks by the victory of the populist Ser-
435  The Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina (NDNV) warned that media 
freedom in Vojvodina and Serbia was in serious jeopardy and that the journalist 
profession is undergoing a decline unseen since the 1990s. This is especially visible 
in the coverage of current affairs in Vojvodina. ‘Those reports abound with nationalist 
propaganda, semi-truths, lies and falsifications,’ the NDNV said in a statement. (www.
ndnv.org) The NDNV rightly points out that the tendency to class people as patriots and 
traitors not only endangers media freedom and democratic processes but can seriously 
jeopardize the security of the citizens of Vojvodina and cause a deep crisis in which it 
will no longer be possible to address problems by the institutions of the system. 
The president of the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia (NUNS), 
Vukašin Obradović, describes the situation in similar terms, saying that a 
‘legalization of hate speech’ is at work on the public stage. ‘Ethnic counts are 
making a comeback, with government representatives failing to take a clear 
position on such instances. This leads us to the conclusion that the extreme 
right-wingers feel that their time has come. They are part of the encumbrance 
we got with the new government,’ Obradović said. Discussion panel: Vraća se 
atmosfera iz devedesetih godina; www.autonomija.info, 11 February 2013.
436  See parts of the Helsinki Committee reports on Vojvodina and extremism.
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bian Progressive Party (SNS) at the presidential elections, which enabled it 
to form a government and enter other institutions. The government made 
no response to the numerous appeals by media associations and civil soci-
ety organizations warning against the growing tide of extremism.
Although extremely low standard of living and widespread unem-
ployment are fertile ground for extremism and hate speech, the Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights is of the opinion that the cause of these 
growing trends should be sought in the political constellation.
The majority of the international donors who have financed Serbian 
media during the last two decades have pulled out. The largest of them, 
IREX from the United States, closed down its office in Belgrade in 2012. 
The international donors had focused on media privatization and their 
financial sustainability in the future, believing that that alone would be 
sufficient to ensure media freedom. However, the media donors failed to 
make sufficient allowance for the risks lurking in Serbian transition and 
in the incapacity of the Serbian elites to make a break with the period of 
warmongering propaganda and strictly controlled media and provide ad-
equate conditions for the development of pluralism of media content.
When IREX left Serbia it painted a very gloomy picture in its Media 
Sustainability Index 2012 report, noting that the previous decade had 
been marked by a stagnation of media development in Serbia. It said that 
in the wake of 2000 the upward period lasted only three years and that 
2003 was followed by a two-year stagnation and then a permanent dete-
rioration over the next six years. In 2012, Serbian media were operating 
in an environment which differed little from the year 2000, it said. In de-
velopment terms, Serbian media lost the last eight years, it noted. Since 
2001, freedom of speech and professional journalism have only margin-
ally improved, with only Macedonia trailing Serbia in the region in this 
regard, it said. In terms of economic operations, the IREX report said that 
Serbia was practically on the level of 2011. The report confirms the assess-
ments of other independent sources that the media are highly politicized, 
which is reflected in the excessive influence of politics on their editorial 
policy, the avoidance by politicians to order the media space in a civilized 
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manner and the meekness with which journalists are resisting the role of 
politics in the media sector.
The government elected in 2012 agreed to implement its predeces-
sor’s media strategy. As regards freedom of the media, the decriminaliza-
tion of libel (towards the end of 2012) was a positive development thanks 
to the insistence of a large number of media associations and civil society 
organizations.
The media strategy does not indicate what guarantees will be offered 
to endure media pluralism, one of the main stumbling blocks of Serbian 
transition. The Internet and the new media are becoming the most impor-
tant source of alternative information in Serbia. However, their reach is 
limited and their impact highly dependent on what information the tra-
ditional media choose to carry from websites and blogs. Also, while many 
people now prefer to keep abreast of events via the Internet, they still rely 
on the websites of the traditional media outlets as their primary sources 
of information.
Motivation for analytical and investigative journalism among jour-
nalists, particularly those belonging to the younger generation, has been 
on a serious decline year after year. The media expert, Professor Snježana 
Milivojević, says that the media have for decades been in a state of leth-
argy as a ‘consequence of the terrible agony and prolonged transition’ of 
a democracy that is neither consolidated nor unconsolidated. ‘I fear that 
this is a permanent state of affairs and that this society is rather imma-
ture,’ Milivojević says. In her opinion, the fact that the issue of the media 
is only raised when absolutely necessary or in certain specific situations 
indicates that the public does not regard the media as an important in-
stitution.437Another indicator of society’s immaturity, she says, is the fact 
that the docile media from the 1990s have succeeded in outliving the au-
tocratic regime.
Topics are forced by influential structures and individuals rather than 
by journalists. In spite of the Law on Free Access to Information of Pub-
lic Importance and incomparably better conditions for investigative jour-
nalism compared to the 1990s, journalists remain hampered by routines 
437  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/tema.php?yyyy=2012&mm=06&nav_id=615037.
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dating from the time when the media were directly controlled by the state. 
They very often rely on sources such as ‘tip-offs’ from politicians’ or ty-
coons’ offices, which are mostly spinned by people with a lot of pull, es-
pecially those from the political-economic circles, in order to sway public 
opinion in their settling of accounts with opponents. On the other hand, 
journalists are going out increasingly rarely to find things for themselves 
and have no motivation for checking information.438
The change of the political make-up of the Serbian government has 
laid bare the media’s inability to stand up to pressure. The hitherto influ-
ential Democratic Party lost its clout with many media outlets. The Inde-
pendent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina (NDNV) pointed out that all 
political elites in Serbia have suppressed the development of professional 
and independent journalism and regarded the media solely as a tool for 
their own promotion and propaganda. In consequence, those who hold 
the reins of power have almost complete control over the media sphere. 
The NDNV warned that the present state of affairs clearly reveals the perils 
of a situation where ‘control has been taken over by those who have lived 
and continue to live by manufacturing crises and creating enemies’.439
The media discourse on topics of consequence for Serbian transition 
remained unchanged in 2012. It comprised topics concerning European 
integration and attitudes to regional issues linked to transitional justice, 
particularly the ICTY.
An analysis of the dominant media discourse will benefit from pay-
ing attention to two aspects: reporting on the main regional issue – the 
Kosovo negotiations which were mostly conducted by Prime Minister Ivica 
Dačić – and reporting on the fight against corruption spearheaded by the 
First Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić.
With the authorities making a gradual volte-face in their policy on 
Kosovo, the media began to modify their dominant discourse on the topic. 
It is interesting to follow, in this context, their attitude towards the two 
key political figures, Ivica Dačić and his deputy Aleksandar Vučić. At the 
height of the negotiations with Pristina, domestic media began to report 
438  Helsinki Committee interview with media representatives.
439  www.ndnv.org.
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one scandal after another (e.g. the ‘Miša Banana’ affair) with the object of 
incriminating Belgrade’s chief negotiator, Prime Minister Dačić. This atti-
tude towards Dačić primarily reflects the ongoing test of strength within 
the ruling coalition (in order to be able to form a government, the victori-
ous SNS had to cede the post of Prime Minister to a partner who had polled 
considerably less votes in the elections). Other than that, in the event of 
a failure of the Kosovo negotiations in Brussels, Aleksandar Vučić would 
come away with his ‘hands clean’.
On the other hand, Vučić enjoyed from the very first media’s strong 
support in his highly problematic conduct of the fight against corruption. 
As time went by, it became increasingly apparent that the SNS was en-
gaged in a populist campaign and that the main object of its fight against 
corruption were party interests rather than systemic solutions and a pro-
cess which would lead to a substantial improvement in the long run. Any 
criticism of Vučić met with hostility in the public discourse. Filip Švarm, 
a journalist with the weekly Vreme, notices that the fight against corrup-
tion is generating a consensus of opinion which could be likened to the 
‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ that brought Slobodan Milošević to power.
As regards the traditional media, it is a paradox that in the last few 
years since the Serbian media were ‘liberated’ Radio Free Europe contin-
ues to play a major part in providing information to people who want to 
hear alternative opinions about certain topics; this is especially true of re-
porting news from the region because coverage by other media is neither 
sufficient nor adequate.
As regards the free flow of information via cable, the case of TV Al Ja-
zeera Balkans shows that it depends mainly on ‘political circumstances 
and requirements’ whether a TV channel will be able to broadcast through 
the cable system. Although it was announced early in 2012 that the chan-
nel would be able to broadcast through the cable system (the start-up be-
ing also advertised on billboards in Belgrade), broadcasts only started at 
the end of the year, that is, after the new government was formed. The 
Helsinki Committee learned that the object of the delay was to prevent the 
broadcasting of any alternative media content first during the electoral 
campaign and then during the new government’s first months in power.
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Hate speech in the social-political context
The 2012 elections returned to power the populist Serbian Progressive 
Party (SNS) and Aleksandar Vučić, who was Minister of Information at the 
time of the severest systemic repression of the independent media in Ser-
bia (March 1998 – October 2000). In 1995, Vučić was elected General Secre-
tary of the Serbian Radical Party, the wartime regime’s ‘mailed fist’ during 
the 1990s, a party notorious for its chauvinist rhetoric and hate speech 
targeting the opposition and non-governmental organizations. Within 
days after the Srebrenica genocide, Vučić himself announced, addressing 
the national parliament, that 100 Muslims would be killed for every Serb 
victim.440
Vučić’s term of office as Minister of Information was marked by the 
murder of journalist Slavko Ćuruvija, proprietor of the daily Dnevni tele-
graf and the magazine Evropljanin, and systematic campaign against 
these papers, bans on media establishments, arrests and detentions of ed-
itors and journalists, the imposition of censorship during the NATO inter-
vention (with Vučić having regular meetings with editors in his capacity 
as chief censor), forbidding independent media journalists to report from 
meetings of state bodies (including parliament), criminal prosecution and 
imprisonment of journalists and adoption of a severely repressive Law on 
Information.
The Helsinki Committee’s 1999 report441 states: ‘During the war, al-
most all media reported in a similar manner, using a more or less vulgar 
and/or impassioned rhetoric’. (...) After the end of the war the situation 
changed considerably, with the majority of dailies, including Glas javnosti, 
Blic, Danas and even Večernje novosti, beginning to report on events in a 
much more objective manner. A number of TV and radio stations, particu-
larly in the interior, also joined this post-war trend. As the media became 
increasingly more professional, government stepped up its repression of 
them. Draconian files, bans on the circulation of particular issues and 
threats against journalists soon followed. The report cites and explains in-
440  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UGqv9CJbd3U.
441  Vreme, http://www.vreme.com/arhiva_html/467/15.html#Uvod.
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stances of this aspect of state repression as well as instances of or rules for 
carrying out state propaganda through state-, or rather, party-controlled 
media (RTS, Politika, Borba, Politika ekspres and others).
A relapse into the 1990s, as far as the official attitude to the media 
and the alternative scene in Serbia was concerned, was in evidence at the 
very beginning of the mandate of the new government: on the eve of 
his appointment,442 Assistant Minister of Culture in charge of the Media, 
Dragan Kolarević, called for a ‘cultural revolution’ and made public a list 
of unsuitable ‘holders and executors of the deleterious anti-Serb policy 
in Serbia’. He mentioned many public personages by name. The text was 
published on 13 August 2012 on the website of the nationalist and con-
servative portal Novi standard.443Throughout 2012 and early in 2013 simi-
lar lists were published intensively by extremist right-wing organizations, 
with no one from the government ever clearly condemning such attacks.
As a result of the new reality in the wake of the elections and the in-
ability of the media to resist the pressure, Vučić became a most popular 
personality with Serbian media. This was confirmed to the Helsinki Com-
mittee by Belgrade media journalists. The editors-in-chief take great pains 
not to antagonize Vučić and to ensure that their media outlets do not go 
too far in criticizing one of Serbia’s most powerful men. Things have gone 
so far that even some media establishments which were targeted during 
Vučić’s term as Minister of Information have now become very kindly dis-
posed towards him. The editors who once bore the brunt of Vučić’s explic-
itly repressive measures are these days seen engaging in quasi-friendly 
discussions with the SNS leader.
The entry of the populist SNS into the institutions in the aftermath of 
the 2012 elections is fertile ground for the activities of extremist groups, 
suppression of free speech and flourishing of hate speech and violence 
against the champions of alternatives. The object is to intimidate all who 
have alternative views and to cow them into silence.
A foretaste of what lies in store for dissenters was provided during TV 
B92’s Utisak nedelje programme on 20 January 2013, featuring Minister 
442  The news of his appointment was announced on 18 August 2012.
443  http://www.standard.rs/dragan-kolarevic-vreme-je-za-prvi-srpski-kulturni-ustanak.html.
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of Justice Nikola Selaković, president of the Serb National Movement Naši 
(SNP Naši) Ivan Ivanović, Liberal Democratic Party MP Miljenko Dereta and 
president of the Helsinki Committee Sonja Biserko. The leader of the ex-
tremist group Naši, Ivan Ivanović, warned that all who say that Kosovo 
is independent would be tortured, mutilated and killed. During the pro-
gramme, he confirmed explicitly on several occasions that he stood by his 
earlier statement that ‘anyone who says that Kosovo is independent will 
not only have their tongue but their head cut off’. Ivanović said this after 
Sonja Biserko had observed that Kosovo was already independent. Ivano-
vić later ‘corrected’ himself and ‘mitigated’ the punishment of Biserko; he 
said that she would be prosecuted rather than beheaded though, to para-
phrase him, some other people’s heads would roll. Ivanović thus made it 
clear that his movement will not shrink from violence.
Members of the movement provoke incidents and liaise with organi-
zations whose aims include ‘strengthening the spirit and military training 
of course takers’. For instance, the movement announced on its website 
www.Našisrbija.org that, during a training exercise in Moscow called ‘The 
Volunteer’, the host National Assembly organization insisted on giving the 
guests from SNP Naši ‘brief training in assembling and stripping Kalash-
nikovs’. In the summer of 2012, the takers of ‘The Volunteer’ course stayed 
in a sports-military camp in Apatin set up by the organization Patriotic 
Front.
What was most worrying in this connection, however, was the attitude 
of Minister of Justice Selaković during the programme. Instead of com-
ing to the defence of Sonja Biserko, he behaved as if he saw no difference 
between her and Ivanović.. The fact that the Minister of Justice permit-
ted threats of murder, mutilation and torture to be made in his presence 
shows that he approves of the activities of the Naši movement. The Minis-
ter not only passed over these threats in silence but went a stage further in 
their relativization when he wound up his ‘exposition’ by concluding that 
there was no difference between Biserko and Ivanović. In doing so, Minis-
ter Selaković came in on the side of the bullies.
The incident was duly reported to Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and 
First Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić, from whose party Selaković 
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comes. The Human Rights House in Belgrade asked them to publicly con-
demn the gesture of Minister Selaković, adding that only then will they 
believe in the sincerity of their words that the authorities of the state must 
protect all citizens who receive such threats. The Human Rights House 
asked them to ‘state clearly and in public that no one may be killed for 
saying things in public, receive threats of death and violence, and that the 
authorities of the state, particularly the judicial system, must protect all 
citizens who are threatened in this way’.
However, the letter remained unanswered. The letter was a test for 
the new government to show its attitude to media freedom and demon-
strate its resolve to oppose extremist groups in Serbia. If anything, hate 
speech has escalated in recent months. Repressive measures against hate 
speech cannot bring about significant results; what is necessary is that 
holders of important posts should continuously offer alternatives and de-
nounce behaviour such as that of Minister Selaković in the abovemen-
tioned programme.
The dangerous tendency to equate extremists with civil society or-
ganizations and media establishments which are critical of extremism is 
manifested in extremists’ announcements that they would file suits for 
‘dissemination of hate speech’ against a large group of professional media 
and non-governmental organizations. Such tactics involving abuse of the 
law are calculated at producing the same effects as in Russia, where the 
authorities are taking a variety of legal measures against human rights de-
fenders on charges of spying. For instance, the Naši movement addressed 
an appeal444 to the Broadcasting Agency and the Serbian government ask-
ing them to ‘put a stop to the hate speech against the Serb people the 
media house RTVB92 disseminates by abusing its national frequency’ and 
called ‘attention to the new text by the activist of the Queeria organi-
zation, Predrag Azdejković, entitled ‘Četiri jahača Kačavende’.445In its ap-
peal,446 the movement points out that it has submitted to the prosecuting 
444  Frontpaged on the website of the Naši organization on 18 April 2013.
445  The text is about the retired Bishop of the SPC, Vasilije Kačavenda, 
who is accused of involvement in serious crime.
446  http://Našisrbija.org/index.php/2013/04/18/snp-Naši-traze-
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authorities material evidence on several occasions about what it calls RT-
VB92’s scandalous and impermissible hate speech against the Serbs.
Such tactics by extremist organizations, which are not clearly de-
nounced by the authorities, constitute a serious threat to the freedom of 
speech. An analysis of the wider context shows several reasons for con-
cern. The Naši organization is not without influence in society. What is 
more, it has a strong footing in the Serbian Orthodox Church and en-
joys the support of influential circles in Serbia which carry weight with 
the government itself and are grouped around Serbian President Tomislav 
Nikolić. Second, it is an organization whose members are perpetrators of 
violent incidents. Finally, one should not lose sight of the political past of 
the ruling SNS (formerly the Serbian Radical Party) and the Socialist Party 
of Serbia, both of which promoted the war propaganda and carried out re-
pression against media and journalists during the 1990s.
Hate speech
During 2012 and especially in early 2013, a strong campaign charac-
terized by threats and hate speech was conducted against the Independ-
ent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina (NDNV) and Radio Television 
Vojvodina (RTV) and their managements. The fact that they were targeted 
as bearers of autonomist policy in Vojvodina makes us conclude that the 
whole campaign against them has a political background and cannot be 
viewed independently of the political context and the Serbian govern-
ment’s attitude to the province.
In the first months of 2013 the attacks grew in intensity. In this con-
nection, The NDNV appealed to the government leaders and the Serbian 
President several times but received no reply.447
The NDNV General Secretary, Nedim Sejdinović, said that the NDNV was 
daily exposed to a media witch-hunt. This is a pattern which repeats itself 
reakciju-rra-zbog-govora-mrznje-medijske-kuce-b92/.
447  Although President Tomislav Nikolić, Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and 
First Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić were informed about the 
persecution campaign against the NDNV leadership, they never reacted.
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over and over again. For instance, in 2007 journalist and DNDV President 
Dinko Gruhonjić and his family were the target of a campaign of hatred 
and threats spearheaded by the neo-Nazi organization Nacionalni stroj, 
which has meanwhile been banned. The premises of the NDNV in the centre 
of Novi Sad were broken into on 14 February 2013 for the sixth time. The 
plate bearing the name of the Association was torn down several times. All 
these incidents were reported to the police. The RTV Programme Director, 
Sanda Savić, received messages that she had been ‘shadowed from birth’, 
that more about her was known than she will ever know about herself and 
that she had better go back to Belgrade or ‘even better, to Split’.448
The pattern of these attacks (including the political background and 
the reactions to the hate speech) is best illustrated by the following in-
stance: In the article entitled ‘Da li su naši TV novci’,449 the TV commentator 
of the weekly Pečat,450 Miodrag Zarković, alleges that the management of 
Radio Television Vojvodina consists of anti-Serb storm troopers and con-
firmed Serb-haters.
Besides making other insults, the text is replete with libel and fabrica-
tions about the authors and management of RTV and about NDNV President 
Dinko Gruhonjić. The closing portion of the article is an apt illustration of 
the way Pečat is bringing back to the public stage the hate speech and war 
propaganda of the 1990s: ‘If one looks at the national affiliation of the ma-
jority of the managers, some of whom have been mentioned in the text, 
and if one looks at the programme of the Novi Sad TV channel, one can 
hardly fail to notice a truculent Croat lobby behind that crime.’
The author is accusing the ‘newly-arrived editors’ of the RTV News 
Programme of being ‘anti-Serb storm troopers to a man’. He alleges that 
the Vojvodina public broadcasting service has ‘since July 2011 been com-
pletely in the hands of anti-Serb managers whose passionate hatred of 
448  This was discussed at length at the discussion panel ‘Vraća se atmosfera 
iz devedesetih godina’ on 11 February 2013, www.autonomija.info.
449  http://www.uns.org.rs/sr/desk/media-news/15086/di-su-Naši-tv-novci!.html.
450  The Editor-in-Chief of Pečat is Milorad Vučelić, editor of 
Radio Television Belgrade at the height of its war-mongering 
propaganda. Pečat regularly publishes texts of that kind.
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the nation in whose state they live and work has been proved beyond 
doubt’. The targets of this nationalist ‘wanted notice’ are Sanda Savić, Dan-
ica Vučenić and Dinko Gruhonjić, reputable media professionals and re-
cipients of prestigious journalist awards.
In an appeal to the state authorities, RTV pointed out that such labels 
can seriously affect the operation of the provincial public broadcaster as 
well as the safety of the staff, who are again having their blood analysed to 
determine their ethnicity, a practice dating back to the time when Pečat’s 
director and editor-in-chief Milorad Vučelić was at the head of the Novi 
Sad TV channel. ‘Since RTV produces programmes in nine national minor-
ity languages, one can well imagine how they feel after being reminded 
of the time when malignant nationalist hysteria flourished,’ RTV said in a 
statement issued on 18 January 2013.451
Official Belgrade did not react to these and similar attacks although 
appeals had been addressed from various quarters requesting top govern-
ment officials to condemn the attacks. The nexus between politics and the 
attacks on RTV can be inferred from the statement of the Vice-President of 
the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and President of the SPS Vojvodina Board, 
Dušan Bajatović, that the party was calling for changes in RTV’s editorial 
policy. Bajatović said that the editorial policy of that media establishment 
was in the service of one political party, namely the Democratic Party (DS). 
‘If its editorial policy is not changed urgently, we will demand the dis-
missal of all senior managers of RTV,’ he told a press conference. Bajatović 
also said that the SPS had asked to see a list of top 20 salaries in RTV. He 
said that the party would also request this information through the Com-
missioner for Information of Public Importance.452
The RTV programme director, Sanda Savić, described Bajatović’s 
statement as a direct political attack: ‘The shadows have come out and 
451  http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/vojvodina/novi-sad/rtv:-govor-mrznje-u-tekstu-
o-radio-televiziji-vojvodine-u-pecatu-sledi-tuzba_364902.html.
452  Published on 8 March 2013. http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/371323/Bajatovic-
Rukovodioci-u-RTVu-imaju-vecu-platu-od-mene-sto-je-priznacete-jako-tesko.
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everything’s clear now. We have been under great pressure from various 
political groups all the time and I expect that this pressure will continue.’453
The Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia warned that 
‘such nationalistic pamphlets (as the Pečat article) are encouragement to 
the extreme right-wing organizations which have in the last months been 
systematically drawing up lists of unsuitable media and organizations and 
accusing them of anti-Serb activities. This is again creating in Serbia a cli-
mate of divisions into “patriots” and “traitors”, something we had during 
the 1990s when people with different opinions were subjected to relent-
less harangues.’454
The General Secretary of the Independent Journalists’ Association of 
Vojvodina, Nedim Sejdinović, says that the Pečat article should be viewed 
in two contexts. ‘First, as a process which has long been conducted against 
Vojvodina and the advocacy of its rights; second, this is one in a series of 
texts which criticize the NDNV as a civil society organization and specifically 
Dinko Gruhonjić,455 a person who is seen as calling for a debate on the sta-
tus of Vojvodina and the decentralization of Serbia.’
RTV announced that a survey carried out at the time of the Pečat arti-
cle showed a 80 per cent increase in RTV’s television viewer ratings, with ra-
dio listener ratings jumping from eighth to third place. In analysing these 
results, one should bear in mind that RTV operates in unsuitable premises 
and has inadequate and obsolete equipment, a poorly regulated subscrip-
tion system and problems with collecting subscriptions.456
Unlike their Belgrade opposite numbers, the provincial authorities 
reacted to the attacks on the management of RTV and the NDNV. The pro-
vincial Prime Minister, Bojan Pajtić, attributes this to the recomposition 
of the multi-ethnic authorities in multi-ethnic environments and their 
453  http://www.autonomija.info/odbor-za-informisanje-
osudio-napade-na-rtv-i-na-ndnv.html.
454  http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/vojvodina/novi-sad/rtv:-govor-mrznje-u-tekstu-
o-radio-televiziji-vojvodine-u-pecatu-sledi-tuzba_364902.html.
455  Danas, 21. January 2013.
456  www.vojvodina.gov.rs/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=7489&Itemid=1&month=3&year=2013.
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replacement with nationalist parties during the last months of 2012. He 
said that the NDNV was being targeted because its name contains the word 
‘Vojvodina’, because it operates in Vojvodina and because it brings to-
gether people of different ethnic backgrounds. ‘We abhor any attack on 
independent journalism and any attack on people who cross themselves 
in a different way, speak a different language and belong to a different na-
tionality,’ he said.457
The Information Committee of the Vojvodina Assembly denounced 
the attacks on journalists and the hate speech and threats addressed to 
the RTV and NDNV managements as also jeopardizing the political stability 
of Vojvodina. However, when it came to the vote, the provincial MP of the 
SNS, Damir Zobenica, said that while he essentially agreed with the conclu-
sions, he had a ‘few minor objections’ (15 March 2013).458
The ‘ethnic count of journalists’ also provoked reactions from interna-
tional organizations.459
However, the reaction to the Pečat article of the President of the As-
sociation of Journalists of Serbia (UNS) and the Press Council (a self-regu-
latory body overseeing the print media code of ethics) was inappropriate. 
Although the UNS deplored the fact that Pečat cannot criticize the profes-
sional work of its colleagues without at the same time denouncing their 
national affiliation and political persuasions, Ljiljana Smajlović presented 
her views in the weekly Vreme. She tendentiously equates the journalists 
rallied around the NDNV and RTV with the extremist organizations, that 
457  http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/vojvodina/pajtic:-neprihvatljivi-
napadi-na-nezavisno-novinarstvo_371641.html.
458  http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/vojvodina/novi-sad/odbor-za-informisanje-
osudio-napade-na-rtv-i-na-ndnv_377970.html.
459  Head of the OSCE media department Dragana Nikolić – Solomon called on the 
state authorities to do ‘everything in their power to stop such public discourse. It 
is necessary to distinguish between freedom of the media and discrimination and 
hate speech. One should know where the limits of a democratic society stand.’ 
(Beta, 21 January 2013). Amnesty International noted that the continual verbal 
attacks on NDNV president Dinko Gruhonjić and on other members of the society 
represent a form of discrimination, hate speech and, in some instances, incitement 
to violence. The overriding motive for those attacks is their ethnic origin, i.e. 
nationality, with NDNV members described as ‘anti-Serbs’. (www.amnesty.org).
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is, the perpetrators of violence. She writes, ‘...not infrequently, our jour-
nalist colleagues act above all as sympathizers of particular political and 
financial projects. It is in this that the author from Pečat and the NDNV 
President differ little from each other. All their opponents are invaria-
bly “storm troopers”, the difference being that Gruhonjić’s opponents are 
“fascists”, “chauvinists” and “genocidal” maniacs and/or “executioners”, 
whereas (Miodrag) Zdravković’s storm troopers are as a rule “anti-Serb”. 
A day or two before Pečat came out, Gruhonjić said, speaking in a panel 
discussion in Belgrade, that the media scene in Serbia is a “viper’s nest” 
and that “warmongers, accomplices in Serb crimes” still occupy editorial 
posts in the majority of state-owned media. I would say that both Gru-
honjić’s struggle for a multicultural and Zarković’s for a Serb Vojvodina 
are equally disregardful of the principle of journalistic impartiality. The 
two of them are equally fond of strong words and injudicious accusations,’ 
Smajlović writes.460For instance, Smajlović makes no distinction between 
RTV journalist Danica Vučinić (recipient of numerous professional awards) 
and Milijana Baletić, a leading light of Serb war propaganda. She finds it 
quite normal that journalists and media funded from abroad should be 
called foreign agents, a label used by extremist organizations in targeting 
their opponents.
The position put forward by Smajlović in Vreme is a most telling ex-
ample of the ‘normalization’ of extremism in Serbia and of drawing an 
equal sign between those who criticize hate speech and are subject to seri-
ous threats and physical violence on one hand and extremists who initiate 
and practice violence on the other. The very same message is also being 
sent by members of the Serbian government, especially the SNS.
In response to Ljiljana Smajlović’s text, the DNDV General Secretary de-
scribed the state of Serbian journalism as follows: ‘In these parts, the silly 
thesis that the truth is never either here or there has long persisted among 
the so-called moderate nationalists and even among those who do not 
call themselves that, and it also persists in a large segment of public opin-
ion. Let us say a studio invites a person who advocates killing and justi-
fies crimes and a person who insists that killing and hatred are something 
460  http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1094343.
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impermissible and punishable. And somehow, from their quest for the 
truth, there somehow finally emerges a middle ground according to which 
killing is quite OK though one should not really go too far. Incitement to 
lynching is also [found to be] justified, only one must find the right target 
and sow moral panic; finding someone to pull the trigger is not all that 
difficult after all.’461
The President of the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia 
(NUNS), Vukašin Obradović, says that at work here is an ‘intellectualiza-
tion’ of hate speech, that is, its legalization through phrases that ‘all lists 
are the same’ and the insistence that freedom of expression is what mat-
ters. He says that in order to make up for the lack of results, the authori-
ties are feeding the population a steady diet of real and fictitious thieves 
on one hand and ‘Croats’, ‘non-Serbs’ and ‘traitors’ on the other.462
The Serb nationalist propaganda matrix from the 1980s and 1990s 
which laid the groundwork for going to war has never disappeared from 
the media discourse in Serbia. This matrix rests on the premises that the 
Serbs bear no responsibility for the war and that they are threatened by 
other Balkan peoples, on denying or playing down the crimes committed 
against Bosniaks and Croats, and on interpreting any demand for decen-
tralizing Serbia as a separatist demand leading to further dismemberment 
of Serbia.
Serb elites have never accepted the narrative about the responsibility 
of the Serbian institutions and leadership for the outbreak of the war in 
the former Yugoslavia nor launched transitional justice processes to cre-
ate a new historical narrative. In this regard, the victory of Tomislav Niko-
lić at the presidential elections, the entry of the SNS into the institutions 
and the establishment of the coalition government by the wartime allies 
SPS and SNS463 resulted in the abovementioned matrix being again forced 
on the media.
461  Nedim Sejdinović: ‘Osrednja istina’, www.autonomija.info , 27 January 2013.
462  Discussion panel: Vraća se atmosfera iz devedesetih godina; 
, 11 February 2013; www.autonomija.info.
463  Today’s leadership of the SNS consists of the same people who occupied the 
highest positions in the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) throughout the war. 
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Apart from the example of Vojvodina, this is clearly seen in the re-
porting about the Hague tribunal and the past. A case in point is one of 
the most popular chat show television programmes called Veče sa Ivanom 
Ivanovićem (An Evening With Ivan Ivanović) which is broadcast nation-
wide by the TV Prva channel. The host incurred the wrath of public figures 
and viewers and received a series of threats when he made a rare decision 
to deviate from his routine (crude jokes about minorities and women are 
not uncommon in his show) and invite as his guest the last President of 
the SFRY and former President of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić.464 Ivanović found 
himself subjected to public harassment: the hue and cry started on twitter 
after he announced Mesić’s participation and escalated during and after 
the programme. The threats, traditional media reported, included death 
threats.465The charges on twitter, carried by a number of websites, were 
that Ivanović had invited as his guest a man ‘whose arms are covered in 
blood up to his elbows’ and who took part in the killing of Serbs. The ed-
itor of the tabloid Informer, Dragan J. Vučićević, was one of the critics.466
Ivanović said, ‘Considering the kind of country we live in, it is no sur-
prise that things like this should happen. I have no special comment. We 
Aleksandar Vučić was a SRS MP and, after 1995, general secretary of the party. 
Nikolić was the number-two man in the SRS since its establishment.
464  Broadcast on 7 December 2012.
465  Blic carried (on 9 December 2012) some of the threats addressed to the 
host: ‘You’re soap for laundering the reputation of the Ustashi’, ‘Ivan, 
one can now freely say that you’re a mere ghost walking about Serbia. 
Therefore, consider yourself as not existing ... You wretch of a man.’
466  The owner and editor of the newspaper Informer, Dragan J. Vučićević, wrote: ‘Ivan 
Ivanović is the very image of the corrupt Serb hypocrite. This country was ruined by 
people like him. I can’t believe that you’re letting Mesić spread Ustashi lies at peak 
viewing time on a national TV channel! Can you imagine Bora Jović appearing as 
guest and spreading Serb propaganda in a prime-time slot of RTL in Zagreb?! What a 
shame, the things they’re doing to us! The Tuđmanite liar Stjepan Mesić poisoning Serb 
children with Ustashi propaganda! Shame on you, Ivanović! (...) Why, that man sitting 
across from you was an accomplice in the killing of Serbs. His arms are covered in blood 
up to his elbows. (...) Actually, tonight Ivan Ivanović is out to convince the Serbs that 
the Croats are our more clever brothers ... the thieving treacherous bandits poisoning 
the nation!’, Vučićević wrote. (The text of Vučićević’s tweet was taken from http://www.
svet.rs/najnovije-vesti/hajka-na-tviteru-ivana-Ivanovića-napali-zbog-stipe-mesica).
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live in a country brimming with violence, so these threats come as no sur-
prise. They attest to the level of our civilization. I hope that as a society we 
shall realize that hatred merely corrupts and slows us down in our lives.’ 
467 However, two weeks before playing host to Mesić, Ivanović invited as a 
guest Veselin Šljivančanin, the former JNA officer who served a prison sen-
tence for the war crime of aiding in the torture of Croat prisoners at Ovčara 
farm near Vukovar.468 Vukovar is a town in Croatia which was occupied by 
the Serbian army during the war. Šljivančanin was introduced as a retired 
major who would be telling anecdotes from The Hague. He was also intro-
duced as the writer of book and the grandfather of a little girl. Šljivanča-
nin’s granddaughter also appeared in the show. This example typifies the 
dominant matrix in the Serbian media.
The commission to investigate 
the murders of journalists
On a proposal from First Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić, the 
Serbian government on 24 January decided to set up a Commission ‘which 
is to investigate the unsolved killings of journalists in Serbia Slavko Ćuru-
vija,469 Dada Vujasinović470 and Milan Pantić’.471 The Commission’s terms 
467  http://www.telegraf.rs/jetset/447402-Ivanović-pretnje-me-
ne-iznenadjuju-jer-zivimo-u-zemlji-Našilja
468  Broadcast on 23 November 2012.
469  Slavko Ćuruvija, the owner of Dnevni telegraf and Evropljanin, was shot dead 
on 11 April 1999. His case will be discussed at greatest length in this report.
470  Dada Vujasinović, a journalist with the weekly Duga who reported from the battle 
zones in Croatia, was found dead in her New Belgrade flat on 8 April 1994. For years, 
the official verdict was that she killed herself with a hunting rifle. Her family did not 
believe this version and new expert analyses were carried out, one of them establishing 
that this was a case of murder after all. The prosecuting authorities accepted this in 
2009, i.e. 15 years after Vujasinović’s death. Since then no progress has been made.
471  Milan Pantić, the Jagodina correspondent of Večernje novosti, was struck in the 
back of the head with a metal bar or similar object and killed in the entrance to the 
building in which he lived on 11 June 2001. Pantić’s coverage of scandals in Jagodina 
is believed to have motivated the crime. Officially, no hard evidence was found and 
only an identikit was issued which led to no arrests. The police announced from 
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of reference were later expanded to include investigation of the deaths 
of 16 RTS employees during the NATO intervention. The Commission was 
initiated and is chaired by Veran Matić, Director of the B92 Fund, and 
comprises representatives of the Serbian security services, the Prosecutor’s 
Office and media.472
However, the Commission does not enjoy much public confidence 
chiefly because of the support of Aleksandar Vučić, who was Minister of 
Information at the time Slavko Ćuruvija was murdered.473 The Helsinki 
Committee believes that there are substantial reasons for this lack of con-
fidence. The establishment of the Commission gave rise to a debate and 
divisions among journalists at the annual Assembly of the Independent 
Association of Journalists of Serbia (NUNS) in April 2013, when the Com-
mission was sharply criticized by Branka Prpa, a prominent historian and 
wife of the late Slavko Ćuruvija. Shortly after its establishment the Com-
mission was left by the journalist-editor of the weekly NIN, Vesna Mališić, 
and, later, by NUNS President Vukašin Obradović.
The circumstances of the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija, who owned the 
magazine Evropljanin and the daily Dnevni telegraf, are the main cause 
of the lack of confidence in the Commission: Aleksandar Vučić, the then 
time to time that hundreds of interviews had been made but made no progress. 
There are no suspects, no testimony about any suspect leaving the scene and 
no forensic evidence that might lead to the identification of the perpetrator.
472  At the OSCE conference on media freedom in South Eastern Europe in September 
2012, Matić said that the object of the commission was to analyse ‘all the 
investigations so far, establish the facts why they have been unsuccessful and 
lay the foundations for upcoming investigations.’ (http://www.politika.rs/
rubrike/Hronika/Osnovana-medjunarodna-komisija-za-ubistva-novinara.lt.html) 
The first report of the Commission was made public early in April 2012 and is 
available at http://www.b92.net/info/dokumenti/index.php?nav_id=703248
473  Apparently, Vučić has so far taken no active part in the work of the Commission. 
However, his support for the Commission is evident, especially in his capacity as 
Coordinator for National Security who coordinates all the security services in the 
country. Veran Matić did not rule out the possibility of Vučić’s direct involvement 
in the work of the Commission: ‘We have not yet involved Aleksandar Vučić in the 
activities of the Commission, though the possibility remains open for us to make 
use of his current position and authority, naturally within the limits of the law.’ (11 
April 2013, http://nuns.rs/info/news/19061/resicemo-slucaj-ubistva-curuvije.html)
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Minister of Information, no doubt bears responsibility for the witch-hunt 
campaign preceding the murder. The analysis and investigation of the in-
cident so far suggest a political murder at the hands of the regime and the 
state. The murder of Ćuruvija was preceded by the destruction of his news-
papers through judicial proceedings because of their criticizing of the re-
gime. Shortly before the murder, the pro-regime daily Politika ekspres on 
5 April 1999 published an article entitled ‘Ćuruvija dočekao bombe’ (Ćuru-
vija welcomes the [NATO] bombs) in which the owner of Dnevni telegraf was 
branded as a traitor. The story was also read on the RTS main television 
news. Many media wrote later that Ćuruvija later received an ‘informa-
tion’ from the authorities that the article was a mistake that would not be 
repeated. These assurances him to remain in the country. The investiga-
tion also established that the state security men who shadowed Ćuruvija 
all the time were called off shortly before the murder.
Branka Prpa, who has been helping all the judicial and police au-
thorities investigating Ćuruvija’s murder so far, said that after the inves-
tigation was concluded in 2007 all that remained to be done was for the 
Prosecutor’s Office to bring an indictment ‘rather than now investigating 
the whole affair all over again by alternative methods’.474 She said that the 
Commission could not serve as a substitute for something the Prosecu-
tor’s Office itself should have done and that its establishment was a ‘pop-
ulist show and extravaganza which is an insult to the dead people’. The 
manipulative character of the Commission is borne out by the fact that it 
is a conglomerate comprising members of the police, secret services and 
the journalist profession.475Lawyer Nikola Barović, who is thoroughly ac-
474  ‘I don’t think that this Commission can help us to come to a denouement of a 
political and state murder such as the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija. I don’t believe in 
any parainstitution which a law-governed state needs to substitute for an institution 
whose reason for existence are precisely serious criminal offences such as the killing 
of people. The prosecution, the investigative authorities, the judicial system are there 
to deal with such things, surely they are the institutions whose job is to deal with 
such cases,’ said Prpa, speaking in the RTV ‘1 na 1’ programme on 29 January 2013.
475  ‘This is a trivialization of the whole affair and is simply impermissible,’ said Prpa. She 
said that the establishment of the commission for solving the murders of journalists 
was a manoeuvre ‘because the authorities are declaring the state powerless to 
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quainted with the Ćuruvija case, says that it is so simple that it could be 
solved at the level of a secondary police school, not a matter for a big com-
mission. He says that it is known who called off the men who followed 
Ćuruvija, who issued the order to kill and who was on duty at headquar-
ters on the day in question.476
NUNS President Vukašin Obradović walked out of the Commission be-
cause he was opposed to the idea of some of the participants in the mur-
der being granted protected witness status if it came to trial. ‘I hold that 
people who take direct part in a murder, either as masterminds or exec-
utors, should not be amnestied by being granted protected witness sta-
tus. Getting at the truth in this way would not have good effects either on 
society or on freedom of information in Serbia,’ he said.477Branka Prpa 
too thinks that granting ‘cooperating witness’ status to someone like Rade 
Marković (a possibility entertained by circles close to the Commission), 
who was at the head of State Security at the time of the murder, would de-
stroy the very concept of justice. ‘This is a monstrous confusion of issues: 
those who were in charge of all those actions and who stand behind all 
those political and state murders since 1998 will now be able to get the 
status of cooperating witnesses. This is unacceptable both politically and 
ethically because it destroys the very idea of sanctioning those who carry 
out such crimes,’ she said.478
Slavko Ćuruvija’s brother, Jovo Ćuruvija, made a public statement on 
the 14th anniversary of the assassination. He said that he did not wish 
to address those who are today in power and who kept silent at the time 
when Slavko and his journalists were persecuted, his offices looted and de-
stroyed, and he finally brutally murdered. They kept silent and were part 
of Milošević’s criminal regime, he said. One of them was the Deputy Prime 
solve that and rehabilitating it’. Speaking on the RTV ‘1 na 1’ programme, she said 
that ‘political will to conclude the process legally also lacked while Boris Tadić was 
in power’ and that ‘there is now a political will, but it is turning into a circus’.
476  Al Jazeera Balkans, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/
imena-ubica-curuvije-poznata-ali-se-taje.
477  www.blic.rs.
478  Al Jazeera Balkans.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 290 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 291
290 serbia 2012 : THE MEDIA
Minister in the Milošević government, another the Minister of Informa-
tion, and a third a mouthpiece for Milošević’s hatred and evil, he said. 
During the reign of terror, and even when Slavko was murdered, they said 
many a heinous lie about him, he said.479
The media strategy and Law on Information
The general verdict of the media community480 on the Draft Law on 
Public Information is that it is excessively regulatory, restrictive, contains 
vague and contradictory provisions and favours the state-owned media. 
The public debate on the Draft Law was marked by an angry controversy 
dating back several years between media associations and private media 
outlets on the one hand and representatives of local public broadcast-
ers and media in minority languages (funded by their respective national 
councils) on the other. Although the Draft Law sets 31 December 2014 
as the final date for the privatization of the state-owned media, there is 
already talk that the time limit may be extended, a possibility strongly 
opposed by the Media Community.481The Draft Law envisages only two 
public broadcasting services – Radio Television Serbia and Radio Televi-
sion Vojvodina.
The Media Community also insists that the Draft Law should explic-
itly prohibit budgetary financing of media from 2014 and provide for a 
changeover to project financing only. The move to privatize the media in 
Serbia has the support of the European Union, with Head of the EU Del-
egation to Serbia Vincent Degert saying that the withdrawal of the state 
from the media is the prime objective.482
479  www.blic.rs.
480  The Media Community comprises the Media Coalition (ANEM, 
UNS, NUNS and Lokal Press) and the Media Association.
481  Under the 2003 Law, the deadline for the privatization of print media was 
April 2006 and for electronic media December 2007. As no deadline has 
been observed so far, the state keeps its ownership of media.. More than 
1,000 media outlets have been registered in Serbia, which has a population 
of 7.1. About 100 media outlets are financed from the budget.
482  ‘Nothing should be done through the back door or under the counter. The 
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As also proposed by the previous government in its media strategy, 
the Draft Law provides for project financing of media, which means that 
media will have to enter competitions and apply for funds on the ba-
sis of projects and that some media will no longer receive direct budget-
ary resources. Sandra Bašić Horvatin, the EU media expert who took part 
in creating the media strategy of the previous government, says that al-
though €20 million was spent on the media from the budget, the criteria 
for spending the money were not clear and transparent. She said, ‘The 
Draft Law on Public Information is not against them (public broadcasters); 
however, all must have equal conditions in the market in order to ensure 
protection of the public interest and a transparent way in which the tax-
payers’ money is spent’. Through project financing the state will render as-
sistance to the media and protect the public interest in information at all 
levels, said Bašić Horvatin.483
However, the Media Community says that the Draft Law does not lay 
down clear criteria for project financing. The community proposes that 
the majority of members of competition commissions should be experts 
delegated by representative professional and media associations and that 
competitions for the election of commission members should be uniform 
regardless of the level of the authority providing the finance (national, re-
gional or local). A case in favour of privatization of the media concerns the 
unfair competition between private and public broadcasters, with state-
owned media being guaranteed budgetary resources under the new law.
The Assistant Minister of Culture and Public Information, Dragan 
Kolarević, says that the concept of regional public broadcasting services 
was dropped because it was difficult to define a region, identify the owner 
and work out the method of their financing.484
financing of projects should be transparent and without exercising the hitherto 
power of discretion,’ said Degert. http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/
drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:425146-Drzava-da-se-povuce-iz-medija.
483  www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Dru%C5%A1tvo/1299216/
Javno+slu%C5%A1anje+o+medijima.html.
484  www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Dru%C5%A1tvo/1299216/
Javno+slu%C5%A1anje+o+medijima.html.
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The City of Belgrade television channel Studio B is one of the me-
dia opposing privatization. Its director Aleksandar Timofejev claims that 
the channel will be forced to close down unless it receives budgetary re-
sources. All that the channel has are its personnel and very old equip-
ment. Because it has no premises, the editors fear that no buyer interested 
in broadcasting news concerning the city’s everyday life will come for-
ward. Closure of some media outlets will be an inevitable consequence of 
the media privatization.
As has been shown in practice, the question of privatizing the me-
dia in minority languages, which are currently financed with funds made 
available to the national councils of national minorities and are not inde-
pendent of them, is somewhat more sensitive: at issue is an acquired right 
of the national minorities and a guarantee of their survival. Media con-
sultant Goran Cetinić says that the media privatization process should be 
pursued and that a long-term strategic programme is necessary to ensure 
the survival and development of minority programmes in Serbia.485The 
problem concerning programmes in minority languages in Serbia is not 
different from those existing in other states, he says. Every state provides 
funds for financing media in minority languages without wishing to own 
those media. Competitions are regularly announced: the role of the state 
is to control the way the funds are used, i.e. how a programme is realized, 
he said. He believes that the state should carry out thorough research on 
a relevant sample and put forward solutions to ensure that the media 
can operate efficiently over the long term. He says that the halting of the 
privatization process has resulted in absolute party control over media 
programmes.
Provisions of the Draft Law concerning concentration of owner-
ship have raised concerns in the Media Community although they have 
been approved by EU media expert Bašić Horvatin. (Sandra Bašić Horva-
tin said that the EU finds it important ‘that the proposed law prevents 
485  Okrugli sto: ‘Privatizacija medija na jezicima nacionalnih manjina 
– deetatizacija i(li) opstanak!’ http://www.vojvodina.gov.rs/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2750&Itemid=1.
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concentration of ownership in the media).486However, the Media Commu-
nity holds that private media at a time of a ‘general media convergence 
and amalgamation are thwarted by the introduction of unacceptable con-
trol mechanisms’. The Law on Public Information overlooks the fact that 
the process of registration or the process of checking for irregular combi-
nation is already regulated by other legislation and forces on the media 
too many provisions and conditions which are the responsibility of gov-
ernment authorities. Representatives of the Media Community consider 
that the Draft Law is contrary to the general principles of free business op-
eration and European standards in this area. The Media Community says 
that the Law is overstandardized regarding the provisions on the media 
register because the quantity of required data about founders and asso-
ciated persons far exceeds the idea of transparency of media ownership. 
The Media Community holds that the Law must incorporate a provision to 
prevent distributors from being founders of print media at the same time.
In spite of the new government’s declaratory support for media pri-
vatization, its use of media financing mechanisms indicates that it does 
not want to relinquish its influence on the media. This is indicated by 
its populist move to abolish compulsory subscription as a way of financ-
ing RTS and revert to financing the public broadcasting service from the 
budget. The state still has a share of ownership of the Politika and Večernje 
novosti dailies.
Transparency of ownership of and 
cash flows in the media
The transparency of media ownership and cash flows within the in-
dustry was a key issue in the media sphere during 2012. The Anti-Corrup-
tion Council says in its 2011 report that of the 30 media establishments it 
analysed, 18 had a vague ownership structure.
The ownership structure of the daily Press is a case in point. The pub-
lic did not learn that tycoon Miroslav Mišković was its owner until he 
486  www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Dru%C5%A1tvo/1299216/
Javno+slu%C5%A1anje+o+medijima.html.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 294 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 295
294 serbia 2012 : THE MEDIA
confirmed this himself. All along, the question of who owned Press had 
been a mystery even to the Anti-Corruption Agency. Shortly before Mišk-
ović made the disclosure, the head of the Operational Affairs Sector of the 
Anti-Corruption Agency, Dragomir Trninić, said that at that moment487 the 
institution had no evidence that either Mišković or Mayor of Belgrade Dra-
gan Đilas had ownership shares in Press. President of the Association of 
Journalists of Serbia Ljiljana Smajlović found it unnatural that owners of 
media outlets should make a secret of the fact; this, she said, indicates bad 
faith and that media are used here for settling accounts with political and 
business opponents.488
On 12 November 2012, Miroslav Mišković announced that he was 
withdrawing from Press as the largest individual owner of the daily (50 per 
cent ownership). Before Mišković made the disclosure, Aleksandar Vučić 
had raised the matter of media ownership in Serbia and said that Mišković 
and Belgrade Mayor Dragan Đilas were the real owners of Press. The tim-
ing of Vučić’s move indicates that he did not raise the issue of ownership 
as a matter of principle in order to lessen the pressure on the media and 
stem the spinning of tales in the media. The daily Politika wrote that Vučić 
raised the question of domestic media ownership ‘in reaction to newspa-
per articles claiming that the Serbian Progressive Party had “offered the 
post of Consul in Thessaloniki in exchange for control of Požarevac”’. Vučić 
dismissed the allegation as actually a ‘self-projection of the real owners of 
the newspaper Press Miroslav Mišković and Dragan Đilas who are gunning 
for him. The scandal surrounding Press, which ended in Mišković’s admis-
sion that he is one of its owners, was a prelude to Mišković’s arrest.
These developments soon led to the closure of the daily (with finan-
cial reasons being given why the daily would no longer come out in print 
form).No sooner was Press closed than a new newspaper, Naše novine, ap-
peared. It is managed by an editorial collegium headed by Đoka Kesić who 
edited Press for years. Because the real owner of the daily cannot be iden-
tified, there is room for fresh speculation about its ownership.
487  14. December 2012.
488  Politika, 15 December 2012.
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The report of the Anti-Corruption Council, the only relevant docu-
ment of that type so far, indicates that €160–170 million a year are turned 
over in the media advertising market, with the state having a 40 per cent 
share. There are no indications that the new government has changed 
course in this regard.
As an example of the non-transparency of cash flows within the me-
dia, the president of the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia, 
Vukašin Obradović, mentioned inter alia the daily Kurir, which changed 
its editorial policy within weeks (after the formation of the new govern-
ment) although the ownership structure remained the same. ‘For exam-
ple, we don’t know who is financing Kurir and how, and not only Kurir but 
also a number of other media that are published without advertisements, 
have no circulation and make no profit,’ he said.489For this reason, he said, 
it is necessary to regulate not only the transparency of media ownership 
but also media financing, that is, the transparency of funding, which is a 
far more difficult task.
The new media
From the point of view of human rights and freedom of the media, 
the most contentious point of the newly-proposed media legislation con-
cerns the new media and the legislation in force pertaining to freedom 
of media activity in a digital environment. The wording of the provisions 
in question is ambiguous and gives the state bodies scope for interpret-
ing them ambiguously and applying them as measures of repression of 
the media. When these statutory provisions were drafted, no account was 
taken of the specific features of the digital technologies and new media. 
These flaws were warned against by representatives of SHARE Foundation, 
which is concerned with the new media.
The Draft Law on Public Information namely envisages the additional 
requirement of registering every electronic publication and incorpo-
rates a wide definition of media including independent electronic publi-
cations distributed via the Internet and other electronic communication 
489  Tanjug, 14 December 2012.
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networks: hypothetically, this may include all kinds of digital and citizen 
media including blogs, web and mobile platforms, forums, twitter regis-
tration, facebook pages and other Internet services providing the public 
with information of public importance. During the public debate, this was 
especially pointed out by representatives of SHARE Conference and the Pi-
rate Movement. They warned that such legislation could even result in 
censorship of free bloggers. The representatives of SHARE Conference re-
called that the media have been exempt from media regulation and that 
no registration had ever been necessary for their operation let alone per-
mission to operate.
This position is fully in line with the Constitution of Serbia and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which stipulate that ‘Everyone 
shall have the freedom to establish newspapers and other forms of public 
information without prior permission and in a manner laid down by the 
law’ (Article 50 of the Constitution) and guarantee the right to freedom of 
expression including ‘freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and re-
gardless of frontiers (Article 10.1 of the Convention). However, even under 
the existing legislation the new media are not outside the legal system and 
hypothetically may be called to account on a number of grounds. Accord-
ing to SHARE Foundation, responsible persons in the cyberspace have had 
to deal with claims for damages (mainly in respect of non-material dam-
age) as well as criminal proceedings (for defamation and libel) although 
they operated outside the regime of the traditional media. Under the pres-
ent legislation, of all digital media, traditional media web presentations 
alone would be subject to media legislation.
New media representatives have voiced their concerns to the Helsinki 
Committee that the new legislation will create confusion as to which me-
dia on the Internet will have to obtain registration, display an imprint 
page, have an editor-in-chief and be subject to the legislation applying to 
the traditional media.
In order to obviate ambiguous interpretation of the new law and its 
use as a tool of repression of new and citizen media, SHARE Foundation 
has proposed an amendment stipulating what shall not be considered an 
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independent electronic media outlet. According to the amendment, in-
dependent electronic publications shall not include electronic platforms 
such as Internet forums, social networks and other platforms which make 
possible the free exchange of information, views and opinions of its mem-
bers, nor shall it include any other presentation of information, views 
or opinions by way of independent electronic publications such as blogs, 
web presentations and like electronic presentations unless the publisher 
files an application for registration with the Public Media Register as re-
quired with the law.490
The preliminary Draft Law on Electronic Media including commentar-
ies by the Broadcasting Agency obtained by the representatives of SHARE 
Foundation provides for an additional requirement to register every elec-
tronic publication.
SHARE warned that the drafters of the preliminary Draft Law on Elec-
tronic Media took upon themselves to regulate in detail the matter of elec-
tronic publications and control of their contents, something which should 
fall within the jurisdiction of the Republic Broadcasting Agency (RRA), 
without carrying out any serious analysis.
SHARE Foundation said it saw confirmation of the state’s tendency to 
introduce mechanisms of control and supervision into the Internet media 
space in the Preliminary Draft Law on Electronic Media accompanied by 
the RRA’s commentaries, which makes it obligatory to register electronic 
publications with the RRA. If the draft is approved, it said, it would impose 
on natural and legal persons the obligation to file an application with the 
RRA in order to be registered as providers of electronic publication services 
before being able to provide such services. Given that there is no defini-
tion of an electronic publication anywhere, and that the obligation relates 
to natural persons, it follows that such an obligation would pertain to 
any presentation of information of public interest, the representatives of 
SHARE Foundation warned.491
490  http://www.shareconference.net/sites/default/files/amandman_zoji_share_22mar13.pdf.
491  http://www.shareconference.net/en/news/reakcija-share-na-pokusaj-
srbije-da-regulise-sajber-prostor-kroz-medijske-zakone.
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Conclusions and recommendations
Hate speech on the Internet, as well as in the traditional media, is se-
riously on the rise and is directed against minority groups (particularly 
the LGBT population) and those expressing minority views. The political-
ly-backed rabble-rousing campaign and threats to journalists and media 
in Vojvodina is especially intensive. There is a clear nexus between the 
government’s political position on Vojvodina and the persecution of those 
who criticize the centralistic attitude of government officials. This should 
also be viewed in the context of the growing number of attacks on people 
who express minority views, particularly in Vojvodina.
Repressive measures are not a mechanism to use in order to prevent 
hate speech in the long run. What is necessary is education, making room 
for different views and creating conditions and a ‘good climate’ for media 
pluralism. It is of particular importance for the authorities of the state to 
publicly name individuals and organizations spreading hate speech and 
to protect those subjected to persecution campaigns with serious threats 
to their security.
In this regard, it is impermissible to equate extremist organizations 
which often resort to violence and civil society organizations, something 
both government officials and public personages often do.
Commissions for the allocation of state funds for media projects 
should include representatives of media associations as well as civil so-
ciety organizations concerned with human rights and democratization 
of Serbia, a prerequisite for creating media pluralism and protecting the 
public interest.
The proposed statutory provisions are creating a context in which me-
dia freedom on the Internet could be endangered. The work of the new 
media must not be restricted by any legislative measures or ambiguous le-
gal regulations making for censorship in the cyberspace.
There are serious grounds set out in this report for not trusting the 
Commission. The presence of the people from the services controlled by 
Aleksandar Vučić, who was Minister of Information at the time journal-
ist Slavko Ćuruvija was persecuted and murdered, throws doubt on the 
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sincerity of the intentions of the Commission. In our opinion, in connec-
tion with the Ćuruvija case the problem is not to ‘establish the truth’ but 
to bring those responsible to court. We suspect that the efforts to bring this 
case to a conclusion are seriously obstructed by people from the regime 
of Slobodan Milošević employed in the security services and the judiciary.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 300 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 301
300
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 300 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 301
301
IX – KOSOVO
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 302 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 303
302
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 302 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 303
303
Progress Made under the 
Pressure from Realities
Serbia and Kosovo’s normalization agreement (signed on April 19) is cru-
cial for both regional and bilateral stabilization. The agreement put an 
end to fragmentation of the region along ethnic lines and to the delusion 
that a change in international constellation would play into the hands 
of Serbia by enabling partition of Kosovo: the option Serbia’s political 
and intellectual elites have banked on until the very end. Instead, the 
agreement practically guarantees Prishtina’s sovereignty over the entire 
territory of Kosovo and complies with the 2007 Ahtisaari plan for the au-
tonomy of the Serb community.
Certain concessions Belgrade got do not undermine the agreement’s 
strategic dimension: definite withdrawal of Serbia and its institutions from 
Kosovo North.
For Belgrade, the fact that the autonomous entity in the North would 
incorporate only four municipalities with Serb majority population (and 
only Mitrovica North) and that a community of municipalities would have 
a president, a vice-president and a council was “a maximum under given 
circumstances.” Major achievements, Belgrade said, was that the commu-
nity of municipalities would appoint a regional police commander and 
that an appellate court would be established in Mitrovica North. Belgrade 
also obtained guarantees from NATO that Kosovo police forces would not 
operate in Kosovo North without permission from the North-Atlantic Alli-
ance and the Serb community.
Faced with strong resistance from the conservative bloc and the grey 
zone of politics, Premier Ivica Dačić was skillfully meandering through 
Brussels’ requests and domestic criticism. The ruling coalition – having 
itself traveled the path from denial to acceptance – obtained relevant po-
litical legitimacy for a turn to take. The Serbian government voted in the 
agreement as one only two days after the Brussels paraph, while the par-
liament adopted it with 173 out of 250 votes.
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Except for Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia /DSS/, all other op-
position parties – Democratic Party, Liberal-Democratic Party, Alliance of 
Vojvodina Hungarians and League of Vojvodina Social Democrats – backed 
the agreement. Anti-European forces assembling Serb Radical Party, un-
represented in the parliament, and various right-wing organizations 
(Dveri, Naši, “1389,” and the like) apart from DSS, failed to stage mas-
sive protests aimed at annulling the agreement. Not even Serb Orthodox 
Church’s open support to this part of Serbia’s social and political scene 
prevented an almost smooth Kosovo-related U-turn. This testifies that le-
gitimacy of these forces has not only dried up but also that the society as 
a whole is exhausted and aware that this is the only choice Serbia could 
possibly make.
Leaders of Serb municipalities in Kosovo North also raised their voice 
against the agreement. Head of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija Alek-
sandar Vulin resigned in protest: an act that in no way affected the gov-
ernment’s unity. Serb leaders in the North were the first to threaten with 
a referendum but missed the mark. For their part, Aleksandar Vučić and 
Ivica Dačić accepted the idea of a referendum under the condition that it 
was called in the shortest possible while and, more importantly, stood not 
in the way of the agreement’s implementation while prepared. As it seems, 
the referendum will never be called.
All relevant international factors and organizations welcomed Bel-
grade and Prishtina’s agreement. They mostly praised its historical aspect. 
The Council of the European Union recommended that Serbia should ob-
tain a date for accession negotiations. EU summit is supposed to decide on 
the issue in late June.
There is no doubt about a historical dimension the agreement has in 
Serb-Albanian relations. Albanians are for the first time ever equal part-
ners to Belgrade. On the other hand, real challenges are still ahead. In-
terpretation of the agreement and, especially, its implementation will be 
major stumbling blocs.
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton, experi-
enced in dealing with Balkan leaders, told Moscow’s Commersant, ““We 
should not be so happy about it in advance. History is not over yet. Both 
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states are still at the crossroads but two brave men have already chosen a 
path of peace.”492
Negotiating agony
After a series of successful rounds from October till late March 2013 
negotiations came to a standstill. Belgrade was expected to have its say 
about the normalization agreement by early April. Acceptance implied de-
nial of the strategy for Kosovo’s partition and dismissal of parallel struc-
tures in Kosovo North.
Belgrade negotiators insisted on autonomous legislative and execu-
tive powers for the Serb community (the judiciary and the police in the 
first place) and on a ban on the Kosovo Army in Kosovo North. A “commu-
nity of municipalities” as such would have resembled Republika Srpska, 
entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was “unacceptable” as US Ambassa-
dor in Belgrade Michael Kirby put it. This was the more so since the 2007 
Ahtisaari plan, incorporated into Kosovo’s Constitution, did not envisage 
that organizational forms of the Serb community should be invested with 
such authorities.
In the dramatic last act Serbia’s top leaders were seeking a face-saver: 
to avoid saying “no” to Brussels on the one hand, and to convince domes-
tic public, especially conservative circles, that negotiations were leading 
towards rejection of Albanian claims on the other. This time their mastery 
of trickery, manipulation and buying time seemed doomed. EU was un-
bending in its demands. However, it allowed extra ten days for Belgrade 
to finally decide: to take or leave what it has been offered at the negotiat-
ing table.
Two positions crystallized over the turmoil at home: political prag-
matism of Ivica Dačić and anti-Europeanism and xenophobia of the influ-
ential conservative circles. President Tomislav Nikolić – to whom the later 
have counted on – actually belongs to this current.
And so it happened that in the shadow of Brussels negotiations con-
servatives won the first round at home. On April 8 the Serbian government 
492  Blic, April 28, 2013.
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unanimously turned down the agreement while asking for a continuation 
of the dialogue. This only strengthened the conservative bloc’s belief that 
any agreement with Prishtina was out of question and that Serbia would 
finally give up the European course – this being their ultimate goal.493
The agreement on dismissal of parallel institutions was a turning 
point in negotiations. That was the hardest test for Belgrade’s cooperative-
ness: it had to give up the plan for Kosovo’s partition that had been the 
sum and substance of its demands. Almost until the very end Ivica Dačić 
kept insisting that partition was the best solution. Aware that he would 
be the one on the carpet – either should he sign or not – Dačić included 
Vice-Premier Aleksandar Vučić in the negotiating team.494
Of all the leaders of the ruling coalition Premier Dačić is obviously the 
best aware of international and domestic realities. In this context the con-
structive turn he made was also the biggest. He skillfully played on war-
mongering careers of some officials of the incumbent regime (Socialists 
from the Milošević era). In an article he penned for the NIN weekly on the 
occasion of the 10th anniversary of Zoran Đinđić’s assassination, he wrote, 
“There maybe some justice in the fact that today I am the most responsible 
for a peaceful solution, a negotiated solution.”495
The balance of power in the parliament was also crucial for the break-
through in the Kosovo policy. Apart from the considerable majority of 
parliamentarians from the ruling coalition (Serb Progressive Party, Social-
ist Party of Serbia and United Regions), Democratic Party /DS/ and Liberal 
Democratic Party /LDP/ backed the agreement with Prishtina.
493  „…”The unity reached in the final act of Brussels negotiations is growing stronger 
and stronger thanks to the participation and support of President of Serbia 
Tomislav Nikolić,” wrote Milorad Vučelić, editor-in-chief of the Pecat magazine, a 
couple of days before the government decided to say „no.” Pecat, April 5, 2013.
494  According to unofficial sources, Dačić asked Catherine Ashton to invite Vice-
Premier Aleksandar Vučić to participate in the last, eight round of negotiations.
495  NIN, March 7, 2013. Dačić also wrote, „We’ve lied that Kosovo belonged 
to us and even legalized the lie in the Constitution. This Constitution is 
of no avail today. The President of Serbia cannot go to Kosovo. Neither 
can the Premier. Nor ministers. Nor the police. Nor the army.
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The agreement was reached because all parties were eager not to allow 
the negotiations to fail: Belgrade did not want to be on the waiting list for 
accession negotiations, Prishtina was after opening the process of Euro-
pean integration and Brussels wanted to demonstrate (to Americans) that 
it is capable of looking after its own backyard.
The resolve of international factors – Germany and US in the first place 
– to make Belgrade’s regime normalize its relations with Prishtina brought 
down the curtain on the last regional problem.
Russian influence
Whether and to what extent Russia contributed to Serbia’s initial de-
nial remains unclear. Belgrade seemed to avoid consultation with Moscow 
over the last months of the negotiations. However, on the eve of the final 
decision Tomislav Nikolić phoned Russian President Vladimir Putin, while 
Dačić paid a visit to Moscow only a day after the government turned down 
the “Brussels paper.” Premier Dmitry Medvedev statement on the occasion 
that is was “Serbia’s privilege to solve the Kosovo problem” did not solve 
the dilemma. Ivica Dačić explained that “Russia was most annoyed with 
learning about some developments in Serbia’s foreign policy post festum” 
(allegedly this referred to Tadić-Ashton agreement to move the Kosovo is-
sue from UN to Brussels).496 His explanation leads to the conclusion that 
Moscow learned about the latest developments post festum once again.
While Ivica Dačić was in visit to Moscow, Serbia was accorded a per-
manent observer status with the Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization /ODKB/ assembling ex-Soviet republics – Russia, Byelorussia, 
Kazakhstan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Commenting 
on this status for Serbia, analyst Milovan Drecun said, “It is most impor-
tant that we establish cooperation with other countries at regional level. 
In this context, a permanent observer status with ODBK is a very good step 
in the right direction.”
According to Russian media, Serbia’s participation in ODKB is Russia’s 
geo-political success because this military alliance has been thus enlarged 
496  Politika, April 12, 2013.
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beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet Union. Russian General Le-
onid Ivashov said that the permanent observer status for Serbia “could 
be the first step towards strengthening its /Serbia’s/ position in the Bal-
kans,”497 whereas analyst Konstantin Sivkov called for establishment of 
Russian military bases throughout Serbia that “would strengthen the 
country’s sovereignty.”498
Cutting the Kosovo knot
After the seventh round of negotiations Dačić said Serbia would accept 
a compromise “but not humiliation and blackmail.”499 With their vague 
and half-finished statements high-ranking officials contributed to general 
confusion and opened the door to “yes” or “no” conjectures about the 
outcome of the “Brussels ultimatum.” Some speculated on disunity of the 
ruling coalition, including disputes between Tomislav Nikolić and Alek-
sandar Vučić. Some papers such as Nase Novine launched the thesis about 
tensions between Nikolić and Vučić. Allegedly, Vučić was in favor of the 
agreement while Nikolić (having spoken to Russian President Putin at the 
time) was against it.500
Officials were simultaneously arguing that Serbia had been offered 
“nothing” and, therefore, could not accept the Brussels paper, and that 
there was no alternative to the talks with Prishtina and the course to Eu-
rope. During his one-day visit to Paris, say, Premier Dačić said that Serbia 
had not a single true friend in the West, was “sinking deeper and deeper in 
quicksand as years go by” and that the talks with Prishtina were such that 
“all that was missing was a coach to sign a capitulation in.”501 And then he 
said, “A refusal would be of no avail in the long run given that we cannot 
expect anything better from any future proposal.”502
497  Voice of Russia
498  Politika, April 12, 2013.
499  Politika, March 23, 2013.
500  Naše Novine, April 5, 2013.
501  An allusion to France’s capitulation to Hitler.
502  Vreme April 11, 2013.
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Statements by Aleksandar Vučić were even more disputable.503 The 
media were most preoccupied with his role in Brussels, claiming he was 
obstructing Dačić’s readiness to accept the agreement (at long last). Alleg-
edly, the media argued, Vučić had been included in the negotiating team 
at Brussels and Washington’s request. The claim gave raise to negative 
commentaries such as “the composition of the negotiating team dictated 
from the outside looked humiliating to the Serbian side.”504
Serbia’s team that showed up in Brussels on April 2 was enlarged by 
Aleksandar Vučić and Suzana Grubješić, vice-premier for European inte-
gration (who joined the “regulars:” Dačić, Aleksandar Vulin, chief of the 
Office for Kosovo and Metohija, and Marko Đurić, foreign policy adviser to 
the President of the Republic).
Another long day in Brussels (talks lasted more than 14 hours) ended 
up as a failure: the agreement was not reached. Calling it a day, Catherine 
Ashton said that despite several proposals that had been put on the table 
the gap between the two delegations remained insurmountable – “shal-
low but deep.” She emphasized that was the last formal meeting of the two 
delegations. “They will now both go back and consult with their colleagues 
in their capitals and will let me know in the next few days of their deci-
sion,” Ashton said. 505
Papers also reported on some bizarre incidents that marked the last 
round in Brussels. Vučić and Thaci were shouting at each other. After the 
meeting Dačić told the press that at one point of excruciating negotia-
tions Vučić offered his resignation, which he refused to accept. According 
to some sources, Premier Dačić and Suzana Grubješić were in favor of the 
503  „We’ve been offered nothing, absolutely nothing...We cannot accept nothing but ask 
for something...We shall not kneel to EU to obtain the date,” Politika, March 31, 2013; 
„If we turn down the plan, the door will close on Serbia and its budget...We must try 
to obtain the date and find a common denominator with Western powers, which is a 
rather risky enterprise,” Aleksandar Vučić said in an interview with RTS, April 3, 2013.
504  Vreme, April 4, 2013.
505  „Bez dogovora u Briselu”, Politika, 3. april 2013.
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agreement, while Vučić, Vulin and Marko Đurić opposed it – and that was 
the reason why Vučić offered his resignation.506
Pressure from the right-wing bloc
The right-wing, conservative bloc perceived all the rounds as Brussels 
“ultimatum.” For it, the agreement stood for “a betrayal of state and na-
tional interests,” whereas “seven points” by German parliamentarians (re-
iterated in Belgrade in March 2013) were highly unacceptable. These seven 
points refer to dismissal of parallel institutions in Kosovo North, investi-
gation into the torching of the German Embassy, implementation of the 
agreements already reached, ban on the denial of the Srebrenica genocide 
and Serbia’s “manifest readiness for a legally committed normalization of 
relations with Kosovo” prior to accession negotiations with EU.
Insisting that the thesis about “no alternative to EU” was fatal to Ser-
bia and recalling EU’s role in the creation “of a false state of Kosovo” and its 
blackmails, the bloc raised the tension with ever more severe accusations. 
It specifically targeted Germany by reminding of “similar” ultimatums it 
posed to Serbia in 1914 and 1941. Democratic Party of Serbia /DSS/ was the 
fiercest critic of the “ultimatum.” The incumbent government, released the 
party, “has a historical opportunity to turn down the ultimatum at the ne-
gotiations in Brussels”, bearing in mind that EU wanted no other state but 
Serbia to “overcome its past and change its collective consciousness.”507 DSS 
also initiated petitioning508 claiming that the authorities were accomplices 
in the gradual appropriation of Kosovo and Metohija as they “bargained 
with EU at the cost of Serbia’s national and historical values.” DSS repre-
sentatives in the parliament unanimously condemned the government’s 
506  „Vučić bi datum, Toma ne pristaje na ultimatum”, Naše novine, 5. april 2013.
507  Prema Vremenu, 4. april 2013.
508  Petition was signed by academicians Milorad Ekmečić, Matija 
Bećković, Vasilije Krestić, Milovan Danojlić and Kosta Čavoški, 
and intellectuals such as Emir Kusturica and Leon Kojen.
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negotiating stance, which, they argued, equaled recognition of Kosovo as 
an independent, neighboring country.509
Leaders of the four Serb municipalities in Kosovo North added fuel to 
the fire. They explicitly called upon Serbia to give up the agreement with 
Kosovo or else they would start the procedure for the establishment of a 
Kosovo North parliament (by the model of the so-called independent au-
tonomous regions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1990s.).
The bloc welcomed the government’s decision of April 8 to turn down 
the agreement. At a joint session deputies from Kosovo North appealed to 
Russian troops to rejoin KFOR to “guarantee peace and security to the Serb 
people.”510 Russian Ambassador Alexander Chepurin visited Mitrovica a 
couple of days before the meeting and was welcomed “with ovation.”511
President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik actively participated 
in the debate urging refusal of the Brussels ultimatum. He paid a visit 
to Tomislav Nikolić a day before Catherine Ashton’s deadline and con-
firmed his stance at a joint press conference.512 The offer from Brussels, 
said Dodik, was “a false compromise” and Serbia should say no to “the ar-
rogant policy of Prishtina, probably encouraged by big powers.”513
The Pečat weekly, a mouthpiece of anti-Europeanism, and the influ-
ential website of the New Serb Political Thought magazine and its edi-
tor-in-chief Đorđe Vukadinović are of like mind. Vukadinović said that 
he had bet on Belgrade’s ‘no.’514 He drew a parallel between quisling gen-
eral Milan Nedić’s policy of “pragmatism and realism” and the incumbent 
government.
509  DSS release, Danas, Novembar 20, 2012.
510  Politika, April 4, 2013.
511  Politika, April 1, 2013.
512  The joint press conference by Nikolić and Dodik, broadcast live by RTS, April 7, 2013.
513  Danas, April 4, 2013.
514  TVB92, April 7, 2013.
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Serb Orthodox Church
Serb Orthodox Church /SPC/ strongly advocated against the agreement. 
“We shall not accept Europe’s invitation if it is conditioned with Kosovo. 
If they expect us to give it up, we shall send our apologies and go on with 
our life, the hard and painful life we’ve lived for 500 years,” said Patriarch 
Irinej.515
However, as the time drew near for crucial decision “ideological al-
lies” noted that SCP calmed down its Kosovo related discourse. While they 
openly criticized the church’s opportunism, some media were speculating 
on discord among high dignitaries and two opposing currents. According 
to the Nedeljnik weekly, Bishop of Backa Irinej was in charge of censorship: 
he swept under the carpet a letter the Holy Synod addressed to President 
Nikolić in late November 2012 appealing to him to end the dialogue with 
Prishtina.516
SPC did not miss the opportunity to raise its voice on the eve of the 
crucial decision. Two days before Brussels’ deadline it publicized Patriarch 
Irinej’s appeal (on behalf of the Holy Synod and believers). The Patriarch 
directly appealed to three highest state officials – the President, the Pre-
mier and the Vice-Premier – to keep their “promises made in the election 
campaign and in the post-election period to never and on no account sur-
render, betray or sell Kosovo and Mehotija, the historical ‘Old Serbia.’”517
Some papers such as Nase Novine claimed that the Premier and the 
Vice-Premier had been willing to accept the “Brussels paper” but then 
changed their mind under the pressure from the Patriarchate and the 
Presidential Palace.518
Evidently annoyed with the church’s attitude, Premier Dačić called the 
appeal superfluous. The church should not tell the people that “we all 
should be sent to the stake and suffer for another 500 years to live to see 
cloudless skies” he retorted harshly. He also reminded church dignitaries 
515  Helsinki Bulletin No. 91
516  Nedeljnik, April 4–11, 2013.
517  Danas, April 8, 2013.
518  Naše Novine, April 9, 2013.
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that their message had not been sent from Peć but from Belgrade. “This 
means that the Serb Patriarch abandoned Kosovo back in 1690,” he was 
quite explicit.519
Conclusions and recommendations
The public in Serbia responded to the U-turn in the decades-long 
Kosovo policy as to something that could not have been avoided. People 
have been aware for long that Kosovo was a lost cause. Kosovo has been 
used only as a tool for the achievement of the goals in Bosnia. Persistence 
on the “Kosovo policy” threatened to drawn Serbia. Germany’s resolute-
ness to put an end to the misuse of Kosovo and clearly defines precondi-
tions for the membership of EU turned out to be most efficient.
Premier Ivica Dačić was the first to realize it, as he knew the best how 
Kosovo has been used and what the effects have been. His personal en-
gagement (with subsequent support from his deputy, Vučić) contributed to 
the rather frictionless atmosphere the agreement met in Serbia.
The attempts by DSS, SRS and their allies from right-wing groupings 
and organizations to stage massive protests have not posed a serious threat 
to the ruling coalition so far.
The conservative bloc takes that Serb Progressive Party has let it down 
as it failed to make a clear break with the “treacherous” policy of Dem-
ocratic Party and its leader, Boris Tadić.520 According to it, the West “pre-
cisely cast SNS as the lead only a party with patriotic aura could possibly 
play.”
So far the advocacy for the establishment of a “strong patriotic bloc” 
as “a genuine opposition and a new force at the Serbian political scene” 
sounds more like a cry for the moon than a serious threat.
Kosovo North leader’s opposition to the agreement is chilling out. 
This only testifies that their area for maneuver has always depended on 
519  Politika, April 8, 2013.
520  „Expectation from SNS has been the biggest enemy of Serbia in the past nine 
month,” wrote DSS vice-president Milos Jovanović, Politika, April 24, 2013.
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Belgrade. Their grudge, deprived of Belgrade’s support, can only to some 
extent stand in the way of the agreement’s implementation.
The implementation of the agreement will be disputed from many 
sides. This calls for continued monitoring by European Commission on 
the one hand and civil societies in Kosovo and Serbia on the other.
EU should insist on overcoming ethnic divisions and thus open the av-
enues for pluralization of the two societies.
A date for accession negotiations will be imbued with political energy 
only if all pro-European forces join hands for the common goal and initi-
ate the society’s transformation with enthusiasm and faith in a European 
Serbia.
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Bosnia-Herzegovina: Waiting for 
the Circumstances to Change
The relations between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) remain un-
changed. Serbia’s state strategy towards BiH has so far been implemented 
consistently by all Serbian governments. This strategy rests on a number 
of major determinants: first and foremost the six war aims laid down at 
the 16th session of the Assembly of Republika Srpska (RS) in May 1992521; 
the congress of Serb intellectuals held in Belgrade in 1994; the conclusions 
of the symposium Geopolitička stvarnost Srba [The Geopolitical Reality of 
the Serb Nation] (Institute for Geopolitical Studies, Fruška Gora, Novi Sad, 
1997), which accepted the Dayton Agreement as the maximum that could 
have been achieved under the international circumstances at the time and 
laid down guidelines for preventing the return of refugees to RS and for 
the economic and cultural integration of RS with Serbia. The rest are Do-
brica Ćosić’s preface to Nikola Koljević’s journal Stvaranje Republike Srpske 
[The Creation of Republika Srpska] (Belgrade, Službeni glasnik, 2008); the 
Strategy of the Serbian Government on relations with the Serbs in the re-
gion prepared by the Ministry for the Diaspora (2009); and Dobrica Ćosić’s 
book Bosanski rat [The Bosnian War] (Belgrade, Službeni glasnik, 2012).
It took historians, academics and many public personages three years 
to prepare that document.522The guidelines for implementing the Strategy 
recommend that Serbia and RS should give serious thought to a political 
521  They are known as the ‘six strategic objectives’: first, detaching the Serbs from the other 
two communities; second, establishing a corridor between Semberija and Krajina; third, 
eliminating the river Drina as a border, i.e. abolishing the existing border separating 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The fourth objective is the establishment of a 
border on the rivers Una and Neretva; the fifth, the division of the city of Sarajevo into 
Serb and Muslim parts. The six objective is an outlet on the sea for Republika Srpska.
522  Slobodna Bosna published a document containing instructions for carrying 
out the strategy defined in the government’s Strategy and aimed at paralysing 
the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and it dissolution on 21 March 2013.
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and economic orientation towards Russia and recommend cold-shoulder-
ing politicians from countries supporting an integral BiH and using every 
means available to hamper and discredit both houses of the BiH parlia-
ment in their work. It is also suggested that the passage of legislation 
which is considered inessential and to be posing no threat to RS should 
be blocked. This is one of the principal means for proving the thesis that 
the joint institutions cannot be made to work. It is insisted that the state 
power and institutions at the level of BiH are unnecessary, superfluous, 
unfeasible, expensive and anti-Serb.523The behaviour of Milorad Dodik in 
recent years, particularly since the adoption of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence of Kosovo, clearly lends credibility to a document published in 
Slobodna Bosna.
RS is envisioned as an autonomous state within Bosnia with prospects 
of detaching itself completely. This is manifested in the statements of Mi-
lorad Dodik as well as in the behaviour of other government representa-
tives. During the past years contacts between Belgrade and Banjaluka have 
been frequent. Sarajevo has figured for the most part symbolically and 
chiefly under pressure from the European Union (EU). Although Serbian 
President Boris Tadić during his term established communication at the 
political level almost throughout the region, this was not followed up by 
any meaningful cooperation at other levels, especially as regards Bosnia.
The present government is choosing its words in all references to BiH 
and RS. However, the substance remains much the same though there is 
an awareness that the international community will not permit the disso-
lution of BiH. Foreign Minister Ivan Mrkić said that the position of Serbia 
was clear and principled. Serbia supports the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of BiH and all the arrangements under the Dayton Agreement. 
It will also support any arrangement which will be agreed by the three 
constituent peoples in BiH. The independence of RS, he stressed, is not an 
option for anybody and is certainly not something that is contemplated 
in Belgrade. He stressed that ‘...we have a common history, a harmonious 
present and are striving for a common future. We ought to be building 
projects and initiatives which will make us stronger. Serbia is ready for this 
523  Slobodna Bosna, 2 March 2013.
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and wants the closest relations with Sarajevo.’524Before visiting Sarajevo in 
September, Prime Minister Ivica Dačić said, ‘There is a clearly defined Bos-
nia and Herzegovina in accordance with the Dayton Agreement, and Ser-
bia will abide by that’. Nevertheless, he added that in his view BiH should 
be a state which ‘should never take it into its head to recognize the inde-
pendence of Kosovo and Metohija’.525
Milorad Dodik misses no opportunity to argue that BiH is an unsus-
tainable creation: ‘We are preparing ourselves for the dissolution of BiH, 
where RS alone is self-sustainable. Except for May Day and the New Year, 
we celebrate no holidays together.’526Analogies with Kosovo are drawn all 
the time and it is stressed that ‘Kosovo is a source of instability in the 
Balkans and that Republika Srpska will never recognize its independ-
ence’.527Mladen Ivanić, the former RS Prime Minister, does not expect any 
major changes in BiH (neither centralization nor dissolution). In his opin-
ion, BiH will be put on the waiting list for membership of the EU the same 
as the rest of the Western Balkan countries. He views the period of wait-
ing for EU membership as an opportunity for RS to grow stronger and wait 
for the circumstances to change and allow full independence to become 
an option. He further elaborates that RS can be satisfied with the Day-
ton Agreement; but if the process of Kosovo’s independence continues, RS 
could, taking a long view of things, say, ‘If the Albanians can do it, so can 
we’.528
Because Kosovo has been looked upon as a precedent in relation to 
the situation in RS and its aspiration for autonomy, Belgrade’s and Ban-
jaluka’s future attitude to the question of Kosovo is uncertain. BiH has not 
recognized Kosovo because RS is preventing it from doing that with Bel-
grade’s backing. Dodik stresses that ‘whereas in a state sense Kosovo is Ser-
bia’s number one priority, in a national sense its number one priority is RS 
524  http://www.naslovi.net/2012–12–27/b92/mrkic-srbija-oseca-bih-kao-suseda/4242814.
525  ‘Srbija će poštovati državu BiH’, Anadolu Agency, 11 September 2012.
526  ‘Srbi budite lojalni’, Kurir, 28 April 2012.
527  ‘BiH nikad neće priznati Kosovo’, Blic, 14–15 April 2012.
528  ‘Vehabije su problem BiH’, Pravda, 20 March 2012.
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because 1,400,000 Serbs live here’.529In common with all Serbian govern-
ments to date, including the present one, Dodik also advocates a partition 
of Kosovo. Prime Minister Dačić for one argues that that would be the best 
solution. Milorad Dodik has in the last year paid several visits to Kosovska 
Mitrovica to express support for its wish to secede.
Slobodan Durmanović, an analyst for the portal of Nova srpska 
politička misao [New Serbian Political Thought], believes that Belgrade’s 
and Banjaluka’s strategic plans regarding Kosovo may meet with a West-
ern demand for a ‘concession’ in BiH involving ‘dividing the sovereignty’ 
of RS, an arrangement that may result in a weakening of the position of RS 
under the Dayton Agreement.530
Such expectations appear to be supported by numerous other anal-
yses, such as, for instance, the one by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 
which issued a publication entitled Bosnia and Herzegovina 2025: Scenar-
ios on future Developments. The publication suggests that the dissolution 
of the state might be an option. The publication also states that both the 
international community and the local communities in BiH see dissolu-
tion as the only possible option after 2025.531
A number of political commentators and historians in Serbia argue 
that Serbia and RS would best function as two neighbouring countries co-
operating most closely because they share the same ethnic and cultural 
space. For instance, Neven Cvjetićanin believes that a ‘stable and econom-
ically strong RS best suits the interests of Serbia because RS is one of the 
few foreign-trade partners with whom we have a positive balance. Serbia 
would have a trustworthy partner in RS on whom it could rely in all other 
matters.’532 The historian Srđan Cvetković points out that ‘A Serb who goes 
to RS does not feel he is in another state. In formal legal terms, RS is an au-
tonomous territory within the neighbouring state of BiH; however, in the 
process of Europeanization, borders are becoming increasingly soft and 
529  ‘Nikolić je u pravu za Srebrenicu’, Blic, 6 June 2012.
530  http://www.nspm.rs/sudbina-dejtonske-bih-i-republika-srpska/rs-i-srbija-
sta-nemogu-dodik-i-Nikolić-q.html (downloaded 1 March 2013).<0}
531  ‘Dejton dva za raspad države’, Danas, 4 April 2012.
532  ‘Najbolje rešenje su dve srpske države na Balkanu’, Press, 16 January 2012.
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relative and serve more to bring people together than to keep them apart. 
Essentially, what matters at this moment is not that we are talking about 
two states but about the same people. In modern times, the ethnic princi-
ple of borders is de facto of far greater importance than the historical. This 
is clearly observable in the example of Kosovo and the same goes for RS.’533
The foreign-policy analyst Predrag Simić says that the ‘relationship 
between Serbia and RS is a topic being discussed not only in these parts 
but also in international circles, especially by drawing a parallel with Al-
bania’s relations with Kosovo’. He argues that essentially it is better to have 
two votes in international bodies than one.534
In the wake of the May 2012 elections, Serbian President Tomislav 
Nikolić made statements reaffirming the continuity of Belgrade’s policy 
on Bosnia and/or RS. Having said that he envisions RS as an independ-
ent state, Nikolić said that Serbia and RS deserve better political leader-
ships. The target of his criticism were both Boris Tadić and Milorad Dodik. 
He said that he could only picture RS as an independent state in the fu-
ture and made clear that BiH both as a state and a political reality were 
of no interest to him. He next stated: ‘Of course, I prefer a Republika Srp-
ska as an autonomous and independent state to a Republika Srpska that 
is immersed in a federation in which it is losing one competence after an-
other,’ he said and added that ‘Republika Srpska cannot forever remain 
a state whose citizens are not permitted to decide on their future in a 
referendum’.535
On the eve of his visit to Banjaluka in December 2012, Nikolić said 
that ‘hardly anybody can separate RS and Serbia’. Nikolić said that ‘Serbia 
has seen the end of this year with many changes: it has positioned itself in 
relation to its neighbours, whom it regards as lesser or greater friends, and 
decided that the relationship between Serbia and RS should be viewed in 
terms of the Agreement on Special Parallel Relations between [Republika] 
Srpska and Serbia, which implies their close cooperation’.536
533  Ibid.
534  Ibid.
535  ‘Nikolić: RS da sama odlučuje o sebi’, www.b92.net, 16 May 2012.
536  ‘Srbiju i RS teško ko može da rastavi’, Vijesti.ba/Srna, 25 December 2012.
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During the final stage of the talks between Belgrade and Pristina (the 
crucial eighth round), Milorad Dodik was invited to a consultation in Bel-
grade where many were asked to state their positions on the document the 
signature of which would secure to Serbia a date for the start of EU acces-
sion talks. Dodik said at the time, ‘We are here in order to line up behind 
the leadership of Serbia and to call for unity, for time will never forgive 
those who are not united...as far as we’re concerned, we’re in favour of re-
jecting ultimatums: it has been our experience that when you say “no” to 
an ultimatum usually nothing happens, whereas if you say “yes” you’re 
presented with a new ultimatum’.537
The international community tried (albeit not hard enough) to stim-
ulate changes in Bosnia in order to make it a functional state. However, it 
failed in that. RS and Milorad Dodik insist that the Office of the High Rep-
resentative should be closed. Furthermore, Dodik views the role of Tur-
key, which has been rather active in trying to solve the Bosnian question, 
as harmful. His view is shared by some circles in Belgrade including Dr 
Darko Tanasković, who maintains that Turkey is ‘trying to strengthen to 
the utmost the position of the Bosniak people’. In this connection, he crit-
icized Bakir Izetbegović for seeking to boost Turkey’s role in dealing with 
internal problems.538
BiH is undergoing its worst crisis since the war. Bodo Weber, a politi-
cal analyst and German Balkans policy expert, sees a ‘constant erosion of 
the institutional and constitutional order – that post-war rough-and-ready 
provisorium – with there being no possibility of establishing any new or-
der including secessionist. The greatest responsibility lies with the EU and 
the United States of America, naturally without absolving the domestic 
actors from their share of responsibility.’539Weber considers that the ‘in-
ternational community must re-establish certain basic rules of the game. 
Nothing more. The political elites will then have to address the interests 
and frustrations of the citizens because they will have run out of their 
authority which they had been drawing from one source and one source 
537  ‘Dodik: Srbija treba da odbije ultimatum’, Blic, 7 April 2013.
538  ‘Erdogan nije lider Bošnjaka u BiH’, Politika, 20 February 2012.
539  Anadolu Agency, 13 November 2012.
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alone – the weaknesses of the international community. However, such an 
about-turn can only be effected by one person – German Chancellor An-
gela Merkel. To be sure, in cooperation with Great Britain and with the re-
newed involvement of the USA.’540
Daniel Server stressed repeatedly that it was important for the USA to 
remain involved in Bosnia although, objectively, it has no major interests 
there other than preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina as an integral state, 
i.e. preventing its dissolution into two or three parts. Washington wishes 
to let the Europeans deal with everything else because it has many other 
difficulties, he said.541
The interpretations of the past
Belgrade’s attitude to the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia has been and re-
mains the main stumbling block in the relations between the two coun-
tries. The complexity of the Bosnian reality is manifested mostly on that 
plane, with each of the three peoples making its own construction of re-
membrance and consequently its own interpretation of the events from 
the 1990s. The character of the war has been interpreted by each side 
as it sees fit. The Serb side views the war in Bosnia as a ‘liberation war 
of the Serb people’ in spite of the numerous judgments of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) which clearly 
point to Serbia’s aggression against Bosnia. The problem lies in the fact 
that neither the ICTY nor the International Court of Justice has taken a 
clear position on the aggression against Bosnia although the documents 
and judgments of the ICTY leave no doubt about it.
In this connection, Dnevni avaz warned that ‘in these days too at-
tempts are being made to obfuscate the truth as to from where and at 
whom the shots are being fired, at whom the barrels of today’s verbal artil-
lery are aimed. Who’s insulting whose intelligence here? This propaganda 
540  Ibid.
541  ‘Dejtonski sporazum favorizuje nacionaliste’, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 5 April 2012.
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which falsifies the historical facts and denies the aggression and genocide 
is neither innocuous nor should be underestimated.’ 542
Every date and every incident are subject to controversy. While, for in-
stance, Sarajevo marks 6 April as the day on which the war in BiH started, 
RS considers that on that day in 1992 the persecution and murders of the 
Sarajevo Serbs began. The Serbs maintain that Sarajevo is a city which no 
longer has its former ‘character’ and ‘neighbourship spirit’ and that these 
centuries-old values have given way to ethnic cleansing and intolerance of 
the other and the different.543On the occasion of the marking of 6 April, 
Milorad Dodik wrote to Zlatko Lagumdžija, the BiH Foreign Minister, that 
a reception to mark the beginning of the ‘siege of Sarajevo’ was absolutely 
unacceptable and that it had not been agreed by all the sides in BiH. In 
his letter to Lagumdžija, Dodik observed that the ‘joint institutions of BiH 
are not a private property of any individual but places for the joint formu-
lation of all policies’.544
Drago Kovač, Secretary in the Ministry for Human Rights and Refu-
gees of BiH, said that Sarajevo’s pre-war Serb population of some 160,000 
had dwindled to about 8,000.545However, the causes of this state of affairs 
are largely disregarded: many Serbs left Sarajevo on the eve of the war and 
many others joined them in the aftermath of the Dayton Agreement. Fur-
ther, a great many Serbs live in Eastern Sarajevo and many of them con-
tinue to work in Sarajevo. In addition, as far as employment is concerned, 
one should not overlook the disastrous economic situation in BiH which is 
affecting all the communities alike.
Belgrade failed in its attempt to use two incidents from the very start 
of the war in Bosnia (1992), the ‘Dobrovoljačka Street’ and the ‘Tuzla col-
umn’, to prove that the Bosniaks provoked the war by attacking the Yugo-
slav People’s Army. The arrests of Ejup Ganić in London and Jovan Divjak 
in Vienna, pursuant to Interpol wanted notices issued by Serbia, and their 
later release proved a total fiasco for Serbia and a discredit to its prosecution 
542  ‘Ko je počeo rat?’, Dnevni avaz, carried by Politika, 7 April 2012.
543  ‘Kovač: Bošnjačka politika tera Srbe iz Sarajeva’, Politika, 2 April 2012.
544  ‘Datum razdora’, Večernje novosti, 7 April 2012.
545  ‘Kovač: Bošnjačka politika tera Srbe iz Sarajeva’, Politika, 2 April 2012.
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especially on the international plane. Nevertheless, the Serbian Prosecu-
tor’s Office continued to insist that it had fresh evidence about alleged 
crimes committed in connection with the Dobrovoljačka Street. The Ser-
bian prosecuting authorities became particularly insistent in this regard 
after their Bosnian opposite numbers in Sarajevo in January 2012 termi-
nated the investigation of 19 suspects (including Ejup Ganić and Jovan 
Divjak) in connection with the Dobrovoljačka Street incident. The case was 
conducted by the international prosecutor Jude Romano. Bruno Vekarić, 
the Serbian Deputy War Crimes Prosecutor, said that the Serbian prose-
cuting authorities continued to investigate the affair and that it was now 
much clearer why the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH had refused to sign an 
agreement on mutual transfer of evidence.546
The Public Security Centre in East Sarajevo submitted to the Prose-
cutor’s Office alleged evidence about crimes committed in Dobrovoljačka 
Street and a complaint against Prosecutor Jude Romano. Milorad Dodik 
for his part said that in view of the said decision RS should not cooperate 
with the Court and the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH regardless of the interna-
tional community’s efforts to preserve their authority.547
However, what provoked the most controversy was the marking of 
the 20th anniversary of RS on 9 January 2012 (the date is observed in 
RS as a public holiday). The large celebration in Banjaluka was attended 
by Serbian senior officials including President Boris Tadić. On that occa-
sion Tadić was presented with an order by Milorad Dodik. Tadić said that 
the order meant for him a personal obligation to continue to maintain 
the ‘special relations between Serbia and RS so that they may result in 
new bridges, a university, scientific cooperation, new roads and power sta-
tions’.548The then leader of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), Tomislav 
Nikolić, did not attend the celebrations because allegedly he had not re-
ceived an invitation on time. He said that he had been awarded a RS order 
at a worse time than today and that he considered that Tadić had received 
the order in his name too: ‘He certainly did not receive it in his own name 
546  ‘Predmet “Dobrovoljačka” odluka nije konačna’, Politika, 19 January 2012.
547  ‘Odluka koja ruši Bosnu!’, Večernje novosti, 19 January 2012.
548  ‘Dodik odlikovao Tadića, Medvedev Dodika’, Danas, 19 January 2012.
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because I cannot see what contribution Tadić has made to the creation and 
preservation of RS. I think that there are far more deserving people than 
Tadić who ought to carry that order, provided the order was awarded to an 
individual.’549
Much praise was showered on RS on the occasion, with Ivica Dačić say-
ing that ‘RS is the Piedmont of Serbdom’550 and Milorad Dodik that for the 
Serb people in BiH RS is a ‘pledge that they will live like free and dignified 
people’.551
The day before the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of RS a 
quantity of weapons was discovered at the Borik sports hall. The incident 
was given much publicity and portrayed as a terrorist plot to kill not only 
Boris Tadić and Milorad Dodik but the entire Serb political leadership. In-
sinuations were made against Muslim terrorists (Wahabis) with a view to 
involving the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP) in the investigation in 
order to demonstrate that Serbia controls the situation in RS. Miloš Šolaja, 
a professor of political science in Banjaluka, believes that the affair was po-
litically motivated, i.e. ‘aimed against political relations in BiH’, and that it 
‘made the situation in BiH and in RS itself considerably worse’.552The inci-
dent, which has never been fully clarified, at least not publicly, was given 
great publicity by the press in Serbia. For instance, Kurir wrote that about 
1,000 agents of the Iranian intelligence service were active in the territory 
of BiH with the object of assassinating RS President Milorad Dodik in one 
way or another. According to Kurir, Dodik has been sentenced to death be-
cause he opposes the recognition of Palestine.553
Milorad Dodik implied the complicity of President Bakir Izetbegović 
in the assassination attempt, saying ‘it is no secret that Bakir Izetbegović is 
continuously in touch with such groups. Our intelligence indicates that he 
549  ‘Nikolić: Tadiću nezaslužen orden RS’, Kurir, 11 January 2012.
550  Ibid.
551  Ibid.
552  ‘Slučaj Borik usmeren ka destabilizaciji RS’, Politika, 12 January 2012.
553  ‘Dodik osuđen na smrt’, Kurir, 13 January 2012.
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is highly respected by radical Islamist groups and even has contacts with 
some groups and services in Iran.’554
At bottom, the whole affair served to manifest the state and police 
unity of Serbia and RS, their togetherness and their joint ‘vulnerability’. 
The police directors of RS and Serbia concluded unanimously that the dis-
covery of the weapons in the Borik sports hall was being treated as an at-
tempted act of terrorism. The suspect, a man named Stanisavljević, was 
dispatched to the detention unit of the Court of BiH because, under the 
terrorism law, he was the responsibility of the state Prosecutor’s Office. The 
decision to transfer the ‘Stanisavljević case’ to the state court has far more 
serious implications: if it turns out that Stanisavljević had no terrorist de-
signs and is simply an arms dealer, RS can easily accuse the Court of BiH of 
being ‘anti-Serb’ and return the whole affair to the political arena.
The Jašarević case
The terrorist attack on the US embassy on 28 October 2011 put the 
question of religious extremism back under the political and public spot-
light. The incident triggered fresh debates about religious extremism in 
Bosnia and its dangers for the region and Europe in particular. The the-
sis was relaunched that it was actually Islamic fundamentalism that de-
stroyed Yugoslavia and that Europe failed to perceive the threat in time. 
At the beginning of February 2012, the European Parliament held a de-
bate on the occasion of adopting a resolution on BiH. This dimension 
came into prominence during the discussion. The Netherlands MP, Bas-
tiaan Belder, asked that the report should include a call to the Islamic 
Community of BiH to ‘make a clearly negative statement on the growth 
of Wahabism’.555However, the European Parliament’s Rapporteur on BiH, 
Doris Pack, said that there are few Wahabis in BiH, that they are isolated, 
and that they are recruited from poor strata of the population because the 
movement pays them to join it. She urged the religious heads to clearly 
dissociate themselves from the ‘shadow’ cast on the entire Islamic commu-
554  ‘Bakir naručuje ubistva!’, Kurir, 14 January 2012.
555  ‘Srpski i evropski strah od vehabija’, Danas, 14–15 April 2012.
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nity.556 However, the resolution adopted a softer formulation which calls 
on the authorities in BiH to ‘fight against extremism, religious hatred and 
violence in close cooperation with the international community’ and calls 
for ‘awareness, an investigation and the elimination of extremist threats of 
all kinds throughout the region of the Western Balkans’.557
The Islamic Community of BiH reacted sharply to the debate, stressing 
that the ‘statements of the EP members Doris Pack and Bastiaan Belder re-
mind the Islamic Community of BiH and the Muslim Bosniaks of the po-
sitions, propaganda and psychological war of the Serb extremists to which 
they have been exposed all this time. These extremist positions, disguised 
as a struggle against an Islamic and Muslim threat to Europe that only they 
and no one else know of, are the cause of the severe suffering of, crimes 
against and large-scale killings of Bosniaks including the genocide.’558
The elections in Srebrenica
In connection with the local elections in Srebrenica, tensions were re-
vived between the Serbs and the Bosniaks that called to mind the events 
that took place in that small eastern Bosnian town in 1995. The Bosnian 
leaders namely asked that Srebrenica be exempt from the provisions of 
the Electoral Law of BiH in order that all who come from Srebrenica could 
cast their votes there, as they did in 2008, regardless of where they live. 
The demand was backed by numerous non-governmental organizations 
and distinguished individuals who argued that a failure to grant the de-
mand would be an ‘evident new genocide and apartheid in BiH with the 
acquiescence of the politicians and the international community’.559
The local elections were won by the Bosniak candidate for municipal-
ity president of Srebrenica. RS responded by launching a series of actions 
aimed at deleting from the electoral registers the names of all voters who 
are not permanently resident in Srebrenica.
556  Ibid.
557  Ibid.
558  Ibid.
559  ‘Bošnjački lideri najvljuju bojkot izbora zbog Srebrenice’, Politika, 10 May 2012.
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In this connection, the Civic Coalition ‘March the 1st’ offered legal as-
sistance to all people from Srebrenica whose residence and other personal 
documents had been invalidated by the Ministry of the Interior of RS, that 
is, by the Police Station in Srebrenica.
The president of the Coalition, Emir Suljagić, said that the possibility 
of criminal proceedings being instituted against the officers in question on 
charges of abuse of office would be most seriously considered pursuant to 
the citizens’ complaints.560
The Coalition said in a statement that ‘such acts by the Police Sta-
tion in Srebrenica and/or the District Prosecutor’s Office in Bijeljina con-
stitute a direct assault on the Dayton Peace Agreement, that is, on Annex 7 
thereto, as well as on the Constitution and law of BiH which treat freedom 
of movement and freedom of choice of domicile as fundamental and invi-
olable rights and freedoms. The Coalition called on the Office of the High 
Representative, the Delegation of the European Commission and the Of-
fice of the EU Special Representative to exercise their authority and protect 
the rule of law and the equality of all before the law in RS.561
The Coalition’s activists pointed out that BiH citizens living abroad 
were under no restrictions regarding the status of their registered perma-
nent residences in BiH, particularly if they maintain effective relations 
with the country such as having property and families there, returning to 
the country, etc. Cases of this kind add to the frustrations of the residents 
of Srebrenica owing to their treatment during the last six months.562
The Coalition called on the Office of the High Representative to take 
a position on the matter, stop the procedure and exercise his authority to 
reverse every illegal invalidation of documents by the RS MUP and the Sre-
brenica Police Station. The Coalition said that, in case the international 
community took no action, it would call on people throughout RS to mo-
bilize and block the work of the Srebrenica Police Station.563
560  Fena Agency.
561  Fena Agency, 25 December 2012.
562  Fena Agency, 4 March 2013.
563  Ibid.
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The Srebrenica case may be applied to other areas in RS if the Coali-
tion receives the backing of the international community.
Republika Srpska’s economic dependence on Serbia
Economic experts’ warnings that RS is in a catastrophic situation have 
been borne out by data of the RS Statistical Office. Obviously, RS is not or-
ganized as an economically viable entity. RS has a very high unemploy-
ment rate. Half of young people are unemployed and are supported by 
their parents. As many as 70 per cent of young people wish to leave RS. The 
foreign-trade deficit stood at nearly one billion Bosnian marks (in the first 
six months of 2012). In the same period, exports fell by 4.1 per cent and 
imports grew by 0.7 per cent. Indebtedness continues to grow, reaching 
4.2 billion Bosnian marks in 2011. Although it has all the conditions for 
being economically profitable, the agriculture sector is in a catastrophic 
situation. Milk production was down by 20 per cent already during 2011. 
The Statistical Office says that the livestock numbers in RS decreased by 21 
per cent in the last five years.
In order to disguise their incompetence, the political elites are pro-
moting the thesis ‘Constitution first, economy second’, their argument be-
ing that RS can prove that it is economically self-supporting only after it 
has resolved its status issue. In order to divert people’s attention from 
the economically disastrous state of affairs, they are asserting that ‘RS has 
never been more stable’ and that ‘it is still fighting for justice in BiH’. RS 
Prime Minister Aleksandar Džombić said that investments in RS amounted 
to some €1.5 billion between 2006 and 2011. He said that Serbia is the 
largest investor with over €770 million. Other major investors were Rus-
sia (over €250 million), Slovenia (€125 million) and Austria (about €120 
million). These figures show clearly to what extent RS depends on Serbia. 
Džombić outlined the future potentials of the cooperation between Serbia 
and RS and said that it had been proposed, at a joint session of the two 
governments, to prepare a study on the complementariness of the econo-
mies of RS and Serbia in order to improve their economic links.564
564  ‘Srpska nikad stabilnija’, Večernje novosti, 27 February 2012.
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In addition, numerous economic, infrastructure, energy, educational 
and cultural projects are envisaged so as to make the River Drina a focus 
of regional integration. The largest of these projects is ‘Podrinje’. Džombić 
said that in order to carry out this large-scale project the two governments 
would apply to the EU for funds. The object of the project is to link to-
gether 24 municipalities in Serbia and RS on both sides of the Drina.565
Džombić said that the cooperation in the area of energy was the most 
important and that the construction of the South Stream pipeline section 
through RS would be of crucial importance.566Milorad Dodik too stressed 
that the cooperation with Serbia was a priority interest and that the ‘lad-
der of cooperation was set up together with presidents Koštunica and Ta-
dić’. This relates above all to the privatization of Telecom, the construction 
of the bridge at Rača, the opening of the ‘Srbija’ school in Pale, a Hemo-
farm production facility and a Komercijalna banka branch, cooperation in 
the area of health care and granting RS students the same status enjoyed 
by Serbian students.567
Milorad Dodik misses no opportunity to point out that independence 
is what RS wants and that it waiting for the ‘right moment to call an auton-
omy referendum’. For the present, he says, he is concerned with restoring 
to RS the prerogatives taken away from it and with consistently imple-
menting the Dayton Agreement.568
The RS government signed an agreement on the construction of four 
hydroelectric power plants on the Drina without consulting the BiH au-
thorities. The latter reacted immediately.
The Democratic Lawyers Association of BiH said that Milorad Dodik 
‘abused his official position and took over the competences of the state of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’. The Association said in a statement that the ‘case 
of the River Drina is not an entity responsibility. The Drina is the larg-
est source of drinking water in Europe. By constructing the hydroelectric 
power plant one not only destroys the local environment but carries out 
565  ‘Drina nas spaja’, Večernje novosti, 5 October 2012.
566  Ibid.
567  ‘Možemo sami’, Večernje novosti, 5 October 2012.
568  Ibid.
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ethnic cleansing–genocide of the Bosniaks’. It also warned that the pro-
jected hydroelectric plant at Paunci near Foča would submerge the arable 
land of the Bosniak population and may force it to emigrate to European 
countries. In this connection, it also criticized the German firm with which 
the agreement was signed.569
Montenegro for its part sent a note of protest accusing BiH of violat-
ing an international convention on environmental impact assessment in 
a transboundary context. Dodik replied that ‘neither Montenegro nor the 
Council of Ministers of BiH has any jurisdiction over that. That is the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the authorities of RS. A study has been prepared. 
Whatever we are doing, we are doing it on RS territory. We are sovereign 
on RS territory and no Montenegro will be able to prevent that by protest 
or any other notes’.570
The local elections in BiH
At the local elections in BiH, Milorad Dodik met with fiasco and was 
even hissed down during the pre-election campaign in Trebinje and a 
number of other places, something that would have been unthinkable 
only a few years ago. Srđan Puhalo, a sociologist from Banjaluka, says that 
this was a sign that people were gradually losing their fear of Dodik and 
that some of them decided to manifest their discontent publicly. What is 
not known is the extent of this discontent and how many more people are 
willing to take the risk and speak their minds in public, he says.571 Surveys 
conducted early in 2012 suggest that many people are dissatisfied with the 
economic situation, corruption and unemployment but are still afraid to 
name the culprit. The problem is, their discontent is manifested as silence, 
apathy, lethargy and withdrawal into oneself because people believe that 
that cannot change anything as individuals.
These elections too showed that an elementary level of political com-
munication in BiH is lacking and that political primitiveness and arrogance 
569  ‘Dodik preuzima nadležnosti države BiH’, Vijesti.ba_Fena, 1 October 2012.
570  Radio BiH, 2 October 2012.
571  Radio Slobodna Evropa, 16 September 2012.
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are the order of the day, particularly during pre-election campaigns. When 
it comes to arrogance, Dodik is certainly without peer. He is remembered 
for his statements about BiH such as ‘Bosnia is a rotten country. It does 
not deserve to exist. That’s clear’ and ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina is definitely 
falling apart and it will happen sooner or later. As far as I am concerned, 
I hope to God it dissolves as soon as possible.’
This situation is largely a reflection of the architecture imposed by 
the Dayton Agreement, with political elites forcing the ethnic principle to 
the utmost. Asim Mujkić, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in 
Sarajevo, said: ‘We live in a society which is constitutionally structured in 
such a manner that it does not recognize itself as such; as a result, the par-
ticular, i.e. the ethnic, has taken over the role of the general; and with a 
view to its further homogenization, it naturally constantly excludes those 
others which are not to its taste. Consequently, of course, we shall have 
statements of this kind which negate the state, negate peoples, which have 
racist undertones, which negate the crimes, etc.’572
The regular local elections in BiH were held on 7 October 2012, re-
turning 136 municipal assemblies (78 in the Federation and 58 in RS, 135 
municipal mayors, 5 mayors in RS and the Assembly of the District of 
Brčko. No elections took place in Mostar because there was no political 
agreement regarding amendments to the electoral provisions relating to 
the election of councillors to the city council.
In RS, the emphasis was on the need to strengthen the statehood and 
autonomy of ‘Srpska’ while the acute and grave economic problems and 
the population’s growing impoverishment were ignored. This is particu-
larly true of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and, 
above all, its leader Milorad Dodik.
In the BiH Federation, parties blamed the serious internal political 
situation on each other. The greatest responsibility lies with the leader of 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Zlatko Lagumdžija, who entered into co-
alitions with parties with different political orientations (a coalition with 
the SDA which broke down; a coalition with two small Croat parties against 
572  ‘BiH posle Dodikovog nastupa: Šta to biješe politička 
komunikacija’, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2 October 2012.
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the HDZ; a coalition with the HDZ). In consequence of this, he initiated 
personnel changes which resulted in turmoil and confusion particularly 
within the governmental institutions of the BiH Federation. By acting as it 
did, the SDP compromised itself and no longer offered the voters an alter-
native to the ethno-national parties of right-wing orientation.
In particular, the elections brought to the fore the ongoing intra-na-
tional turmoil within individual parties. This was especially visible in the 
Bosniak parties, particularly the SDA and the SDP. The turmoil was some-
what less pronounced parties in RS and least in the Croat body.
The elections were won by the three original ethno-national parties – 
the SDA, SDS and HDZ. Some analysts believe that such election results are 
returning BiH to the 1990s, in view of the fact that the said ethno-national 
political options have emerged as dominant. Nevertheless, one could not 
say that a reversion to the 1990s is in progress because the ethno-national 
parties have transformed themselves over time.
There is no doubt that the results of the municipal elections will have 
an impact on the results of the general elections due in two years’ time. It 
is hard to imagine a repetition of 2010. The results of the local elections 
have brought about a mismatch between the newly-elected municipal au-
thorities and the authorities at the state, entity and cantonal levels estab-
lished on the basis of the results of the 2010 general elections.
Dodik: continual obstruction of a functional BiH
Other than incessantly negating the existence of BiH, Dodik did his 
best to prevent BiH from obtaining a road map necessary for membership 
of NATO. In this, he has the support of Serbia and Russia. Among Dodik’s 
many obstructions to NATO membership was his demand for the ‘demili-
tarization of BiH’, i.e. the dissolution the armed forces of BiH. Dodik cited 
financial reasons, saying that the BiH army (a joint institution in existence 
since 2006) was too expensive to maintain.
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Dodik argues that RS cannot join NATO without Serbia because in that 
case the Drina would constitute a border. Similarly, he says that ‘RS will 
not join the EU at all costs’ because ‘RS has a good friend in Russia’.573
RS has established very strong ties with the Russian Federation par-
ticularly in the areas of economy and energy. However, a closer look at 
these relations points to a deep political background. The president of the 
Academy on Geopolitical Affairs of the Russian Federation, General Le-
onid Ivashov, said that BiH in its present state was a temporary phenom-
enon and an unnatural coalition created to address the consequences of 
the war fought on its territory. He said that a natural alliance for RS would 
be with the Slav peoples of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Serbia. Such an 
alliance might be joined by Bulgaria and Macedonia and all other Slav na-
tions, he said.574 This is the reason why the West is bent on having BiH as 
a NATO member. While BiH is certainly of no great military-political im-
portance, it is one of NATO’s priorities in order to prevent a penetration by 
Russia.
Other than resisting membership of NATO, both RS and Belgrade are 
increasingly critical of Turkey’s role in the region. In an interview with the 
New Serbian Political Thought portal, Professor Nenad Kecmanović said 
that ‘in the event of BiH joining NATO, the allied Turkish army could walk 
into RS legally and legitimately under the joint banner’.575For this reason, 
Kecmanović argues, Russia’s support to RS is more than invaluable, both 
politically and economically, because it serves to counterbalance Turkey’s 
influence in the Federation.576
573  Dodik’s speech in Srebrenica, Vijesti.ba, 24 September 2012.
574  ‘Ruski general “ujedinjuje” RS sa Rusijom!?’, Srna, 7 November 2012.
575  http://www.nspm.rs/sudbina-dejtonske-bih-i-republika-srpska/
ne-raspada-se-samo-bih-nego-i-federacija-bih.html .
576  Ibid.
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High Representative for BiH Valentin 
Inzko’s report to the Security Council
In his November 2012 report to the UN Security Council, the interna-
tional community’s High Representative in BiH, Valentin Inzko, described 
the situation in BiH as more complex than the year before. The deterio-
ration was due above all to the political crisis at the state and federation 
levels brought about by numerous sackings and reshuffles at government 
level. Inzko also pointed out that the negative rhetoric coming from RS was 
constantly calling into question the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
BiH. Inzko said that after the BiH Council of Ministers was finally formed 
and the state budget adopted, a new gridlock occurred coupled with polit-
ical strife and attempts to reconfigure government at state and Federation 
levels as well as in a number of cantons. Most worrying, however, was the 
rise in anti-state, secessionist rhetoric, he said.577
He asked the Security Council to pay special attention to the attacks on 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and to prevent them. Inzko 
said that BiH was lagging behind the countries in the region on their Eu-
ropean road and that that could no longer be tolerated.
Although Inzko’s previous report was along similar lines, there was no 
reaction from the international community. The international community 
has assumed to role of an observer.
Professor Slavo Kukić considers that it is too early for the interna-
tional community to assume such an attitude because its job is not yet 
finished: ‘This analysis suggests that the High Representative and the in-
stitutions of the international community in BiH, which stand as guar-
antors of the Dayton Agreement and which have thereby undertaken to 
stabilize BiH as a state and a society, are behaving as external observers 
and not exercising at all their authority under the Dayton Agreement in 
order to check these negative trends.’578
577  ‘Inckov izvještaj o BiH: Najviše brine rastuća antidržavna i secesionistička 
retorika’, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 14 November 2012.
578  Ibid.
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However, it is hard to believe that the US will allow some adventurist 
politicians to ruin the peace project behind which it stands. The EU is the 
bigger problem because it still has no unanimous policy either on BiH or 
on Kosovo (Kosovo has not been recognized by five EU members), and this 
leaves the US as the prime guarantor of peace and stability in the region.
The grip tightens on Dodik
Dodik’s populism based on the thesis about RS’ alleged vulnerability 
has obviously spent itself. His increasingly arrogant treatment of inde-
pendent media and non-governmental organizations is also a sign that he 
is slowly nearing his political end. Voicing his dissatisfaction with report-
ing by the BN Television channel, the RS President in an interview with the 
Serb News Agency (SRNA) accused the outlet of ‘playing the decadent role 
of MERCENARY’, a reference to the fact that the channel played host the US 
ambassador to BiH, Patrick Moon. Dodik said that in all probability ‘cer-
tain deals and arrangements were made’ on that occasion.579
The attempts to discredit Dodik over corruption have so far been un-
successful. The portal seebiz.eu on 5 November 2012 carried a communi-
cation, numbered 2094/ot, from the Chief Prosecutor’s Office in Munich to 
the Higher Prosecutor’s Office in the same city confirming that proceed-
ings had been instituted against Hypo Group Alpe Adria bank in Banjaluka 
and against Milorad Dodik and Igor Dodik. They were suspected of money 
laundering, using their political clout to extract money and transferring 
money of the Hypo Group to a secret account owned by Dodik’s son to be 
used for rendering illegal services of political protection by Dodik to the 
Banjaluka bank.580
Thanks to his political influence on the judiciary in RS, Dodik pre-
vented the processing of the affair. This move by Dodik, however, enabled 
the German judiciary to take over jurisdiction of the case. The opening of 
the case number 2094/ot on 5 December 2012 meant that Dodik and his 
579  ‘Dodikove vjetrenjače: Ugroženost maska za neuspjeh’,Radio BiH, 5 January 2013.
580  http://www.seebiz.eu/ekskluzivno-tuziteljstvo-u-mnchenu-
pokrece-istragu-u-slucaju-dodik—hypo/ar-50182/.
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son became subject to an investigation by the German authorities in con-
nection with the ‘Hypo scandal’. All of a sudden, however, the case ceased 
being the focus of media attention and appeared to have been laid to rest 
for the time being.
What is more, Dodik succeeded in almost completely blocking the 
transfer of jurisdiction from entity level to BiH institutions. Because of the 
weak reaction of the international community, this is having pernicious 
consequences for the operation of BiH as a state and is considerably slow-
ing its progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Since RS gave up hold-
ing a referendum on the BiH Court and Prosecutor’s Office (2011), there 
have been no initiatives aimed at undermining the Dayton Agreement. 
Dodik, who is regarded by many as the most successful Serb politician, has 
Belgrade’s support for his policy towards Sarajevo.
Emil Vlajki, the RS Vice-President, was among those who called for 
Dodik’s resignation due to the exceptionally bad economic situation in RS. 
Vlajki said, ‘Dodik’s internal policy is out of step with the results at the ex-
ternal level. RS has found itself in a grave condition: high unemployment, 
domination of grey and black economy, sale of national wealth, critical 
situation in the health sector, the pension and disability fund, the rail-
ways, forestry, underdevelopment of the real sector, tax arrears running 
into billions, etc. The fraudulent privatizations have never been seriously 
processed while the people have been reduced to poverty by the local bul-
lies hiding behind Dodik’s authority. Of course, Dodik is not to blame for 
everything. A portion of that has been inherited, and his party is a long 
way from being compact, either organizationally or morally; it is obvi-
ously obstructing him in matters calling for vigorous action. Nevertheless, 
he cannot escape a good deal of command responsibility for the accumu-
lated problems.’ All the same, he believes that the ‘departure of Dodik 
would mean the end of Republika Srpska, which would remain an empty 
shell, an administrative province governed from Sarajevo. Having seen 
what is going on in Serbia, such a sequence of events in RS would mean 
the defeat of Serbdom and, for a long time to come, the end of hopes for 
any autonomy for the Serb citizens and Serb lands on both sides of the 
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Drina.’581Belgrade’s relations with RS leader Milorad Dodik are not as cor-
dial as they were during the term of Boris Tadić. The editor of the portal 
Buka from Banjaluka, Aleksandar Trifunović, says that ‘clearly these rela-
tions are a far cry from those with Boris Tadić and DS. For one thing, the 
first visit of Milorad Dodik to Serbia ended in a [press] conference held in 
the street, in front of the residence of the Serbian President, rather than 
inside the building itself. It was not a joint conference either: he alone 
gave his perception of it. One should not be surprised at all – Milorad 
Dodik was openly and quite necessarily against Tomislav Nikolić during 
the electoral campaign and that was the consequence of his attitude. That 
interference resulted in a distinct chill in relations. However, RS suits Ser-
bia politically. In my opinion, a measure of control over RS will always 
come before the relationship of any two political personalities. I think that 
this relationship will be good as long as RS suits Serbia geo-politically. Al-
though relations between politicians or other personages can be bad, this 
relationship generally fully reflects the stability of the relations between 
those two political structures.’582
581  ‘Smrtno proleće Milorada Dodika’, http://www.nspm.rs/sudbina-
dejtonske-bih-i-republika-srpska/samrtno-proljece.html.
582  http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/otopljavanje-odnosa-bih-srbije/24892384.html.
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Conclusions and recommendations:
• It is necessary that Belgrade should abandon its hitherto policy 
towards BiH, particularly RS, and support a revision of the Dayton 
Agreement in order to make BiH a functional state;
• it should address every dispute in the process of succession in a 
constructive manner and finally give a substantial contribution to 
finding and identifying the missing persons;
• it should stop denying the genocide in Srebrenica and in BiH 
because that is what constantly obstructs the improvement of 
relations;
• it should abandon its strategy based on equating and relativizing 
the responsibility for the war in BiH and, in this regard, promote 
the cooperation between the two Prosecutor’s Offices in accord-
ance with the Agreement signed in January 2013;
• it should drop the indictments brought by the Military Prosecu-
tor’s Office (in 1993) and accept the reality of BiH being an inde-
pendent state, without expecting that its status will change in the 
foreseeable future;
• it should stop spinning threats of ‘Islamist fundamentalism’ all 
the time and address the issue in a more realistic manner. To this 
end, it should stop pursuing the same strategy in Sandžak;
• it should promote its relations with the BiH Federation and bal-
ance its relations with RS;
• it should desist from using the Council for Serbs in the region for 
undermining BiH;
• it should support all initiatives aimed at promoting relations with 
BiH, particularly with young people.
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Serbia Turns Toward EU
The radically changed political scene in the aftermath of the May 2012 
elections hardly affected the country’s foreign policy and its dynamics. 
Hesitant at first, the new regime resumed the course towards EU charted by 
Democratic Party /DS/ despite strong resistance from the then opposition 
Serb Progressive Party /SNS/.
The new regime’s determination for “European policy” was tested 
on its sore point: normalization of relations with Kosovo. EU officials had 
prioritized the only unsettled regional problem over Serbia’s democratic 
transition in accordance with Copenhagen criteria. A fixed date for the be-
ginning of accession negotiations for Serbia was actually and almost solely 
preconditioned by the progress made in Belgrade-Prishtina relationship.
While in opposition, SNS used to strongly criticize DS and its coali-
tion partners for opening the “technical dialogue” with Prishtina. Once 
in power, it claimed, all the agreements reached would be put in the pub-
lic eye – and annulled should they turn to be disadvantageous to Serbia.
However, when it actually came to power SNS overstripped its prede-
cessor in almost no time. It not only confirmed the obligatory character 
of all the agreements reached but also – with EU High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton’ mediation – raised the dialogue to the 
highest level involving the premiers, Ivica Dačić and Hashim Thaci. True, 
in December 2012 Serbia did not obtain the date for accession negotia-
tions from the European Council. This “carrot” was postponed till June 
2013 under the condition that by April 2013 Belgrade and Prishtina found 
a solution that would mark the end of “institutional parallelism” and the 
beginning of Kosovo North’s reintegration into Kosovo’s political system 
and its autonomy of sorts (like the one laid down in the Ahtisaari plan of 
2007).
On April 19, in the dramatic last act of the 10-round negotiations start-
ing in late October 2012 the two premiers initialed the agreement that ac-
tually guarantees Prishtina’s sovereignty in the entire territory of Kosovo 
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and envisages autonomy for the Serb community in the North, in accord-
ance with the Ahtisaari Plan. Normalization of relations with Prishtina 
opened the door to accession negotiations.
Thanks to key international factors’, EU’s and US’, resoluteness not to 
allow Serbia to bye time any more and dodge the things agreed on – all of 
Serbia’s government have been prone to in the past ten years – new vis-
tas were opened to Serbia and Kosovo alike. All of Serbia’s governments 
in the past ten years have been after “freezing” the Kosovo conflict and 
a partition scenario when circumstances permit. Faced with economic-fi-
nancial collapse (Serbia is practically at the verge of bankruptcy)583, the re-
gime was forced to negotiate an alternative status for the Serb community 
in Kosovo.
On the other hand, once compelled to cooperate new leaders secured 
themselves the support of the international community, especially when 
it came to their public statements.584
It goes without saying that international players are fully aware of 
their present-day interlocutors’ CVs, their wartime (and post-war) biogra-
phies and their “merits” for the situation Serbia has found itself in.585 As it 
seems, they decided to maximally play on these Achilles’ heels while sup-
porting them in public in turn.
583  „The slogan ’There is no alternative to Europe’ was replaced 
by the slogan ’Serbia cannot survive without Europe’,” says 
Professor Predrag Simić. Politika, December 28, 2012.
584  In this context, the attitude taken by Jelko Kacin, EU rapporteur for Serbia, is most 
indicative. Known as a consistent critic of the situation in Serbia and positions 
of its leaders, he was among the first applauders to the new administration.
585  Ex-president Tadić said he was sorry for his successors. “I can only imagine the 
manner in which crucial international players address them,” he said, adding, “We had 
democratic legitimacy and this was what they all bore in mind over talks that were 
usually thorny. Representatives of the present regime do not have such legitimacy.” 
RTV B92, March 4, 2013; Answering the question from the audience about “the 
criminal past” of Kosovo leader, Hashim Thaci, US Ambassador to Belgrade Michael 
Kirby said, “All leaders over here are criminals.” Nase Novine, March 13, 2013.
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Disunity among State Leadership
However, Serbia’s “new” foreign policy and diplomatic activity is not 
uniform at all levels of government. Differences are most notable between 
the Premier and the First Vice-Premier on the one hand, and the Presi-
dent on the other. While Premier Dačić and Vice-Premier Vučić are focused 
on the dialogue with Prishtina – for which they score well in EU and US – 
President Nikolić is sticks to the positions of the conservative bloc and re-
lies on Russia and other “anti-American” countries. In late February 2013 
President Nikolić bestowed high decorations on the leaders of these coun-
tries, although most of them are authoritarian and coming from the coun-
tries emerging from the former Soviet Union – from Russian President 
Putin through heads of state of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uz-
bekistan to Venezuela (posthumous decoration). He even took trouble to 
travel to Belarussia in order to pin a medal on its president and European 
“pariah,” Alexander Lukashenko.586 Boško Jakšić, columnist for the Politika 
daily, commented this cynically, “Dačić and Vučić are darting to and fro in 
Washington, Brussels and Berlin. Nikolić is active in Belarussia, Azerbaijan 
and Uzbekistan. While the former two are digging for a date for the begin-
ning of accession negotiations with EU, I expect the later to dispatch the 
second round of thank-offerings to North Korea, Iran, Cuba and Mali.”587
Nikolić’s gesture “against the wind” was nothing unexpected. For in-
stance, his public criticism of Croatian Premier Zoran Milanović while he 
was in visit to Belgrade was a diplomatic scandal of sorts.588 By such be-
havior, said some commentators, Nikolić is pushing himself on the mar-
gins and “turning into a growingly heavier burden, if not an obstacle.”589
586  He pinned a medal on the President of Belarussia on March 12, 2013, when Belgrade 
marked the 10th anniversary of the assassination of Premier Zoran Đinđić.
587  Politika, March 3, 2013.
588  During the two premiers’ meeting in the Serbia Palace, President Nikolić held a 
press conference assembling mostly foreign correspondents. He called Premier 
Milanović’s visit “insincere” and “wrong,” arguing that he /Nikolić/ should have 
first met with his Croatian colleague Josipović. Danas, January 17, 2013.
589  „If Some among You See Zoran Đinđić These Days...,” Danas, March 16–17, 
2013. „Frustrated by the fact that his young protegees shoved him aside 
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Nikolić’s address to the UN session discussing international criminal 
courts on April 10, 2013 only testified of the above. He repeated all the 
negative stereotypes about ICTY and its effects.
Yet another player – former “steroidal” foreign minister, Vuk Jeremić 
– contributes to this diplomatic cacophony. Having banked on Russia, Jer-
emić was elected the president of the UN General Assembly in September 
2012 in lieu of already nominated representative of Latvia. By pleasing 
Russia Jeremić disturbed Serbia’s relations with Baltic states. Latvia is the 
only EU member-state that has not yet ratified the SAA between Serbia 
and EU. Ambitious to resume his influence on domestic scene upon return 
from New York, Jeremić self-promotes his own promotion and pays no 
heed to the consequences of his actions on Serbia’s international position. 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had to apologize for the ceremony 
marking “Serb New Year” Jeremić had organized under the auspices of UN. 
He also initiated the “global discussion” on ICTY effects in UN on April 10, 
2013 (the date of the establishment of the quisling Independent State of 
Croatia in 1941). According to the correspondent for the Washington Post, 
US and EU are dissatisfied with Jeremić for “promoting Serb national pol-
icy” in his capacity as the President of the UN General Assembly.590
Relations with Russia
The date for accession negotiations – the Serbian government’s “top 
priority” since mid-2012 – questioned the country’s relations with Mos-
cow. The new regime had been expected to orient Serbia more towards 
the East and Russia, the more so since Tomislav Nikolić, even before for-
mally sworn in, directed himself towards Moscow to flatter Vladimir Putin 
(“Only you would have won more votes than I in Serbia”).
shortly after his victory over Tadić, and confused by his advisers either 
enamored with Serb Nazism or with Latin American dictators, Nikolić staggers 
and knows not where to go,” quotes the story among other things.
590  A syndicated article in Foreign Policy, reprinted by PR 
Department of Bosniak Congress of North America.
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Considering official Moscow’s obvious self-restraint in commenting 
the intensified dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina, commentators 
and analysts conclude that Serbia has distanced itself from Moscow for the 
sake of European integration. The same conclusion could be drawn from 
a critical remark by Jelena Guskova (usually most welcome in Serbia and 
Republika Srpska) of the Russian Academy of Sciences: Guskova said that 
Belgrade had not asked Kremlin to “be a warrant” of its agreement with 
Prishtina.
Finance Minister Mlađan Dinkić’s statement (March 2013) that Serbia 
would halve the amount of the loans from Russia announced at one bil-
lion USD could also fit into the “cooling off” scenario. The fact that Serbia 
will apply to Russia for a 500-million-USD loan only, testifies that specula-
tions about extremely costly Russian credits were correct (conditions un-
der which these loans were given have never been publicized).
On the other hand, an exclusive story run by Politika – according to 
which Dačić and Vučić visited Moscow at the time Belgrade-Prishtina di-
alogue came to a standstill over future competences of the planned com-
munity of Serb municipalities in Kosovo – contradicts the speculation 
about Serbia’s distancing itself from Kremlin. The paper claimed that the 
visit was “hidden from the public.”591
President Nikolić explained Moscow “marginalization” in Serbia’s for-
eign policy and diplomatic activity by the fact that Belgrade-Prishtina dia-
logue was conducted under the auspices of EU (“The situation would have 
been different had the dialogue been conducted under the auspices of 
UN,” he said.).592
In the finals of Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue when President Nikolić 
telephoned Russian President Putin the “Moscow card” was pulled out of 
a hat again. Then, in early April, Premier Dačić paid a visit to Russia. Rus-
sian Premier Dmitry Medvedev’s statement on the occasion about solving 
of the Kosovo problem being “Serbia’s privilege” sounded more like a re-
buke than support. Ivica Dačić’s explanation about Russia “being very an-
gry for having learned post festum some developments in Serbia’s foreign 
591  Politika, March 23, 2013.
592  TV B92, March 25, 2013.
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policy” (referring to 2010 when Tadić and Catherine Ashton agreed on 
moving the Kosovo issue from UN to EU)593 indicates that Moscow has not 
been kept properly posted on negotiations with Kosovo.
European Standards Neglected
The race for a date for the beginning of accession negotiations with EU 
that overshadows crucial issues of the society’s democratic transformation 
and modernization rather associates “a pageantry of Europeanization.”594
Probably because EU bureaucrats boiled down all their demands from 
Serbia to normalization of relations with Prishtina, the Belgrade admin-
istration shelved all other obligations and prerequisites for EU accession. 
This is testified by the effects of the government’s and the parliament’s 
work on the adjustment of domestic legislation to EU standards. In late 
December 2012 the government published its report on the implementa-
tion of the National Program for EU Integration. According to the report, 
from July 2008 till December 31, 2012 Serbia adjusted 88 percent of its leg-
islation, or adopted 1030 regulations out of 1172.595 The great majority of 
these regulations were adopted at the time of the former government and 
parliament. For instance, in the autumn of 2012 – at the time both the 
new government and the parliament have already been constituted and 
functioning – only 48 regulations out of 94 were adopted. Then, out of 19 
draft laws the government planned for the period October – December 
2012, only four drafts were submitted to parliamentary consideration.596
Implementation of the so-called European laws is even more problem-
atic. Non-governmental organizations – including the Helsinki Committee 
in its annual reports – have been alerting the public to the discrepancy be-
tween the legislation and practice, notably in the domain of human rights 
(Anti-discrimination Act, Law on Councils of National Minorities, etc.).
593  Politika, April 12, 2013.
594  Danas, February 15–16, 2013.
595  Tanjug, Febraury 13, 2013.
596  Danas, February 15–16, 2013.
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In early 2013 citizens witnessed the most dramatic case of the govern-
ment’s indifference to European standards. That was when they learned 
that a much higher level of aflatoxin (dangerous, carcinogen substance) 
than allowed is found in the milk produced and sold throughout Serbia. 
Minister of Agriculture Goran Knežević commented that the regulation 
on the level of aflatoxin in the milk was “passed in the past period at the 
time of Euro-fanaticism.”597 To make things worse the government simply 
changed the regulation allowing ten times higher level of aflatoxin in the 
milk (from 0.05 to 0.5 percent), renounced “Euro-fanaticism” and upheld 
the “argumentation” propagated by the Minister and domestic manufac-
turers and merchandisers. Following a hue and cry about the scandal the 
government – and Vice-Premier Vučić – promised to restore the “European 
level” of aflatoxin in the milk. To all appearances this will not be the case 
in foreseeable future.
When it came to power the incumbent administration was beating the 
big drum for a “reform” of the judiciary reform of its predecessors. EU had 
explicitly asked for it. However, all the government did was to annul the 
decisions on judges that had not been reelected in the first place and de-
pose the President of the Supreme Cassation Court.
Euro-skepticism Spirals
Citizens’ attitude towards Serbia’s relations with EU stands for a para-
dox of sorts. Namely, while the predominant political elites – in power and 
in opposition – have never before been so unison about the strategy for a 
membership of EU, citizens have never been less enthusiastic about it. Ac-
cording to a survey conducted in December 2012, only 41 percent of inter-
viewees supported the country’s accession to EU (in some periods after the 
ouster of Slobodan Milošević even more than 70 percent of citizens shared 
this view and, except for 2012, the percentage has never been lower than 
50). The survey, commissioned by the Governmental Office for European 
597  Ibid.
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Integration, also showed that citizens’ disposition spiraled down 8 percent 
in the period June – December).598
Reasons for the growing Euro-skepticism among citizens of Serbia 
could be many: no doubt that many of them are tired with waiting for a 
ticket to EU and actual membership that might take the long haul (10 years 
at least) and are skeptical of a better life in near future. Besides, there is 
the crisis within EU moving from one country to another – Italy, Spain, 
Greece, Cyprus, etc., and there is the announced referendum on EU mem-
bership in one of the most powerful member-states, Great Britain. Last 
but not least, domestic media have been spinning stories about constantly 
new preconditions to Serbia – a major argument by politicians for long. 
Commenting the fall in Euro-enthusiasm in Serbia, Maja Bobić, secretary 
general of the European Movement, said, “It is discouraging that we – and 
I mean politicians in the first place – haven’t better explained to citizens 
that their idea of a modern and prosperous Serbia was a European Ser-
bia.”599 Analyzing the findings of the above-mentioned survey, Head of the 
Office for European Integration Milan Pajević said that one third of citi-
zens of Serbia (31 percent) opposed accession to EU, while 19 percent of 
them would vote “no” at a referendum on membership.600
To all appearances, the assumption that the intensified dialogue with 
Prishtina – the process leading towards recognition of Kosovo’s realities – 
is among the reasons why Euro-skepticism is on the rise is wrong. Namely, 
another public opinion poll, the one conducted by Ipsos Strategic Mar-
keting, shows that even 63 percent of citizens consider Kosovo an inde-
pendent country and 61 percent take that Premier Ivica Dačić successfully 
negotiates with his counterpart, Hashim Thaci.601
The same could be concluded from the fact that political parties hold-
ing that EU “appropriates” Kosovo from Serbia and that all negotiations 
with Brussels “demanding recognition of Kosovo’s independence” are less 
and less popular. While the ratings of the ruling SNS are on the upward 
598  Ibid.
599  Danas, January 30, 2013.
600  Politika, February 1, 2013.
601  Politika, March 5, 2013.
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curve and those of SPS and United Regions stagnate, extreme anti-Eu-
ropean parties such as Kostunica’s DSS have not profited from the votes 
“lost” to DS.
While some experts in public opinion polls argue that responses by 
interviewees often depend on the manner in which questions are formu-
lated, the fact remains that not a single reliable survey on the issue has 
been conducted in Serbia so far. Coming accession negotiations must have 
“activated” the Serbian society’s traditional resistance to modernization. 
What challenges Serbia are not only two diametrically opposed tendencies 
– for and against Europe – but also its actual capacities for transformation 
and readiness to pursue along this course.
New Foreign Minister
As of the second half of 2012 a new foreign minister, Ivan Mrkić, has 
been in charge of diplomatic activity. Unlike his predecessor (Vuk Jeremić), 
Mrkić is almost “invisible.”602 He rarely addresses the press. Although 
blocking of recognition of Kosovo’s independence is also among his prior-
ities, he acts more discreetly than Jeremić.
A professional diplomat himself, he advocates re-professionalization 
of the Foreign Ministry, especially when it comes to ambassadors. The is-
sue should be regulated under a new legislation on foreign affairs (envis-
aging, say, that at least 60 percent of ambassadors shall come from the 
ranks of professionals).
Only once, with his circular letter to Serbia’s diplomatic-consular mis-
sions he raised the dust. He rebuked heads of missions for having “less 
motive and incentive” since the change of the regime in Belgrade. He re-
minded them that “the task of diplomacy worldwide” was to “affirm key 
decision-makers” no matter of the political option in power.603
602  „I am not a politician. I am here to serve the state and this Ministry. Throughout 
my career I’ve been endeavoring to speak on behalf of Serbia,” he said commenting 
on his and Jeremić’s different approaches to diplomacy. NIN, October 11, 2012.
603  Danas, November 14, 2012.
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Out of a number of ambassadors recalled since his appointment, 
many had already served their terms.
Over his first year in office, the new Foreign Minister took steps to 
improve relations with neighboring countries, especially with Croatia. He 
established continual cooperation with Croatian Foreign Minister Vesna 
Pusić.
European Council
In March 2012 Serbia obtained EU candidacy. For months following 
the May elections Euro-integration processes stalled. It was only near the 
end of 2012 that Serbia moved on – but at its meeting in December 2012 
EU Council of Ministers did not consider this progress good enough to fix a 
date for the beginning of accession negotiations with Serbia.
True, the Belgrade-Prishtina negotiations at the level of prime minis-
ters has been launched in the meantime resulting in major steps forward: 
Belgrade stopped to boycott regional meetings with Kosovo’s participa-
tion; integrated border management was established at the most prob-
lematic border crossing stations, in Jarinje and Brnjak. This is why official 
Belgrade hoped for a more favorable progress report in April 2013, if not 
in December 2012, that would ensure it the date for the beginning of ac-
cession negotiations in June 2013.604
After lengthy discussion in early December 2012 foreign ministers of 
EU member-states decided to assess in spring 2013 whether Serbia had 
fulfilled the conditions for the beginning of accession negotiations. They 
precisely defined what was expected from Serbia in the next six months:
• To ensure the functionality of a single institutional and adminis-
trative setup within Kosovo;
• To continue to implement in good faith all agreements reached;
• To fully respect the provisions of the Energy Community Treaty;
• To find solutions for telecommunications;
604  „Had we not accepted it (integrated border management) we 
would be speaking now about 2014 or 2015,” Premier Dačić told 
the Tanjug News Agency; Politika, December 11, 2012.
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• To ensure irreversible progress towards delivering structures in 
northern Kosovo, which meet the security and justice needs of the 
local population in a transparent and cooperative manner;
• To work together with Kosovo in order to ensure a transparent flow 
of money in support of the Kosovo Serb community;
• To ensure that EULEX is able to implement fully its mandate in the 
north;
Germany
Reporting on the December 2012 ministerial discussion on Serbia in 
Brussels, the Politika daily quoted a diplomatic source claiming these were 
“Germany’s stands from A to Z” and that Germany remained “a hard-lin-
er.”605 The quote only confirms that thesis about “Germany that used to be 
a second fiddle in the Balkans now leads the entire orchestra,” as observer 
of Balkan developments, journalist Tim Judah, put it.606
Serbia’s ex-president, Boris Tadić, was faced with Germany’s position 
during Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit in August 2011. The Chancellor 
made no bones about what Serbia had to do in Kosovo if it was genuinely 
after EU prospects. The point of the message she put across was full recog-
nition of Kosovo’s territorial integrity, implying dismissal of Serb parallel 
institutions in the North.
The new regime was faced with Germany’s position from the very start. 
As the most powerful EU member-state – explicitly sided by the Nether-
lands and Great Britain in the case of Serbia – Germany has a final say 
about Serbia’s progress on its way towards EU; in other words, whether 
or not it deserved to be given a date for accession negotiations at the EU 
summit meeting in June 2013. “Everything happens in Brussels, but de-
cisions are made in Berlin,” as Vice-Premier for European Integration Su-
zana Grubješić put it.607
605  Politika, December 13, 2012.
606  The Economist, reprinted by Politika, March 4, 2013.
607  Danas, February 22, 2013.
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First Vice-Premier Aleksandar Vučić is fully aware of Germany’s crucial 
role. Moreover, as by informal casting, Premier Dačić is the one who com-
municates with Brussels, Vučić communicates with Berlin. (In a TV show, 
boasting about a new language he learned each year, Vučić announced he 
would take a course in German in 2013.).
In February 2013, a large parliamentary delegation, headed by Vučić 
and Grubješić, paid a visit to Berlin. Though emphasizing that “Germans 
want to see Serbia in EU,” their German hosts kept insisting on the pre-
conditions formulated back in August 2011. Addressing the press after the 
visit Vučić said that “tightrope walking” awaited Serbia should it want to 
obtain the date for accession negotiations.608 German parliamentarians in 
visit to Serbia in March 2013 and the delegation leader, Andreas Schocken-
hoff of the CDU-CSU caucus, confirmed their country’s resoluteness in the 
matter: they reiterated the stands their hosts had been presented with in 
September 2012. They actually came to see what progress has been made 
since.
Only should Serbia meet the “seven-point demand” could Germany 
“justify its yes to the beginning of accession negotiations with Serbia.” The 
focus of the agenda is on “an obvious will for a legally bounding normal-
ization of relations with Kosovo” Serbia should demonstrate. “Both sides 
should be in the position to demonstrate such a will before the beginning 
of the negotiations,” commented the Politika daily.609
Germany’s demands include dismissal of parallel institutions in 
Kosovo, reform of the judiciary and the struggle against corruption, re-
gional reconciliation (freed from historical reinterpretations as the one 
about the Srebrenica genocide) and detection and prosecution of persons 
responsible of having torched German Embassy in Belgrade in 2008.
608  Politika, February 23, 2013. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle asked 
Vučić on the occasion to get more involved in the resolution of the Kosovo 
issue as thus demonstrate his support to Premier Dačić. Though stating he 
intended not to „hide behind nice things and let others tackle the bad ones,” 
Vučić said that Dačić was „quite enough” for the dialogue with Prishtina.
609  Politika, March 20, 2013.
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During his visit to Belgrade Schockenhoff pointed to three positive 
developments he called “historically significant:” the dialogue between 
Dačić and Dačić, President Nikolić’s meeting with President of Kosovo At-
ifete Jahjaga and the article Dačić penned for the NIN weekly on the occa-
sion of the 10th anniversary of Zoran Đinđić’s assassination (among other 
things, Dačić wrote, “Ten years of lies that Kosovo belongs to Serbia, the 
Constitution even put in black and white, are of no avail today.”).610
Germany has been Serbia’s most reliable partner ever since the ouster 
of Slobodan Milošević. Apart from the 1.4-billion-Euro grant Serbia got 
from Germany in 2000, 250 German companies with total 20,000 employ-
ees are operating in Serbia – and have invested 1.5 million Euros so far. 
Serbia is on the 16th place on the list of Germany’s foreign trade partners 
(out of 150 countries): the fact is interesting in itself considering Croatia’s 
49th and Montenegro’s 73rd place on the list.
Despite of all, the conservative bloc has been consistently fueling the 
fire of resentment and negative stereotypes about Germany. It has inten-
sified this “anti-propaganda” since 2011 – actually since Angela Merkel’s 
clear-cut message. Its rhetoric rather associates the one of 1990s alluding 
to Germany as the “Fourth Reich.” The media under its control have been 
insisting on Germany’s “brutality” to economically staggering countries 
like Greece, Spain or Cyprus.
People most agile in the anti-German campaign come from the con-
servative intellectual circle, close to Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia 
(Vladeta Janković, Dušan Bataković, etc.).611 According to them, Germany’s 
policy for the Balkans has been the same in 1914, 1991 and 1999. Refer-
ring to this “debris of history,” political analyst Miodrag Radojević says, 
“German planes have bombarded us in two world wars and then again in 
1999. Germany has provoked ex-Yugoslavia’s disintegration by being the 
first to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. Even the visit by Chancellor Merkel 
will be remembered by her ultimatum to Serbia unless it recognized Koso-
vo.”612 And historian Predrag Marković argues, “Germany has not made 
610  Ibid.
611  Emisija „Stav Srbije”, Televizija Prva, 31. mart 2013.
612  „Između Srbije i Nemačke talog istorije”, Politika, 15. april 2013.
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a single gesture of sympathy for Serbia.” He calls Germany’s support to 
countries in the region “humiliating” – he explains it ironically, “We are 
helping you but you are nevertheless angry with us for having disinte-
grated your state.”613 For German journalists, statements as such “revive 
the specters of 1990s” in the relations between Serbia and Germany.614
United States
Philip Reeker, US high foreign service officer, was in Brussels through-
out the Belgrade-Prishtina talks. The Department of State’s “silence pres-
ence” testifies of the major role Washington had, as a “background player,” 
had in the finals of the settlement of the Kosovo issue: Germany and US 
equally press up Serbia to recognize the new reality in the region.
The same as their European counterparts, US officials publicly sup-
port the new administration in Belgrade. This is especially the case when 
it comes to the government that, as Philip Reeker puts it, “demonstrated 
the capability of understanding best prospects for all citizens of Ser-
bia.615 He particularly praises Premier Dačić whose leadership and whose 
ability to “establish working relations with Premier Thaci was worthy of 
admiration.”616
Indicatively, throughout 2012 and in early 2013 Washington-Belgrade 
high level talks were by far more frequent than in final years of Boris Ta-
dić and “his” government’s era. In October 2013 Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton (together with Catherine Ashton) paid a visit to Belgrade, this be-
ing practically her last diplomatic mission. In December 2012 Vice-Pre-
mier Vučić visited Washington and, among others, met with Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta (no defense minister of Serbia before him had such 
a high-level meeting). On the occasion of the National Prayer Breakfast 
2013 Premier Dačić had a brief meeting with the newly appointed Secre-
tary of State John Kerry. Then, at the enthronement ceremony of new Pope 
613  Isto.
614  Isto.
615  „Vođstvo Dačića vredno divljenja”, Filip Riker, za Danas 30–31. mart 2013.
616  Isto.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 356 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 357
357Serbia Turns Toward EU
Francis I on March 18, 2013 President Nikolić met talked to US Vice-Presi-
dent Joseph Biden.
Judging by concurring statements by US officials, US want not only to 
see the Kosovo problem settled but also Serbia on unbending course to 
Europe. During his visit to Washington Aleksandar Vučić gave one of his 
“most European” interviews, saying, “Accession to EU is our main objective 
and the only way to improve the living standards of our citizens and join 
a wider democratic circle. We may be critical about some EU decision but 
this is a criticism of one’s own family…”617
During her farewell visit to Belgrade, Hillary Clinton not only empha-
sized that “Kosovo is an independent state” and that “borders in Europe 
will not change” but also said, “America understands constitutional and 
political restrictions due to which Belgrade authorities wish not to recog-
nize Kosovo.” However, she added, “Many things can be accomplished if 
Serbia and Kosovo work together in mutual interest.”618 She also promised 
US support to Serbia’s accession to EU.
President Nikolić spoke highly of his meeting with Vice-President 
Biden, taking pride in the fact that the meeting lasted longer than en-
visaged by protocol. “The information Washington was getting did not 
correspond to the actual state of affairs in Belgrade-Prishtina relations,” 
commented Nikolić.619 Neither than or later did he detail what it was Wash-
ington had been “kept in the dark” about.
Turkey
Preoccupied with problems in its Middle East neighborhood (Syria, 
Israel, Iran) throughout 2012, Turkey left its influence on the Balkans to a 
“soft power” – TV series that are most popular in Serbia and other coun-
tries in the region.
Ankara followed the change of the regime in Belgrade attentively and 
carefully. Namely, during Boris Tadić presidency Ankara and Belgrade 
617  Politika, December 7, 2012.
618  Danas, October 31, 2012.
619  Politika, March 19, 2013.
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established close communication, especially within the trilateral one, in-
cluding Sarajevo. Besides, Turkey had been involved in the attempted nor-
malization within the Islamic community in Serbia.
Nikolić’s election as president and the government formed on that 
account questioned the continuation of the policy of appeasement and 
cooperation between the two countries. This was the more so since influ-
ential domestic Islamologists (led by Darko Tanasković) had been warning 
against Turkey’s “foreign policy strategy” that was, as they put it, neo-Ot-
toman in the context of the Balkans. Quoting other authorities they have 
been arguing against Turkey’s membership of EU.620 They had been fue-
ling Islamophobia and fear of a “natural alliance” of Turkey, Bosnia-Her-
zegovina and Kosovo. Some had been even claiming that the plan for 
Belgrade-Prishtina normalization had not been developed in Brussels or 
Washington but in – Ankara.621
It turned out, however, that the new regime was rather pragmatic 
when it came to Turkey – looking for its investments in Serbia in the first 
place. In February 2013 Tomislav Nikolić and a large delegation of Serbia’s 
businessmen visited Ankara and Istanbul. They were warmly welcomed by 
Turkey’s President Abdullah Ghul. After a meeting that took place behind 
closed doors, Nikolić and Ghul told a joint press conference that the time 
had come for “Serbia and Turkey to cooperate to the last breath” and an-
nounced Turkey’s “investment boom” in Serbia (President Ghul).622
According to some estimates, Turkey – the biggest economic power 
in the region – has invested less than 100 million Euros in Serbia. At the 
same time it invested 9.5 billion in Rumania, some 4.5 billion in Bulgaria 
and as much as 1.1 billion in Kosovo. The relatively modest economic co-
operation between the two countries amounts to some 200 million Euros 
620  In the book of collected interviews with Darko Tanasković titled “Anatomy of Thought” 
Tanasković, former Ambassador to Turkey and Vatican, claims that Cardinal Ratzinger – 
before elected Pope Benedict XVI – told him that some European politicians’ advocacy 
for Turkey’s membership of EU was an absurdity, almost a “political and historical 
aberration.” Allegedly, Ratzinger also said that Europe could remain Europe only 
should it safeguard its spiritual-cultural, Christian identity. Danas, March 2–3, 2013.
621  Svedok, April 16, 2013.
622  Politika, February 5, 2013.
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 358 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 359
359Serbia Turns Toward EU
per year. Major investments of Turkish businessmen in construction of 
roads, airports and an industrial zone at the Pester Plateau (especially in-
vestments in the Sandžak region) have been announced for years now.
Turkish Ambassador to Belgrade Mehemet Kemal Bosai has also an-
nounced a “new chapter” in bilateral economic relations. Referring to Tur-
key’s investment philosophy of “being in the right place at the right time,” 
he said, “Serbia is the right place and now is the right time.”623 According 
to him, Turkish investors are most interested in infrastructure (Corridor 
10 and Corridor 11, airport in Kraljevo, and energy plants) and transfer of 
technology.
As for the political aspect of Ghul-Nikolić meeting, the two presidents 
agreed to renew trilateral meetings to include Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
announced the first such meeting for May 2013. However, the agreements 
made at the time were seriously questioned later on when Nikolić ad-
dressed the UN General Assembly session on ICTY. What he said on the oc-
casion embittered members of the Bosnian Presidency, Bakir Izetbegović 
and Željko Komšić.
Anti-European Bloc
Though fed on Serbian society’s traditional skepticism toward mo-
dernity, pluralism, democracy and human rights, the anti-European bloc 
practically lost its key political ally in 2012. Having come to power, SNS 
and its leaders, Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić, had to face the dis-
astrous economic situation of the country and – in fear of total collapse 
– managed to “skip over their own shadow.” Commenting on it, the Lon-
don-based Economist wrote that Serbia’s new leaders were behaving dif-
ferently than everyone had expected them before they came to power.624
When it proclaimed that Serbia would pursue the course toward EU, 
SNS formally split with the anti-European bloc leaving DSS as the only 
parliamentary opposition to this policy. Kostunica, DSS leader, advocat-
ing for the end of the movement towards EU is supported by influential 
623  Politika, April 15, 2013.
624  Politika, December 20, 2012.
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intellectual and media circles, non-parliamentary parties (Serb Radical 
Party and Dveri), right-wing organizations and groups and their mentor 
– Serb Orthodox Church /SPC/. All of them taken together, however, are 
not powerful enough as a movement capable of enforcing the end of Bel-
grade-Prishtina dialogue and Serbia’s U-turn to the East and Russia in-
stead of Europe.
President Nikolić’s disputable statements and gestures often act like 
tonic to this part of Serbia’s sociopolitical scene. In final analysis, how-
ever, they generate confusion rather than identify him anew as a political 
leader capable of opening other vistas (other than European) to Serbia. 
For instance, in October 2012 Nikolić told the Večernje Novosti daily, “If 
faced with a choice between Europe and Kosovo, Serbia will give up the 
European course.”625
On the other hand, when in December 2012 Serbia accepted the inte-
grated border management in Kosovo – the act the conservative bloc con-
siders de facto recognition of Kosovo’s independence – Nikolić put across 
quite a different message. Also, under the pressure from “realities” and 
two other key players, Vučić and Dačić, Nikolić waived some major stands 
from the Platform on Kosovo he had penned.
In the eyes of nationalists and “patriots” he was thus disqualified as a 
national leader. Commenting on the new regime of border management, 
Boško Obradović of Dveri said, “The people no longer trust their former 
leader and would go on protest no more if urged by him.”626 “People’s trust 
in a true opposition has to be restored…And their trust could be restored 
only by a united patriotic front, initiated by DSS, SRS and Dveri, and then 
promptly joined by many patriotic organizations, diaspora and intellectu-
als, as well as SPS and SNS voters opposing Serbia’s membership of EU at 
any cost,” he added.627
The anti-European bloc was frustrated throughout the talks be-
tween Belgrade and Prishtina. This was evident in its strong rhetoric and 
625  Politika, October 17, 2012.
626  Politika, December 17, 2012.
627  Ibid.
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defamatory remarks to the new regime, labeling its leaders “traitors” and 
“capitulatants” to ultimatums by Brussels, Berlin and Washington.
The bloc’s strategic goal is to have Serbia back out from European in-
tegration and establish closer ties with Russia. Its criticism of the new 
regime – the same as the former one – for claiming that “there is no al-
ternative to Europe” was now backed by economic argumentation. Experts 
from the Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies (chaired by law profes-
sor Boris Begović) advocates Serbia’s membership of European Economic 
Area /EEA/. They argue that economic advantages of the membership of EEA 
are the same as of EU membership but the former is not preconditioned 
by politics. However, what they sweep under the carpet are the facts that 
EEA has not admitted a new member since 1991 and that some EU mem-
ber-states in its membership would not exactly like to see Serbia in their 
ranks.
The bloc was greatly relieved when Belgrade said ‘no’ to EU in early 
April 2013 – it felt triumphant. Convinced that Belgrade-Prishtina talks 
would come to an end (“Our NO sounds more and more convincing and 
self-assured,” wrote Milorad Vučelić, editor of the Pecat magazine), they 
were looking forward to the same scenario for Serbia’s course towards 
EU. And yet, only ten days later premiers Dačić and Thaci initialed the 
agreement.
The bloc’s rhetoric radicalized. Leader of DSS Vojislav Kostunica said 
the regime had given its consent to the abolishment of the state of Serbia 
in Kosovo, put Serb people at the mercy of Albanian separatists and trade 
off the territory of Kosovo for a worthless date for the beginning of acces-
sion negotiations with EU. “This regime is a statecide as it destroyed Serb 
governmental institutions in Kosovo,” he said.628
Serbs in Kosovo North were also dissatisfied, announcing they would 
reject the agreement and get self-organized. Given that all relevant parties 
– in power and in opposition alike – welcomed the agreement, the grudge 
of the anti-European elites and their followers was kept under the control.
628  Politika, 20. april 2013.
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Conclusions
Despite its many limitations, Serbia’s government pursued the course 
toward EU. European prospects would be irrevocable should Serbia obtain 
a date for accession negotiations with EU in June 2013.
In this context, the government should
• Work on the implementation of everything agreed on in Brussels;
• Focus on the implementation of European values and standards in 
other areas, especially in the administration;
• Speed up reforms, notably the “reform of the reformed” judiciary;
• Contribute to a change in the public discourse about EU and Eu-
ropean values;
• Work towards moral renewal of the society with particular focus on 
the education system;
• Endeavor to renew relations of mutual trust in the region, consid-
erably disturbed during its first year in power;
• Adjust foreign policy to the course towards EU.
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Russian interests in Serbia
Serbia’s diopter often blows up Russia’s interest in it. Moscow’s last foreign 
policy document touches on Serbia only twice. It mentions it once when 
stating that together with Armenia, Uzbekistan, Iran, Cuba and Syria, Ser-
bia is among the countries “the Russian Federation has supported stead-
ily” and, therefore, expects from them “concrete economic compensation, 
including privileged import, investment, transit, etc. regimes in accord-
ance to /each country’s/ international isolation.” It refers to Serbia for 
the second time when suggesting, “Cooperation with Serbia in the do-
main of thermal energy should be activated, primarily in the realization 
of the South Stream construction project and implementation of the Mili-
tary-Technical Agreement.629
And yet, one should not underestimate the significance Moscow at-
taches to its “Serbia-wise position” in the Balkans. Skeptical about EU’s 
integration capacity in the long run and hoping to see EU’s core /around 
Berlin/ crystallize differently, Russia has been cooperating with the coun-
tries of “old Europe” and in parallel focusing on the “problematic rest,” 
Europe’s periphery: the Balkans. It tries its best to be present where it 
should be present – in this periphery – when the expected EU enlargement 
begins. So it endeavors to keep its political, and even more economic, 
standing in Serbia, the country customarily confused about its identity 
and thorn between the tradition and the modernity.
Incapable of coping with modern times, Serbia has been a knotty 
partner to the West and Moscow alike. There have been ups and downs 
in Kremlin’s “success chart” in Belgrade. Russia has dragged on the finan-
cial support Serbia needed badly. Instead of “yet another loan” all Ser-
bia’s governments hoped to get easily from Russia, they got “long-term” 
visions.
According to some observers in the West, “Serbia is the main goal of 
Russia’s policy for the Western Balkans” considering Moscow’s strategy for 
629  NIN, 23. avgust.2012
HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 364 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2008 – SRPSKI” strana 365
364 serbia 2012 : SERBIA AND THE WORLD
hindering democratic transformation in the Balkans and in East Europe.630 
By keeping Serbia away from EU and NATO can safeguard the pivot of its in-
fluence in the region with reliance on the unsettled Kosovo issue.
Russia and Kosovo
Kosovo has been the crucial link in the chain of Serbia’s cooperation 
with Moscow and its plan to undermine and, if possible, prevent its inde-
pendence. As for Russia, a UNSC member-state, tarrying resolution of the 
Kosovo problem and turning it into yet another “frozen conflict” – like 
Pridnestrovie or Karabakh – would ensure its “Balkan role” in the longer 
run. The commentary the Voice of Russia aired on the occasion of the 20th 
anniversary of Republika Srpska – this broadcaster sees as capable of co-
ordinating the process of unification of Serb ethnicity – testifies of the po-
tential “field of action” for Russia in this region:
“…It /Republika Srpska/ is concerned with Serbs in Kosovo, maintains 
close relations with Serbia and helps it /Serbia/ to pull through…The In-
ternational Institute of Middle East and Balkan Studies in Ljubljana takes 
that the Banjaluka-Belgrade-Moscow triangle that will secure safe action 
to Serbs has already been established.”631
Commenting on the significance of Republika Srpska, the Voice of 
Russia continues, “This Serb victory in Bosnia-Herzegovina is worthy of 
respect given Serb losses elsewhere – in Croatia, Kosovo and Montenegro. 
They have strengthened their statehood in Bosnia-Herzegovina only. To-
day’s Serbia is in a deplorable state due to the policies of former govern-
ments: it has lost national compass and feeling of patriotism, it has false 
goals, it is economically devastated and it has an impotent army that be-
haves like a servant rather than a master in its own home. Today, only 
Republika Srpska respects its own people and has become a pivot of Ser-
bhood in the Balkans…Republika Srpska is no longer concerned with its 
survival only but makes plans for a wider platform: it tries to find answers 
630  http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=39920&ćash=b22a66e254427ded96233bfc56e6243a.
631  http://serbian.ruvr.ru/2012_09_28/republika-srpska-kao-faktor-stabilnosti-na-balkanu/.
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to the problems plaguing all Serbs, from Kosovo, through Montenegro to 
Croatia; it plans joint actions for protection of Serbs in the Balkans; it in-
vites all Serbs in the region to unite in a common policy and for a com-
mon goal. Republika Srpska is ready to help Serbia to become stronger 
and more independent…Milorad Dodik works for the protection of the 
Serb people regardless of the countries of their domicile.”632
Moscow and Belgrade established close cooperation on the issue of 
Kosovo. In 2004 and at the request of Vojislav Kostunica cabinet Rus-
sia promised to help Serbia in UN in its campaign against recognition of 
Kosovo independence. Russia’s advocacy for Serbia’s cause implied har-
monized foreign policy steps by the two parties. However, in 2010, during 
Boris Tadić’s presidency, Belgrade eschewed harmonization when it with-
drew its draft Kosovo resolution – emphasizing that “unilateral secession 
cannot be an acceptable method for the resolution of territorial disputes” 
– in UN General Assembly.
Moscow was taken aback. Its relations with the government in Bel-
grade, formed around the “pro-European” Democratic Party, became 
chilly. According to the Voice of Russia, Boris Tadić was the most respon-
sible for such an unexpected turn. “Not a single person in Serbia is una-
ware of all the things Boris Tadić is to blame. Gentle and warmhearted to 
the eye, he was a resolute decision-maker and brought Serbia to the verge 
of destruction, to actual dissolution (Kosovo, Vojvodina, South Serbia),” 
quoted the commentary of the Voice of Russia.633
However, the blow struck against official relations did not disturb the 
relations between Russia and the “mainstream Serbia” represented by na-
tionally oriented political groupings. This “mainstream Serbia” worships 
Putin and despises “traitors” among Belgrade authorities. Even President 
Tomislav Nikolić admitted how thing stand by saying to Putin, “I wouldn’t 
have won the election only if I had Vladimir Putin running for Serbia’s 
presidency.”634
632  http://serbian.ruvr.ru/2012_09_28/republika-srpska-kao-faktor-stabilnosti-na-balkanu/.
633  http://serbian.ruvr.ru/2012_12_22/Promene-na-politićkoj-sceni-Srbije/.
634  http://www.kremlin.ru/news/15447 .
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Alexander Putin – Russian ambassador advocating Russia’s cause with 
missionary fervor but also with sternness of a delegated apparatchik – 
spared no effort to save “close, brotherly relations between two Eastern 
Orthodox nations” when Democratic Party tried to channel Serbia towards 
the West. He was a diplomat who never withheld his criticism of the gov-
ernment he was accredited with. He admonished Belgrade relentlessly as 
if he thought the greater part of Serbia understood him better than its 
own government. He was called “Serb Ambassador to Serbia.”635
In 2009, commenting on the criticism of the Serbia-Russia agreement 
on the sale of NIS (Oil Industry of Serbia) that benefited Russia, Konuzin 
told the press that some members of the Serbian government “opposed 
the development of Russia-Serbia relations.” The Ambassador’s high-
toned question, “Are there any Serbs here?” posed to the participants in 
the panel discussion on security issues in the heart of Belgrade probably 
raised even more controversy. Konuzin was annoyed by the debate focus-
ing on global security and Russia’s pretension in the Balkans rather than 
on barricades at Brnjak and Jarinje border crossing stations in Kosovo 
North.
Before leaving Belgrade (2012) Konuzin said, “I am leaving you closely 
tied to Russia.” This is how he summed up his activities in Belgrade – he 
was satisfied because the Russia-Serbia “train of closeness” was back on 
track.636
Democratic Party, a driving force of the pro-West policy, lost the elec-
tions. Its leader, Boris Tadić, was defeated by Tomislav Nikolić, leader of 
Serb Progressive Party /SNS/, in the presidential race. The newly elected 
President Nikolić and his party are deeply inclined to Russia. The Social-
ists that used to be in coalition with the Democrats joined Progressists af-
ter the elections. Moscow was working and mediating behind the scenes. 
Having visited Moscow, Ivica Dačić, leader of Socialist Party of Serbia /SPS/, 
decided to break up with Tadić and make a coalition with SNS. He had also 
paid a visit to Moscow before his party formed the government with DS in 
635  http://serbian.ruvr.ru/2012_09_17/Aleksandra-Konuzina-za-pocasnog-građanina-Srbije/.
636  Večernje novosti, September 15, 2012.
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2008 and denied Russia’s influence afterwards. But this time he made no 
bones about Moscow’s insistence on a coalition with the Progressists.637
Moscow had many reasons to put across the message Konuzin gave 
voice to – Serbs, you are back on the right course and must be careful now. 
“I would like to wish Serbs to resume trust in their own power; to be in-
spired by the heroes of their history, to get united and build a new Serbia, 
to look after every inch of the territory they have inherited from their an-
cestors…Russia will always be your closest friend,” said Konuzin.638
Asked about his overt “sympathy” for SNS and SPS, and the chances 
for the new government to pursue “the policy that will bring Serbia even 
closer to Russia,” Konuzin explained that he had cherished relations with 
all the parties friendly to Russia. “And such parties make up a great major-
ity over here,” he added. Commenting on the newly formed government, 
Konuzin said, “Judging by what officials of the ruling coalition are saying 
and the steps the Serb leadership is taking now, our two countries will re-
ally become closer to each other and enter a qualitatively new era of bilat-
eral relations.” He confirmed Russia’s interests in the Balkans, explaining 
this by the “dictate of geography and history.”639
New regime and Russia
First steps taken by the new regime in Belgrade testified that the “Rus-
sian course” was restored. In five months of his presidency, Nikolić trave-
led to see Putin twice, before and after Putin’s inauguration. “I am proud 
that I will be presiding over Serbia in a manner that benefits the interests 
of Serbia and Russia,” Nikolić told Putin during their first meeting in May 
2012, shortly after his election. In Moscow the two of them attended the 
congress of United Russia, a sister party of SNS. Russophilia of the Serbian 
President is nothing new. But at the photos with Putin Nikolić seemed to 
be deeply moved. “I thank Russia for its support to Serbia, especially when 
it comes to the safeguard of its sovereignty in Kosovo and Metohija. I am 
637  Danas, September 15–16, 2012.
638  “I Cannot Be More Serb than You,” Vreme, September 13, 2012.
639  Ibid.
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confident that the cooperation between Serbia and Russia would spiral 
in no time. I would like you to know that Serbia is Russia’s partner in the 
Balkans…Serbia loves you. And you deserved this love by the manner you 
rule Russia,” Tomislav Nikolić said to Putin.640
Nikolić did not deny Belgrade’s former pro-European policy; on the 
contrary, he told Putin, “Serbia is on its way towards EU. That’s a long way 
to go, and its final destination is uncertain.” His resolute denial of any po-
litical bargain over Kosovo could have been finally music to Moscow’s ears. 
Nikolić said that to his knowledge EU did not precondition Serbia’s acces-
sion with recognition of Kosovo. “Should it /precondition/, we would not 
accept even at the cost of terminating all negotiations,” he said. Referring 
to NATO he said, “A parliamentary resolution obliges Serbia to military 
neutrality, so Serbia will not join NATO.” “This is what I openly promised 
to citizens of Serbia over the election campaign, and I won the election,” 
he emphasized.”641
On the same occasion Vladimir Putin admitted that he was also think-
ing about Kosovo. “In our view, a UN decision must be carried out, which 
means the Resolution 1244.”642 As he put it, Russia considers Serbia not 
only its traditional but also a major partner in the Balkans. “We consider 
Serbs our spiritual brothers, and that makes the foundation of our bilat-
eral relations, today and tomorrow. Welcome,” said Putin.643
In an interview with Russian “Regnum” news agency Nikolić said 
that Serbia should join EU but not at any cost. “Nothing should be ac-
cepted at any cost. The territory of Kosovo and Metohija is the cost we shall 
never pay,” he said. Asked about the priorities of Serb-Russian coopera-
tion, Nikolić replied, “Economic relations are top priorities.” He also said 
that Serbia could be a “bridge over” EU-Russia cooperation and that Rus-
sia could build hydroelectric power plants in Serbia and cooperate with 
Serbia in the domain of gas production. For its part, as he put it, Ser-
bia can supply Russia with “almost all types of products.” Asked about 
640  http://www.kremlin.ru/news/15447.
641  http://www.kremlin.ru/news/15447
642  Ibid.
643  Ibid.
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his opinion of Euro-Asian union and Serbia’s possible cooperation with 
it, Nikolić said that Belgrade should first “get better informed about the 
principles on which this alliance rests.” However, he added, “Serbia must 
join all economic alliance worldwide, which suit it, especially the alliances 
formed with Russia’s participation.” “But Serbia will not join any military 
alliance.”644
Not everyone in Russia seemed convinced by Serbia’s shift towards 
Russia manifested over this visit. The Voice of Russia reported that partic-
ipants in the round table assembling Russian and other experts in Rus-
sia-Serbia relations debated “whether Belgrade steers towards Russia.”645 
The participants were not exactly impressed by Nikolić’s visit. Over the 
past years Serbia’s strategy followed one course only: the course to Brus-
sels and the West, although it was transmitting SOS to the East, to Russia in 
the first place, whenever it came to Kosovo, concluded the participants.646
“All in all, Serbia was heading towards the West but turning to Russia 
whenever in dire straits. That’s not a candid policy and such a policy did 
no good to Serbia. The time has come for changes. According to all analy-
ses, Russia played a major role in Serbia’s post-election period, and for the 
first time crushed the West’s monopolistic influence on forming of ruling 
coalitions in Serbia. This is evident in intensive communication between 
Belgrade and Moscow over past weeks – from humanitarian aid, through 
security issues and strategic partnership in Serbia’s energetics, to political 
issues. So, we already witness changes but these changes will not be dra-
matic – and probably need not be. It is better to steer Serbia’s strategic 
boat slowly but surely, towards stronger and more intensive cooperation 
with the Russian Federation,” remarked a participant.”647
Addressing the round table Jelena Ponomaryova, expert in Balkanol-
ogy, said, “Are political relations between Serbia and Russia compatible 
with Serbia’s membership of EU? Hardly so. I wouldn’t say Serbia has 
changed and really transformed its course. This is all more about a minor 
644  http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1535250.html#ixž1vuvRmNIJ.
645  http://serbian.ruvr.ru/2012_09_01/Kud-plovi-srpski-brod-prvi-deo/-
646  Ibid.
647  Ibid.
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correction. European clerks are now dictating Serbia’s agenda. After his in-
auguration President Nikolić met with European Commissionaire for En-
largement Fule and the two discussed what it was Serbia should do to be 
treated favorably by EU. And over his meeting with Ashton Nikolić explic-
itly said that Serbia had no future other than EU…And there is yet another 
factor we need to take into consideration: former US ambassador to Ser-
bia, William Montgomery, was the main political adviser to Nikolić during 
the election campaign. Moreover, Americans played an active role in the 
process of formation of the Serbian cabinet. In early July Philip Gordon, 
US deputy secretary of state for Europe and Euro-Asia, paid a visit to Bel-
grade and met with all key players at Serbia’s political scene. All this indi-
cates that the West has been lobbying for itself in the region. In my view, 
Russia should have been more active in Serbia before its government was 
formed – serious agreements are usually made before people are actually 
appointed.”648
She concluded, nevertheless, that Serbia has been and still is Russia’s 
major historical ally. In this context, neither can Serbia distance itself from 
Russia nor the other way round. “I think that Serbia tries to have a poly-
vector policy and that the Russian vector is among the main ones. Bel-
grade will do its best to develop good relations with Russia. But given that 
good is a rather slippery term, we need to see actual acts.”649
The Serbia-Russia summit in May (2012) took place before Putin was 
inaugurated the president for the third time. Nevertheless, Nikolić and 
Putin discussed the avenues for a better cooperation between the two 
countries, especially economic. Putin said that there were many tasks to 
be accomplished in this area, the tasks that were not simple, and added, 
“I hope the cooperation between Serbia and Russia would facilitate not 
only what each of our two country has to do but also the solution to the 
problems facing the leadership of Serbia.” He also said he looked forward 
to forming of Serbia’s new government. And, as he put it, he was satis-
fied with the growth of the trade of goods and services, and the level of 
648  Ibid.
649  Ibid.
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“Russia’s overall investment in Serbia’s economy, totaling one billion and 
400 million US dollars.”650
“All in all, that’s far from being a bad indicator,” concluded Putin, 
adding, “Two years ago we offered Serbia a 200-million-dollar loan and 
are now ready to pay the second, 800-million-dollar installment. This is 
the loan for infrastructural projects. We are ready to support their imple-
mentation. We are waiting for concrete proposals from our partners in 
Serbia, the proposals that will be technically and economically sustaina-
ble. Please, dear Mr. President, give impetus to the work of the newly es-
tablished administrative structures.”651
Nikolić promised that Serbia would submit good project proposals and 
thus realize the Russian loan that had been discussed for several years. “As 
we prepared for the elections we developed many project proposals for 
joint investment with Russia,” said Nikolić, underpinning that Russians 
and Serbs were brotherly nations. “States and nations are usually tied by 
economic interests. But ties between Serbia and Russia exceed by far eco-
nomic interests. A better and a safer life for Russians means a better and 
a safer life for Serbs,’ he said.652
On this occasion Putin invited Nikolić to pay him an official visit after 
his inauguration ceremony – “at any time that suits Nikolić.” Nikolić will 
always be “welcome in Russia.” “Russia’s leadership and general public are 
aware of his attitude towards Russia and appreciate it,”653 said the Russian 
leader. For his part, Nikolić promised that the new government would be 
“tasked with the establishment of a close cooperation with the govern-
ment of Russia without delay.”654
The two presidents met for the second time in Sochi, in September 
2012. They summarized the outcomes of their agreements, the actual ef-
fects of which, as they put it, would be visible only in early 2013.
650  http://www.kremlin.ru/news/15447
651  Ibid.
652  Ibid.
653  Ibid.
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Effectuation of the “Russian policy”
The SNS-SPS coalition government and Premier Ivica Dačić on the one 
hand, and their Russian counterparts on the other, focused on mending 
bilateral relations, the Democrats’ cabinet had impaired. Relations with 
Moscow were restored among governmental priorities. Belgrade stuck to 
the development of a polycentric cooperation – probably contrary to the 
expectations of Russian Balkanology strategists – and Tomislav Nikolić 
said in Rome in the autumn of 2012, “I’ve always wanted Serbia to be a 
bridge between the East and the West. Not using the advantages of such a 
good position would be wrong. We want Serbia to continue its course to-
wards Europe, but it would do it no harm to simultaneously develop eco-
nomic cooperation with the countries outside EU.”655
The general public in Serbia was pleased with the news about resump-
tion of the South Stream project. Newspaper headlines were euphoric – “A 
Big Russian Company Interested in Buying the Smederevo Steelworks and 
the Agreement Is at Hand, Said Ivica Dačić,”656 “A Higher Quota for Steel 
Products Export to Russia Is an Option,”657 or “Serbian and Russian Gov-
ernments Sign a Gas Agreement.” There were also headlines such as “The 
Russian Billion Is at Hand,” “Loans to Be Taken from Creditors Offering 
Best Conditions – Russia and China, Best Creditors so far,”658 “One Billion 
to Serbia – 300 Million This Year and 700 Million in 2013,”659 etc.
“In the previous period we have probably treated Russian investors 
differently. But now we are ready to offer them whatever they want, from 
agriculture to energetics, and under the same conditions as to other inves-
tors,” said a commentary run in the Politika daily. Papers went even more 
euphoric over the announced Serbia-Russia cooperation in the produc-
tion of light armored vehicles and heavy artillery, running banners such 
655  Beta, October 8, 2012.
656  Večernje Novosti, September 27, 2012.
657  Blic, October 1, 2012.
658  Večernje Novosti, October 20, 2012.
659  Večernje Novosti, October 27, 2012.
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as “Building Tanks with Bachuska!”660 “Serbia and Russia to Construct Ar-
mored Vehicles for Africa too!”661 or “Bachuska Brings Good News.”662
Public opinion polls confirmed Russia’s absolute prestige among citi-
zens of Serbia. The “top list of friendly states” did not change when com-
pared with 2011 – Russia topped the list, followed by Greece and China.663
General Leonid Ivashov, demobilized officer in charge of moral-po-
litical education in the Cold War era and close friend of Belgrade-seated 
nationalistic media, paid yet another visit to Serbia. “My advice to Serbs 
is not to rush to EU,” he said. “My advice is that you should first carefully 
examine the case of Greece that used to be more prosperous before join-
ing EU…Serbs must decide for themselves whether they are ready to trade 
the place that is sacred to them. For, trading Kosovo would be the same 
as if we, Russians, decided to bargain our miracle icon of the Virgin Mary. 
Global constellation is changing. The Kosovo problem should be frozen, 
therefore, and all negotiations on its recognition ended immediately…
Russia is getting stronger and stronger, while the entire world is coming 
together to confront the aggressive ideas of US and NATO,” he said.664
All this indicates that Kosovo is the bedrock of the Russia-Serbia pol-
icy (apart from the profit Russia made on Serbia’s energetics and other 
domains of economy). Moscow wanted to test Belgrade’s tenacity in pre-
venting international recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The visit 
Dmitry Rogozin paid to Belgrade in November 2012 should be perceived 
in this context.
Rogozin is a vice-premier of Russia in charge of military industry. His 
visit was formally focused on the military cooperation. However, there was 
a reason more for his visit. “Russia got a reliable and serious partner in 
Serbia’s new authorities. We stand by you, Putin stands by you, and what 
we need is a strong Serbia standing for its interests. We have money to 
invest in your country and are willing to. And I believe we will not have 
660  Večernje Novosti, December 2, 2012.
661  Blic, November 29, 2012.
662  Kurir, November 29, 2012.
663  Danas, October 18, 2012.
664  Pecat, 242/2012.
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a ‘marriage’ of convenience but shall marry for love,” said Rogozin.665 “I 
expect Serbia to become a stronger state once our agreements are imple-
mented, and so much stronger that everyone would have to think twice 
before using arms against it,” he emphasized.666
The talks with Rogozin explored the avenues for production of mili-
tary equipment in the territory of Serbia. The two parties agreed that in 
some segments Serbia was capacitated for the production of arms and mil-
itary machinery for competitive markets. Serbia’s First Vice-Premier Vučić 
said that a new plant would be constructed in Velika Plana by the end of 
the year and would be producing, together with Russia, armed transport-
ers and self-propelled artillery “Nora” for the Army of Serbia and for ex-
port to Kenya and Bangladesh.
Rogozin said the People’s Assembly of Serbia would soon decide to 
send its delegation to the parliamentary assembly of the Collective Secu-
rity Treaty Organization /ODKB/ that would accord Serbia a permanent ob-
server status. The Treaty assembles most of ex-Soviet republics, published 
the Russian Word.667 The Russian Word, the governmental mouthpiece, 
elaborated on what Rogozin had in mind by referring to Kosovo:
“If what Rogozin meant to put across were just such ‘advices’ that 
would have been a geopolitical sensation to say the least. But there was no 
sensation at all. What the Russian Vice-Premier actually had in mind was, 
‘If recognition of Kosovo conditions your accession to EU, you should think 
twice about that condition. This is a brazen condition, but it is upon you to 
accept it or not. As for Russia, it will support any decision you make…The 
advice to Serbia to ‘think twice’ is a subtle message rather than an appeal 
to Serbia to give up Kosovo…His /Rogozin’s/ statements were not populist, 
meant to please some people in Serbia. In an interview with RTS he clearly 
messaged, ‘Let me put it strait – we are close friends but Russia is not your 
lawyer. All we advocate for is justice and the truth, and the truth is that 
Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. In this, we are standing for the inter-
national law…As it seems Rogozin let the Serbian public and authorities 
665  Večernje Novosti, November 29, 2012.
666  Ibid.
667  http://ruskarec.ru/articles/2012/12/13/razmisljanje_o_onom_uslovu_18743.html).
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know that Russia could not exert pressure on Serbia and channel its do-
mestic and foreign policy. Moscow will be forced to orient its activities to-
wards the decisions made by the Serb leadership, whatever they are. By 
this he underpinned what Sergey Lavrov said four years ago, ‘Russian can-
not be more Serbs and Serbs themselves.’ Russia made yet another signal 
to the Serb leadership that obviously tries to keep a foot in both camps: it 
wants Serbia to become an EU member-state without having to recognize 
Kosovo’s independence. Be it as it may, the Serbian government will have 
to make up its mind. No expert could predict the decision it would make. 
It could be said, therefore, that the Russian Vice-Premier’s statement was 
the right one and corresponds to geopolitical realities.”668
The article motivated interpretations by analysts in Belgrade. Profes-
sor Predrag Simić observed that Rogozin had made no bones about what 
Serbia could expect from Russia. “It means that it can expect the South 
Stream and a credit, but cannot expect Nicolai the Second to return from 
the grave and go to war against the West just to save Serbia. The Russia of 
today would never do such a thing. Expectations over here are rather un-
realistic,” said Simić, adding, “The Russian Vice-Premier was quite precise, 
clear and fair in letting Serbian politicians know what their realistic expec-
tations from Russia could be.”669
Historian Dragan Petrović of the Institute of International Relations 
wrote, “For the past four years and a half – ever since the fall of Kos-
tunica’s second cabinet – Russia has been facing the official Belgrade’s 
tactics in the fundamental issue of Kosovo and Metohija…This is why Ro-
gozin had to put across a clear-cut message on the matter.” According to 
Petrović, Russia had expected the new government to make a “political 
breakthrough” and discontinue the policy of the former cabinet but its 
expectation were in vain.670 Predrag Simić also takes that Moscow believes 
Serbia has an alternative to EU, given that Russia works on the establish-
ment of Euro-Asian Union.
668  Ibid.
669  Politika, November 30, 2012.
670  Ibid.
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It remains unclear to what extent did Russia contribute to Serbia’s 
negative answer at the close of the eight round of negotiations with 
Prishtina. Namely, in the past months Belgrade seemed not to consult 
Moscow about the talks with Prishtina. However, in the days preceding the 
decision Tomislav Nikolić phoned President Putin, and only a day after 
Serbia turned down the “Brussels paper” Premier Ivica Dačić paid a visit 
to Russia. Russian Premier Dmitry Medvedev’s statement on the occasion 
– “Solving of the Kosovo problem is Serbia’s privilege” – did not answer 
the dilemma. Ivica Dačić’s explanation about Russia “being very angry for 
having learned post festum some developments in Serbia’s foreign policy” 
(referring to 2010 when Tadić and Catherine Ashton agreed on moving the 
Kosovo issue from UN to EU)671 indicates that Moscow learned about the fi-
nale of the eight round when everything was over.
What Moscow messaged to the Serbian public was its obvious dissat-
isfaction with political effects of the “Russian turnabout” in Serbia’s pol-
icy. Russia is quite realistic about how things stand between Serbia, Russia 
and Russia’s rivals in the West. It did not give up the cooperation with 
Serbia, on the contrary. It did not give up its ambitions in the long run as 
well. But it protected itself from possible surprises in 2013.
Conclusion
The Serbian government needs to define state and national interests 
and, in this context, relations between Serbia and Russia. Russia plays an 
important role in Serbia’s overall political, economic and cultural ties with 
other countries, but this role should in no way place Serbia in a back seat 
when it comes to Russia’s interests, to obstructing NATO enlargement in the 
Western Balkans in the fist place. This would disadvantage Serbia’s position 
in the region and contribute to international distrust in Serbia’s intentions.
Russia’s should play a responsible role considering its strong presence 
in the Balkans, especially in Serbia, Republika Srpska, Montenegro and 
other neighboring countries. The West should not bypass Russia as its part-
ner in the Balkans. This would only fuel Russia’s frustration and backfire on 
the region.
671  Politika, April 12, 2013.
